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DottaandPaperclip
98d9360658
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Local coding adapters currently spawn their CLI processes directly on the Paperclip host. > - CLI-native approval and sandbox flags do not provide a reliable host filesystem or network boundary. > - An agent can therefore inspect unrelated host files or fetch external material when an operator needs stronger isolation. > - The confinement must stay opt-in so existing local adapter behavior does not change unexpectedly. > - This pull request adds a shared Linux Bubblewrap spawn layer for workspace filesystem and deny/allowlist network scopes. > - The benefit is enforceable defense in depth around Codex and Claude local runs while preserving explicit provider connectivity. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description ### What happened? `codex_local` and `claude_local` processes could read arbitrary host paths and make unrestricted outbound network requests because Paperclip did not impose a spawn-level boundary. ### Expected behavior Operators can opt into a workspace-only filesystem view and either deny network egress or allow exact provider/API hosts, independently of CLI approval flags. ### Steps to reproduce 1. Run current `master` on Linux and configure a Codex or Claude local adapter. 2. Ask the agent to read a canary file outside its active workspace. 3. Ask the agent to `curl` a public host. 4. Observe that both operations succeed without a Paperclip-level confinement option. ### Environment - Paperclip commit: `c36f1a4af` / current `master` base. - Deployment mode: Linux local dev or self-hosted server. - Installation: built from source. - Adapters: Codex and Claude Code. - Database: not related. ## What Changed - Added a shared Bubblewrap process wrapper with opt-in `filesystemScope: "workspace"`, managed/extra path mounts, private `/tmp`, and Linux-only validation. - Added `networkScope: "deny" | "allowlist"`; both use a private network namespace, while allowlist mode exposes an exact-host HTTP(S) proxy over a Unix-socket bridge. - Wired Codex and Claude local CLI execution through the wrapper and forced scoped auto runs onto the CLI lane because ACP processes are not covered. - Added unit and gated Bubblewrap canaries for outside-file denial, workspace writes, direct network denial, allowlisted forwarding, and rejected destinations. - Documented both scopes, provider allowlist examples, Bubblewrap requirements, and default-off behavior. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts packages/adapters/codex-local/src/server/acp.test.ts packages/adapters/claude-local/src/server/acp.test.ts` — 34 passed, 4 gated Bubblewrap tests skipped by default. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils build` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local build` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local build` - Attempted the gated tests with a vendored Bubblewrap binary; this container blocks unprivileged namespace setup (`setting up uid map: Permission denied` / loopback `RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`), so kernel-level execution remains for CI or a namespace-enabled Linux host. ## Risks - Bubblewrap must be installed and unprivileged user/mount/network namespaces must be enabled on the host; scoped runs fail clearly if the prerequisite is missing. - Allowlist mode depends on the coding CLI honoring standard `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` variables; custom providers must list every required exact hostname and port. - Exact-host allowlists intentionally reject wildcards, which is safer but may require operators to enumerate multi-host provider setups. - No behavior changes unless an operator enables `filesystemScope` or `networkScope`. > This aligns with the ROADMAP direction toward safer remote and sandboxed agent environments and does not duplicate an open PR or issue found in the repository search. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5.5 (`gpt-5.5`) via Codex CLI, with reasoning, repository tool use, shell execution, code editing, and test execution. The serving context-window size is not exposed to the agent. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>