Files
headroom/tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py
8cdce172ea fix(router): ignore shell operators inside quoted arguments in read detection (#4646)
## Description

Item 3 of #4478, the quoted-pattern case that #4521 left open. Read
detection scanned the raw command text for shell syntax without regard
to quoting: `_segment_is_read` treated any `>` as a redirect
(`content_router.py:893` on `e4a60ed7`) and split the pipeline at the
first `|`, and `_command_segments` split on `;`, `&&` and `||`. A quiet
sed whose script holds one of these characters, such as `sed -n '/if x >
0/,/return/p' a.py` or the GNU alternation `sed -n '/def \|class /p'
a.py`, was therefore not detected as a file read and lost read
protection.

The three scans now run on a copy of the command in which quoted,
backslash-escaped and commented characters are masked, and the match
positions are mapped back onto the original text. Two shell rules keep
word boundaries intact (review round 2): a backslash-newline is a line
continuation and is masked as two spaces, so a redirect or `tee` on the
next line still counts as a write; and an unquoted `#` at the start of a
word masks the rest of its line without changing quote state, so a quote
mark inside a comment cannot hide the next line's separators. Unquoted
operators behave as before.

Refs #4478

## Type of Change

- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)

## Changes Made

- `headroom/transforms/content_router.py`: new `_mask_quoted(command)`,
which returns a same-length string with characters inside `'...'` /
`"..."`, backslash-escaped characters and comment text replaced by `_`
(the quote characters are kept; a backslash-newline becomes two spaces;
a comment's newline stays visible). `_segment_is_read` runs its
redirect/`tee` check and its pipeline split on the masked string;
`_command_segments` finds `;` / `&&` / `||` on the masked string and
slices the original.
- `tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py`:
`test_quoted_shell_operators_are_arguments`, 25 cases. Quoted `>`, `>>`,
`|`, `;`, `&&` and `tee` inside a sed script or a file name are reads; a
real redirect, pipe-to-`tee` or separator next to a quoted script still
counts; `bash -lc "cat foo.py > copy.py"` is still not a read (the inner
command is checked on its own, as before). Round 2 adds: continued `>`,
`>>` and `| tee` are writes; a comment with an unmatched `"` or `'`
followed by `ls; cat foo.py` / `true; cat foo.py` on the next line is a
read; `cat foo.py # > not a redirect` is a read; a `#` inside a word is
not a comment.

## Testing

- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) (run on
`headroom/transforms/content_router.py` only, see below)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed

### Test Output

```text
# fail before (source at e4a60ed7, new test kept)
tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py: 9 failed, 104 passed

# round 2: the new review cases against the round-1 head 639bfa9e
7 failed, 115 passed

# pass after (head 50798e5a)
tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py: 122 passed

# wider set, same environment:
# tests/test_transforms + tests/test_*content_router*.py + tests/test_router*.py
e4a60ed7:     27 failed, 930 passed, 96 skipped   (round 1 comparison)
639bfa9e:     25 failed, 941 passed, 96 skipped
50798e5a:     18 failed, 948 passed, 96 skipped
# the 18 are the same tests on every side (the extras are the new cases); they
# come from the local `_core` build not matching this tree (Rust parity
# fixtures, minification), not from this change

# ruff check / ruff format --check: All checks passed! / 2 files already formatted
# mypy headroom/transforms/content_router.py: Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```

## Real Behavior Proof

- Environment: Ubuntu (WSL2) on Windows 11, Python 3.12.15, `headroom`
Python source at `e4a60ed7` and at this branch, offline.
- Exact command / steps: `ContentRouter.apply` on a three-message
transcript (user, an assistant `Bash` tool call, a 3,890-byte Python
tool result), with `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS=1`,
`HEADROOM_SHELL_RESULT_MIN_CHARS=2000` and the router config used by
`test_quiet_sed_output_reaches_read_protection`
(`enable_kompress=False`, `enable_code_aware=False`). Checked whether
`router:read_protected` is in `transforms_applied` for each command.
- Observed result: on `e4a60ed7` the three quoted-operator commands lose
read protection; on this branch they keep it, and both controls are
unchanged (table below). For the review-round cases, real `bash -c` in a
temporary directory agrees with `_is_read_command` on this head for all
7 (continued `>`, `>>` and `| tee` write `copy.py`; the three
multiline-comment commands and `cat foo.py # > not a redirect` print the
file); on `639bfa9e` 6 of the 7 disagreed with bash.

  | command | `e4a60ed7` | this branch |
  |---|---|---|
  | `sed -n '1,120p' foo.py` (control) | protected | protected |
| `sed -n '/if value > 0/,/return 0/p' foo.py` | not protected |
protected |
  | `sed -n '/def \|class /p' foo.py` | not protected | protected |
  | `sed -n '/x;y/p' foo.py` | not protected | protected |
| `sed -n '1,120p' foo.py > out.txt` (control, real redirect) | not
protected | not protected |

- Not tested: a run in which an unprotected read is actually compressed.
With Kompress and code-aware compression off, the tool result came back
byte-identical on both sides, so this proof shows the classification
only. Not tested: the full test suite and `mypy headroom` as a whole
(only `content_router.py`). Heredoc handling (`<<`) is unchanged and
still a whole-command bailout.

## Runtime Rollout Safety

- Rollout-managed feature(s): None.
- Minimum rollout channel: N/A
- Stable/default behavior changed: Yes, narrowly: commands whose only
`>`, `|`, `;`, `&&` or `||` sits inside quotes, after a backslash or
inside a comment are now classified by the rest of the command, so a
quiet sed or `cat` of that kind gets read protection when
`HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS` is on.
- Kill switch / disable path: None added; read protection as a whole is
still controlled by `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS`.
- Unsafe override required: No
- Qualification impact: None expected
- Rollback path: revert this commit.

## Review Readiness

- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review

## Checklist

- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` — it is generated by
release-please from my Conventional Commit PR title (a CI guard enforces
this)

## Screenshots (if applicable)

N/A

## Additional Notes

#4478 had four items. Items 1 and 2 were fixed by #4488, item 4 by
#4583, and the quiet-option half of item 3 by #4521, whose description
notes that quoted redirect parsing remained separate. This PR covers
that remainder. The `|` and `;` cases are the same cause as the `>` case
reported in the issue (a quote-blind scan of the same command), so they
are fixed together rather than left for a later PR.

Review round 2 (head `50798e5a`) addresses the two masking regressions
found by Devin and Copilot and confirmed by JerrettDavis:
backslash-newline continuations and quote marks inside comments.

Produced with AI assistance (Claude Code) operated by me (HetCreep); the
reproduction was run on my machine against a clone of the repository.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)


### Maintainer requalification

Re-reviewed the author update against upstream main
e4a60ed72f. The two earlier actual Git
Bash counterexamples now classify correctly: continued redirect writes
an exact copy and is not a read; a quote inside a comment no longer
hides the next-line source read. All 132 focused read-detection and
Gemini tests pass; touched-source Ruff/format and whitespace checks
pass. The only maintainer change is the shared Gemini ASGI request test
fixture from #4644; hosted failure was the same four independently
verified main failures, with no contributor production logic changed.
Addressed Devin/Copilot threads resolved after inspecting author fixes.
Exact-head hosted CI remains pending.


### Maintainer current-main requalification

Exact head `2461a910e31c5140d160942927c1c7b3fa203cc1`, upstream main
`ea59ac3eef3a3dc02076e9fe4bb30d572ca9c1a9`.

Cleanly integrated upstream/main
ea59ac3eef and re-reviewed the additive
content-router overlap with main's confident HTML classification. Actual
isolated tree-sitter0.26.0:133 read-command/HTML tests pass,94 unrelated
cases deselected,1 HTML assertion fails. A control with byte-identical
main Python/transforms/test/lock inputs reproduces that same
unrecoverable_sections assertion using the same existing development
native extension, so it is not a finding against this PR. Read-command
cases pass; prior actual Git Bash continued-redirection/comment-quote
evidence remains scoped to unchanged shell parser inputs. Ruff and
whitespace pass. No contributor behavior rewritten, fresh native build
or cloud runtime claim. No new PR correctness finding; final approval
awaits exact-head hosted checks. Nothing merged.


Exact-head hosted checks are being handled by maintainers. No new
finding in the reviewed scope; formal approval awaits exact-head hosted
qualification; nothing merged.


### Maintainer current-main requalification

Exact head `69a6bd592932467162d9433601b0c2bd1c4c4728`, upstream main
`c01cf07d943d816cfd9d97e6838ed4e38f1ff9a4`.

Final post-Dependabot requalification against upstream/main
c01cf07d94. All six Dependabot updates are
now merged. Relative to this branch's freshly tested prepared tree, the
final main sync changes only the three intended Cargo.lock records;
Python/source/test inputs are unchanged. Re-reviewed the integration and
confirmed complete native source/lock/toolchain objects match the tested
combined build and exact fresh native DLL used for this branch's local
tests.

Focused fresh-native qualification: 134 passed, 94 deselected in 5.40s.
Selected real dependency overlays and native DLL paths are recorded in
final4646-fresh-native-tests.log; the DLL provenance/input hashes are in
final-native-artifact-proof.json. No redundant rerun is implied after
this Cargo-only merge. Whitespace passes. Prior source review and scoped
real-behavior evidence remain applicable to unchanged contributor
inputs.

No new source finding in the reviewed scope. Final formal approval
awaits exact-head hosted qualification. The earlier HTML assertion with
the old primary extension now passes with the fresh combined DLL; the
same case also passes on a byte-identical-main Python-source control. No
production workaround or assertion suppression was required.

Maintainers handle hosted checks; no external-provider claim,
contributor semantic rewrite or non-Dependabot merge.


Exact-head hosted checks are being handled by maintainers. No new
finding in the reviewed scope; formal approval awaits exact-head hosted
qualification; nothing merged.

---------

Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-06 09:20:15 -06:00

245 lines
9.8 KiB
Python

"""Tests for `_is_read_command` — which shell commands count as file reads.
Read detection drives read protection: a command classified as a file read has
its output passed verbatim instead of lossy-compressed, because the agent needs
exact bytes to build a patch from. Chained commands used to fall through: only
the first program was inspected, so `wc -l a.py && sed -n '1,60p' a.py` was
classified as a `wc` run and the file content was word-dropped by Kompress.
"""
import json
import pytest
from headroom.tokenizers.estimator import EstimatingTokenCounter
from headroom.transforms.content_router import (
ContentRouter,
ContentRouterConfig,
_is_read_command,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"command",
[
"cat foo.py",
"head -80 foo.py",
"tail -n 50 foo.py",
"sed -n '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -ne '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -En '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed --quiet '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed --silent '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed --quiet --expression='1,60p' foo.py",
"timeout 30 sed -ne '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -n --follow-symlinks '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -a -n '1,60p' foo.py", # BSD sed.
"sed -n -e '1,60p' foo.py -l", # BSD line buffering (no argument).
"sed -l -n '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -ln '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -l 80 -n '1,60p' foo.py", # GNU line length takes an argument.
"sed -nl80 '1,60p' foo.py",
"cd /repo && cat foo.py",
"sudo cat foo.py",
"rtk cat foo.py",
'bash -lc "cat foo.py"',
# The `-c` argument is not the first token after the shell.
'bash --norc -lc "cat foo.py"',
],
)
def test_simple_reads_are_detected(command: str) -> None:
assert _is_read_command(command) is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"command",
[
# The reported case: a read batched behind an unrelated first program.
"wc -l a.py b.py && sed -n '1,60p' c.py",
"grep -n X foo.py | head -40; head -80 bar.py",
"ls -la || cat foo.py",
"echo start; cat foo.py",
# Bare `sed` is a stream edit, but the `cat` segment is still a read.
"sed 's/a/b/' foo.py && cat -n bar.py",
# A read in the first segment survives a non-read tail.
"cat foo.py && pytest -q",
# Trailing and doubled separators produce empty segments, which are skipped.
"cat foo.py;",
"ls -la; ; cat foo.py",
# A write in a SIBLING segment does not unprotect the read segment: the
# output still carries the exact bytes of foo.py.
"cat foo.py && echo done > marker",
"echo done > marker && cat foo.py",
"sed -n '1,60p' foo.py; touch out >> log",
],
)
def test_chained_reads_are_detected(command: str) -> None:
assert _is_read_command(command) is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"command",
[
# Derived output — stays compressible.
"grep -n x foo.py",
"pytest -q",
"ls -la",
# A pipeline stage consumes the previous stage's output, not a file:
# `head` here truncates grep output, it does not read bar.py.
"grep -n x foo.py | head -40",
# Writes are never reads.
"cat > foo.py",
# The write lives in the read segment itself — a pipeline is one segment,
# so `tee` is still visible after the split.
"cat foo.py | tee bar.py",
"cat foo.py > copy.py && echo done",
"sed -n '1,60p' foo.py >> out.txt",
"sed 's/a/b/' foo.py",
"sed -n1,60p foo.py", # Invalid: a script cannot be attached to -n.
"sed -ni '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -n -i '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -n -I .bak '1,60p' foo.py", # BSD in-place editing.
"sed -n -I '' '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -n -l -i '' '1,60p' foo.py", # BSD -l must not hide in-place flags.
"sed -n -l -I .bak '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -in '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed --quiet --in-place '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed --quiet --in-place=.bak '1,60p' foo.py",
"sed -e 's/a/ -n /' foo.py", # Script text is not a quiet option.
"sed -e ' -n ' foo.py",
"sed -- -n foo.py", # Option parsing ends at --.
# Lockfiles are regenerated, never byte-patched.
"cat uv.lock",
# `-n` from a sibling segment must not qualify a bare `sed`.
"sed 's/a/b/' foo.py && ls -n",
# A segment that is only an env assignment resolves to no program.
"FOO=1",
# A shell invocation with no `-c` argument runs a script, not a read.
"bash --norc",
"bash script.sh",
],
)
def test_non_reads_are_not_detected(command: str) -> None:
assert _is_read_command(command) is False
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("command", "expected"),
[
# Shell operators inside a quoted sed script are part of the argument (#4478).
("sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py", True),
("sed -n '/x >> y/p' foo.py", True),
('sed -n "/a > b/p" foo.py', True),
("sed -n '/a|b/p' foo.py", True),
("sed -n '/a;b/p' foo.py", True),
("sed -n '/a && b/p' foo.py", True),
("sed -n '/ tee /p' foo.py", True),
("cat 'a > b.py'", True),
# An escaped operator is a literal argument too.
(r"cat foo.py \> out", True),
# Real operators next to a quoted script still count.
("sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py > out.txt", False),
("sed -n '/a|b/p' foo.py | tee out.txt", False),
("sed -n '/a;b/p' foo.py; echo done", True),
("echo '>' && sed 's/a/b/' foo.py", False),
# The -c argument of a shell is quoted at the outer level; the inner
# command is checked on its own.
('bash -lc "cat foo.py > copy.py"', False),
('bash -lc "cat foo.py | tee copy.py"', False),
('bash -lc "cat foo.py"', True),
# A backslash-newline is a line continuation: the write on the next line
# still counts (review of #4646).
("cat foo.py \\\n> copy.py", False),
("cat foo.py \\\n>> copy.py", False),
("cat foo.py | \\\ntee copy.py", False),
("sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py \\\n> out.txt", False),
("sed -n '1,60p' \\\nfoo.py", True),
# A comment ends at the newline; its quote marks do not open a quote that
# would hide the next line's separators (review of #4646).
('echo start # " unclosed in comment\nls; cat foo.py', True),
("echo ok # author's note\ntrue; cat foo.py", True),
("cat foo.py # > not a redirect", True),
# A hash inside a word is not a comment.
("cat foo#bar.py > out.txt", False),
],
)
def test_quoted_shell_operators_are_arguments(command: str, expected: bool) -> None:
assert _is_read_command(command) is expected
def test_heredoc_body_is_not_split_into_a_bogus_read() -> None:
"""A `;` inside a heredoc body must not produce a segment that looks like a
read — the command as a whole writes a file."""
command = "cat > foo.py <<EOF\nprint(1); head -5 bar.py\nEOF"
assert _is_read_command(command) is False
@pytest.mark.parametrize("flag", ["-n", "-ne", "-En", "--quiet", "--silent"])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("comment", ["", " # avoid -i here", " # --unknown", " # author's note"])
def test_quiet_sed_output_reaches_read_protection(flag: str, comment: str, monkeypatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS", "1")
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_SHELL_RESULT_MIN_CHARS", "2000")
# Sixty source lines exceed the small-shell shortcut and reach read protection.
content = "".join(
f"def compute_{i}(value):\n"
" return value * 2 # Preserve this source exactly for a later patch.\n"
for i in range(30)
)
assert len(content) >= 2000
messages = [
{"role": "user", "content": "Read the module."},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": None,
"tool_calls": [
{
"id": "read-1",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "Bash",
"arguments": json.dumps({"command": f"sed {flag} '1,60p' foo.py{comment}"}),
},
}
],
},
{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "read-1", "content": content},
]
router = ContentRouter(
ContentRouterConfig(
enable_code_aware=False,
enable_kompress=False,
protect_analysis_context=False,
protect_recent_reads_fraction=0.0,
)
)
result = router.apply(messages, EstimatingTokenCounter(), protect_recent=0)
assert "router:shell_small_result_verbatim" not in result.transforms_applied
assert "router:read_protected" in result.transforms_applied
assert result.messages[2]["content"] == content
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("command", "expected"),
[
("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # avoid -i here", True),
("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # --unknown", True),
("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # author's note", True),
("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # unclosed \"quote", True),
("sed -n '1,60p' 'foo#bar.py'", True),
('sed -n "1,60p" "foo#bar.py"', True),
("sed -n '1,60p' foo#bar.py", True),
(r"sed -n '1,60p' foo\#bar.py", True),
("sed -n '/# marker/p' foo.py", True),
# Literal hashes must not hide real in-place options that follow them.
("sed -n '1,60p' foo#bar.py -i", False),
("sed -n '1,60p' 'foo#bar.py' -i", False),
(r"sed -n '1,60p' foo\#bar.py -i", False),
(r"sed -n '1,60p' foo\ #bar.py -i", False),
("sed -n '/# marker/p' foo.py -i", False),
("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py -i # --quiet", False),
("sed -n 'unterminated # quote", False),
],
)
def test_sed_shell_comments_and_literal_hashes(command: str, expected: bool) -> None:
assert _is_read_command(command) is expected