* feat(auth): implement RFC 0011 Phase 2 workspace authorization Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address PR review feedback on workspace authorization - Docker e2e: add --health-port and switch readiness probe from `openshell status` to `curl /healthz`, fixing a false-positive readiness check in OIDC mode where the CLI exited 0 without actually contacting the gateway - ListWorkspaces: move membership filtering from post-query N+1 lookups into a SQL EXISTS subquery so pagination applies to the visible set, not the global ordering. Add generic list_with_membership to the persistence layer. - Descriptor validator: reject role/scope fields on unauthenticated and sandbox auth modes, and allow-list workspace_role as user/admin and global_role as platform_admin to catch typos at startup Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(server): use authed request in delete telemetry test The workspace authorization added by the Phase 2 auth changes requires a Principal on every delete request. The delete-telemetry test was still using a bare Request::new, so extract_principal failed before the handler could acquire the delete gate, causing a 5-second timeout flake. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address gator review findings for workspace authorization - Inject unauthenticated-local-dev principal in no-auth gateway mode so handlers that call extract_principal() always find one. - Cap label-selector membership query at MAX_PAGE_SIZE instead of u32::MAX to bound the in-memory read. - Authorize workspace membership before resolving workspace existence in all sandbox RPCs to prevent workspace-name enumeration by non-members. - Remove dead_code allow on AuthorizedWorkspace.workspace now that callers use the normalized name from the authz result. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): close workspace-name oracle and label-selector truncation Swap authorize-before-resolve ordering in 27 handlers across provider.rs, service.rs, policy.rs, and workspace.rs to prevent CWE-203 workspace-name enumeration by non-members. Add combined membership+label SQL query (list_with_membership_and_selector) to both persistence backends so ListWorkspaces with label selectors no longer silently drops results beyond the first page of membership matches. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(auth): add non-member rejection and membership+label persistence tests Add comprehensive test coverage for workspace authorization changes: - Non-member rejection tests across all 44 workspace-scoped handlers (sandbox, provider, service, policy, workspace, inference) verifying PERMISSION_DENIED is returned instead of NOT_FOUND to prevent CWE-203 workspace-name oracle - Persistence test for list_with_membership_and_selector verifying SQL-level membership EXISTS + label filtering, multiple predicates, no-match cases, and pagination Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): format merged import line in sandbox tests Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address gator re-review findings on workspace authorization - Fix TUI unconditionally setting providers_v2_enabled after provider refresh; read the actual gateway setting via GetGatewayConfig at startup instead - Fix SQLite json_extract with dotted label keys (e.g. example.com/env) by quoting the key in the JSON path - Add authed_request wrappers to upstream OCI identity tests that were missing a principal after rebase - Add test proving GetGatewayConfig is accessible without Platform Admin - Add test for dotted/prefixed Kubernetes-style label key filtering Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address second gator re-review findings - Loosen GetGatewayConfig from platform_admin to scope-only so workspace users can discover providers_v2_enabled during sandbox creation with inferred-provider commands; update proto descriptor, descriptor validation, and RFC 0011 access table - Add validate_label_selector to handle_list_workspaces and escape single quotes in SQLite json_extract interpolation (CWE-89 defense-in-depth) - Re-fetch providers_v2_enabled after TUI gateway switch so the new gateway's capability is reflected - Add e2e test for workspace user with inferred-provider command - Add persistence test for adversarial label keys with SQL injection attempts - Add handler test for invalid label selector rejection in ListWorkspaces Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address third gator review findings - Cap label selector pairs at 64 (CWE-400) to bound SQLite dynamic SQL - Add SCOPE_ONLY_METHODS allowlist for scope-without-role RPCs (CWE-863) - Normalize ID-based data-plane handlers to return NOT_FOUND for unauthorized sandboxes, closing the cross-workspace oracle (CWE-203) - Fix TUI provider profile cache lookup key mismatch for legacy providers with empty profile_workspace - Add whoami to CLI skill reference command tree - Update TUI skill doc with workspace, provider, and settings coverage - Document scope/workspace orthogonality on GetGatewayConfig proto Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): extend CWE-203 normalization to policy.rs sandbox handlers GetSandboxConfig and GetSandboxLogs in policy.rs had the same fetch-before-authorize pattern that leaked cross-workspace sandbox existence. Promote fetch_and_authorize_sandbox to pub(super) and use it from both sandbox.rs and policy.rs handlers. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(auth): update assertions for CWE-203 sandbox ID normalization Cross-workspace sandbox access via ID-based handlers now returns NOT_FOUND instead of PERMISSION_DENIED to prevent existence inference. Update the unit test and OIDC e2e assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): narrow CWE-203 error mapping and correct whoami output formats Only remap PERMISSION_DENIED to NOT_FOUND in fetch_and_authorize_sandbox and RevokeSshSession, letting INTERNAL and UNAUTHENTICATED propagate as-is. Fix whoami --output format values in cli-reference.md to match the actual CLI (table/json/yaml, not text/json). Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(ci): share network namespace with Keycloak in containerized CI In GitHub Actions job containers, Docker port publishing lands on the host, not inside the job container. Detect this environment and attach Keycloak to the job container's network namespace instead, with hardened defaults (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, loopback-only listener). Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>
OpenShell is the safe, private runtime for autonomous AI agents. It provides sandboxed execution environments that protect your data, credentials, and infrastructure — governed by declarative YAML policies that prevent unauthorized file access, data exfiltration, and uncontrolled network activity.
OpenShell is built agent-first. The project ships with agent skills for everything from gateway troubleshooting to policy generation, and we expect contributors to use them.
Alpha software — single-player mode. OpenShell is proof-of-life: one developer, one environment, one gateway. We are building toward multi-tenant enterprise deployments, but the starting point is getting your own environment up and running. Expect rough edges. Bring your agent.
Quickstart
Prerequisites
- A supported host — Linux, macOS (Apple Silicon), or Windows with WSL 2 (experimental).
- A local runtime — Docker, Podman, or host virtualization enabled for MicroVM-backed sandboxes.
Install
Binary (recommended):
curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/main/install.sh | sh
From PyPI (requires uv):
uv tool install -U openshell
Both methods install the latest stable release by default. To install a specific version, set OPENSHELL_VERSION (binary) or pin the version with uv tool install openshell==<version>. A dev release is also available that tracks the latest commit on main.
Helm chart:
Experimental — the Kubernetes deployment path is under active development. Expect rough edges and breaking changes.
Deploy the OpenShell gateway into a Kubernetes cluster from the OCI chart published to GHCR:
helm install openshell oci://ghcr.io/nvidia/openshell/helm-chart
See deploy/helm/openshell/README.md for available versions, dev tag conventions, and configuration.
For deploying OpenShell on OpenShift, see deploy/helm/openshell/README.md#install-on-openshift.
Create a sandbox
openshell sandbox create -- claude # or opencode, codex, copilot
The sandbox container includes the following tools by default:
| Category | Tools |
|---|---|
| Agent | claude, opencode, codex, copilot |
| Language | python (3.14), node (22) |
| Developer | gh, git, vim, nano |
| Networking | ping, dig, nslookup, nc, traceroute, netstat |
For more details see https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell-Community/tree/main/sandboxes/base.
See network policy in action
Every sandbox starts with minimal outbound access. You open additional access with a short YAML policy that the proxy enforces at the HTTP method and path level, without restarting anything.
# 1. Create a sandbox (starts with minimal outbound access)
openshell sandbox create
# 2. Inside the sandbox — blocked
sandbox$ curl -sS https://api.github.com/zen
curl: (56) Received HTTP code 403 from proxy after CONNECT
# 3. Back on the host — apply a read-only GitHub API policy
sandbox$ exit
openshell policy set demo --policy examples/sandbox-policy-quickstart/policy.yaml --wait
# 4. Reconnect — GET allowed, POST blocked by L7
openshell sandbox connect demo
sandbox$ curl -sS https://api.github.com/zen
Anything added dilutes everything else.
sandbox$ curl -sS -X POST https://api.github.com/repos/octocat/hello-world/issues -d '{"title":"oops"}'
{"error":"policy_denied","detail":"POST /repos/octocat/hello-world/issues not permitted by policy"}
See the full walkthrough or run the automated demo:
bash examples/sandbox-policy-quickstart/demo.sh
How It Works
OpenShell isolates each sandbox in its own container with policy-enforced egress routing. A lightweight gateway coordinates sandbox lifecycle, and every outbound connection is intercepted by the policy engine, which does one of three things:
- Allows — the destination and binary match a policy block.
- Routes for inference — strips caller credentials, injects backend credentials, and forwards to the managed model.
- Denies — blocks the request and logs it.
| Component | Role |
|---|---|
| Gateway | Control-plane API that coordinates sandbox lifecycle and acts as the auth boundary. |
| Sandbox | Isolated runtime with container supervision and policy-enforced egress routing. |
| Policy Engine | Enforces filesystem, network, and process constraints from application layer down to kernel. |
| Privacy Router | Privacy-aware LLM routing that keeps sensitive context on sandbox compute. |
OpenShell runs a gateway control plane that manages sandbox lifecycle through a configured compute driver. Supported compute platforms include Docker, Podman, MicroVM, and Kubernetes.
Protection Layers
OpenShell applies defense in depth across four policy domains:
| Layer | What it protects | When it applies |
|---|---|---|
| Filesystem | Prevents reads/writes outside allowed paths. | Locked at sandbox creation. |
| Network | Blocks unauthorized outbound connections. | Hot-reloadable at runtime. |
| Process | Blocks privilege escalation and dangerous syscalls. | Locked at sandbox creation. |
| Inference | Reroutes model API calls to controlled backends. | Hot-reloadable at runtime. |
Policies are declarative YAML files. Static sections (filesystem, process) are locked at creation; dynamic sections (network, inference) can be hot-reloaded on a running sandbox with openshell policy set.
Providers
Agents need credentials — API keys, tokens, service accounts. OpenShell manages these as providers: named credential bundles that are injected into sandboxes at creation. The CLI auto-discovers credentials for recognized agents (Claude, Codex, OpenCode, Copilot) from your shell environment, or you can create providers explicitly with openshell provider create. Credentials never leak into the sandbox filesystem; they are injected as environment variables at runtime.
GPU Support (Experimental)
Experimental — GPU passthrough works on supported hosts but is under active development. Expect rough edges and breaking changes.
OpenShell can pass host GPUs into sandboxes for local inference, fine-tuning, or any GPU workload. Add --gpu when creating a sandbox:
openshell sandbox create --gpu --from [gpu-enabled-sandbox] -- claude
Docker-backed GPU sandboxes auto-select CDI when available and otherwise fall back to Docker's NVIDIA GPU request path (--gpus all).
Requirements: NVIDIA drivers and the NVIDIA Container Toolkit must be installed on the host. The sandbox image itself must include the appropriate GPU drivers and libraries for your workload — the default base image does not. See the BYOC example for building a custom sandbox image with GPU support.
Supported Agents
| Agent | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | base |
Works out of the box. Provider uses ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. |
| OpenCode | base |
Works out of the box. Provider uses OPENAI_API_KEY or OPENROUTER_API_KEY. |
| Codex | base |
Works out of the box. Provider uses OPENAI_API_KEY. |
| GitHub Copilot CLI | base |
Works out of the box. Provider uses GITHUB_TOKEN or COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN. |
| OpenClaw | NemoClaw | Run OpenClaw more securely inside NVIDIA OpenShell with managed inference using NemoClaw. |
| Hermes Agent | NemoClaw | Run Hermes Agent more securely inside NVIDIA OpenShell with managed inference using NemoClaw. |
| Ollama | Community | Launch with openshell sandbox create --from ollama. |
| Pi | Community | Launch with openshell sandbox create --from pi. |
Key Commands
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
openshell sandbox create -- <agent> |
Create a sandbox and launch an agent. |
openshell sandbox connect [name] |
SSH into a running sandbox. |
openshell sandbox list |
List all sandboxes. |
openshell provider create --type [type] --from-existing |
Create a credential provider from env vars. |
openshell policy set <name> --policy file.yaml |
Apply or update a policy on a running sandbox. |
openshell policy get <name> |
Show the active policy. |
openshell inference set --provider <p> --model <m> |
Configure the inference.local endpoint. |
openshell logs [name] --tail |
Stream sandbox logs. |
openshell term |
Launch the real-time terminal UI for debugging. |
See the full documentation for command guides, tutorials, and reference material.
Terminal UI
OpenShell includes a real-time terminal dashboard for monitoring gateways, sandboxes, and providers — inspired by k9s.
openshell term
The TUI gives you a live, keyboard-driven view of your gateway and sandboxes. Navigate with Tab to switch panels, j/k to move through lists, Enter to select, and : for command mode. Gateway health and sandbox status auto-refresh every two seconds.
Community Sandboxes and BYOC
Use --from to create sandboxes from the OpenShell Community catalog, a local directory, or a container image:
openshell sandbox create --from gemini # community catalog
openshell sandbox create --from ./my-sandbox-dir # local Dockerfile
openshell sandbox create --from registry.io/img:v1 # container image
See the OpenShell Community catalog and the BYOC example for details.
Explore with Your Agent
Clone the repo and point your coding agent at it. The project includes agent skills that can answer questions, walk you through workflows, and diagnose problems — no issue filing required.
git clone https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell.git # or git@github.com:NVIDIA/OpenShell.git
cd OpenShell
# Point your agent here — it will discover the skills in .agents/skills/ automatically
Your agent can load skills for CLI usage (openshell-cli), gateway troubleshooting (debug-openshell-cluster), inference troubleshooting (debug-inference), policy generation (generate-sandbox-policy), and more. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full skills table.
Built With Agents
OpenShell is developed using the same agent-driven workflows it enables. The .agents/skills/ directory contains workflow automation that powers the project's development cycle:
- Spike and build: Investigate a problem with
create-spike, then implement it withbuild-from-issueonce a human approves. - Triage and route: Community issues are assessed with
triage-issue, classified, and routed into the spike-build pipeline. - Security review:
review-security-issueproduces a severity assessment and remediation plan.fix-security-issueimplements it. - Policy authoring:
generate-sandbox-policycreates YAML policies from plain-language requirements or API documentation.
All implementation work is human-gated — agents propose plans, humans approve, agents build. See AGENTS.md for the full workflow chain documentation.
Getting Help
- Questions and discussion: GitHub Discussions
- Bug reports: GitHub Issues — use the bug report template
- Security vulnerabilities: See SECURITY.md — do not use GitHub Issues
- Agent-assisted help: Clone the repo and use the agent skills in
.agents/skills/for self-service diagnostics
Learn More
- Full Documentation — overview, architecture, tutorials, and reference
- Quickstart — detailed install and first sandbox walkthrough
- GitHub Sandbox Tutorial — end-to-end scoped GitHub repo access
- Architecture — detailed architecture docs and design decisions
- Roadmap — planned work and project priorities
- RFC Board — RFC proposals tracked on the OpenShell Roadmap with the
rfclabel - Support Matrix — platforms, versions, and kernel requirements
- Brev Launchable — try OpenShell on cloud compute without local setup
- Agent Instructions — system prompt and workflow documentation for agent contributors
Contributing
OpenShell is built agent-first — your agent is your first collaborator. Before opening issues or submitting code, point your agent at the repo and let it use the skills in .agents/skills/ to investigate, diagnose, and prototype. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full agent skills table, contribution workflow, and development setup.
Telemetry
OpenShell collects anonymous telemetry to help improve the project for developers. This data is not used to track individual user behavior. It helps us understand aggregate usage of sandbox, provider, and policy workflows so we can prioritize product improvements and share usage trends with the community.
Disable telemetry at runtime by setting OPENSHELL_TELEMETRY_ENABLED=false on the gateway deployment. OpenShell propagates this deployment setting into sandbox supervisor environments so sandbox-side telemetry collection is disabled as well.
You can also compile telemetry out entirely. Telemetry support is a default-on telemetry Cargo feature; building with --no-default-features produces binaries that contain no telemetry endpoint, no telemetry HTTP client, and no emission code. Build telemetry-free artifacts with, for example, cargo build --release -p openshell-server --no-default-features (gateway) and the equivalent for openshell-sandbox and openshell-driver-vm. With telemetry compiled out, the gateway emits nothing and reports telemetry disabled to the sandboxes it launches.
Telemetry events are limited to anonymous operational categories and counts, such as sandbox lifecycle outcomes, provider profile buckets, policy decision counts, and aggregate network activity denial categories. OpenShell telemetry does not collect sandbox names or IDs, hostnames, file paths, binary paths, prompts, credentials, provider names, model names, or user content.
Opting out applies only to telemetry emitted by OpenShell. Third-party services, model providers, inference endpoints, agents, or tools that you configure and use with OpenShell may have their own terms and privacy practices.
We publish aggregate usage trends from this telemetry every two weeks. See the community telemetry reports for the latest summary.
Notice and Disclaimer
This software automatically retrieves, accesses or interacts with external materials. Those retrieved materials are not distributed with this software and are governed solely by separate terms, conditions and licenses. You are solely responsible for finding, reviewing and complying with all applicable terms, conditions, and licenses, and for verifying the security, integrity and suitability of any retrieved materials for your specific use case. This software is provided "AS IS", without warranty of any kind. The author makes no representations or warranties regarding any retrieved materials, and assumes no liability for any losses, damages, liabilities or legal consequences from your use or inability to use this software or any retrieved materials. Use this software and the retrieved materials at your own risk.
License
This project is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
