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2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
d9ae7ad721 fix(proxy): stop a "*" origin setting from waiving the WebSocket Origin check (#4846)
## Description

The WebSocket routes (`/v1/responses`, `/v1/live`) check the browser
`Origin` against `HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS`, falling back to
`HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS`. A `*` entry in either made every Origin
acceptable. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*` is a documented value for CORS
(which pages may *read* a response), so loosening CORS for a remote
dashboard also let any page open in the user's browser open these
sockets, and the proxy then adds its own credentials upstream.

`*` now matches nothing in the Origin check. A list that holds only `*`
keeps the loopback default; explicit origins in either variable keep
working. CORS itself is unchanged.

## Type of Change

- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)

## Changes Made

- `headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py`: `_allowed_ws_origins_from_env`
drops `*` entries (empty result means the loopback default);
`_is_allowed_websocket_origin` no longer short-circuits to `True` on
`*`. `providers/codex/live.py` uses the same helper, so `/v1/live` is
covered too.
- `tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py`: policy test for `*` via either
variable and mixed with an explicit origin, plus a handler test that a
foreign Origin is closed with 1008 under `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*`.

## Testing

- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed

### Test Output

```text
# new tests on origin/main (before the fix)
$ pytest tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py -k wildcard
FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_websocket_origin_policy_ignores_wildcard[None-*]
FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_websocket_origin_policy_ignores_wildcard[*-None]
FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_websocket_origin_policy_ignores_wildcard[None-*, https://dash.example.com]
FAILED tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py::test_handle_openai_responses_ws_closes_foreign_origin_under_wildcard_cors
======================= 4 failed, 43 deselected in 1.33s =======================

# with the fix
$ pytest tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py tests/test_codex_live.py
======================= 57 passed, 7 warnings in 16.31s ========================

$ ruff check headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py tests/test_openai_codex_routing.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```

## Real Behavior Proof

- Environment: macOS, Python 3.12, `headroom proxy --host 127.0.0.1
--no-optimize` started with `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS='*'`, one run on
origin/main and one on this branch.
- Exact command / steps: open `ws://127.0.0.1:<port>/v1/responses` with
the `websockets` client, once with `Origin: https://page.example` and
once with `Origin: http://127.0.0.1:<port>`.
- Observed result:
  ```text
  == origin/main (HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*)
  Origin=https://page.example -> handshake accepted, socket open
  Origin=http://127.0.0.1:18941 -> handshake accepted, socket open
  == this branch (HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*)
  Origin=https://page.example -> handshake refused HTTP 403
  Origin=http://127.0.0.1:18942 -> handshake accepted, socket open
  ```
- Not tested: `/v1/live` end to end (same helper, covered by the unit
tests' shared code path).

## Runtime Rollout Safety

- Rollout-managed feature(s): none
- Minimum rollout channel: n/a
- Stable/default behavior changed: only for operators who set `*` in
`HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS` or `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS`. Native clients (Codex,
SDKs) send no Origin and are unaffected; loopback pages still connect.
- Kill switch / disable path: list the browser origins that need the
WebSocket routes explicitly in `HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS`.
- Unsafe override required: no
- Qualification impact: none
- Rollback path: revert this commit

## Review Readiness

- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review

## Checklist

- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` — it is generated by
release-please from my Conventional Commit PR title (a CI guard enforces
this)

## Additional Notes

`HEADROOM_WS_ORIGINS` is not documented anywhere, so there was no doc to
update. A companion PR applies the same Origin rule to the HTTP routes;
once both land, `*` is ignored there too because they share
`_is_allowed_websocket_origin`.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

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Reported by @JoaoMarcos44. Thank you for your contribution! 🩵

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-11-17 09:48:30 +05:30
Tejas Chopra bd55a426bc fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description

Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.

This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.

Closes #863.

Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".

## Type of Change

- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)

## Changes Made

- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.

## Testing

- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed

### Test Output

```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
    tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
    tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!

$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files

$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
    tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
    tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
    tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```

## Real Behavior Proof

- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)

## Review Readiness

- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review

## Checklist

- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable

## Screenshots (if applicable)

N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".

## Additional Notes

**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**

- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.

Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).

**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00