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fix(security): resolve high-severity CodeQL alerts (#4005)
## Description Resolves the high-severity CodeQL alerts in product code. Three are real leaks (an API key in the proxy log, a credential in an oauth2 warning, XSS in the HTML report); the rest are hardening. Closes # ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - **#63, Gemini API key written to the proxy log.** Google forwarders build `...?key=<api key>` URLs (`batch.py:442` and others) and `log_outbound_request` logged the full URL at INFO. The log line now drops the query string, fragment and userinfo, keeping scheme, host (IPv6 literals stay bracketed) and path. A URL with an invalid port logs `<unparseable>` rather than raising. - **#104, credential in an oauth2 warning.** A static header written as `Authorization: Bearer x=y` splits on the first `=`, so `Authorization: Bearer x` lands in the key, is rejected as malformed, and was echoed by the warning. The warning no longer prints the key. - **#131, XSS in the HTML report.** `model` and other request fields are client supplied. Jinja2 autoescape is now on; no report field relies on raw HTML. - **#127:** `SNOWFLAKE_HOST` must end with `.snowflakecomputing.com` instead of merely containing it. - **#19, #128, #129, #130:** the `/\/+$/` trailing-slash regex in the TS SDK and opencode plugin backtracks quadratically on long runs of `/`. Replaced with a loop. The committed wheel bundle (`headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js`) is rebuilt to match. Not changed (false positives, to dismiss): **#105** (URL already reduced to `scheme://host` by `_redact_url`) and **#109** (`token_fingerprint` is a short SHA-256 fingerprint of a high-entropy token for comparison, not password storage). ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed New tests: outbound log keeps no `key=` value or userinfo, keeps IPv6 brackets, and handles relative paths and invalid ports; the report escapes `<script>`; the Snowflake host must end with the domain; both TS trailing-slash helpers are tested on normal inputs and on a 100k-slash input (the old regex took ~5.2 s on it; the test bound is 1 s). ### Test Output ```text $ HEADROOM_REQUIRE_RUST_CORE=false pytest -q tests/test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding.py tests/test_reporting.py tests/test_provider_cortex_code.py 105 passed in 4.65s $ HEADROOM_REQUIRE_RUST_CORE=false pytest -q plugins/headroom-oauth2/tests 70 passed $ ruff check headroom/proxy/helpers.py tests/test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding.py && ruff format --check ... All checks passed! 2 files already formatted $ (cd plugins/opencode && npm run typecheck && npx vitest run) Test Files 3 passed (3) Tests 38 passed (38) $ (cd sdk/typescript && npx vitest run) Test Files 19 passed | 5 skipped (24) Tests 351 passed | 33 skipped (384) $ (cd plugins/opencode && npm run build:standalone) && cmp dist-standalone/entry.opencode.js ../../headroom/providers/opencode/_dist/entry.opencode.js (no output: bundle matches source) ``` The two oauth2 tests that start the full proxy need the Rust core, which was not built in the local worktree, so they ran with `HEADROOM_REQUIRE_RUST_CORE=false`. ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS 26 (Darwin 25.6), Python 3.12 venv, this branch at `bb634a3b`, `HEADROOM_REQUIRE_RUST_CORE=false`. A local fake Gemini upstream (Python `http.server`) listening on IPv6 `[::1]:9911`. - Exact command / steps: 1. `python fake_gemini.py` (accepts POST, logs the request path, returns `{"batch":{"name":"batches/fake"}}`) 2. `headroom proxy --port 8799 --gemini-api-url 'http://[::1]:9911'` 3. `curl -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:8799/v1beta/models/gemini-2.5-pro:batchGenerateContent' -H 'x-goog-api-key: AIzaFAKE-RUNTIME-PROOF-123' -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"batch":{"displayName":"proof","inputConfig":{"requests":{"requests":[]}}}}'` 4. `grep outbound_request proxy.log; grep -c AIzaFAKE proxy.log` - Observed result: the client got `HTTP 200`. The upstream still received the key (`/v1beta/models/gemini-2.5-pro:batchGenerateContent?key=AIzaFAKE-RUNTIME-PROOF-123`), so forwarding is unchanged. The proxy log line was `event=outbound_request forwarder=google_batch_passthrough method=POST path=http://[::1]:9911/v1beta/models/gemini-2.5-pro:batchGenerateContent body_bytes=76 ...`, and the key appeared in the proxy log **0** times. - Not tested: real Google, Snowflake or oauth2 provider endpoints; the HTML report was exercised only through unit tests; the opencode plugin was not loaded into a live opencode session; Windows. ## Runtime Rollout Safety - Rollout-managed feature(s): None. No rollout-managed feature or flag is touched. - Minimum rollout channel: Stable. These are security fixes with no opt-in behaviour. - Stable/default behavior changed: Only diagnostics and validation: the `outbound_request` log line no longer includes the query string, fragment or userinfo; the oauth2 malformed-header warning no longer prints the key; HTML report fields are escaped; a `SNOWFLAKE_HOST` that merely contains `.snowflakecomputing.com` is now rejected. Request forwarding is byte-for-byte unchanged. - Kill switch / disable path: None needed; nothing new is enabled. Reverting the PR restores the previous behaviour. - Unsafe override required: No. - Qualification impact: None. No compression, routing or token-accounting path changes. - Rollback path: Revert this PR. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` — it is generated by release-please from my Conventional Commit PR title (a CI guard enforces this) ## Additional Notes Possible overlap: #3999 also replaces the opencode trailing-slash regex. Whichever lands second will need a small rebase. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5.5
parent
5a516b54af
commit
dea9092e19
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ def default_api_url(environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
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if host:
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if host.startswith("https://"):
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return host
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if ".snowflakecomputing.com" in host:
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if host.endswith(".snowflakecomputing.com"):
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return f"https://{host}"
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return f"https://{host}.snowflakecomputing.com"
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return _FALLBACK_API_URL
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@@ -12431,8 +12431,13 @@ var _proxyUrlCache = null;
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function getDefaultProxyUrl() {
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return _proxyUrlCache ?? process.env.HEADROOM_BASE_URL ?? "http://localhost:8787";
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}
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function trimTrailingSlashes(value) {
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let end = value.length;
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while (end > 0 && value.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47) end--;
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return value.slice(0, end);
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}
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function createHeadroomRetrieveTool(config2) {
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const origin = config2.proxyBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
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const origin = trimTrailingSlashes(config2.proxyBaseUrl);
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return {
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name: "headroom_retrieve",
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description: "Retrieve original uncompressed content from Headroom's compression store. Use when compressed context mentions a hash and you need the full details. Pass the hash from the compression marker (24 hex characters). Retrieval is by hash and always returns the full original content.",
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@@ -12896,7 +12901,7 @@ function uninstallHeadroomTransport() {
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// src/plugin.ts
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function normalizeProxyUrl2(url2) {
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return url2.replace(/\/+$/, "");
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return trimTrailingSlashes(url2);
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}
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function resolveProxyUrl(options) {
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return normalizeProxyUrl2(
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
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from logging.handlers import RotatingFileHandler
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Literal, cast
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from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
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from headroom import fileperms as _fileperms
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from headroom import paths as _paths
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@@ -368,6 +369,27 @@ def sanitize_forwarded_response_headers(
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return {key: value for key, value in dict(headers).items() if key.lower() not in drop}
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def _path_for_log(path: str) -> str:
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"""Drop the query string, fragment and userinfo from an outbound URL.
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Callers pass the full upstream URL, and Google routes put the API key in
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the query (``?key=...``), so logging it verbatim writes the key to disk.
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Scheme, host and path are enough to tell forwarder calls apart.
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"""
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try:
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parts = urlsplit(path)
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port = parts.port
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except ValueError:
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return "<unparseable>"
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host = parts.hostname or ""
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# ``hostname`` drops the brackets around an IPv6 literal; put them back
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# so the logged URL still names the upstream that was contacted.
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netloc = f"[{host}]" if ":" in host else host
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if port:
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netloc = f"{netloc}:{port}"
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return urlunsplit((parts.scheme, netloc, parts.path, "", ""))
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def log_outbound_request(
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*,
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forwarder: str,
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@@ -383,8 +405,8 @@ def log_outbound_request(
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"""Structured log line for every outbound forwarder call.
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Per realignment build constraints: every cache-affecting decision is
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logged. Never includes ``Authorization``/``x-api-key`` content or full
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body bytes.
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logged. Never includes ``Authorization``/``x-api-key`` content, the URL
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query string (where Google puts ``key=``) or full body bytes.
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``dropped_mutation_reasons`` records edits that byte-faithful passthrough
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discarded before the wire. That is a WARNING, not a detail: the line above
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@@ -396,7 +418,7 @@ def log_outbound_request(
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"body_mutated=%s mutation_reasons=%s source=%s request_id=%s",
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forwarder,
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method,
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path,
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_path_for_log(path),
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body_bytes_count,
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"true" if body_mutated else "false",
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",".join(mutation_reasons) if mutation_reasons else "",
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@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ def _get_jinja2_template(template_str: str):
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try:
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from jinja2 import Template
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return Template(template_str)
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# Request fields such as ``model`` come from clients; escape them so a
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# crafted value cannot inject script into the report.
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return Template(template_str, autoescape=True)
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except ImportError as e:
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raise ImportError(
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"jinja2 is required for report generation. Install with: pip install headroom[reports]"
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@@ -39,7 +39,12 @@ def parse_headers(s: str | None) -> dict[str, str]:
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if not k:
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continue
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if _ctrl(k) or _ctrl(v) or " " in k or ":" in k:
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log.warning("headroom-oauth2: dropping malformed static header: %r", k)
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# Don't echo the key: a pair like "Authorization: Bearer x=y" lands
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# here whole, so the "key" can carry the credential itself.
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log.warning(
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"headroom-oauth2: dropping malformed static header "
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"(name has a space, colon or control character)"
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)
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continue
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out[k] = v
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return out
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@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ import type { Plugin } from "@opencode-ai/plugin";
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import { tool } from "@opencode-ai/plugin";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { createHeadroomRetrieveTool, getDefaultProxyUrl } from "./retrieve.js";
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import {
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createHeadroomRetrieveTool,
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getDefaultProxyUrl,
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trimTrailingSlashes,
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} from "./retrieve.js";
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import { installHeadroomTransport } from "./transport.js";
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export interface HeadroomOpenCodePluginOptions {
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@@ -14,7 +18,7 @@ export interface HeadroomOpenCodePluginOptions {
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}
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function normalizeProxyUrl(url: string): string {
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return url.replace(/\/+$/, "");
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return trimTrailingSlashes(url);
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}
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function resolveProxyUrl(options?: HeadroomOpenCodePluginOptions): string {
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@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
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import { trimTrailingSlashes } from "./retrieve.js";
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export interface HeadroomModelMapping {
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name: string;
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limit: {
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@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ export const DEFAULT_MODELS: Record<string, HeadroomModelMapping> = {
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export const DEFAULT_MODEL = "claude-sonnet-4-6";
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function resolveBaseUrl(options: HeadroomProviderOptions): string {
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if (options.proxyBaseUrl) return options.proxyBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
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if (options.proxyBaseUrl) return trimTrailingSlashes(options.proxyBaseUrl);
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const port = options.proxyPort ?? 8787;
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return `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { trimTrailingSlashes } from "./retrieve.js";
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describe("trimTrailingSlashes", () => {
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it.each([
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["http://localhost:8787", "http://localhost:8787"],
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["http://localhost:8787/", "http://localhost:8787"],
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["http://localhost:8787///", "http://localhost:8787"],
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["http://localhost:8787/v1/", "http://localhost:8787/v1"],
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["///", ""],
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["", ""],
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])("trims %j to %j", (input, expected) => {
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expect(trimTrailingSlashes(input)).toBe(expected);
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});
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it("runs in linear time on long runs of slashes", () => {
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// The previous /\/+$/ regex backtracked quadratically on a long run of
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// "/" that is not at the end of the string (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos).
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const slashes = "/".repeat(100_000);
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const input = `http://localhost:8787${slashes}x${slashes}`;
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const start = performance.now();
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const result = trimTrailingSlashes(input);
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expect(performance.now() - start).toBeLessThan(1000);
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expect(result).toBe(`http://localhost:8787${slashes}x`);
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});
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});
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@@ -15,8 +15,18 @@ export interface RetrieveToolConfig {
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proxyBaseUrl: string;
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}
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/**
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* Strip trailing "/" characters. A loop rather than a `+$` regex, which
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* backtracks quadratically on inputs with long runs of slashes.
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*/
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export function trimTrailingSlashes(value: string): string {
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let end = value.length;
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while (end > 0 && value.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47) end--;
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return value.slice(0, end);
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}
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export function createHeadroomRetrieveTool(config: RetrieveToolConfig) {
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const origin = config.proxyBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
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const origin = trimTrailingSlashes(config.proxyBaseUrl);
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return {
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name: "headroom_retrieve",
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@@ -75,6 +75,16 @@ export interface HeadroomParams {
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headroomToolProfiles?: Record<string, Record<string, any>>;
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}
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/**
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* Strip trailing "/" characters. A loop rather than a `+$` regex, which
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* backtracks quadratically on inputs with long runs of slashes.
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*/
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function trimTrailingSlashes(value: string): string {
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let end = value.length;
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while (end > 0 && value.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47) end--;
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return value.slice(0, end);
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}
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// --- Sub-clients ---
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class ChatCompletions {
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@@ -211,11 +221,9 @@ export class HeadroomClient implements HeadroomClientInterface {
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readonly messages: Messages;
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constructor(options: ExtendedClientOptions = {}) {
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this.baseUrl = (
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options.baseUrl ??
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getEnv("HEADROOM_BASE_URL") ??
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DEFAULT_BASE_URL
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).replace(/\/+$/, "");
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this.baseUrl = trimTrailingSlashes(
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options.baseUrl ?? getEnv("HEADROOM_BASE_URL") ?? DEFAULT_BASE_URL,
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);
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this.apiKey = options.apiKey ?? getEnv("HEADROOM_API_KEY");
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this.timeout = options.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
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this.fallback = options.fallback ?? true;
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@@ -119,6 +119,23 @@ describe("HeadroomClient", () => {
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expect(url).toBe("http://localhost:8787/v1/compress");
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});
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it("handles long runs of slashes in baseUrl in linear time", async () => {
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// The previous /\/+$/ regex backtracked quadratically on a long run of
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// "/" that is not at the end of the string (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos).
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const slashes = "/".repeat(100_000);
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mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(okResponse(sampleProxyResponse));
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const start = performance.now();
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const client = new HeadroomClient({
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baseUrl: `http://localhost:8787${slashes}x${slashes}`,
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});
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expect(performance.now() - start).toBeLessThan(1000);
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await client.compress(sampleMessages, { model: "gpt-4o" });
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const [url] = mockFetch.mock.calls[0];
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expect(url).toBe(`http://localhost:8787${slashes}x/v1/compress`);
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});
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it("throws HeadroomAuthError on 401 (always, even with fallback)", async () => {
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mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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errorResponse(401, {
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@@ -97,3 +97,10 @@ def test_cortex_code_install_registry_unknown_target_skipped() -> None:
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)
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assert "unknown-tool" not in result
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assert "cortex-code" in result
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def test_cortex_code_default_api_url_only_trusts_snowflake_suffix() -> None:
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# The domain must end the host, not merely appear somewhere in it.
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url = default_api_url({"SNOWFLAKE_HOST": "acct.snowflakecomputing.com.evil.io"})
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assert url != "https://acct.snowflakecomputing.com.evil.io"
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assert url.endswith(".snowflakecomputing.com")
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ from headroom.proxy.body_forwarding import (
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thinking_blocks_survived_mutation,
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)
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from headroom.proxy.helpers import (
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_path_for_log,
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_reset_session_beta_tracker_for_test,
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append_text_to_latest_user_chat_message,
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get_session_beta_tracker,
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@@ -509,6 +510,67 @@ def test_log_outbound_request_emits_structured_fields() -> None:
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assert "x-api-key" not in msg.lower()
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def test_log_outbound_request_strips_query_string_api_key() -> None:
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"""Google forwarders put the API key in ``?key=``; it must not reach the log."""
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import logging
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proxy_logger = logging.getLogger("headroom.proxy")
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records: list[logging.LogRecord] = []
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class _ListHandler(logging.Handler):
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def emit(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> None:
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records.append(record)
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handler = _ListHandler(level=logging.INFO)
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prev_level = proxy_logger.level
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proxy_logger.addHandler(handler)
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proxy_logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
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try:
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log_outbound_request(
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forwarder="google_batch_passthrough",
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method="POST",
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path=(
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"https://user:pw@generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/"
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"models/gemini-2.5-pro:batchGenerateContent?key=AIzaSECRET#frag"
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),
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body_bytes_count=1,
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body_mutated=False,
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mutation_reasons=[],
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request_id=None,
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source="passthrough",
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)
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finally:
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proxy_logger.removeHandler(handler)
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proxy_logger.setLevel(prev_level)
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msg = next(r.getMessage() for r in records if "outbound_request" in r.getMessage())
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assert (
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"path=https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/"
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"models/gemini-2.5-pro:batchGenerateContent " in msg
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)
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assert "AIzaSECRET" not in msg
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assert "key=" not in msg
|
||||
assert "user:pw" not in msg
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
("path", "expected"),
|
||||
[
|
||||
# IPv6 upstreams keep their brackets so the log stays a valid URL.
|
||||
("https://[::1]:8787/v1/messages?key=SECRET", "https://[::1]:8787/v1/messages"),
|
||||
("http://[2001:db8::1]/v1/chat", "http://[2001:db8::1]/v1/chat"),
|
||||
("https://api.example.com:8443/v1?x=1#f", "https://api.example.com:8443/v1"),
|
||||
# Relative paths pass through without a query.
|
||||
("/v1/messages?key=SECRET", "/v1/messages"),
|
||||
# An invalid port makes urlsplit raise; never fall back to the raw URL.
|
||||
("https://host:notaport/v1?key=SECRET", "<unparseable>"),
|
||||
("https://[::1/v1?key=SECRET", "<unparseable>"),
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_path_for_log(path: str, expected: str) -> None:
|
||||
assert _path_for_log(path) == expected
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# httpx-mock end-to-end byte-faithful checks
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
+11
-1
@@ -49,8 +49,9 @@ def test_reporting_public_export() -> None:
|
||||
|
||||
def test_get_jinja2_template_success_with_stub(monkeypatch) -> None:
|
||||
class FakeTemplate:
|
||||
def __init__(self, template_str: str) -> None:
|
||||
def __init__(self, template_str: str, **options) -> None:
|
||||
self.template_str = template_str
|
||||
self.options = options
|
||||
|
||||
def render(self, **kwargs) -> str:
|
||||
return f"{self.template_str}:{kwargs['name']}"
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +59,15 @@ def test_get_jinja2_template_success_with_stub(monkeypatch) -> None:
|
||||
monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "jinja2", SimpleNamespace(Template=FakeTemplate))
|
||||
template = generator._get_jinja2_template("hello")
|
||||
assert template.render(name="world") == "hello:world"
|
||||
assert template.options == {"autoescape": True}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_report_template_escapes_client_supplied_fields() -> None:
|
||||
pytest.importorskip("jinja2")
|
||||
template = generator._get_jinja2_template("<td>{{ model }}</td>")
|
||||
html = template.render(model="<script>alert(1)</script>")
|
||||
assert "<script>" not in html
|
||||
assert "<script>" in html
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_get_jinja2_template_raises_helpful_error(monkeypatch) -> None:
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user