Files
headroom/tests/test_proxy_hardening.py
673831a456 fix(proxy): answer /api/hello probes behind the token gate, log rejection context (#4150)
## Description

With `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` set, every Anthropic SDK client logs a
`proxy_auth_rejected` line once per process, Claude Code included and
even when it is configured correctly. Claude Code sends an
unauthenticated `HEAD /api/hello` reachability probe. That probe never
carries `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS`, so it cannot hold the proxy token:
it gets a 401, which the client ignores, and the rejection lands in the
log. On a busy deployment these lines bury real rejections.

Behind a gateway, the rejection line also showed only the gateway's peer
address, so a rejected caller could not be identified.

This PR:

1. **Answers the probe locally, behind the token.** The HTTP security
gate lets GET/HEAD on exactly `/api/hello` (also under `/p/<project>`)
past the token check and marks it. Extension middleware still runs, so
an extension can still refuse it. The `/api/hello` passthrough route
answers a marked probe with an empty 200 (the gate adds the security
headers) and never relays it. This only happens when a token is
configured. It is deliberately **not** added to `_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS`,
which would hand the probe to the passthrough relay: an anonymous
upstream request (to Anthropic since #4059, to the OpenAI default target
before it). Without a token, the probe keeps its #4059 route unchanged.
2. **Gives the rejection line context.** `proxy_auth_rejected` (HTTP and
WebSocket) adds `method=`, `ua=` and `xff=` fields. Both headers are
caller-controlled, so neither is logged as received; each maps to a
fixed vocabulary:
- `ua`: the harness name `CLIENT_UA_MAP` gives the User-Agent, the same
name the outcome and cost records use (`claude-code`, `codex`, `cursor`,
`opencode`, `aider`, `copilot`, …). Failing that, the product token of a
generic HTTP client (`node`, `anthropic`, `openai`, `curl`, `mozilla`,
`python-httpx`, …). Otherwise `other`. `X-Client` is not consulted,
since it is free text.
- `xff`: the leftmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop when it parses as a plain IP
address, else `invalid`. An IPv6 zone index (`fe80::1%<zone>`) is free
text, so it counts as `invalid`. The hop is unverified, used only for
attribution, and drives no decision.
   - Either is `none` when its header is absent.
   - No credential header is read for the log.

## Type of Change

- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)

## Changes Made

- `headroom/proxy/server.py`:
- **`_security_gate`**: when a token is configured, `GET`/`HEAD` on
exactly `/api/hello`, matched on the routed path so
`/p/<project>/api/hello` counts too, skips the token check and sets
`request.state.headroom_local_hello_probe`. It then calls `call_next`
like any request, so extension middleware (installed inside the gate)
still runs and can refuse it. `POST /api/hello`, `/api/hello/` and
`/api/hello/x` still need the token.
- **New helper**: `_auth_rejection_context` returns `(ua, xff)` from the
fixed vocabulary above: `CLIENT_UA_MAP` then an allowlist of generic
clients (`_AUTH_REJECTION_CLIENTS`) for the User-Agent, and
`ipaddress.ip_address` on the first hop (from
`forwarded_policy.header_first`).
- **Both `proxy_auth_rejected` warnings** gain the new fields: the HTTP
gate gets `method=`, and the WebSocket middleware gets the same
`ua=`/`xff=` fields, so the two transports stay aligned.
- `headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py`: the provider passthrough route
answers a marked probe with an empty 200 and never relays it upstream.
- `tests/test_proxy_hardening.py`:
- **Probe answer** (`test_api_hello_probe_is_answered_locally`):
GET/HEAD on `/api/hello` and `/p/demo/api/hello` from a non-loopback
peer gets 200 with an empty body and security headers, and the
passthrough spy shows nothing relayed. `POST /p/demo/api/hello` and `GET
/p/demo/stats` still get 401. `POST /api/hello`, `GET /api/hello/x`,
`GET /api/hello/` and `GET /stats` still get 401, with nothing relayed.
With no token configured, `/api/hello` still reaches the passthrough.
- **Log line**: `claude-cli/2.1.0 (external, cli)` with
`X-Forwarded-For: 198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.9` logs `ua=claude-code
xff=198.51.100.7`. Absent headers log `ua=none xff=none`.
`test_known_clients_keep_their_proxy_wide_name` covers `claude-code`,
`codex`, `cursor`, `opencode`, `aider` behind a wrapper prefix, the
Anthropic SDK and `node`.
- **Caller text never reaches the line**
(`test_caller_text_never_reaches_the_line`): a
`PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY` in the User-Agent (bare, as a product token,
behind a fake quoted field) and in X-Forwarded-For (as the first hop, as
a zone index, as a port suffix) never appears in the line, which logs
`other`/`invalid` instead. CR/LF in either header maps to
`other`/`invalid` (tested on the helper directly, since an HTTP client
refuses to send CR/LF).
- **No credentials**: neither the configured token, a wrong
`x-headroom-proxy-token`, `Authorization: Bearer …` nor `x-api-key` ever
appears in the line.
- **WebSocket**: the rejection line matches the HTTP gate's, and the
same canary in both headers never appears in it
(`test_rejection_log_keeps_caller_text_out`).
- `tests/test_proxy_extension_ordering.py`:
- **Extension policy**
(`test_api_hello_probe_still_runs_extension_policy`): an extension that
answers 403 to everything gets the token-less GET/HEAD probe and refuses
it.

## Testing

- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed

### Test Output

```text
$ python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_hardening.py tests/test_anthropic_hello_probe_routing.py \
    tests/test_provider_proxy_routes.py tests/test_provider_route_specs.py \
    tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_extension_ordering.py \
    tests/test_proxy_bind_policy.py tests/test_auth_mode.py -q
365 passed in 78.96s

$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_hardening.py
All checks passed!
$ ruff format --check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_hardening.py
2 files already formatted

$ python -m mypy headroom/proxy/server.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```

## Real Behavior Proof

- Environment: this branch on Windows 11 with Python 3.13. Ran `headroom
proxy --port 18787` from the worktree with a throwaway
`HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN`.
- Exact command / steps: `curl -I http://127.0.0.1:18787/api/hello`,
`curl http://127.0.0.1:18787/api/hello`, then checked the proxy log.
- Observed result: HEAD and GET returned `200` with 0 bytes and
`x-content-type-options: nosniff`, `x-frame-options: DENY`,
`referrer-policy: no-referrer` and `strict-transport-security`. The
proxy log has no `proxy_inbound_request` and no `outbound_headers` line
for either probe, so nothing was forwarded. For contrast, a loopback
`POST /api/hello` (loopback is token-exempt, existing behavior) logs
`forwarder=openai_passthrough`.
- Not tested: the new rejection-line fields behind a real gateway. They
were checked against a real non-loopback peer, below.

Rejection diagnostics, at `d70ec3c` (contains current `main`): the same
worktree proxy, bound to a non-loopback LAN address (`--host
192.168.0.48 --port 18787 --no-optimize`, `HEADROOM_OFFLINE=1`) with a
throwaway token, called from that address:

```text
GET /stats  UA=PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY  XFF=PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY, 192.0.2.1          -> 401
GET /stats  UA=claude-cli/2.1.0 (external, cli)  XFF=198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.9                -> 401
GET /stats  UA=codex-cli/0.46.0                                                             -> 401
GET /stats  UA=PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY/9 opencode/1.2.3                                   -> 401
GET /stats  no UA, no XFF                                                                   -> 401
GET /stats  UA=PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY/1.0  XFF=fe80::1%PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY         -> 401
GET /stats  valid x-headroom-proxy-token                                                    -> 200
HEAD /api/hello                                                                             -> 200
WS upgrade /v1/responses  UA=PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY  XFF=PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY       -> 403

event=proxy_auth_rejected method=GET path=/stats client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=other xff=invalid
event=proxy_auth_rejected method=GET path=/stats client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=claude-code xff=198.51.100.7
event=proxy_auth_rejected method=GET path=/stats client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=codex xff=none
event=proxy_auth_rejected method=GET path=/stats client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=opencode xff=none
event=proxy_auth_rejected method=GET path=/stats client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=none xff=none
event=proxy_auth_rejected method=GET path=/stats client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=other xff=invalid
event=proxy_auth_rejected transport=websocket path=/v1/responses client=192.168.0.48 reason=missing_token ua=other xff=invalid

$ grep -c PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY proxy.out
0
```

The HEAD `/api/hello` probe from that non-loopback peer logs
`proxy_inbound_request` / `proxy_inbound_response` (`status=200`,
`response_content_length=0`) and no `outbound_headers` line. Since
`d125805` the probe runs through the inbound request logging like any
routed request; it is still never forwarded. The loopback run above
predates that commit.

## Runtime Rollout Safety

- Rollout-managed feature(s): none.
- Minimum rollout channel: n/a.
- Stable/default behavior changed: only when `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` is
set. GET/HEAD `/api/hello` then gets a local 200 instead of a 401, and
the rejection line gains three fields. Answered probes appear in the
inbound request log (`proxy_inbound_request` / `proxy_inbound_response`)
instead of as `proxy_auth_rejected` warnings. With no token, behavior is
unchanged.
- Kill switch / disable path: none needed. The probe answer carries no
data and makes no upstream call.
- Unsafe override required: no.
- Qualification impact: log parsers that match the exact old
`proxy_auth_rejected` line need to accept the extra trailing fields. The
`path=`, `client=` and `reason=` fields are unchanged; the HTTP line now
starts with `method=` before `path=`.
- Rollback path: revert the commit.

## Review Readiness

- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review

## Checklist

- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` — it is generated by
release-please from my Conventional Commit PR title (a CI guard enforces
this)

## Screenshots (if applicable)

N/A

## Additional Notes

- Documentation: N/A. The docs don't list the token-exempt paths or the
`proxy_auth_rejected` format.
- Why only when a token is configured: without a token, the #4059
passthrough route is fine. Answering locally only matters when the
alternative is a 401 for every client.
- `xff` is not resolved through `HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS`:
the gate runs before forwarded-header resolution, and resolving here
would emit untrusted-peer events on every rejection. It is logged only
as a validated IP literal (or `invalid`/`none`), unverified, for
attribution.
- `ua` reuses `CLIENT_UA_MAP`, so a harness added there is named in the
rejection line too. Generic clients outside `_AUTH_REJECTION_CLIENTS`
log `other`; adding one is a one-line change.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

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### Maintainer combined-tree qualification

On the integration with main `31dcaf41`, all 375 focused hardening,
hello-routing, provider-route/spec, loopback, extension-ordering,
bind-policy, and auth-mode tests passed on Windows/Python 3.12 using the
existing native extension. Changed-file lint, formatting, and whitespace
checks passed. The provider-route insertion conflict retains the PR
local-probe early return before main per-request upstream-override
processing; AST comparison proves the combined route is the unchanged PR
guard followed by the unchanged main route body. The probe test now also
supplies a loopback or metadata-address upstream override and confirms
the response stays empty/local with nothing relayed. This checks the
integration boundary without rewriting contributor authorization or
forwarding logic. Hosted qualification for the published sync remains
pending.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: JD Davis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-11-04 22:38:51 -06:00

1120 lines
44 KiB
Python

"""Tests for the Tier-2 pilot hardening features:
- 2.1 optional inbound auth token (HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN) on the data plane
- 3.1 response security headers
- 2.4 admin/state-mutating audit log
- 2.2 air-gap master switch (HEADROOM_OFFLINE)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import logging
import httpx
import pytest
pytest.importorskip("fastapi")
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from headroom.cache.compression_store import reset_compression_store
from headroom.offline import apply_offline_env, is_offline
from headroom.proxy.audit import is_auditable_path
from headroom.proxy.handlers.openai import OpenAIHandlerMixin
from headroom.proxy.server import (
ProxyConfig,
WebSocketAuthMiddleware,
create_app,
scrub_proxy_token_headers,
)
NONLOOPBACK = ("203.0.113.5", 44444) # TEST-NET-3, never loopback
LOOPBACK = ("127.0.0.1", 12345)
def _make_app(**overrides):
reset_compression_store()
config = ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
**overrides,
)
return create_app(config)
def test_create_app_accepts_test_net_host_without_transport_validation(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
# No transport-level validation of the host string — but a non-loopback
# bind with no token is an *acknowledged* open bind, never a silent one
# (see test_proxy_bind_policy.py for the refusal path).
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_BIND", "1")
app = _make_app(host="203.0.113.5", proxy_token=None)
assert app is not None
# ───────────────────────────── 2.1 inbound auth token ─────────────────────
class TestInboundAuthToken:
def test_no_token_configured_leaves_data_plane_open(self):
"""Default (no token): non-loopback callers are not challenged."""
app = _make_app()
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
assert c.get("/livez").status_code == 200
def test_token_set_rejects_nonloopback_without_credential(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.get("/stats")
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_token_set_accepts_correct_bearer(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.get("/stats", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer s3cr3t-token"})
assert resp.status_code != 401
def test_token_set_accepts_custom_header(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.get("/stats", headers={"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": "s3cr3t-token"})
assert resp.status_code != 401
def test_token_set_accepts_custom_header_with_upstream_oauth(self):
"""The upstream OAuth bearer must not override the proxy credential."""
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.get(
"/stats",
headers={
"Authorization": "Bearer oauth-subscription-token",
"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": "s3cr3t-token",
},
)
assert resp.status_code != 401
def test_token_set_rejects_wrong_token(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.get("/stats", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer wrong"})
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_loopback_is_exempt_from_token(self):
"""Loopback callers (same trust boundary as admin routes) skip the token."""
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
assert c.get("/stats").status_code != 401
def test_missing_peer_address_is_not_loopback(self):
"""No ``scope["client"]`` (UDS, adapters) must fail closed, not open.
``is_loopback_host(None)`` used to return True, which silently switched
the token gate off for any transport that leaves the peer unset.
"""
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=None) as c: # type: ignore[arg-type]
assert c.get("/stats").status_code == 401
ok = c.get("/stats", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer s3cr3t-token"})
assert ok.status_code != 401
def test_health_endpoints_exempt_even_nonloopback(self):
"""Orchestrator health probes must work without the token."""
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
assert c.get("/livez").status_code == 200
assert c.get("/readyz").status_code in (200, 503) # ready/not-ready, never 401
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("method", "path"),
[
("GET", "/healthz"), # no Python route: lands on the catch-all
("POST", "/health"),
("PUT", "/livez"),
("DELETE", "/readyz"),
("HEAD", "/livez"), # @app.get does not register HEAD
],
)
def test_health_exemption_does_not_reach_passthrough(self, monkeypatch, method, path):
"""Only GET probes are exempt from the token.
Any other request on a health path is not served by the health handler
but by the catch-all passthrough, which relays it upstream. Exempting
those turned the proxy into an unauthenticated relay.
"""
relayed: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
async def _spy_passthrough(self, request, base_url, *args, **kwargs):
relayed.append((request.method, request.url.path))
return JSONResponse({"relayed_to": base_url})
monkeypatch.setattr(OpenAIHandlerMixin, "handle_passthrough", _spy_passthrough)
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert relayed == []
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", ["/api/hello", "/p/demo/api/hello"])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method", ["GET", "HEAD"])
@pytest.mark.parametrize("override", [None, "http://127.0.0.1:1", "http://169.254.169.254"])
def test_api_hello_probe_is_answered_locally(self, monkeypatch, method, path, override):
"""The SDK reachability probe never carries custom headers, so it can't
hold the token. It is answered locally: 200, empty, never relayed, also
under a /p/<project> base URL."""
relayed: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
async def _spy_passthrough(self, request, base_url, *args, **kwargs):
relayed.append((request.method, request.url.path))
return JSONResponse({"relayed_to": base_url})
monkeypatch.setattr(OpenAIHandlerMixin, "handle_passthrough", _spy_passthrough)
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.request(
method,
path,
headers={"x-headroom-base-url": override} if override else None,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.content == b""
assert resp.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] == "nosniff"
assert relayed == []
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("method", "path"),
[
("POST", "/api/hello"),
("GET", "/api/hello/x"),
("GET", "/api/hello/"),
("POST", "/p/demo/api/hello"),
("GET", "/p/demo/stats"),
("GET", "/stats"),
],
)
def test_api_hello_answer_is_exact(self, monkeypatch, method, path):
"""Only GET/HEAD on exactly /api/hello skips the token."""
relayed: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
async def _spy_passthrough(self, request, base_url, *args, **kwargs):
relayed.append((request.method, request.url.path))
return JSONResponse({"relayed_to": base_url})
monkeypatch.setattr(OpenAIHandlerMixin, "handle_passthrough", _spy_passthrough)
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.request(method, path)
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert relayed == []
def test_api_hello_without_token_is_left_to_the_passthrough(self, monkeypatch):
"""No token configured: the probe keeps its normal Anthropic route."""
relayed: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
async def _spy_passthrough(self, request, base_url, *args, **kwargs):
relayed.append((request.method, request.url.path))
return JSONResponse({"relayed_to": base_url})
monkeypatch.setattr(OpenAIHandlerMixin, "handle_passthrough", _spy_passthrough)
app = _make_app()
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
c.get("/api/hello")
assert relayed == [("GET", "/api/hello")]
@contextlib.contextmanager
def _captured_proxy_warnings():
"""Collect ``headroom.proxy`` log messages (attached to the logger itself:
the proxy's logging setup controls propagation, so caplog can miss them)."""
messages: list[str] = []
class _Capture(logging.Handler):
def emit(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> None:
messages.append(record.getMessage())
handler = _Capture(level=logging.WARNING)
proxy_logger = logging.getLogger("headroom.proxy")
previous_level = proxy_logger.level
proxy_logger.setLevel(logging.WARNING)
proxy_logger.addHandler(handler)
try:
yield messages
finally:
proxy_logger.removeHandler(handler)
proxy_logger.setLevel(previous_level)
def _rejections(messages: list[str]) -> list[str]:
return [m for m in messages if "event=proxy_auth_rejected" in m]
# Stands in for anything sensitive a caller may put in a header.
CANARY = "PRIVATE_CREDENTIAL_CANARY"
class TestAuthRejectionLog:
"""``proxy_auth_rejected`` carries enough to attribute a caller behind a
gateway (method, User-Agent, leftmost X-Forwarded-For hop), and never a
credential."""
def test_line_carries_method_client_and_first_forwarded_hop(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
c.get(
"/stats",
headers={
"User-Agent": "claude-cli/2.1.0 (external, cli)",
"X-Forwarded-For": "198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.9",
},
)
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert "method=GET path=/stats" in line
assert "reason=missing_token" in line
assert line.endswith("ua=claude-code xff=198.51.100.7")
def test_absent_headers_log_as_none(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
c.get("/stats", headers={"User-Agent": ""})
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert line.endswith("ua=none xff=none")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("user_agent", "forwarded_for", "tail"),
[
(CANARY, f"{CANARY}, 192.0.2.1", "ua=other xff=invalid"),
(f"{CANARY}/1.0", "192.0.2.1", "ua=other xff=192.0.2.1"),
(f'curl" xff="{CANARY}', f"fe80::1%{CANARY}", "ua=other xff=invalid"),
("node", f"192.0.2.1:{CANARY}", "ua=node xff=invalid"),
(f"{CANARY}/9 opencode/1.2.3", "192.0.2.1", "ua=opencode xff=192.0.2.1"),
],
)
def test_caller_text_never_reaches_the_line(self, user_agent, forwarded_for, tail):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
c.get(
"/stats", headers={"User-Agent": user_agent, "X-Forwarded-For": forwarded_for}
)
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert CANARY not in line
assert line.endswith(tail)
def test_path_cannot_smuggle_control_characters(self):
# The ASGI server percent-decodes the path. Starlette's URL parsing
# drops CR/LF/TAB from request.url.path, but every other control
# character (NUL, ESC for terminal escapes, U+2028) reaches the line.
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
c.get("/stats%0D%0A%1B%5B1Aevent=forged%00%E2%80%A8")
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert line.isprintable()
assert "path=/stats\\x1b[1Aevent=forged\\x00\\u2028 client=" in line
def test_context_is_a_fixed_vocabulary(self):
# Exercised directly: an HTTP client refuses to send CR/LF in a header,
# but an ASGI server in front of the proxy is not guaranteed to.
from headroom.proxy.server import _auth_rejection_context
assert _auth_rejection_context(
{"user-agent": "curl\r\nevent=forged", "x-forwarded-for": "192.0.2.1\r\nevent=forged"}
) == ("other", "invalid")
assert _auth_rejection_context(
{"user-agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0)", "x-forwarded-for": "2001:DB8::1"}
) == ("mozilla", "2001:db8::1")
assert _auth_rejection_context({}) == ("none", "none")
# X-Client is free text, so it never names the client here.
assert _auth_rejection_context({"user-agent": "x", "x-client": "claude-code"}) == (
"other",
"none",
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("user_agent", "client"),
[
("claude-cli/2.1.0 (external, cli)", "claude-code"),
("claude-code/2.0.14", "claude-code"),
("codex-cli/0.46.0", "codex"),
("Cursor/1.7.0", "cursor"),
("opencode/1.2.3", "opencode"),
("CorpWrapper/3.1 aider/0.86", "aider"),
("Anthropic/Python 0.69.0", "anthropic"),
("node", "node"),
],
)
def test_known_clients_keep_their_proxy_wide_name(self, user_agent, client):
# Harnesses log under the same name the rest of the proxy gives them
# (CLIENT_UA_MAP); generic HTTP clients under their product token.
from headroom.proxy.server import _auth_rejection_context
assert _auth_rejection_context({"user-agent": user_agent}) == (client, "none")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"headers",
[
{"Authorization": "Bearer wrong-bearer-value"},
{
"x-headroom-proxy-token": "wrong-header-value",
"Authorization": "Bearer sk-ant-oat01-upstream-oauth",
},
{"x-api-key": "sk-ant-api03-provider-key"},
],
)
def test_no_credential_ever_reaches_the_line(self, headers):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
c.post("/v1/messages", headers={"User-Agent": "claude-cli/2.1", **headers})
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert "method=POST" in line
for secret in ("s3cr3t-token", *headers.values()):
assert secret.removeprefix("Bearer ") not in line
assert "authorization" not in line.lower()
# ──────────────────── 2.1b inbound auth token over WebSocket ──────────────
WS_PATHS = ("/v1/responses", "/v1/live")
class _SpyApp:
"""Downstream ASGI app that records whether it was ever reached."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.called = False
async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send) -> None:
self.called = True
def _ws_scope(*, client=NONLOOPBACK, headers=(), path="/v1/responses"):
return {
"type": "websocket",
"path": path,
"client": client,
"headers": [(k.lower().encode("latin-1"), v.encode("latin-1")) for k, v in headers],
}
async def _drive(middleware, scope):
"""Run one connection through the middleware, returning (sent, downstream)."""
inbox = [{"type": "websocket.connect"}]
sent: list[dict] = []
async def receive():
return inbox.pop(0) if inbox else {"type": "websocket.disconnect"}
async def send(message):
sent.append(message)
await middleware(scope, receive, send)
return sent
def _closed_with_policy_violation(sent) -> bool:
return any(m.get("type") == "websocket.close" and m.get("code") == 1008 for m in sent)
class TestWebSocketAuthMiddleware:
"""The middleware itself, driven directly over ASGI.
Asserted at this layer because a pre-accept close surfaces through
``TestClient`` as a bare ``AttributeError`` — indistinguishable from any
other handshake failure — so an exception-shape assertion would pass for
the wrong reason.
"""
async def test_rejects_missing_credential(self):
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope())
assert downstream.called is False
assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_rejects_wrong_credential(self):
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("authorization", "Bearer wrong")]))
assert downstream.called is False
assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_rejection_log_matches_the_http_gate(self):
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(_SpyApp(), proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
scope = _ws_scope(
headers=[
("user-agent", "node"),
("x-forwarded-for", "198.51.100.8, 10.0.0.1"),
("authorization", "Bearer wrong-ws-bearer"),
]
)
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
await _drive(mw, scope)
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert "transport=websocket" in line and "reason=bad_token" in line
assert line.endswith("ua=node xff=198.51.100.8")
async def test_rejection_log_keeps_caller_text_out(self):
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(_SpyApp(), proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
scope = _ws_scope(
headers=[
("user-agent", CANARY),
("x-forwarded-for", f"{CANARY}, 192.0.2.1"),
]
)
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
await _drive(mw, scope)
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert CANARY not in line
assert line.endswith("ua=other xff=invalid")
assert "wrong-ws-bearer" not in line and "s3cr3t-token" not in line
async def test_rejection_log_path_cannot_forge_a_line(self):
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(_SpyApp(), proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
scope = _ws_scope(path="/v1/responses\r\nevent=proxy_auth_rejected")
with _captured_proxy_warnings() as messages:
await _drive(mw, scope)
(line,) = _rejections(messages)
assert "\r" not in line and "\n" not in line
assert "path=/v1/responses\\r\\nevent=proxy_auth_rejected " in line
async def test_accepts_correct_bearer(self):
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token")]))
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_accepts_custom_header(self):
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("x-headroom-proxy-token", "s3cr3t-token")]))
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_accepts_custom_header_with_upstream_oauth(self):
"""The upstream OAuth bearer must not override the proxy credential."""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(
mw,
_ws_scope(
headers=[
("authorization", "Bearer oauth-subscription-token"),
("x-headroom-proxy-token", "s3cr3t-token"),
]
),
)
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_loopback_is_exempt(self):
"""Same trust boundary the HTTP gate already grants loopback.
Both gates the HTTP admin guards apply: loopback peer *and* loopback
``Host`` header (a real handshake always carries one).
"""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(client=LOOPBACK, headers=[("host", "127.0.0.1:8787")]))
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_loopback_peer_with_foreign_host_header_is_not_exempt(self):
"""DNS rebinding: a local browser reaching 127.0.0.1 still says Host: attacker.
The HTTP admin routes have checked Host since the loopback guard was
written; the WebSocket gate checked the peer only. Same rule now.
"""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(
mw, _ws_scope(client=LOOPBACK, headers=[("host", "attacker.example:8787")])
)
assert downstream.called is False
assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_loopback_peer_with_foreign_host_but_valid_token_passes(self):
"""The Host check only decides the *exemption*; the token still works."""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(
mw,
_ws_scope(
client=LOOPBACK,
headers=[
("host", "attacker.example:8787"),
("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token"),
],
),
)
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_unknown_client_is_not_loopback(self):
"""Mirrors is_loopback_host(None) -> False: fail closed, like the HTTP gate."""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(client=None, headers=[("host", "127.0.0.1")]))
assert downstream.called is False
assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_repeated_header_resolves_like_the_http_gate(self):
"""A duplicated Authorization must mean the same thing on both transports.
Starlette's Headers (what the HTTP gate reads) returns the FIRST
occurrence. A hand-built dict returns the last, which would let the two
paths disagree about which credential counted.
"""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(
mw,
_ws_scope(
headers=[
("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token"),
("authorization", "Bearer wrong"),
]
),
)
# First header wins → authenticated, same as the HTTP gate.
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_no_token_configured_is_a_passthrough(self):
"""Default deployment must gain no new challenge."""
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token=None)
sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope())
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
async def test_http_scope_is_left_to_the_http_gate(self):
downstream = _SpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
sent = await _drive(mw, {**_ws_scope(), "type": "http"})
assert downstream.called is True
assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
class TestWebSocketRoutesAreGatedInTheApp:
"""The middleware is actually wired into ``create_app``.
Asserts the security property directly — the route handler must never run
for an unauthenticated handshake — rather than inspecting the exception the
client happens to see.
"""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WS_PATHS)
def test_unauthenticated_handshake_never_reaches_the_handler(self, path, monkeypatch):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
reached = _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch)
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
try:
with c.websocket_connect(path):
pass
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - the refusal shape is asserted above
pass
assert reached() is False
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WS_PATHS)
def test_authenticated_handshake_reaches_the_handler(self, path, monkeypatch):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
reached = _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch)
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
try:
with c.websocket_connect(path, headers={"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": "s3cr3t-token"}):
pass
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - route may fail with no upstream
pass
assert reached() is True
def _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch):
"""Spy both WebSocket route families; returns a callable reporting arrival."""
from headroom.providers import proxy_routes
seen: list[str] = []
# Each spy must terminate the handshake itself: a handler that returns
# without accepting or closing leaves the client waiting forever.
async def _responses_spy(websocket):
seen.append("responses")
await websocket.close(code=1000)
async def _live_spy(websocket, *args, **kwargs):
seen.append("live")
await websocket.close(code=1000)
monkeypatch.setattr(app.state.proxy, "handle_openai_responses_ws", _responses_spy)
monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_routes, "handle_codex_live_websocket", _live_spy)
return lambda: bool(seen)
# ─────────────── 2.1c the proxy token never reaches an upstream ───────────
TOKEN = "s3cr3t-token"
class _CapturingTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):
"""Upstream stand-in that records every request the proxy sends it."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.requests: list[httpx.Request] = []
async def handle_async_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
self.requests.append(request)
if "chat/completions" in str(request.url):
body = {
"id": "chatcmpl-mock",
"object": "chat.completion",
"created": 1,
"model": "gpt-4o",
"choices": [
{
"index": 0,
"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": "hi"},
"finish_reason": "stop",
}
],
"usage": {"prompt_tokens": 1, "completion_tokens": 1, "total_tokens": 2},
}
elif "/v1/messages" in str(request.url):
body = {
"id": "msg_mock",
"type": "message",
"role": "assistant",
"content": [{"type": "text", "text": "hi"}],
"usage": {"input_tokens": 1, "output_tokens": 1},
}
else:
body = {"object": "list", "data": []}
return httpx.Response(200, headers={"content-type": "application/json"}, json=body)
@contextlib.contextmanager
def _upstream_capturing_client(*, client=NONLOOPBACK, base_url="http://testserver"):
reset_compression_store()
config = ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
anthropic_api_url="https://api.anthropic.test",
openai_api_url="https://api.openai.test",
proxy_token=TOKEN,
)
app = create_app(config)
transport = _CapturingTransport()
with TestClient(app, base_url=base_url, client=client) as c:
# Startup builds the real upstream client, so swap it only after
# entering the lifespan or requests would leave the test process.
app.state.proxy.http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport)
yield c, transport
def _anthropic_request(c, headers):
return c.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01", **headers},
json={
"model": "claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}],
"max_tokens": 16,
},
)
def _only_upstream_request(transport) -> httpx.Request:
assert len(transport.requests) == 1, transport.requests
return transport.requests[0]
class TestProxyTokenIsNotForwardedUpstream:
"""The proxy credential authenticates to Headroom only.
Handlers build upstream headers from the inbound request and strip only
``x-headroom-*``, so a token sent as ``Authorization: Bearer`` used to be
relayed to the provider verbatim. These tests capture what actually leaves
the proxy.
"""
def test_bearer_token_is_dropped_and_provider_key_kept(self):
with _upstream_capturing_client() as (c, transport):
resp = _anthropic_request(
c, {"x-api-key": "sk-ant-test", "Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"}
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
upstream = _only_upstream_request(transport)
assert "authorization" not in upstream.headers
assert upstream.headers["x-api-key"] == "sk-ant-test"
assert TOKEN not in str(upstream.headers.raw)
def test_lowercase_scheme_is_dropped_too(self):
"""The gate accepts ``bearer`` in any case, so the scrub must as well."""
with _upstream_capturing_client() as (c, transport):
resp = _anthropic_request(
c, {"x-api-key": "sk-ant-test", "Authorization": f"bearer {TOKEN}"}
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert "authorization" not in _only_upstream_request(transport).headers
def test_custom_header_is_dropped_and_provider_bearer_kept(self):
with _upstream_capturing_client() as (c, transport):
resp = c.post(
"/v1/chat/completions",
headers={"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": TOKEN, "Authorization": "Bearer sk-test"},
json={"model": "gpt-4o", "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
upstream = _only_upstream_request(transport)
assert upstream.headers["authorization"] == "Bearer sk-test"
assert "x-headroom-proxy-token" not in upstream.headers
def test_custom_header_is_dropped_even_with_internal_strip_disabled(self, monkeypatch):
"""``HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled`` must not leak the credential."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS", "disabled")
with _upstream_capturing_client() as (c, transport):
resp = _anthropic_request(
c, {"x-api-key": "sk-ant-test", "X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": TOKEN}
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert "x-headroom-proxy-token" not in _only_upstream_request(transport).headers
def test_loopback_caller_token_is_dropped(self):
"""Loopback skips the check, but its token is still not the provider's."""
with _upstream_capturing_client(client=LOOPBACK, base_url="http://127.0.0.1") as (
c,
transport,
):
resp = _anthropic_request(
c, {"x-api-key": "sk-ant-test", "Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"}
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert "authorization" not in _only_upstream_request(transport).headers
def test_catch_all_passthrough_drops_bearer_token(self):
with _upstream_capturing_client() as (c, transport):
resp = c.get(
"/v1/models",
headers={"x-api-key": "sk-ant-test", "Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
upstream = _only_upstream_request(transport)
assert "authorization" not in upstream.headers
assert upstream.headers["x-api-key"] == "sk-ant-test"
class TestScrubProxyTokenHeaders:
"""The scope-level scrub both gates share."""
@staticmethod
def _scope(*headers):
return {"headers": [(k.encode("latin-1"), v.encode("latin-1")) for k, v in headers]}
def test_drops_matching_bearer_keeps_other_headers(self):
scope = self._scope(("authorization", f"Bearer {TOKEN}"), ("x-api-key", "sk-ant"))
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, TOKEN.encode())
assert scope["headers"] == [(b"x-api-key", b"sk-ant")]
def test_keeps_non_matching_bearer(self):
scope = self._scope(("authorization", "Bearer sk-provider"))
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, TOKEN.encode())
assert scope["headers"] == [(b"authorization", b"Bearer sk-provider")]
def test_keeps_non_bearer_authorization(self):
scope = self._scope(("authorization", f"Basic {TOKEN}"))
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, TOKEN.encode())
assert scope["headers"] == [(b"authorization", f"Basic {TOKEN}".encode())]
def test_duplicate_authorization_drops_only_the_token(self):
scope = self._scope(
("authorization", f"Bearer {TOKEN}"),
("authorization", "Bearer sk-provider"),
)
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, TOKEN.encode())
assert scope["headers"] == [(b"authorization", b"Bearer sk-provider")]
def test_custom_header_dropped_even_without_configured_token(self):
scope = self._scope(("x-headroom-proxy-token", "anything"), ("x-api-key", "sk-ant"))
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, b"")
assert scope["headers"] == [(b"x-api-key", b"sk-ant")]
def test_no_configured_token_leaves_authorization_alone(self):
scope = self._scope(("authorization", f"Bearer {TOKEN}"))
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, b"")
assert scope["headers"] == [(b"authorization", f"Bearer {TOKEN}".encode())]
def test_non_ascii_header_value_does_not_raise(self):
scope = {"headers": [(b"authorization", "Bearer café".encode("latin-1"))]}
scrub_proxy_token_headers(scope, TOKEN.encode())
assert len(scope["headers"]) == 1
class _HeaderSpyApp:
"""Downstream ASGI app that records the headers it was handed."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.headers: list[tuple[bytes, bytes]] | None = None
async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send) -> None:
self.headers = list(scope["headers"])
class TestWebSocketScrubsProxyToken:
@pytest.mark.parametrize("client", [NONLOOPBACK, LOOPBACK])
async def test_bearer_token_removed_before_the_app(self, client):
downstream = _HeaderSpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token=TOKEN)
await _drive(
mw,
_ws_scope(
client=client,
headers=[("authorization", f"Bearer {TOKEN}"), ("x-api-key", "sk-ant")],
),
)
assert downstream.headers == [(b"x-api-key", b"sk-ant")]
@pytest.mark.parametrize("token_header", ["authorization", "x-headroom-proxy-token"])
async def test_loopback_exempt_handshake_is_still_scrubbed(self, token_header):
# Loopback peer *and* loopback Host takes the token exemption; the
# exemption must not skip the scrub, or a local client that sends the
# token anyway has it forwarded upstream.
downstream = _HeaderSpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token=TOKEN)
value = f"Bearer {TOKEN}" if token_header == "authorization" else TOKEN
await _drive(
mw,
_ws_scope(
client=LOOPBACK,
headers=[
("host", "127.0.0.1:8787"),
(token_header, value),
("x-api-key", "sk-ant"),
],
),
)
assert downstream.headers == [(b"host", b"127.0.0.1:8787"), (b"x-api-key", b"sk-ant")]
async def test_custom_header_removed_provider_bearer_kept(self):
downstream = _HeaderSpyApp()
mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token=TOKEN)
await _drive(
mw,
_ws_scope(
headers=[
("authorization", "Bearer sk-provider"),
("x-headroom-proxy-token", TOKEN),
]
),
)
assert downstream.headers == [(b"authorization", b"Bearer sk-provider")]
def test_responses_route_handler_never_sees_the_token(self, monkeypatch):
app = _make_app(proxy_token=TOKEN)
seen: list[dict[str, str]] = []
async def _responses_spy(websocket):
seen.append(dict(websocket.headers))
await websocket.close(code=1000)
monkeypatch.setattr(app.state.proxy, "handle_openai_responses_ws", _responses_spy)
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
try:
with c.websocket_connect(
"/v1/responses", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"}
):
pass
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - spy closes the socket immediately
pass
assert len(seen) == 1
assert "authorization" not in seen[0]
# ───────────────────────────── 3.1 security headers ───────────────────────
class TestSecurityHeaders:
def test_headers_present_on_responses(self):
app = _make_app()
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
h = c.get("/livez").headers
assert h.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
assert h.get("X-Frame-Options") == "DENY"
assert h.get("Referrer-Policy") == "no-referrer"
assert "max-age=" in h.get("Strict-Transport-Security", "")
def test_headers_present_on_401(self):
app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
resp = c.get("/stats")
assert resp.status_code == 401
assert resp.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
# ───────────────────────────── 2.4 admin audit log ────────────────────────
class TestAdminAuditLog:
def test_auditable_path_classification(self):
assert is_auditable_path("/admin/runtime-env")
assert is_auditable_path("/cache/clear")
assert is_auditable_path("/stats/reset")
assert not is_auditable_path("/v1/messages")
assert not is_auditable_path("/livez")
def test_cache_clear_emits_audit_event(self):
# Capture the dedicated audit logger directly (the proxy's logging setup
# configures propagation, so attach to the logger rather than rely on
# caplog's root handler).
messages: list[str] = []
class _Capture(logging.Handler):
def emit(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> None:
messages.append(record.getMessage())
handler = _Capture()
audit_logger = logging.getLogger("headroom.audit")
audit_logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
audit_logger.addHandler(handler)
try:
app = _make_app()
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
assert c.post("/cache/clear").status_code == 200
finally:
audit_logger.removeHandler(handler)
assert messages, "expected an audit record for /cache/clear"
assert any("/cache/clear" in m for m in messages)
assert any("headroom_admin_audit" in m for m in messages)
assert any('"source_ip": "127.0.0.1"' in m for m in messages)
# ───────────────────────────── 2.2 air-gap switch ─────────────────────────
class TestOfflineSwitch:
def test_is_offline_reads_env(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", raising=False)
assert is_offline() is False
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
assert is_offline() is True
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "off")
assert is_offline() is False
def test_offline_disables_telemetry(self, monkeypatch):
from headroom.telemetry.beacon import is_telemetry_enabled
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_TELEMETRY", "on")
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
assert is_telemetry_enabled() is False # offline overrides the opt-in
def test_offline_disables_update_check(self, monkeypatch):
from headroom.update_check import is_update_check_enabled
monkeypatch.delenv("CI", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_STATELESS", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
assert is_update_check_enabled() is False
def test_apply_offline_env_sets_hf_offline(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.delenv("HF_HUB_OFFLINE", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("TRANSFORMERS_OFFLINE", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
apply_offline_env()
import os
assert os.environ.get("HF_HUB_OFFLINE") == "1"
assert os.environ.get("TRANSFORMERS_OFFLINE") == "1"
# ─────────────────── missing peer address fails closed everywhere ───────────
def test_is_loopback_host_none_is_not_loopback() -> None:
from headroom.proxy.loopback_guard import is_loopback_host
assert is_loopback_host(None) is False
# Sanity: the genuine loopback literals are unaffected.
assert is_loopback_host("127.0.0.1") is True
assert is_loopback_host("::1") is True
assert is_loopback_host("localhost") is True
def test_require_loopback_404s_a_request_with_no_peer() -> None:
"""Admin/debug guards must not open up when ``request.client`` is None."""
from fastapi import HTTPException
from headroom.proxy.loopback_guard import require_loopback
class _NoPeerRequest:
client = None
headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:8787"}
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
require_loopback(_NoPeerRequest()) # type: ignore[arg-type]
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 404
def test_debug_route_404s_for_request_with_no_peer() -> None:
app = _make_app()
with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=None) as c: # type: ignore[arg-type]
assert c.get("/debug/tasks").status_code == 404