Adds a temporary converter that allows each Actor workflow to use the
substrate resource rather than CRD, to prevent regression while we are
in the parallel state.
* Allows each workflow to use the ActorTemplate substrate proto under
the hood, in preparation for the full cut over, e2e tests start testing
the new code path.
* Changes any functions that consumes the ActorTemplate CRD to use the
substrate proto instead.
* The converter will be deleted once we fully cutover to the substrate
resource.
Per-container CPU and memory limits for micro-VM actors. First slice of
#752.
An `ActorTemplate` container can cap its own cpu and memory so it cannot
starve or kill its siblings in the same actor. A container that exceeds
its memory limit is OOM-killed on its own; the rest of the actor is
unaffected.
```yaml
sandboxClass: microvm
containers:
- name: trainer
resources:
limits: {memory: 1500Mi}
- name: sidecar
resources:
limits: {memory: 256Mi, cpu: "0.2"}
```
#752 asks for per-container device selection as well. This PR does the
cpu and memory half; devices are the remaining half, and when they land,
GPU assignment should follow the same field rather than staying
actor-wide as it is today.
## Why micro-VM only
The two sandbox classes support opposite halves of #752. Micro-VM actors
have a real guest kernel, so each container gets its own cgroup and the
limits bind. gVisor applies cgroup limits at the sandbox level: one
sentry backs every container in the actor, so a per-container cgroup is
created and then stays empty (google/gvisor#190). Measured on a running
actor, the workload container's cgroup reported `memory.current=0` while
all 20 sandbox processes sat in the pause leaf. A template that sets
`resources` with `sandboxClass: gvisor` is rejected at admission.
## How a limit travels
`ActorTemplate` → CEL validation → `ate-api-server` resolves each
`resource.Quantity` once → `ateletpb` → atelet writes OCI
`linux.resources` → `ateom-microvm` merges kata's defaults and checks
the guest envelope → `SpecToAgentPB` → kata agent → guest cgroup.
The limit is carried as a standard OCI field rather than a
substrate-private concept, so a runtime that gains per-container
enforcement picks it up without new plumbing.
## Composition with #679#679 sizes the sandbox itself from `ActorTemplate.spec.resources`: guest
RAM and vCPUs for a micro-VM, the sentry for gVisor. This PR subdivides
that sandbox. The two are different fields and complementary layers.
They collided in one place. #679 applied the actor-level size to
**every** container's OCI spec, overwriting the per-container limits
atelet writes into the same field, so a container asking for 64Mi
silently received the whole guest. This PR removes that call on the
micro-VM path. A container now gets a cgroup limit only when it declares
one; an undeclared container is bounded by guest RAM, which is the real
ceiling. On micro-VM the stamp never reached the guest at all:
`SpecToAgentPB` carried neither `Memory` nor `CPU.Quota`, so it stopped
at the bundle's `config.json`. Running the pre-PR pipeline shows
`Quota=50000 Memory=2Gi` on disk arriving as `Quota=0 Memory=<nil>` on
the wire.
gVisor is untouched. There the actor-level size is applied to the
`pause` container, and since one sentry backs every container, that is
the only cgroup that binds.
Two consequences worth calling out for reviewers of #679:
- The `sizing.SandboxSize` threaded into `buildActorContainers` and
`ensureKataCompatibleSpec` had no remaining reader, so it and the
`guestSize` helper are removed. `resolveGuestMemMiB` still sizes the VM
and still rejects a declared limit too small to boot.
- `internal/sizing`'s package doc claimed both runtimes shared
`ApplyToOCISpec` for container cgroups. That is now gVisor-only, and the
comments say so. No code in that file changed.
`checkResourceEnvelope` runs after `resolveGuestMemMiB`, so it validates
the per-container sum against the post-reserve guest rather than the
SandboxConfig default. Its error now names
`spec.resources.limits.memory` (or `.cpu`) when the actor declared a
size, and `SandboxConfig` when it did not.
`internal/e2e/suites/sizing` is unaffected: it asserts on `num_cpu` and
`mem_total_bytes`, both of which come from VM sizing, and only logs the
cgroup files.
## Verified on hardware
Same template, run twice, one commit apart on a micro-VM actor:
| | before | after |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `hog_ovl/memory.max` | `max` | `67108864` (the declared 64Mi) |
| `bystander_ovl/memory.max` | `max` | `max` |
| hog allocates 128MB | survived | OOM-killed |
| bystander | alive | alive |
The bug in between: `SpecToAgentPB` converted only `Devices` and
`CPU.Shares` out of `Linux.Resources`, so a memory limit reached the
bundle's `config.json` and was dropped on the way to the agent. Every
unit test passed and the on-disk spec was correct while the feature did
nothing.
## Notes for review
- `ContainerResources` deliberately does not reuse
`corev1.ResourceRequirements`, which also carries `requests` and
`claims`. There is no scheduler inside an actor to hint at, and for
memory a soft request cannot express "must have this much to come back
at all". #679 reached the same conclusion from the other direction and
now rejects `spec.resources.requests` and `.claims` at admission.
- `Limits` is a bounded named type. A `MaxProperties` marker on the
field lands at the wrong schema level for a named map, and without a
bound the CEL cost estimator rejects the whole schema. This CRD is close
to its schema-wide CEL cost ceiling; a rule that iterates containers and
parses quantities exceeds it by more than 100x and takes the existing
rules down with it.
- A cpu limit below `10m` is raised to `10m`: the kernel rejects a CFS
quota under 1ms.
- `SpecToAgentPB` drops a non-positive quota and a zero period rather
than forwarding them. A non-positive quota means unlimited in OCI but
was sent as a literal zero, which the guest applies as no CPU at all; a
non-nil zero period overwrote the CFS default set for a live quota. Both
now read a spec the way `cpuLimitMillis` does, so the envelope check and
the conversion agree on the same input.
- `mergeKataResources` fills the gaps kata's defaults cover rather than
allowlisting known fields, so a field it does not recognise survives the
merge. That holds only as far as the merge: `SpecToAgentPB` converts
`Devices`, `Memory` and `CPU` only, so `Pids`, `BlockIO`,
`HugepageLimits` and `Network` stop at the ttrpc boundary. Nothing sets
them today.
## Known gaps
- An OOM-killed container is not reported above the guest. The actor
stays `STATUS_RUNNING` and nothing records which container died. Raised
on #550. Note that #961 settled workload stats at the sandbox level and
deliberately does not attribute per container, so surfacing which
container died needs a separate signal: the guest cgroup's
`memory.events`, not the stats path.
- A container's writable rootfs is a guest tmpfs, so filesystem writes
are charged to its memory limit and a container writing more than its
limit to `/tmp` is OOM-killed. Documented in `api-guide.md`; separating
the two budgets needs an `ephemeral-storage` field.
- Over-subscription across containers is caught when the actor starts,
not at apply time. An admission-time sum check is not implementable
within the CEL cost budget.
- The atelet hop that attaches resources to the bundle spec has no test:
replacing `ctr.GetResources()` with `nil` leaves the whole suite green.
Closing it needs an imagecache fixture for `prepareOCIDirectory`.
- Restored actors inherit the golden's cgroups rather than applying
their own spec. Correct today only because `ActorTemplateSpec` is
immutable.
- The GPU section of `api-guide.md` still says `ActorTemplate` has no
per-container resource fields, which this PR makes false. Correcting it
is left to the devices half of #752, which is what will change the GPU
behaviour that paragraph describes.
---
- [x] Tests pass
- [x] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR
---------
Signed-off-by: Eliran Wolff <eliranw@nvidia.com>
Part of #932 (PR 1 of 3). Adds the user-declarable trustBundle data
source for SystemInfo volumes (#802) and the end-to-end proof that the
projected anchors work against the MITM egress gateway. Live refresh for
running actors (PR 2) and auto-injection (PR 3) come separately.
What this adds
A SystemInfo volume data source that projects the trust anchors of a
named trust bundle to a PEM file:
volumes:
- name: trust
systemInfo:
dataSources:
- trustBundle:
name: egress-mitm.ate.dev
path: egress-ca.pem
Inspired by the Kubernetes clusterTrustBundle projected volume source,
but source-neutral: the template names a bundle; where it's fetched from
is a deployment concern, not part of the API.
Design points
- Resolution lives on the node. The wire carries only {name, path};
atelet resolves the name at write time through an informer-backed lister
on ClusterTrustBundles and writes the sanitized PEM with the temp+rename
discipline from #803 (find-paths safe). Contents refresh on every
Run/Restore. ateapi is not involved, per review discussion — the same
informer is what live refresh (PR 2) will hang off.
- Allowlist in atelet, not the CRD schema. Today only
egress-mitm.ate.dev (the egress gateway CA bundle, #823), mapped to the
ClusterTrustBundle that atecontroller's EgressMITMTrustReconciler (#946)
derives from the egress-mitm-ca-pool Secret. The signer-linked object
name stays a backend detail; the future backend registry (#932) widens
the allowlist without an API change.
- The watch is scoped to the one backing object via a metadata.name
field selector — this informer runs on every node, so an unfiltered
watch would fan every ClusterTrustBundle in the cluster out to every
atelet. RBAC can't express this (resourceNames doesn't apply to
list/watch), so the field selector is the enforcement point.
get/list/watch on clustertrustbundles moves to the atelet ClusterRole.
- No availability probe. The informer registers unconditionally; a
cluster that doesn't serve the feature-gated certificates.k8s.io/v1beta1
blocks atelet startup at cache sync, with the reflector errors naming
the missing API (hack/create-kind-cluster.sh enables the gate).
- Fail-closed. Unknown names, missing bundles, and unusable bundles fail
actor start naming the bundle — an actor that declared a trust bundle
must not start without one.
- Kubelet-parity sanitization (internal/pemutil): CERTIFICATE blocks
only, deduplicated, headers stripped, and anchors deliberately shuffled
so consumers can't grow a dependence on order.
- Schema note: dataSources MaxItems tightened 32→8 while adding the
trustBundle member. Vacuous in practice (the old schema couldn't admit
more than one entry), but flagged since it's ratchet-shaped.
E2E — delivery and consumption
Delivery (identity suite, both sandbox classes): provisions the
egress-mitm-ca-pool Secret and drives the real #946 reconciler (writing
the bundle directly isn't possible — the reconciler reverts hand-edits),
asserts the projected file byte-exact, then rotates the pool across a
suspend/resume to prove refresh-on-restore. Since the probe fixture is
shared and fail-closed, e2e.DeployProbe itself ensures the bundle exists
for whatever suite deploys it.
Consumption (new egressmitm suite, both sandbox classes): deploys the
sdsmint (MITM) egress gateway and proves an actor completes a TLS
handshake with the gateway's per-SNI minted leaf using ONLY the
projected anchors — plus a system-roots negative control that must fail.
The pair is unambiguous in both directions: the positive can't pass
under passthrough (the bundle holds no public CAs), and the negative
can't fail under passthrough.
CI: two steps appended to the existing e2e job after the standard lanes
(the gateway swap is cluster-wide and breaks passthrough assumptions):
--deploy-atenet --experimental-use-sdsmint redeploys only the atenet
components, then the egressmitm suite runs once per sandbox class.
Flake mitigation: the probe fixture pool drops from 3 workers to 2. Each
suite deploys its own copy and drives one actor at a time, so the third
worker per copy was idle memory multiplied across suites on the one-node
CI cluster — pressure that has been killing sandboxes mid-test (runsc:
signal: killed, a vanished ateom socket) on this PR and on main's
identity suite. This reduces the pressure; right-sizing e2e concurrency
or worker-pod QoS cluster-wide is follow-up material.
Not in this PR
- Live refresh for running actors (#932 PR 2) — until then, a running
actor's file is the bundle as of its last Run/Restore, and correctness
rests on overlap rotation by the bundle publisher.
- Auto-injection of the egress trust volume (#932 PR 3).
- Configurable backend registry (#932) — the allowlist is the seam it
will replace.
Fixes#783
Adds an `image` source to `ActorTemplate`'s `VolumeSource`: a container
can mount the contents of an OCI image it does not run. This is how
tooling gets into images built by third parties without rebuilding them.
```yaml
spec:
containers:
- name: sandbox
image: docker.io/example/benchmark@sha256:...
command: ["/ate/agent"]
volumeMounts:
- name: agent
mountPath: /ate
volumes:
- name: agent
image:
reference: registry.example.com/agent@sha256:...
```
## How it works
atelet pulls the image through the existing layer cache and records the
volume's layers in the bundle's overlay spec, next to the rootfs layers.
ateom composes the volume inside the bundle — the cached layers with no
writable layer on top, so the mount is read-only — and the container
binds it at the declared path. The volume is composed per container:
containers of one actor may mount the same volume, and each gets its own
mount point inside its own bundle, all backed by the same shared layers.
On resume the volume is re-composed the same way.
References must be digest-pinned, the same rule as container images: a
snapshot is only valid against the exact bytes it was taken with.
On micro-VMs the volume rides the same read-only virtio-fs share as the
container rootfs: ateom stages each composed volume beside the rootfs on
the host, and the guest binds it into the container at the declared
path.
Part of #802 (first PR: the actorIdentity data source; does not close
the issue).
## What changed and why
Adds a systemInfo volume source to ActorTemplate — a read-only volume
whose files are generated by atelet on every Run/Restore, analogous to
Kubernetes projected volumes. The initial data source, actorIdentity,
writes the actor's own name to a configurable relative path:
```
spec:
volumes:
- name: system-info
systemInfo:
dataSources:
# Part 1 (this PR): own-metadata projection, downwardAPI-style
- actorMetadata:
items:
- field: name # enum: name | atespace | uid
path: actor-name
- field: atespace
path: atespace
- field: uid
path: actor-uid
containers:
- name: main
image: app@sha256:...
volumeMounts:
- name: system-info
mountPath: /run/ate
```
Because the files are regenerated before the sandbox starts, they carry
the resumed actor's own values regardless of what checkpointed state it
boots from — the property the old hardcoded /run/ate identity mount
provided, now as an explicit, extensible API that future data sources
(identity JWTs, certificates — see #802) can slot into.
**Behavior change:** the automatic /run/ate/actor-id mount is removed;
actors must opt in by declaring the volume (the e2e identity probe in
this PR is the reference example).
### Reviewer notes:
- Over half the diff is vendored + generated code
(cmd/atelet/internal/third_party/atomicwriter/, atelet.pb.go,
zz_generated.deepcopy.go, the CRD manifest). The hand-written surface is
~700 lines.
- System-info volume roots live under a new ActorPath/system-info/ host
dir, deliberately separate from durable-dir/: the micro-VM durable
machinery snapshots everything under the durable-dir root, and generated
identity files must never be captured into snapshots.
- Supports microVM as well as gVisor.
- The e2e identity suite exercises the new API end-to-end with unchanged
probe binary and assertions. It runs in the kind-cluster CI job (not run
locally).
## Checklist
- [x] Issue is linked above
- [x] Tests pass locally (go test ./...)
- [x] Root-gated tests pass if applicable (N/A — no root-gated packages
touched)
- [x] Documentation updated if behavior changed (docs/api-guide.md:
SystemInfo Volumes section with example)
---------
Co-authored-by: Taahir Ahmed <taahm@google.com>
This reverts the ActorTemplate valueFrom.secretKeyRef support added in
#20 (issue #15).
We don't want actors to have any access to secrets, they will be
injected on the egress route instead. Removing this now so we don't need
to copy secrets into substrate resources.
The pause image holds the sandbox's namespaces and runs no workload
code. It is an implementation detail of the sandbox, not something actor
authors pick, so it belongs with the sandbox binaries that already moved
off the ActorTemplate onto the cluster-scoped SandboxConfig.
It now travels with those binaries end to end: resolved from the pool's
SandboxConfig, carried on ateletpb.SandboxAssets rather than
WorkloadSpec, and recorded in the per-actor sandbox record so Checkpoint
pins it into the snapshot manifest and Restore rebuilds the sandbox from
the image the snapshot was taken with (the golden's on a DATA_ON_GOLDEN
restore). A record without one is rejected outright rather than pulling
an empty image.
- [x] Tests pass
- [x] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR
> **Rescoped again.** This PR previously proposed
`--golden-snapshot-warmup`, a
> tunable wall-clock delay before the golden checkpoint. Per discussion,
that
> direction is dropped: the answer for a workload that cannot report
readiness
> is a readiness endpoint — a small sidecar where the workload itself
cannot be
> changed — not a longer timer. What survives is the piece that
discussion
> agreed on, and which the previous revision already flagged as a
follow-up:
> making the readyz deadline itself configurable.
>
> The warmup work is not in this branch. It is kept locally in case a
workload
> genuinely cannot be given a readiness signal before GA, and would come
back as
> its own PR if so.
## Summary
`readyz.Wait` polls until the container returns 200 or a **hardcoded
30s**
elapses. A workload that legitimately takes longer to bind its HTTP
server
cannot be accommodated without raising the ceiling for every actor in
the
cluster, and losing that race fails the actor start.
How long a workload takes to become ready is a property of that
workload, so
this makes the deadline a per-template setting rather than a package
constant.
Adds optional `timeoutSeconds` to `ContainerReadyz`. **Unset keeps
today's 30s**,
so no existing template changes behavior.
## Changes
The value rides on the existing probe, so it follows the chain the probe
already
takes and no call site needs to know about it:
`ContainerReadyz.timeoutSeconds` → `toAteletReadyz` → `ateletpb.Readyz`
→
`toAteomReadyz` → `ateompb.Readyz` → `readyz.Wait`
- `pkg/api/v1alpha1/actortemplate_types.go` — `TimeoutSeconds *int32`,
`+optional`, `Minimum=1`, `Maximum=3600`.
- `internal/proto/ateletpb/atelet.proto`,
`internal/proto/ateompb/ateom.proto` —
`int32 timeout_seconds = 2` on both `Readyz` messages.
- `cmd/ateapi/internal/controlapi/workload_spec.go`,
`cmd/atelet/main.go` — pass
it through the two conversions.
- `internal/readyz/readyz.go` — `OverallTimeout` becomes
`DefaultOverallTimeout` (still 30s) and `Wait` resolves its deadline
through a
new `overallTimeout(probe)` helper.
- Regenerated: both `.pb.go`, `zz_generated.deepcopy.go`, and the
`actortemplates` CRD.
None of the four `readyz.WaitAll` call sites change.
**On the zero value.** Unlike a warmup delay — where zero is a real
request
meaning "checkpoint immediately" — a zero readiness deadline could never
be met,
so it is never something a template author means. A non-positive value
on the
wire is therefore read as "unset" and falls back to the default, and the
CRD
field is a pointer with `Minimum=1` so the API rejects `0` outright
rather than
silently substituting 30s behind the author's back.
**On bounding**, which was the open question left on the previous
revision:
bounded at `3600`. A template asking to wait longer than an hour for
readiness
is expressing a broken workload, not a slow one, and the bound keeps a
typo from
pinning a worker for a day.
## Verification
- `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt`, `go test ./...` — all pass.
- `internal/readyz/readyz_test.go` — `overallTimeout` resolves unset and
negative to the default and honors an explicit value; `Wait` against a
port
nothing binds gives up at the probe's 1s deadline rather than the 30s
default.
- `workload_spec_test.go`, `cmd/atelet/main_test.go` — the timeout
crosses both
conversions, and a probe without one stays zero on the wire.
- `actortemplate_validation_test.go` — the bounds are enforced by a real
API
server. This suite runs under envtest against the generated CRD
directory, so
it exercises the regenerated `actortemplates` CRD rather than the Go
markers:
`300` is accepted, unset is accepted, and `0`, `-1` and `3601` are all
rejected by apiserver schema validation.
- **On a real cluster, via CI.** `internal/e2e/fixtures/probe` now
declares a
`readyz` probe with `timeoutSeconds: 60`, pointed at the `/healthz` the
probe
binary already serves on `:80`. The kind e2e that runs on every PR
therefore
exercises the value crossing ateapi → atelet → ateom on real binaries,
across
the auth matrix, on both the run and restore paths. This is also the
readyz
path's first e2e coverage — no fixture declared a probe before.
Wire compatibility degrades safely in both skew directions:
`timeout_seconds` is
a new field 2 on a `Readyz` message that has only ever had field 1, so
an old
ateom ignores it and an old ateapi leaves it zero, which reads as the
30s
default.
No GKE run. What that would add over the above is a workload whose
readiness
genuinely exceeds 30s, and that is the readiness-sidecar work rather
than this
PR.
Fixes #<issue_number_goes_here>
> It's a good idea to open an issue first for discussion.
- [x] Tests pass
- [x] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR
---------
Co-authored-by: Maya Wang <mymaya@google.com>
Part of #232
1. During CreateActor, the volumes to be created get instantiated in the
Actor API in PENDING status. The Actor is still instantiated as
SUSPENDED.
However, the CreateVolume operation is moved to the beginning of
ResumeActor. This is because CreateActor is intentionally designed to
not be idempotent. The downside is that the user won't know dependent
resource creation failed until the first resume.
2. Changes volume id to use actor uid instead of atespace+actorname and
adds "substrate" prefix
3. Adds a new DELETING status that gets persisted before we start to
delete volumes.
This shifts the existing DB DELETE precondition checks to the new
DELETING status. And now you can only delete the actor in DB from
DELETING status.
4. Refactor DeleteActor to use a workflow
In the future, we will also add a workflow that will do mandatory node
cleanup of volumes before starting to delete the volumes.
- [x] Tests pass
- [x] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR
Initial part of #232.
Extends the ActorTemplate API to add support for per-actor external
volumes and adds control plane and atelet hooks following the Actor
lifecycle.
Callouts to volume operations are abstracted with a Volume interface.
Right now, only a mock volume plugin for testing has been implemented,
but we will add CSI support next.
- [x] Tests pass
- [ ] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR - Not
going to update documentation until we add CSI support.
* Add `args` field in addition to `command`.
* Implement logic in atelet to resolve both argv from the actor template
fields and the OCI image config (`entrypoint` and `cmd` fields).
* Update demos to not hardcode command as now we honor the image
default, which makes it not necessary.
Fixes#456
Implement a layer allowing to take durableDir snapshot only, without
taking snapshot of entire memory. This is a part of the #119 feature.
The "durableDir" support is introduced via adding Volumes support to
ActorTemplate.
## Knowns issues / limitations
1. No MicroVM support for homedir yet. Will be implemented in following
PR.
2. Resume from SNAPSHOT_SCOPE_DATA temporary behavior
Current behavior of resume from durableStorage returns immediately after
gVisor process is started, it means container's bootstrap is not
completed by the time resume API returned to the caller. It causes the
issue that first curl request for suspended actor throws an HTTP
exception, since webserver listening on the port inside container is not
running yet.
PR #330 fixes the issue, for a meantime the workaround is to call `
kubectl ate resume actor` and after it call to the curl itself.
- [X ] Unit tests pass
- [X ] E2E tests are updated and pass
Extends ActorTemplate.Container spec to allow defining a readyz probe.
* ateoms (both gVisor & microVM) are updated and wait for readyz signal
if it was enabled on container when creating a new container or resume
from a snapshot.
* actorTemplates controller has been updated not to wait 20 sec during
golden snapshot creation, if readyz is enabled on actor. It assumes,
atelet call returns when all containers passed readyz.
Tested manually both counters:
* gVisor
* microvm
Fixes#316
- [x] e2e tests pass
- [X] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR
A couple of TODOs/Discussions which I think are important to have based
on these changes.
1. Do we need a caching client for this to avoid calling the apiserver
every time?
2. Where/how do we want to resolve secrets generally? I think there are
good arguments to be made for the control-plane OR the "node" component.
In my mind this also related to:
https://github.com/agent-substrate/substrate/issues/18Fixes#15
> It's a good idea to open an issue first for discussion.
- [ x ] Tests pass
- [ x ] Appropriate changes to documentation are included in the PR
Zoe Zhao