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Part of #932 (PR 1 of 3). Adds the user-declarable trustBundle data source for SystemInfo volumes (#802) and the end-to-end proof that the projected anchors work against the MITM egress gateway. Live refresh for running actors (PR 2) and auto-injection (PR 3) come separately. What this adds A SystemInfo volume data source that projects the trust anchors of a named trust bundle to a PEM file: volumes: - name: trust systemInfo: dataSources: - trustBundle: name: egress-mitm.ate.dev path: egress-ca.pem Inspired by the Kubernetes clusterTrustBundle projected volume source, but source-neutral: the template names a bundle; where it's fetched from is a deployment concern, not part of the API. Design points - Resolution lives on the node. The wire carries only {name, path}; atelet resolves the name at write time through an informer-backed lister on ClusterTrustBundles and writes the sanitized PEM with the temp+rename discipline from #803 (find-paths safe). Contents refresh on every Run/Restore. ateapi is not involved, per review discussion — the same informer is what live refresh (PR 2) will hang off. - Allowlist in atelet, not the CRD schema. Today only egress-mitm.ate.dev (the egress gateway CA bundle, #823), mapped to the ClusterTrustBundle that atecontroller's EgressMITMTrustReconciler (#946) derives from the egress-mitm-ca-pool Secret. The signer-linked object name stays a backend detail; the future backend registry (#932) widens the allowlist without an API change. - The watch is scoped to the one backing object via a metadata.name field selector — this informer runs on every node, so an unfiltered watch would fan every ClusterTrustBundle in the cluster out to every atelet. RBAC can't express this (resourceNames doesn't apply to list/watch), so the field selector is the enforcement point. get/list/watch on clustertrustbundles moves to the atelet ClusterRole. - No availability probe. The informer registers unconditionally; a cluster that doesn't serve the feature-gated certificates.k8s.io/v1beta1 blocks atelet startup at cache sync, with the reflector errors naming the missing API (hack/create-kind-cluster.sh enables the gate). - Fail-closed. Unknown names, missing bundles, and unusable bundles fail actor start naming the bundle — an actor that declared a trust bundle must not start without one. - Kubelet-parity sanitization (internal/pemutil): CERTIFICATE blocks only, deduplicated, headers stripped, and anchors deliberately shuffled so consumers can't grow a dependence on order. - Schema note: dataSources MaxItems tightened 32→8 while adding the trustBundle member. Vacuous in practice (the old schema couldn't admit more than one entry), but flagged since it's ratchet-shaped. E2E — delivery and consumption Delivery (identity suite, both sandbox classes): provisions the egress-mitm-ca-pool Secret and drives the real #946 reconciler (writing the bundle directly isn't possible — the reconciler reverts hand-edits), asserts the projected file byte-exact, then rotates the pool across a suspend/resume to prove refresh-on-restore. Since the probe fixture is shared and fail-closed, e2e.DeployProbe itself ensures the bundle exists for whatever suite deploys it. Consumption (new egressmitm suite, both sandbox classes): deploys the sdsmint (MITM) egress gateway and proves an actor completes a TLS handshake with the gateway's per-SNI minted leaf using ONLY the projected anchors — plus a system-roots negative control that must fail. The pair is unambiguous in both directions: the positive can't pass under passthrough (the bundle holds no public CAs), and the negative can't fail under passthrough. CI: two steps appended to the existing e2e job after the standard lanes (the gateway swap is cluster-wide and breaks passthrough assumptions): --deploy-atenet --experimental-use-sdsmint redeploys only the atenet components, then the egressmitm suite runs once per sandbox class. Flake mitigation: the probe fixture pool drops from 3 workers to 2. Each suite deploys its own copy and drives one actor at a time, so the third worker per copy was idle memory multiplied across suites on the one-node CI cluster — pressure that has been killing sandboxes mid-test (runsc: signal: killed, a vanished ateom socket) on this PR and on main's identity suite. This reduces the pressure; right-sizing e2e concurrency or worker-pod QoS cluster-wide is follow-up material. Not in this PR - Live refresh for running actors (#932 PR 2) — until then, a running actor's file is the bundle as of its last Run/Restore, and correctness rests on overlap rotation by the bundle publisher. - Auto-injection of the egress trust volume (#932 PR 3). - Configurable backend registry (#932) — the allowlist is the seam it will replace.
71 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
71 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Google LLC
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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// Package pemutil sanitizes PEM certificate bundles for projection into
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// actors, the way kubelet does for clusterTrustBundle projected volumes.
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package pemutil
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import (
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"math/rand/v2"
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"sort"
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)
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// SanitizeCertificateBundle re-encodes a PEM bundle keeping only CERTIFICATE
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// blocks, with block headers stripped and exact duplicates (by DER bytes)
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// removed. It returns an error if the input contains no CERTIFICATE blocks
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// at all — an empty trust bundle is never what a workload should silently
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// receive.
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//
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// The anchors are deliberately shuffled, as in kubelet's clustertrustbundle
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// manager: order carries no meaning, and a scrambled order keeps consumers
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// from growing a dependence on it.
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func SanitizeCertificateBundle(in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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seen := map[string]bool{}
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var ders []string
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rest := in
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for {
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var block *pem.Block
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block, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
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if block == nil {
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break
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}
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if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
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continue
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}
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der := string(block.Bytes)
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if seen[der] {
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continue
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}
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seen[der] = true
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ders = append(ders, der)
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}
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if len(ders) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("bundle contains no CERTIFICATE PEM blocks")
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}
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// Sort first so the shuffle's input is independent of source order.
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sort.Strings(ders)
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rand.Shuffle(len(ders), func(i, j int) {
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ders[i], ders[j] = ders[j], ders[i]
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})
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var out []byte
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for _, der := range ders {
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out = append(out, pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: []byte(der)})...)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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