The router used to rewrite :authority to the actor's worker pod IP and let
the dynamic_forward_proxy cluster resolve it, reaching the actor over
plaintext pod-IP:80. The worker no longer DNATs pod-IP:80 to the actor, so
that path is gone.
Instead the ext_proc resolves the actor to its worker's atunnel ingress
address (IP:443) and puts it in x-ate-original-dst. An ORIGINAL_DST cluster
dials exactly that address, which leaves the request Host as the actor DNS
name -- atunnel needs it to authorize the active actor. The header is set
with OVERWRITE_IF_EXISTS_OR_ADD so a client-supplied value can never
influence the address Envoy dials.
The upstream hop is mTLS: the cluster presents the router's podidentity
credential bundle as its client cert and validates the atunnel server
against the podidentity trust bundle. Validation matches the SPIFFE URI SAN
prefix rather than the dialed pod IP, because the atunnel cert carries only
a spiffe:// URI SAN and Envoy's default SAN check against an ephemeral pod
IP would never match. atunnel in turn only accepts
spiffe://cluster.local/ns/ate-system/sa/atenet-router.
The dynamic_forward_proxy cluster, HTTP filter and DNS cache config are
removed along with the :authority rewrite.
The weekly govulncheck run on main is failing:
[GO-2026-6061](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6061) (vulnerabilities in
the xDS RBAC engine and the HTTP/2 transport server) in
google.golang.org/grpc v1.81.0.
Bump grpc to the fixed v1.82.
Keith Mattix II