Files
headroom/docker-compose.yml
ee731d7ea8 fix(proxy): refuse token-less non-loopback binds, gate operator routes (#3852)
## Why

Four related gaps in the proxy's network gate (findings 01-F1, 01-F2,
01-F5, 01-F9):

- **Open bind.** A non-loopback bind with no `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` only
logged a warning, then served the `/v1/*` relay, with the operator's
upstream credentials, to every peer that could reach the port.
- **Missing peer address.** `is_loopback_host(None)` returned `True`. A
Unix-domain socket, an ASGI adapter that leaves `scope["client"]` unset,
or a hand-built request therefore turned off the token gate, the
`/admin` and `/debug` guards and the WebSocket gate.
- **Operator data routes.** `/stats-history` (including CSV export),
`/quota`, `/subscription-window` and `/metrics` were served to any
network caller.
- **WebSocket loopback exemption** checked only the peer IP, not the
`Host` header, so it had no DNS-rebinding defence.

## What changes

- New `headroom/proxy/bind_policy.py`. A non-loopback bind (`0.0.0.0`,
`::`, a LAN address or a hostname) with no token is refused at three
places: `create_app` (embedders and the multi-worker factory),
`run_server` (one exit with code 2 before uvicorn forks) and the
`headroom proxy` CLI (a clear error before the banner, exit code 1). An
absent host means uvicorn's default `127.0.0.1`.
- `HEADROOM_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_BIND=1` acknowledges an open bind when
the runtime already restricts reachability, such as a container
published on `127.0.0.1`. The `proxy_open_bind` warning is still logged
on that path, and the banner says the bind is open.
- `is_loopback_host(None)` now returns `False` (fail closed), matching
`identity.py`.
- `/stats-history`, `/quota` and `/subscription-window` answer only: a
non-loopback caller that passed the token gate, a loopback caller (peer
and `Host` header both loopback), a trusted dashboard client, or, under
an acknowledged token-less bind, the container's own default-gateway TCP
peer with a loopback `Host` (the host browser reaching a
`127.0.0.1`-published container). Everyone else gets 404, as with
`/admin`. Settings writes keep their stricter rule with no token
short-cut.
- `/metrics` answers a non-loopback caller that passed the token gate, a
loopback caller, a connecting peer in
`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS` (whatever it forwards), or a
resolved client in the dashboard CIDRs. For CIDR peers a hostname `Host`
is fine, so Prometheus scrapers work; a cross-origin browser request is
still refused.
- The token short-cut applies only to non-loopback requests. The gate
exempts loopback peers without checking `Host`, so a loopback request
has not proven it holds the token and must pass the loopback `Host`
check. This blocks a DNS-rebound browser on the operator's machine.
- The `/dashboard` shell stays ungated. It is a static template, like
the already public `/dashboard/static` assets. Gating it would break the
dashboard for containers published on host loopback, where the peer is
the bridge gateway and `Host` is `localhost`. The data routes behind it
are gated.
- The WebSocket loopback exemption requires a loopback peer and a
loopback `Host` header. A loopback peer with a foreign `Host` can still
connect with the token.
- Launchers that always publish on `127.0.0.1` set the acknowledgement
themselves: `headroom install` (docker preset), `scripts/install.sh` and
`scripts/install.ps1` (through one helper that adds the acknowledgement
only together with the `127.0.0.1` publication), and
`docker/docker-compose.native.yml`.
- Docs: `proxy.mdx` documents the new variable and which routes the
token also gates; `docker-install` (docs and wiki) and the
`docker-compose.yml` comment show the acknowledgement in the
loopback-published example. `e2e/docker-bind-security.sh` sets it and
checks that the same launch without it refuses to start.

## Behaviour change (breaking)

- `headroom proxy --host 0.0.0.0`, or `HEADROOM_HOST` set to any
non-loopback address, without `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` now refuses to
start. The error names both remedies. Set a token, bind loopback, or set
`HEADROOM_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_BIND=1` when the port is already
confined. Anyone running the image by hand with `--host 0.0.0.0` and no
token must add one of these.
- Without a token, `/stats-history`, `/quota`, `/subscription-window`
and `/metrics` return 404 to non-loopback callers outside a trusted
CIDR. Prometheus scrapers on another host must be in
`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS` or send the token.
- Code that relied on a request with no peer address being treated as
loopback now gets the non-loopback path.
- The default loopback run is unchanged.

## Tests

- `tests/test_proxy_bind_policy.py`: the refuse/allow matrix
(non-loopback, loopback, unset host, token, acknowledgement values), the
warning on the acknowledged path, `create_app`, the `run_server` exit
before uvicorn, and the CLI (refusal, `HEADROOM_HOST` from env,
acknowledged start, offline banner, start with a token).
- `tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`: each data route against
non-loopback, loopback, trusted-CIDR and token callers; the dashboard
shell stays reachable; the host of an acknowledged, loopback-published
container reads the data routes while another bridge peer, a forwarded
gateway address and a foreign `Host` do not; CSV export is not served to
network callers; `/metrics` across loopback, both CIDR lists,
out-of-range peers, cross-origin browsers and token callers, including a
trusted gateway relaying a scraper outside its own range. A regression
test shows that a token on the proxy does not exempt a loopback peer
from the `Host` check; it fails without the fix.
- `tests/test_proxy_hardening.py`: the HTTP gate with no peer address,
WebSocket `Host` cases, `require_loopback` and `/debug` with no peer.
- Installer tests: `headroom install` adds the acknowledgement, and the
shell and PowerShell wrappers add it only together with the loopback
publication. Launcher-level tests start the proxy with the environment
and `--host` that `build_runtime_command()` and
`docker-compose.native.yml` produce and check that the host browser
(bridge-gateway peer) gets `/stats-history` and another container does
not.
- Tests that bound `0.0.0.0` for unrelated reasons now set a token or
the acknowledgement. Tests that read operator routes use an explicit
loopback peer.

On `main`, 14 of the gating and hardening tests fail and the bind-policy
module does not exist. Manual runs: token-less `--host 0.0.0.0` exits
with the refusal from both the CLI and `run_server`; with the
acknowledgement, the data routes are 404 to a LAN peer and to a loopback
peer with a foreign `Host`; with a token, a LAN peer gets 401 without it
and 200 with it; the default loopback bind starts as before.

Not tested: a real Unix-domain-socket deployment and a real Prometheus
scrape (both covered by tests only).

## Merge order

Part of a set. Suggested order: #3852 → #3891 → #3849 → #3860 → #3862 →
#3863. This PR goes first: it is the gate the others assume, and it is
the release-note event.

## Not in this PR

- Enforcing the token for loopback callers when one is configured.

Revised 2026-10-02 after review: `/metrics` matches gateway CIDRs
against the TCP peer, and the operator data routes serve the host of a
loopback-published container (bridge-gateway peer under the launchers'
bind acknowledgement) so the default Docker dashboard works.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

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---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: JD Davis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-10-05 08:27:35 -05:00

126 lines
6.0 KiB
YAML

# =============================================================================
# Headroom — full "memory stack" compose
# =============================================================================
# Brings up the Headroom proxy together with the two datastores it needs for
# semantic memory: Qdrant (vector search) and Neo4j (relationship graph).
#
# Quick start:
# 1. cp .env.example .env # then set a real NEO4J_AUTH before any non-local use
# 2. docker compose up -d
# 3. point your LLM client at http://localhost:8787 (proxy)
#
# Just want the proxy without the memory features? You can run the proxy image
# on its own (`docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8787:8787 -e HEADROOM_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_BIND=1
# ghcr.io/headroomlabs-ai/headroom --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8787`; the env var acknowledges that the
# 127.0.0.1 publication, not a token, is what keeps the port private); the two
# database services below are only required for the memory/relevance features.
#
# Ports published on the host — all bound to 127.0.0.1 (this machine only):
# 8787 proxy (OpenAI-compatible endpoint)
# 6333 Qdrant REST 6334 Qdrant gRPC
# 7474 Neo4j Browser 7687 Neo4j Bolt
#
# None of these three services authenticates inbound callers by default: the
# proxy's /v1/* data plane is open unless HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN is set, Qdrant
# has no API key, and Neo4j falls back to a published dev password. Publishing
# them on 0.0.0.0 therefore hands any peer on your network a relay through the
# proxy plus direct read/write on the embeddings and graph derived from your
# prompts. They are bound to loopback so that `docker compose up -d` is safe on
# a shared or untrusted network.
#
# To reach the proxy from another machine, publish it deliberately AND require
# a token — never one without the other:
# HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32) # put this in .env
# ports: ["8787:8787"] # override in a compose override file
# =============================================================================
services:
# Headroom proxy — the OpenAI-compatible endpoint your client talks to.
# Built from the repo Dockerfile so it tracks your local checkout.
headroom-proxy:
build:
context: .
args:
HEADROOM_BUILD_VERSION: ${HEADROOM_BUILD_VERSION:-source-build}
# Bind to all interfaces inside the container so the published port is reachable.
command: ["--host", "0.0.0.0"]
environment:
- HEADROOM_HOST=0.0.0.0
# The proxy binds 0.0.0.0 *inside* the container (required for Docker port
# forwarding); it is confined to host loopback by the published port below.
# A proxy token is required so the data plane is never open if you widen the
# bind. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32
- HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN=${HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN:?set HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN (see .env.example; e.g. openssl rand -hex 32)}
- HOME=/home/nonroot
# Keep all Headroom read/write state on the named volume below.
- HEADROOM_WORKSPACE_DIR=/home/nonroot/.headroom
- HEADROOM_CONFIG_DIR=/home/nonroot/.headroom/config
# if you want to use a custom OpenAI-compatible API endpoint,
# uncomment and set the following line with the desired URL
# - OPENAI_TARGET_API_URL=https://api.x.ai
# Required before publishing this port beyond loopback: without it the
# /v1/* data plane accepts unauthenticated callers.
# - HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN=${HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN}
ports:
# Loopback-only. The container still listens on 0.0.0.0 (above) so the
# other compose services can reach it by name; this line controls only
# which host interfaces the port is published on.
- "127.0.0.1:8787:8787"
volumes:
- headroom_workspace:/home/nonroot/.headroom
# Readiness probe: the orchestrator polls /readyz so dependents and
# `docker compose up --wait` only see the proxy as healthy once it's serving.
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "--fail", "--silent", "http://127.0.0.1:8787/readyz"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 20s
# Start the datastores first. Note: this waits for the containers to start,
# not for them to be fully ready — the proxy retries its connections, so a
# brief "database not ready yet" window on first boot is expected.
depends_on:
- qdrant
- neo4j
# Vector database for semantic search.
# Stores embeddings so the proxy can retrieve semantically similar context.
qdrant:
image: qdrant/qdrant:v1.17.1
ports:
# Loopback-only: Qdrant runs unauthenticated here and holds embeddings
# derived from your prompts.
- "127.0.0.1:6333:6333" # REST API
- "127.0.0.1:6334:6334" # gRPC
# Named volume keeps the vector index across container restarts/recreates.
volumes:
- qdrant_data:/qdrant/storage
environment:
- QDRANT__SERVICE__GRPC_PORT=6334
# Graph database for relationships and multi-hop reasoning.
# Backs the memory features that traverse links between stored items.
neo4j:
image: neo4j:5.26
ports:
# Loopback-only to keep the graph store off the network.
- "127.0.0.1:7474:7474" # HTTP (Browser)
- "127.0.0.1:7687:7687" # Bolt
# Named volume persists the graph data across container restarts/recreates.
volumes:
- neo4j_data:/data
environment:
# No default credential — must be supplied (see .env.example).
- NEO4J_AUTH=${NEO4J_AUTH:?set NEO4J_AUTH, e.g. neo4j/<strong-password>}
# APOC: Neo4j's standard procedure library, needed by Headroom's queries.
- NEO4J_PLUGINS=["apoc"]
# APOC file import/export stays disabled (its Neo4j default) — it grants
# filesystem read/write via stored procedures. Do not enable unless required.
# Named volumes — managed by Docker, survive `docker compose down` (use
# `docker compose down -v` to delete the stored data as well).
volumes:
headroom_workspace: # persists dashboard savings/history, logs, config, memory state, session stats, and TOIN
qdrant_data:
neo4j_data: