* fix(l7): reject ambiguous HTTP framing in REST proxy (SEC-009)
Harden the L7 REST proxy HTTP parser against request smuggling:
- Reject requests containing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding
headers per RFC 7230 Section 3.3.3 (CL/TE ambiguity)
- Replace String::from_utf8_lossy with strict UTF-8 validation to
prevent interpretation gaps with upstream servers
- Reject bare LF line endings (require CRLF per HTTP spec)
- Validate HTTP version string (HTTP/1.0 or HTTP/1.1 only)
* fix(server): harden shell_escape and command construction (SEC-002)
Harden the gRPC exec handler against command injection via the
structured-to-shell-string conversion:
- Reject null bytes and newlines/carriage returns in shell_escape()
- Add input validation in exec_sandbox: reject control characters in
command args, env values, and workdir
- Enforce size limits: max 1024 args, 32 KiB per arg/value, 4 KiB
workdir, 256 KiB total assembled command string
- Change shell_escape and build_remote_exec_command to return Result
so callers must handle validation failures
* fix(server): add command validation at SSH transport boundary (SEC-003)
Add defense-in-depth validation in run_exec_with_russh before sending
the command to the sandbox SSH server:
- Reject null bytes in command string at transport boundary
- Enforce max command length (256 KiB) at transport boundary
- Enhance stream_exec_over_ssh logging with command length, stdin
length, and truncated command preview for audit trail
* fix(sandbox): validate port range and extend loopback check in SSH (SEC-007)
Harden the SSH direct-tcpip channel handler:
- Validate port_to_connect <= 65535 before u32-to-u16 cast to prevent
port truncation (e.g., 65537 becoming port 1)
- Replace string-literal loopback check with is_loopback_host() that
covers the full 127.0.0.0/8 range, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:127.x),
bracketed IPv6, and case-insensitive localhost
- Remove #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)] since the cast is
now proven safe by the preceding range check
* fix(sandbox): sanitize inference error messages returned to sandbox (SEC-008)
Replace verbatim internal error strings in router_error_to_http with
generic messages to prevent information leakage to sandboxed code.
Upstream URLs, internal hostnames, TLS details, and file paths are no
longer exposed. Full error context is still logged server-side at warn
level by the caller for debugging.
* fix(server): block internal IPs in SSH proxy target validation (SEC-006)
Add IP validation in start_single_use_ssh_proxy to prevent SSRF if a
sandbox status record were poisoned:
- Resolve DNS before connecting and validate the resolved IP
- Block loopback (127.0.0.0/8) and link-local (169.254.0.0/16, covers
cloud metadata endpoint) addresses
- Block IPv4-mapped IPv6 variants of the same ranges
- Connect to the validated SocketAddr directly to prevent TOCTOU
- Add debug logging of resolved target IP for audit
* fix(sandbox): add resource limits to chunked body parser (SEC-010)
Harden parse_chunked_body in the inference interception path:
- Replace all unchecked +2 additions with checked_add for consistent
overflow safety across all target architectures
- Add MAX_CHUNKED_BODY (10 MiB) to cap decoded body size
- Add MAX_CHUNK_COUNT (4096) to prevent CPU exhaustion via tiny chunks
- Early-reject chunk sizes larger than remaining buffer space
* fix(cli): double-escape command for SSH path, validate host and name (SEC-004)
Harden doctor_exec against command injection in the SSH remote path:
- Apply shell_escape to inner_cmd in the SSH path so it survives the
double shell interpretation (SSH remote shell + sh -lc). This also
fixes a correctness bug where multi-word commands were silently
broken in the SSH path.
- Add validate_gateway_name to reject shell metacharacters in gateway
names before use in container_name
- Add validate_ssh_host to reject metacharacters in remote_host loaded
from metadata.json
* fix(sandbox): add CIDR breadth warning and control-plane port blocklist (SEC-005)
Defense-in-depth for the allowed_ips feature:
- Log a warning when a CIDR entry has a prefix length < /16, as overly
broad ranges may unintentionally expose control-plane services
- Block K8s API (6443), etcd (2379/2380), and kubelet (10250/10255)
ports unconditionally in resolve_and_check_allowed_ips, even when
the resolved IP matches an allowed_ips entry
* test(e2e): update assertion for sanitized inference error message (SEC-008)
The SEC-008 fix changed the error message from 'no compatible route
for source protocol ...' to 'no compatible inference route available'.
Update the E2E assertion substring to match.
* feat(policy): support host wildcards and multi-port endpoints
Add glob-style host wildcards to endpoints[].host using OPA's
glob.match with "." as delimiter — *.example.com matches a single
DNS label, **.example.com matches across labels. Validation rejects
bare * and requires *. prefix; warns on broad patterns like *.com.
Add repeated uint32 ports field to NetworkEndpoint for multi-port
support. Backwards compatible: existing port scalar is normalized to
ports array. Both the proto-to-JSON and YAML-to-JSON conversion paths
emit a ports array; Rego always references endpoint.ports[_].
Fix OpaEngine::reload() to route through the full preprocessing
pipeline instead of bypassing L7 validation and port normalization.
Closes#359
* fix(policy): reject configs with both port and ports set
---------
Co-authored-by: johntmyers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(sandbox): prevent overread request smuggling in L7 REST parser
The HTTP/1.1 parser used a 1024-byte read buffer that could capture
bytes from a pipelined second request. Those overflow bytes were
forwarded upstream as body overflow without L7 policy evaluation,
enabling request smuggling that bypasses per-request method/path
enforcement.
Replace multi-byte read with byte-at-a-time read_u8 that stops exactly
at the CRLFCRLF header terminator. Add regression test proving two
pipelined requests are parsed independently.
Refs: #350
* fix(server): harden sandbox TLS secret volume permissions to 0400
Kubernetes secret volumes default to 0644, allowing the unprivileged
sandbox user to read the mTLS client private key via the Landlock
baseline /etc read set. A compromised sandbox could use the key to
impersonate the control-plane client.
Set defaultMode to 256 (octal 0400, owner-read only) on both the
default and custom pod template paths. The supervisor reads TLS
materials as root before forking, so this does not affect normal
operation.
Refs: #350
* fix(sandbox): stop using cmdline paths for binary policy matching
/proc/pid/cmdline is fully attacker-controlled (argv[0] can be set to
any string via execve) and had no integrity verification, unlike
exec.path and ancestors which are kernel-managed and get TOFU/SHA256
checks. The Rego policy used cmdline_paths as a grant-access signal,
allowing any sandboxed process to claim the identity of an allowed
binary and bypass network restrictions.
Remove the cmdline exact-match rule and exclude cmdline_paths from the
glob-match rule. Only exec.path and exec.ancestors (from /proc/pid/exe)
are now used for binary identity. cmdline_paths remain in the OPA input
for deny-reason diagnostics only.
Refs: #350
* fix(sandbox): reject symlink and non-dir read_write paths before chown
The supervisor runs as root and calls chown on each read_write path.
Since chown follows symlinks, a malicious container image could place a
symlink (e.g. /sandbox -> /etc/shadow) to trick the supervisor into
transferring ownership of arbitrary files to the sandbox user.
Add symlink_metadata (lstat) check before chown to reject symlinks and
non-directory entries. The TOCTOU window is not exploitable because no
untrusted child process has been forked yet at this point.
Refs: #350
* fix(server): redact provider credentials in gRPC CRUD responses
Provider CRUD RPCs (create, get, list, update) returned full Provider
objects including plaintext credentials (API keys, secrets). Any
authenticated client -- including sandbox workloads running untrusted
code -- could read credentials for all providers.
Add redact_provider_credentials helper that clears the credentials map
before returning. Internal server paths (inference routing, sandbox env
injection) read from the store directly and are unaffected. Update
tests to verify redaction and assert persistence via direct store reads.
Refs: #350
* fix(sandbox): enforce non-root fallback when process user unset
drop_privileges silently returned Ok(()) when both run_as_user and
run_as_group were None, even when running as root. In local/dev mode
policies are loaded from disk without passing through the server-side
ensure_sandbox_process_identity normalization, so child processes could
retain root and all capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN).
When running as root with no process identity configured, fall back to
sandbox:sandbox instead of no-oping. Non-root runtimes are unaffected.
Refs: #350
* fix(sandbox): deny forward proxy for L7-configured endpoints
The forward proxy path only performed L4 (endpoint) and allowed_ips
checks. If an endpoint had L7 rules (method/path restrictions), a
sandboxed process could bypass them by using HTTP_PROXY with plain
http:// requests instead of CONNECT tunneling, since L7 inspection
only runs in the CONNECT path.
Add a guard in handle_forward_proxy that queries the endpoint's L7
config and returns 403 if any L7 rules are present, forcing traffic
through the CONNECT path where per-request inspection happens.
Refs: #350
* test(e2e): add regression test for forward proxy L7 bypass
Verifies that the forward proxy path (plain http:// via HTTP_PROXY)
returns 403 for endpoints with L7 rules configured, preventing
sandboxed processes from bypassing per-request method/path enforcement
by avoiding the CONNECT tunnel.
Refs: #350
* fix: update tests for cmdline path and TLS volume changes
Update OPA tests to verify cmdline_paths no longer grant access
(regression tests for the security fix). Fix formatting in TLS
volume test.
Refs: #350
* test(e2e): update provider e2e tests for credential redaction
Provider CRUD gRPC responses no longer include credential values.
Update three e2e tests to assert credentials are empty in responses.
Provider functionality is verified by existing e2e tests that check
env var injection into sandboxes (which read from the store directly).
Refs: #350
* chore: reformat for Rust 1.94 assert! macro style
* fix(sandbox): make drop_privileges tests root-aware for CI
CI runs as root but has no 'sandbox' user. The security fix correctly
errors when running as root with no process identity and no fallback
user available -- this is the intended behavior (refuse to run as root).
Update tests to expect that error in root-without-sandbox-user
environments instead of unconditionally asserting Ok.
Refs: #350
* fix(sandbox): allow non-directory read_write entries like /dev/null
The symlink guard incorrectly rejected all non-directory entries.
Character devices like /dev/null are legitimate read_write paths
used in sandbox policies. Only reject symlinks, which are the
actual attack vector for the chown privilege escalation.
Refs: #350
Closes#273
Verify inference endpoints synchronously on the server during set/update, expose a --no-verify escape hatch in the CLI and Python helper, and return actionable failures when validation does not pass.
* feat(sandbox): inject host gateway hostAliases into sandbox pods
Sandbox pods running in the k3s cluster cannot resolve host.docker.internal
by default, preventing them from reaching services on the Docker host.
Detect the host gateway IP (default route) in the cluster entrypoint,
thread it through the Helm chart to the gateway server, and inject
hostAliases entries (host.docker.internal, host.openshell.internal)
into every sandbox pod spec. The injection is conditional -- when the
IP is empty (non-Docker deployments), no hostAliases are added.
---------
Co-authored-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com>
* feat(sandbox): add gpu sandbox scheduling support
Allow sandbox creation to request GPU resources explicitly or infer them from GPU image names. This wires GPU intent through bootstrap, validates gateway support, and adds dedicated GPU E2E coverage for follow-up cluster testing.
UpdateProvider RPC was doing full replacement of credentials and config
maps, silently destroying data on partial updates. This changes the
semantics so empty maps preserve existing values, non-empty maps merge
(upsert), and empty-string values delete individual keys. Also makes
provider type immutable after creation and adds field validation on
update.
Closes#199
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
When --provider <name> is passed and no provider with that name exists on
the server, the CLI now checks if the name is a recognized provider type
(e.g. claude, nvidia, github). If it is, the provider is auto-created
from local credentials using the same discovery flow as inferred providers.
If the name is not a recognized type, the CLI returns a clear error
instead of deferring validation to the server.
This eliminates the FailedPrecondition error that occurred when passing
--provider nvidia on a fresh cluster where no providers had been created
yet.
* feat(proxy): support plain HTTP forward proxy for private IP endpoints
Add forward proxy mode to the sandbox proxy so that standard HTTP
libraries (httpx, requests, etc.) work with HTTP_PROXY for plain HTTP
calls to private IP endpoints. Previously, non-CONNECT methods were
unconditionally rejected with 403.
The forward proxy path requires all three conditions to be met:
- OPA policy explicitly allows the destination
- The matched endpoint has allowed_ips configured
- All resolved IPs are RFC 1918 private
This ensures plain HTTP never reaches the public internet while enabling
seamless access to internal services without custom CONNECT tunnel code.
Implementation:
- parse_proxy_uri(): parses absolute-form URIs into components
- rewrite_forward_request(): rewrites to origin-form, strips hop-by-hop
headers, adds Via and Connection: close
- handle_forward_proxy(): full handler with OPA eval, SSRF checks,
private-IP gate, upstream connect, and bidirectional relay
- Updated dispatch in handle_tcp_connection to route non-CONNECT methods
Includes 14 unit tests and 6 E2E tests (FWD-1 through FWD-6).
CONNECT path remains completely untouched.
Closes#155
* fix(proxy): remove InspectForInference match arm removed by #146
The inference routing simplification in #146 reduced NetworkAction to
Allow/Deny, removing InspectForInference. Drop the dead match arm from
handle_forward_proxy.
* fix(sandbox): restore BestEffort as default Landlock compatibility
The Landlock V2 upgrade in #151 changed the default from BestEffort to
HardRequirement. This causes all proxy-mode sandboxes to crash with
Permission denied when the policy omits the landlock field, because the
child process gets locked to only /etc/navigator-tls and /sandbox.
Restore BestEffort as the default so policies without an explicit
landlock field degrade gracefully.
Fixes#161
* fix(sandbox): inject baseline filesystem paths for proxy-mode sandboxes
Proxy-mode sandboxes need baseline filesystem paths (/usr, /lib, /etc,
/app, /var/log read-only; /sandbox, /tmp read-write) for the child
process to function under Landlock. Without these, the child can't exec
binaries, resolve DNS, or load shared libraries.
The supervisor now enriches the policy with these baseline paths at
startup, covering both standalone (file) and gateway (gRPC) modes. For
gateway mode, the enriched policy is synced back so users see the
effective policy via 'nemoclaw sandbox get'.
The gateway validation is relaxed to allow additive filesystem changes
(new paths can be added, existing paths cannot be removed) to support
the supervisor's enrichment sync-back.
Includes 2 E2E tests: BFS-1 (missing filesystem_policy) and BFS-2
(incomplete filesystem_policy).
Fixes#161
* fix(e2e): update assertion for relaxed filesystem validation message
---------
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(policy): add validation layer to reject unsafe sandbox policies
Add policy validation that checks for root process identity, path
traversal sequences, overly broad filesystem paths, and exceeding
filesystem rule limits. Validation runs at three entry points:
disk-loaded YAML policies (fallback to restrictive default on violation),
gRPC CreateSandbox, and gRPC UpdateSandboxPolicy (returns
INVALID_ARGUMENT). Filesystem paths are normalized before storage to
collapse traversal components.
Closes#33
* fix(e2e): correct policy update test to match immutable field behavior
The update policy test was asserting on validation errors for fields
(process, filesystem) that are immutable on live sandboxes. The server
rejects changes to these fields before validation runs. Updated the test
to verify the immutability guard instead.
---------
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
Closes#101
Add pytest-xdist for parallel e2e test execution with configurable
concurrency. Default to 5 workers; override via E2E_PARALLEL env var
(accepts a number or 'auto' for CPU-count matching). Make session-scoped
mock inference route fixtures worker-safe by incorporating the xdist
worker_id into route names and routing hints.
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(policy): consolidate duplicated YAML struct hierarchies into navigator-policy
Closes#96
Merge the Deserialize-only input structs and Serialize-only output structs
into a single set of types in navigator-policy that derive both Serialize
and Deserialize. This eliminates the duplicate PolicyYaml hierarchy in
navigator-cli and fixes three round-trip issues:
- filesystem_policy vs filesystem field name mismatch
- allowed_ips silently dropped on proto-to-YAML conversion
- network policy name field silently dropped on proto-to-YAML conversion
Also adds api_patterns support to the inference YAML schema and switches
network_policies from HashMap to BTreeMap for deterministic output ordering.
* fix(e2e): update non-CONNECT test assertion from 405 to 403
Align test_l4_non_connect_method_rejected with the proxy behavior
change in c06117e which intentionally returns 403 for non-CONNECT
requests.
---------
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
The sandbox SSH server used tokio::spawn fire-and-forget for each stdout/stderr
chunk, which provided no ordering guarantee under tokio's work-stealing scheduler.
Under load, chunks arrived out-of-order, corrupting tar streams during download.
Replace tokio::spawn with runtime.block_on() to ensure each chunk is fully sent
before reading the next. Remove AsyncWriteExt::shutdown() from the SSH proxy's
copy helper to prevent gateways from treating TCP half-close as full-close and
truncating in-flight downloads.
Implement channel_eof handler on the sandbox SSH server to close the child
process stdin when the client signals EOF. Without this, commands like
'cat | tar xf -' used by sync --up would hang waiting for stdin EOF
indefinitely. Add ValueHint::AnyPath to the --up argument for shell completion.
Closes#42
- Change non-CONNECT proxy response from 405 to 403 to align with
how CONNECT denials are surfaced
- Add structured deny logging for non-CONNECT requests with hostname
extraction from absolute-form URIs
- Revise 7 user-facing error messages across proxy.rs and
dev-sandbox-policy.rego to follow consistent principle: generic
policy-deny messages for non-inference requests, descriptive messages
for recognized inference endpoints
- Update E2E test assertion to match new error message
- Update architecture docs to reflect new behavior
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(sandbox): allow egress to private IP space via allowed_ips policy field
Add an allowed_ips field to NetworkEndpoint that accepts CIDR notation and
exact IPs, enabling sandboxes to reach private IP space under policy control
while maintaining SSRF protections for loopback and link-local addresses.
Three modes are supported:
- Default (no allowed_ips): all private IPs blocked (existing behavior)
- Host + allowlist: domain must resolve to an IP in allowed_ips
- Hostless allowlist (no host): any domain allowed if resolved IP matches
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(router): use protocol-aware auth headers for inference proxying
The router always sent `Authorization: Bearer` when proxying to backends,
which breaks Anthropic endpoints that require `x-api-key`. Thread the
source_protocol through to proxy_to_backend and set the appropriate auth
header based on protocol family.
* fix(server): remove noisy inference bundle log
The "serving inference bundle" info log fired every 30s per sandbox on
each route refresh poll. Remove it since there is no equivalent log for
policy serving.
* fix(sandbox): keep inference routing active when cluster bundle is initially empty
In cluster mode, if GetSandboxInferenceBundle returned zero routes at
sandbox startup, build_inference_context() returned None, disabling
inference routing for the sandbox lifetime and preventing
spawn_route_refresh() from starting. Routes created after sandbox
startup were never picked up.
Keep inference interception active with an empty cache in cluster mode
so background refresh can activate routes created later. File-mode
semantics are unchanged.
Closes#78
## What You Can Do
### Live policy updates
Update a running sandbox's network policy without recreating it:
```bash
nav sandbox policy set <sandbox> --policy new-policy.yaml --wait --timeout 60
```
The sandbox hot-reloads the policy within 30s (configurable). On failure, the previous policy stays active (last-known-good).
Idempotent — submitting the same policy twice returns the existing version:
```
✓ Policy version 3 submitted (hash: a1b2c3d4e5f6)
$ nav sandbox policy set test --policy same.yaml
· Policy unchanged (version 3, hash: a1b2c3d4e5f6)
```
### Policy history & inspection
```bash
nav sandbox policy list <sandbox> # version history with status
nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> # current policy metadata
nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> --full # print full policy as YAML
nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> --rev 2 --full # specific revision as YAML
```
### Sandbox logs
Stream logs from both the gateway and sandbox supervisor in one view:
```bash
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> # one-shot, last 2000 lines
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --tail # live streaming
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --source sandbox # supervisor logs only
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --source gateway # gateway logs only
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --level warn # warnings and errors only
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --since 5m # last 5 minutes
nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --tail --source sandbox --level info
```
Each log line is tagged with its source and includes structured fields:
```
[1772055394.673] [sandbox] [INFO ] [navigator_sandbox::proxy] CONNECT action=allow dst_host=api.anthropic.com dst_port=443 policy=claude_code
[1772055061.005] [gateway] [INFO ] [navigator_server::grpc] GetSandboxPolicy served from policy history
```
---
## Implementation
### Proto changes
- 7 new RPCs: `UpdateSandboxPolicy`, `GetSandboxPolicyStatus`, `ListSandboxPolicies`, `ReportPolicyStatus`, `GetSandboxLogs`, `PushSandboxLogs` (client-streaming)
- `SandboxLogLine`: added `source` (gateway/sandbox), `fields` (structured key-value map)
- `WatchSandboxRequest`: added `log_since_ms`, `log_sources`, `log_min_level`
- `GetSandboxLogsRequest`: added `sources`, `min_level`
- `PolicyStatus` enum, `SandboxPolicyRevision` message
- `Sandbox.current_policy_version` field
### Server
- **Policy persistence**: New `sandbox_policies` table (SQLite + Postgres) with per-sandbox monotonic versions, status tracking, and policy hash
- **UpdateSandboxPolicy**: Validates static field immutability (filesystem/landlock/process), network mode consistency (Block↔Proxy), deterministic hash comparison for idempotent updates
- **Lazy backfill**: First `GetSandboxPolicy` call creates version 1 from `spec.policy` for existing sandboxes
- **Log broker**: `TracingLogBus::publish_external()` injects sandbox-pushed logs into the same broadcast channel + tail buffer (2000 lines). Server forces `source="sandbox"` and `sandbox_id` on all pushed logs
- **Source/level filtering**: Applied server-side in both `GetSandboxLogs` and `WatchSandbox` streams
- **Version supersession**: When a new version is loaded, all older pending+loaded versions are marked superseded
### Sandbox
- **`OpaEngine::reload_from_proto()`**: Full `from_proto()` pipeline (L7 validation, access preset expansion) with atomic engine swap. On failure, previous engine untouched (LKG)
- **Policy poll loop**: Background task polls every 30s (configurable via `NAVIGATOR_POLICY_POLL_INTERVAL_SECS`), reports status via `ReportPolicyStatus` RPC
- **`LogPushLayer`**: Tracing layer captures events at INFO+ (configurable via `NAVIGATOR_LOG_PUSH_LEVEL`), sends structured fields via `PushSandboxLogs` client-streaming RPC. Background task batches 50 lines / flushes every 500ms. Best-effort (drops on full channel, never blocks)
- **`CachedNavigatorClient`**: Persistent mTLS channel for both policy polling and log push
### Database migration
- `002_create_sandbox_policies.sql` (SQLite + Postgres)
## Tests
- **Unit**: 8 policy persistence tests (put/get/list/status/supersede/isolation)
- **Integration**: 4 test files updated with new RPC stubs
- **E2E**: `test_live_policy_update_and_logs` — full lifecycle: create → set same (unchanged) → push new → wait for load → verify connectivity → push same (unchanged) → verify history → fetch logs
## Documentation
- `architecture/sandbox.md`: Log streaming architecture, LogPushLayer, push task, server broker, source tagging, structured fields, CLI filtering, failure modes
- `architecture/security-policy.md`: Live update semantics, deterministic hashing, CLI filter flags, policy inspection
- `architecture/plans/issue-78-sandbox-log-streaming.md`: Design plan for log streaming
## Security
- Trust boundary documented: shared mTLS cert model (per-sandbox auth tracked in #80)
- Server forces `source="sandbox"` and `sandbox_id` on pushed logs (can't impersonate gateway or other sandboxes)
- Per-batch line cap (100) prevents flooding
John T. Myers