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## Description The WebSocket routes (`/v1/responses`, `/v1/live`) check the browser `Origin` against `HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS`, falling back to `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS`. A `*` entry in either made every Origin acceptable. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*` is a documented value for CORS (which pages may *read* a response), so loosening CORS for a remote dashboard also let any page open in the user's browser open these sockets, and the proxy then adds its own credentials upstream. `*` now matches nothing in the Origin check. A list that holds only `*` keeps the loopback default; explicit origins in either variable keep working. CORS itself is unchanged. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - `headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py`: `_allowed_ws_origins_from_env` drops `*` entries (empty result means the loopback default); `_is_allowed_websocket_origin` no longer short-circuits to `True` on `*`. `providers/codex/live.py` uses the same helper, so `/v1/live` is covered too. - `tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py`: policy test for `*` via either variable and mixed with an explicit origin, plus a handler test that a foreign Origin is closed with 1008 under `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*`. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text # new tests on origin/main (before the fix) $ pytest tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py -k wildcard FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_websocket_origin_policy_ignores_wildcard[None-*] FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_websocket_origin_policy_ignores_wildcard[*-None] FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_websocket_origin_policy_ignores_wildcard[None-*, https://dash.example.com] FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_handle_openai_responses_ws_closes_foreign_origin_under_wildcard_cors ======================= 4 failed, 43 deselected in 1.33s ======================= # with the fix $ pytest tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py tests/test_codex_live.py ======================= 57 passed, 7 warnings in 16.31s ======================== $ ruff check headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py All checks passed! $ mypy headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py --ignore-missing-imports Success: no issues found in 1 source file ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS, Python 3.12, `headroom proxy --host 127.0.0.1 --no-optimize` started with `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS='*'`, one run on origin/main and one on this branch. - Exact command / steps: open `ws://127.0.0.1:<port>/v1/responses` with the `websockets` client, once with `Origin: https://page.example` and once with `Origin: http://127.0.0.1:<port>`. - Observed result: ```text == origin/main (HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*) Origin=https://page.example -> handshake accepted, socket open Origin=http://127.0.0.1:18941 -> handshake accepted, socket open == this branch (HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*) Origin=https://page.example -> handshake refused HTTP 403 Origin=http://127.0.0.1:18942 -> handshake accepted, socket open ``` - Not tested: `/v1/live` end to end (same helper, covered by the unit tests' shared code path). ## Runtime Rollout Safety - Rollout-managed feature(s): none - Minimum rollout channel: n/a - Stable/default behavior changed: only for operators who set `*` in `HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS` or `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS`. Native clients (Codex, SDKs) send no Origin and are unaffected; loopback pages still connect. - Kill switch / disable path: list the browser origins that need the WebSocket routes explicitly in `HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS`. - Unsafe override required: no - Qualification impact: none - Rollback path: revert this commit ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` — it is generated by release-please from my Conventional Commit PR title (a CI guard enforces this) ## Additional Notes `HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS` is not documented anywhere, so there was no doc to update. A companion PR applies the same Origin rule to the HTTP routes; once both land, `*` is ignored there too because they share `_is_allowed_websocket_origin`. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) <!-- devin-review-badge-begin --> --- <a href="https://app.devin.ai/review/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/4846" target="_blank"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://static.devin.ai/assets/gh-devin-review-dark.svg?v=4"><img src="https://static.devin.ai/assets/gh-devin-review-light.svg?v=4" alt="Devin Review"></picture></a> <!-- devin-review-badge-end --> Reported by @JoaoMarcos44. Thank you for your contribution! 🩵 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
114 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
114 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
"""CORS scoping tests.
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The proxy binds on localhost and serves content endpoints (e.g. ``/v1/retrieve``
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returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs). A wildcard CORS origin combined with
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``allow_credentials=True`` let any web page the user had open read those
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responses via a cross-origin fetch to ``127.0.0.1`` (CWE-346). The default
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policy must allow only loopback origins — on *any* port, since the bound port
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lives in the CLI/uvicorn layer, not in ``ProxyConfig`` — while still offering an
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explicit override for Docker / remote-dashboard deployments. See #863 / #864.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import httpx
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import pytest
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
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def _make_client() -> TestClient:
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config = ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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log_requests=False,
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ccr_inject_tool=False,
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ccr_handle_responses=False,
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ccr_context_tracking=False,
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image_optimize=False,
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)
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return TestClient(create_app(config))
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def _preflight(client: TestClient, origin: str) -> httpx.Response:
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"""Send a CORS preflight; CORSMiddleware answers it directly."""
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return client.options(
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"/v1/messages",
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headers={"Origin": origin, "Access-Control-Request-Method": "POST"},
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"origin",
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[
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"http://localhost:8787",
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"http://127.0.0.1:8787",
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"http://localhost:9000", # non-default port — must still be allowed
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"http://127.0.0.1:54321",
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"https://localhost:8787",
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"http://[::1]:8787", # IPv6 loopback
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"http://localhost", # no explicit port
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],
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)
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def test_loopback_origins_allowed_on_any_port(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, origin: str) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", raising=False)
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resp = _preflight(_make_client(), origin)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == origin
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# The original vulnerability was wildcard + credentials; credentials stay off.
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assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") != "true"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"origin",
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[
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"http://evil.com",
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"https://attacker.example",
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"http://localhost.evil.com", # suffix smuggling
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"http://127.0.0.1.evil.com",
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"http://notlocalhost", # prefix smuggling
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],
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)
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def test_cross_origin_pages_rejected(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, origin: str) -> None:
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monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", raising=False)
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resp = _preflight(_make_client(), origin)
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# A disallowed origin is never echoed back, so the browser blocks the read.
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assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") != origin
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def test_explicit_allowlist_override(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://dash.example.com, http://10.0.0.5:3000")
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client = _make_client()
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allowed = _preflight(client, "https://dash.example.com")
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assert allowed.status_code == 200
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assert allowed.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == "https://dash.example.com"
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# Once an explicit list is set, loopback is no longer implicitly trusted.
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blocked = _preflight(client, "http://localhost:8787")
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assert blocked.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") != "http://localhost:8787"
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def test_wildcard_optback(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS", "*")
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monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS", raising=False)
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client = _make_client()
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# "*" widens which pages may read a response; it does not let a foreign
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# page drive the proxy, so the security gate refuses it before CORS runs.
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foreign = _preflight(client, "http://evil.com")
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assert foreign.status_code == 403
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assert foreign.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") is None
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refused_post = client.post("/v1/messages", content="{}", headers={"Origin": "http://evil.com"})
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assert refused_post.status_code == 403
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# A page the proxy trusts still gets the wildcard answer.
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local = _preflight(client, "http://127.0.0.1:8787")
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assert local.status_code == 200
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assert local.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == "*"
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# Wildcard opt-back must not silently re-enable credentialed reads.
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assert local.headers.get("access-control-allow-credentials") != "true"
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