structuredClone in an island of a value holding native records, class
instances or objects (interceptor objects V8's serializer cannot clone)
clones a plain copy of that data, as Node clones the objects themselves.
An island array of primitives or strings (or arrays of those) returned
directly or through a promise crosses as a copy, which the checked cast
then meets, instead of failing the cast as an object handle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A call into Node from an async fiber runs in a context of its own on Node's
stack while the calling fiber stays suspended in it, but runtime code that
Node called back there still ran as that fiber: scr_current named it, and
a fiber resumed from there saved its resumer in scr_loop_ctx and, under
ASan, its fake stack in the calling fiber's slot. The calling fiber's next
park then returned to a context that no longer existed, or under ASan
resumed with a fake stack the nested context had destroyed
(6870-node-island-server-fibers in dev mode, sanitized: SEGV in
nh_keep_done). The nested entry now runs host callbacks as the loop's code
does (no current fiber, the main exception cell and ALS slot) and puts the
calling fiber's state and the loop context back when it returns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release builds no longer import runtime bitcode, so program code called scr_map_retain_v for every Map read out of a container and scr_map_size for every size read. A Map retain now uses the emitted increment helper, as string retains do, and Map.size reads the live count through an internal helper.
A typed record encoded from its field hooks queued a plain-object field on
the visit stack and went on to the next field, so getters on later fields
ran before the properties of earlier ones were read. Node's serializer
finishes each field, nested properties included, before the next.
The record path now drains the visit stack down to where it started after
each field, so properties are read in Node's order. Corpus 7139 posts a
record whose fields hold getter-bearing objects and prints the read order.
- Once a 'message' listener without a typed entry has decoded the
message, the listeners after it read that decoded value, so a typed
listener sees what an earlier untyped listener changed, as in Node.
- A union with a literal discriminator gets no typed message entry: its
checked conversion also tests the discriminator, which the message
readers do not.
Corpus 7361 checks a typed listener after an untyped one that changes
the message, and a listener on a discriminated union.
postMessage of a typed record boxes it as a live record capsule, and the
message encoder materialized the capsule's checked-dynamic view to read
it: it built the view object, listed its own keys, tested each one for
enumerability and read it back, then released the view and the key list.
On an object-only run of bench/channel-messages that was about half of
the encode time.
- A live record capsule whose view was never created (no undeclared
properties, no writes through an untyped view) now encodes from the
record's field hooks (ScrDynTypedRecordOps), which answer exactly the
view's keys, order and boxed values. Nested records encode the same way
to a depth of 32, then through their views as before. Capsules with a
view, published values, and every other value encode as before.
- The mail event that carries a message lives in the message's block, so
a queued message is one allocation instead of two.
Corpus 7139 and 7360 post typed records on a MessageChannel and between a
worker and the main thread: optional fields, nested records, a record
reached twice, a chain deeper than the recursion limit, a parsed record
with undeclared keys, and a function-valued field.
A 'message' listener with a typed parameter received each message as a
checked-dynamic value: the port decoded the message into dyn objects, the
listener's thunk matched the value against each union arm, read every
field again to build the record, and the dyn objects were then released.
For bench/channel-messages that was about a third of the delivery time.
- A closure registered with on, once, addListener, prependListener or
prependOnceListener for 'message' gets a typed message entry when its
parameter is a number, boolean, string, a record of those without union
fields, or a boxed union of those arms with null or undefined. The
entry builds the parameter from the message's nodes and calls the
closure.
- The entry handles a message only when it has the parameter's exact
layout: the union arm the checked conversion picks, and a record's
declared keys in declaration order with no others. Any other message
runs through the thunk on the decoded value, as before, so undeclared
keys, other orders and mismatches behave as they did.
- Ports, workers and parentPort deliver a message through the entries
when no value in it is reached twice and it holds no ports or native
handles. Listeners without an entry share one decoded value, made when
the first of them runs.
- The message readers are runtime entry points, so the runtime ABI is now
27.
Corpus 7130 and 7131 check typed listeners on MessageChannel ports, a
worker and parentPort against Node: exact layouts, extra keys, shared
values, nested records, untyped listeners beside typed ones, once
listeners and a transferred port.
Keys, primes and generators drop their leading zero bytes before import,
as BN_bin2bn does, and a value still past mbedTLS's 80000-byte limit
throws Node's error or a coded SC2020 error instead of aborting the
process: computeSecret rejects a key longer than the prime as too large,
a long generator is a bad generator, and setPublicKey/setPrivateKey
refuse with SC2020.
Under the RFC 5114 groups, computeSecret rejects a peer key with
key^q mod p != 1 with ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_KEYTYPE, as OpenSSL's public
key check does, closing small-subgroup confinement of the private key.
The safe-prime groups keep the range check only, as in Node.
Exponents past 8192 bits are split into digits bit by bit, so
generateKeys with a long private key takes linear time.
When an event-loop callback calls an async function or steps a generator
that enters a store before its first await, the store becomes the
callback's at the end of the prefix. On the main slot it now ends with
that callback, as an enterWith there does: the copy schedules the tick
that clears the main slot, so the store does not reach later callbacks.
new tls.TLSSocket(socket, { isServer: true, secureContext, requestCert:
true }) skipped the options walk that refuses requestCert, so the server
asked for no client certificate and accepted every client, even with
rejectUnauthorized: true. With a secureContext, Node still reads the
socket's own options, so a truthy requestCert, SNICallback and
ALPNCallback now throw the fence there too.
A TLS socket's transport kept its 'secure' and 'session' listeners until
the socket was freed. A handshake that fails never fires 'secure', so a
listener that captures the socket kept the socket and its TLS state alive
after it closed. The transport now drops those listeners when the socket
settles, and ignores listeners added after that.
crypto.subtle.wrapKey exports a secret key (raw, raw-secret or jwk) and
encrypts it, and unwrapKey decrypts and imports one, as Node's
webcrypto.js does: the wrap algorithm normalizes through the wrapKey
registry (AES-KW) and then the encrypt registry (AES-GCM, AES-CBC and
AES-CTR with their dictionaries), the wrapping key's algorithm and
usages are checked, and a JWK payload is its JSON text, padded with
spaces to a multiple of 8 bytes for AES-KW. A wrapped JWK that is not
UTF-8 JSON with a kty member rejects with Node's DataError.
AES-KW is RFC 3394 key wrap over the vendored mbedTLS block cipher, in
scr_webcrypto_aes.c beside the other AES modes: wrapping takes a
multiple of 8 bytes and at least 16, unwrapping a multiple of 8 and at
least 24, and the integrity check value is compared in constant time.
The cipher's failures, and unwrapKey's import errors, reject on a later
loop turn as Node's job promises do.
This completes jose's symmetric key management: 7132 runs the real
jose 6.2.12 PBES2-HS256+A128KW, PBES2-HS384+A192KW, PBES2-HS512+A256KW,
A128KW and A256KW paths (EncryptJWT and jwtDecrypt) against Node.
getPublicKey replaces wrapKey as the refused method in the fenced
fixture and the JavaScript refusal test.
The key and signature errors formatted into fixed stack buffers and
passed snprintf's return value on as the message length. A message
longer than the buffer, such as "Invalid digest: " with a long algorithm
name from crypto.sign or crypto.verify, then copied bytes past the end of
the buffer into the error. The messages are now sized to their whole
text, so a long name appears in full, as in Node.
The received values in these messages also follow Node: strings as
util.inspect quotes them, cut at 128 characters, and large integers with
ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE's separators. A fractional, NaN or infinite
modulusLength reports "It must be an integer", as validateUint32 does.
Malte Ubl