Walk ../../proto recursively instead of maintaining a hard-coded list. Sort paths for deterministic codegen and keep cargo:rerun-if-changed scoped to the proto tree.
Signed-off-by: ddurst <267424412+ddurst-nvidia@users.noreply.github.com>
When no drivers are explicitly configured, the server now automatically
detects the appropriate compute driver by checking the runtime environment:
- Kubernetes: detected via KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST env var (set inside pods)
- Podman: detected by checking if podman binary is available on PATH
- Docker: detected by checking if docker binary is available on PATH
Priority order: Kubernetes → Podman → Docker. VM is never auto-detected
and must be selected explicitly via --drivers vm.
The Auto variant is internal-only and does not serialize to config files.
The default --drivers value is now empty, triggering auto-detection.
Docker's default AppArmor profile blocks mount(2) with MS_SHARED even
when SYS_ADMIN is granted, which prevents ip-netns from creating
network namespaces required for proxy-mode network isolation. The
sandbox enforces its own isolation (seccomp, Landlock, network
namespaces), so the host AppArmor profile provides no meaningful
additional defence inside a container that already holds SYS_ADMIN.
* feat(auth): add OIDC/Keycloak authentication with RBAC
Add OAuth2/OIDC authentication to the gateway server with role-based
access control, CLI login flows, and full deployment plumbing.
Server: JWT validation against configurable OIDC issuer (oidc.rs),
JWKS key caching with TTL and rotation handling, method classification
(unauthenticated/sandbox-secret/dual-auth/bearer), identity extraction
with provider-agnostic Identity type, and RBAC enforcement via
AuthzPolicy with configurable admin/user roles and auth-only mode.
CLI: browser-based Authorization Code + PKCE flow, Client Credentials
flow for CI/automation, token storage with refresh, gateway add/login/
logout commands, OIDC bearer token injection over mTLS transport,
discovery endpoint for auto-configuration.
Security: sandbox-secret scope restriction on UpdateConfig (policy
sync only), anti-spoofing header stripping, dual-auth fallthrough
from sandbox-secret to Bearer token.
Deployment: OIDC config wired through DeployOptions, Docker env vars,
Helm values/templates, HelmChart manifest, cluster-entrypoint.sh, and
bootstrap scripts. Keycloak dev server script with pre-configured
realm (test users, roles, PKCE client, CI client).
Tested with Keycloak. The roles claim path and role names are
configurable to support other OIDC providers.
* feat(auth): add OAuth2 scope-based fine-grained permissions
Add opt-in scope enforcement on top of existing OIDC role-based access
control. When --oidc-scopes-claim is set, the server extracts scopes
from the JWT and checks them per-method against an exhaustive scope map.
Scopes: sandbox:read, sandbox:write, provider:read, provider:write,
config:read, config:write, inference:read, inference:write, and
openshell:all (wildcard). Methods not in the scope map require
openshell:all. Scopes layer on top of roles and cannot escalate
privilege. Auth-only mode (empty role names) still enforces scopes
when enabled.
Server: scopes_claim in OidcConfig, scope extraction from JWT
(space-delimited and JSON array formats), standard OIDC scope
filtering, scope check in AuthzPolicy after role check.
CLI: --oidc-scopes on gateway add/start stored in metadata and
consumed by gateway login, --oidc-scopes-claim on gateway start
forwarded to server, scopes parameter in browser and client
credentials OAuth2 flows with openid deduplication.
Deployment: oidc_scopes_claim wired through DeployOptions, docker.rs,
Helm, bootstrap scripts, and cluster entrypoint.
Keycloak: realm config updated with built-in OIDC scopes and 9
OpenShell client scopes as optional on openshell-cli and openshell:all
as default on openshell-ci.
* fix(auth): address branch review findings
Add GetInferenceBundle to sandbox-secret methods so sandbox inference
route refresh works under OIDC. Make GetSandboxConfig dual-auth so CLI
users can read sandbox settings with Bearer tokens.
Preserve OIDC gateway metadata on restart — a bare gateway start
without --oidc-* flags no longer erases the stored OIDC registration.
Document CI client ID requirement (openshell-ci vs openshell-cli) in
the testing guide. Add security note about auth-only mode blast radius
for GitHub Actions.
* fix(auth): complete review findings for OIDC auth boundary
Move OpenShell/GetSandboxConfig from sandbox-secret-only to dual-auth
so CLI users can read sandbox settings with Bearer tokens while sandbox
supervisors continue using the shared secret.
Add sandbox secret interceptor to the inference bundle fetch path so
GetInferenceBundle works under OIDC-enabled gateways. Extract shared
interceptor constructor to avoid duplication.
Add GetSandboxConfig to the config:read scope map so scope enforcement
applies consistently when scopes are enabled.
Refactor OIDC metadata preservation into apply_oidc_gateway_metadata()
with explicit resume semantics — only preserve existing OIDC metadata
on real resume paths, not on fresh deployments.
Update architecture docs and testing guide to reflect the corrected
method classifications and add new test coverage for interceptor
injection, scope requirements, metadata preservation, and dual-auth
classification.
* refactor(auth): use oauth2 crate for CLI OIDC flows
Replace hand-written PKCE generation, authorization URL construction,
token exchange, client credentials, and token refresh with the oauth2
crate's typed API.
Eliminates sha2, hex, and getrandom dependencies from the CLI. The
custom urlencoded() helper and manual form POST logic are replaced by
BasicClient methods with proper type-state safety.
Discovery and the callback server remain custom since the oauth2 crate
does not provide OIDC discovery or a localhost redirect listener.
* refactor(auth): move server auth modules into auth/ directory
Group oidc.rs, authz.rs, identity.rs, and the auth HTTP endpoints
under src/auth/ module directory. No behavioral changes.
auth/mod.rs — module root, re-exports HTTP router
auth/oidc.rs — JWT validation, JWKS caching, method classification
auth/authz.rs — role and scope authorization policy
auth/identity.rs — provider-agnostic Identity type
auth/http.rs — /auth/connect and /auth/oidc-config endpoints
* fix(auth): use RequestBody auth type for client credentials flow
The oauth2 crate defaults to BasicAuth (HTTP Basic header) but Keycloak
and most OIDC providers expect client_secret_post (credentials in the
request body). Set AuthType::RequestBody explicitly to match the
pre-refactor behavior.
Also re-export Identity, IdentityProvider, and JwksCache from the auth
module so ServerState's public API remains nameable by external consumers.
* fix(auth): forward OPENSHELL_OIDC_SCOPES through cluster bootstrap
Pass --oidc-scopes to gateway start so the metadata includes requested
scopes after cluster bootstrap. Without this, users had to manually
edit metadata.json to set scopes for gateway login.
Usage: OPENSHELL_OIDC_SCOPES="openshell:all" mise run cluster
* test(auth): add OIDC e2e tests for RBAC, scopes, and client credentials
Add 10 end-to-end tests covering OIDC authentication against a live
K3s cluster with Keycloak:
RBAC (5 tests): admin can create providers, user cannot, user can list
sandboxes, unauthenticated requests rejected, health probe works
without auth.
Scopes (4 tests): sandbox-scoped token can list sandboxes but not
providers, openshell:all grants full access, no-scopes token denied.
Client credentials (1 test): CI token via client_credentials grant.
Tests are opt-in via OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC=1 and OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC_SCOPES=1
env vars. They derive the Keycloak URL from gateway metadata to match
the server's configured issuer.
Run with:
OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC=1 OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC_SCOPES=1 \
PYTHONPATH=python uv run pytest e2e/python/oidc/ -v
* fix(docs): fix markdown lint errors in OIDC architecture docs
Add blank lines before lists and fenced code blocks to satisfy
markdownlint MD031 and MD032 rules.
* ci(docker): use prebuilt Rust binaries by default
Flip Docker image builds to consume staged native Rust artifacts, remove in-Docker Rust build stages, and publish per-arch images with a manifest merge.
Add local staging support for prebuilt gateway and sandbox binaries so development image builds continue to work without CI artifacts.
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
* ci(docker): address prebuilt build review feedback
* ci(rust): allow existing vfio complexity
* ci(rust): pin toolchain to 1.95
---------
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
* Adding qemu vm driver support with GPU pass-through
Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
* Add GPU rootfs variant, harden VFIO binding, and fix networking and supervisor reliability issues discovered during GPU VM bring-up.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
* fix(net): catch IPv4-mapped blocked ranges in is_always_blocked_net
The IPv6 branch only checked whether the network address itself mapped
to a blocked IPv4 address. A broader prefix like ::ffff:168.0.0.0/103
has a public network address but spans ::ffff:169.254.0.0, so the old
code accepted it at policy load time while is_always_blocked_ip silently
rejected every connection at runtime.
Add three containment checks for the IPv4-mapped loopback, link-local,
and unspecified representatives. The existing network-address check is
kept because it handles single-host entries (/128) whose network address
is already in a blocked range.
Five new tests cover: single-host loopback and link-local mapped
addresses, broad prefixes that span each blocked range without starting
there, and a public single-host address that must not be blocked.
* fix(net): address clippy warnings in is_always_blocked_net
Use Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST instead of Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1) and
collapse the nested if let / if into is_some_and.
Builds openshell-gateway and openshell-sandbox natively per-arch on the
nv-gha-runners shared CPU pool with a GHA-backed sccache, and uploads
the resulting binaries as artifacts shaped for Dockerfile.images'
BINARY_SOURCE=prebuilt path (added in #945).
Dispatch manually 4-5 times after merge to collect cold + warm numbers
and compare against the Rust portion of docker-build.yml's ARC baseline.
PR 4c will wire these artifacts into the real pipeline once numbers land.
Refs OS-128.
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
The default socket path assumed Linux conventions ($XDG_RUNTIME_DIR or
/run/user/{uid}), which do not exist on macOS. Use the podman machine
socket at $HOME/.local/share/containers/podman/machine/podman.sock
on macOS and show a targeted "podman machine start" hint when missing.
Signed-off-by: Florent Benoit <fbenoit@redhat.com>
Change sandbox user UID from 1000 to 1000660000 in custom image examples and E2E tests.
Using a high UID range (1000000000+) prevents conflicts with host users when running
without user namespace remapping, where container UIDs map directly to host UIDs.
This resolves fork failures caused by RLIMIT_NPROC enforcement when the host user
already has many threads running.
Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>
The docker-cleanup.sh script failed when no containers were running because
grep -v returned exit code 1 on empty input, causing the script to abort
due to set -euo pipefail.
Add || true to the volume detection pipeline so the script succeeds when
there are no running containers (in_use_volumes will be empty, which is
the correct behavior).
Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>
#966 hard-coded `buildkitd-config: /etc/buildkit/buildkitd.toml` inside
the `driver: local` branch of the setup-buildx composite action. The only
caller using that driver is shadow-docker-build.yml, which runs inside
the ghcr.io/nvidia/openshell/ci:latest container — so the host-side
buildkitd.toml was invisible to docker/setup-buildx-action and every
matrix job failed at "Set up buildx".
Revert the hard-coded path and expose it as an opt-in input on the
action (empty default, passed through to both the remote and local
branches). Wire shadow-docker-build.yml to bind-mount /etc/buildkit
into the ci container and pass the path explicitly, so the action can
read the file from inside the container. Remote-driver callers are
unaffected (empty input is a no-op).
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
ddurst-nvidia