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fix(router): ignore shell operators inside quoted arguments in read detection (#4646)
## Description Item 3 of #4478, the quoted-pattern case that #4521 left open. Read detection scanned the raw command text for shell syntax without regard to quoting: `_segment_is_read` treated any `>` as a redirect (`content_router.py:893` on `e4a60ed7`) and split the pipeline at the first `|`, and `_command_segments` split on `;`, `&&` and `||`. A quiet sed whose script holds one of these characters, such as `sed -n '/if x > 0/,/return/p' a.py` or the GNU alternation `sed -n '/def \|class /p' a.py`, was therefore not detected as a file read and lost read protection. The three scans now run on a copy of the command in which quoted, backslash-escaped and commented characters are masked, and the match positions are mapped back onto the original text. Two shell rules keep word boundaries intact (review round 2): a backslash-newline is a line continuation and is masked as two spaces, so a redirect or `tee` on the next line still counts as a write; and an unquoted `#` at the start of a word masks the rest of its line without changing quote state, so a quote mark inside a comment cannot hide the next line's separators. Unquoted operators behave as before. Refs #4478 ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - `headroom/transforms/content_router.py`: new `_mask_quoted(command)`, which returns a same-length string with characters inside `'...'` / `"..."`, backslash-escaped characters and comment text replaced by `_` (the quote characters are kept; a backslash-newline becomes two spaces; a comment's newline stays visible). `_segment_is_read` runs its redirect/`tee` check and its pipeline split on the masked string; `_command_segments` finds `;` / `&&` / `||` on the masked string and slices the original. - `tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py`: `test_quoted_shell_operators_are_arguments`, 25 cases. Quoted `>`, `>>`, `|`, `;`, `&&` and `tee` inside a sed script or a file name are reads; a real redirect, pipe-to-`tee` or separator next to a quoted script still counts; `bash -lc "cat foo.py > copy.py"` is still not a read (the inner command is checked on its own, as before). Round 2 adds: continued `>`, `>>` and `| tee` are writes; a comment with an unmatched `"` or `'` followed by `ls; cat foo.py` / `true; cat foo.py` on the next line is a read; `cat foo.py # > not a redirect` is a read; a `#` inside a word is not a comment. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) (run on `headroom/transforms/content_router.py` only, see below) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text # fail before (source ate4a60ed7, new test kept) tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py: 9 failed, 104 passed # round 2: the new review cases against the round-1 head639bfa9e7 failed, 115 passed # pass after (head50798e5a) tests/test_transforms/test_read_command_detection.py: 122 passed # wider set, same environment: # tests/test_transforms + tests/test_*content_router*.py + tests/test_router*.pye4a60ed7: 27 failed, 930 passed, 96 skipped (round 1 comparison)639bfa9e: 25 failed, 941 passed, 96 skipped50798e5a: 18 failed, 948 passed, 96 skipped # the 18 are the same tests on every side (the extras are the new cases); they # come from the local `_core` build not matching this tree (Rust parity # fixtures, minification), not from this change # ruff check / ruff format --check: All checks passed! / 2 files already formatted # mypy headroom/transforms/content_router.py: Success: no issues found in 1 source file ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: Ubuntu (WSL2) on Windows 11, Python 3.12.15, `headroom` Python source at `e4a60ed7` and at this branch, offline. - Exact command / steps: `ContentRouter.apply` on a three-message transcript (user, an assistant `Bash` tool call, a 3,890-byte Python tool result), with `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS=1`, `HEADROOM_SHELL_RESULT_MIN_CHARS=2000` and the router config used by `test_quiet_sed_output_reaches_read_protection` (`enable_kompress=False`, `enable_code_aware=False`). Checked whether `router:read_protected` is in `transforms_applied` for each command. - Observed result: on `e4a60ed7` the three quoted-operator commands lose read protection; on this branch they keep it, and both controls are unchanged (table below). For the review-round cases, real `bash -c` in a temporary directory agrees with `_is_read_command` on this head for all 7 (continued `>`, `>>` and `| tee` write `copy.py`; the three multiline-comment commands and `cat foo.py # > not a redirect` print the file); on `639bfa9e` 6 of the 7 disagreed with bash. | command | `e4a60ed7` | this branch | |---|---|---| | `sed -n '1,120p' foo.py` (control) | protected | protected | | `sed -n '/if value > 0/,/return 0/p' foo.py` | not protected | protected | | `sed -n '/def \|class /p' foo.py` | not protected | protected | | `sed -n '/x;y/p' foo.py` | not protected | protected | | `sed -n '1,120p' foo.py > out.txt` (control, real redirect) | not protected | not protected | - Not tested: a run in which an unprotected read is actually compressed. With Kompress and code-aware compression off, the tool result came back byte-identical on both sides, so this proof shows the classification only. Not tested: the full test suite and `mypy headroom` as a whole (only `content_router.py`). Heredoc handling (`<<`) is unchanged and still a whole-command bailout. ## Runtime Rollout Safety - Rollout-managed feature(s): None. - Minimum rollout channel: N/A - Stable/default behavior changed: Yes, narrowly: commands whose only `>`, `|`, `;`, `&&` or `||` sits inside quotes, after a backslash or inside a comment are now classified by the rest of the command, so a quiet sed or `cat` of that kind gets read protection when `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS` is on. - Kill switch / disable path: None added; read protection as a whole is still controlled by `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS`. - Unsafe override required: No - Qualification impact: None expected - Rollback path: revert this commit. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` — it is generated by release-please from my Conventional Commit PR title (a CI guard enforces this) ## Screenshots (if applicable) N/A ## Additional Notes #4478 had four items. Items 1 and 2 were fixed by #4488, item 4 by #4583, and the quiet-option half of item 3 by #4521, whose description notes that quoted redirect parsing remained separate. This PR covers that remainder. The `|` and `;` cases are the same cause as the `>` case reported in the issue (a quote-blind scan of the same command), so they are fixed together rather than left for a later PR. Review round 2 (head `50798e5a`) addresses the two masking regressions found by Devin and Copilot and confirmed by JerrettDavis: backslash-newline continuations and quote marks inside comments. Produced with AI assistance (Claude Code) operated by me (HetCreep); the reproduction was run on my machine against a clone of the repository. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) ### Maintainer requalification Re-reviewed the author update against upstream maine4a60ed72f. The two earlier actual Git Bash counterexamples now classify correctly: continued redirect writes an exact copy and is not a read; a quote inside a comment no longer hides the next-line source read. All 132 focused read-detection and Gemini tests pass; touched-source Ruff/format and whitespace checks pass. The only maintainer change is the shared Gemini ASGI request test fixture from #4644; hosted failure was the same four independently verified main failures, with no contributor production logic changed. Addressed Devin/Copilot threads resolved after inspecting author fixes. Exact-head hosted CI remains pending. ### Maintainer current-main requalification Exact head `2461a910e31c5140d160942927c1c7b3fa203cc1`, upstream main `ea59ac3eef3a3dc02076e9fe4bb30d572ca9c1a9`. Cleanly integrated upstream/mainea59ac3eefand re-reviewed the additive content-router overlap with main's confident HTML classification. Actual isolated tree-sitter0.26.0:133 read-command/HTML tests pass,94 unrelated cases deselected,1 HTML assertion fails. A control with byte-identical main Python/transforms/test/lock inputs reproduces that same unrecoverable_sections assertion using the same existing development native extension, so it is not a finding against this PR. Read-command cases pass; prior actual Git Bash continued-redirection/comment-quote evidence remains scoped to unchanged shell parser inputs. Ruff and whitespace pass. No contributor behavior rewritten, fresh native build or cloud runtime claim. No new PR correctness finding; final approval awaits exact-head hosted checks. Nothing merged. Exact-head hosted checks are being handled by maintainers. No new finding in the reviewed scope; formal approval awaits exact-head hosted qualification; nothing merged. ### Maintainer current-main requalification Exact head `69a6bd592932467162d9433601b0c2bd1c4c4728`, upstream main `c01cf07d943d816cfd9d97e6838ed4e38f1ff9a4`. Final post-Dependabot requalification against upstream/mainc01cf07d94. All six Dependabot updates are now merged. Relative to this branch's freshly tested prepared tree, the final main sync changes only the three intended Cargo.lock records; Python/source/test inputs are unchanged. Re-reviewed the integration and confirmed complete native source/lock/toolchain objects match the tested combined build and exact fresh native DLL used for this branch's local tests. Focused fresh-native qualification: 134 passed, 94 deselected in 5.40s. Selected real dependency overlays and native DLL paths are recorded in final4646-fresh-native-tests.log; the DLL provenance/input hashes are in final-native-artifact-proof.json. No redundant rerun is implied after this Cargo-only merge. Whitespace passes. Prior source review and scoped real-behavior evidence remain applicable to unchanged contributor inputs. No new source finding in the reviewed scope. Final formal approval awaits exact-head hosted qualification. The earlier HTML assertion with the old primary extension now passes with the fresh combined DLL; the same case also passes on a byte-identical-main Python-source control. No production workaround or assertion suppression was required. Maintainers handle hosted checks; no external-provider claim, contributor semantic rewrite or non-Dependabot merge. Exact-head hosted checks are being handled by maintainers. No new finding in the reviewed scope; formal approval awaits exact-head hosted qualification; nothing merged. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
JerrettDavis
Claude Opus 5.5
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8cdce172ea
@@ -880,9 +880,72 @@ def _command_segments(command: str) -> list[str]:
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Splits on ``;``, ``&&`` and ``||`` — never on a single ``|``. Pipelines are kept
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whole so the segment's own writes (``cat a.py | tee b.py``) stay visible; the
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reduction to the first stage happens in :func:`_segment_is_read`.
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reduction to the first stage happens in :func:`_segment_is_read`. Separators inside
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quotes (``sed -n '/a;b/p' foo.py``) are part of an argument, not a new command.
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"""
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return [seg.strip() for seg in _CMD_SEPARATOR_RE.split(command) if seg.strip()]
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masked = _mask_quoted(command)
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segments: list[str] = []
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start = 0
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for m in _CMD_SEPARATOR_RE.finditer(masked):
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segments.append(command[start : m.start()])
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start = m.end()
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segments.append(command[start:])
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return [seg.strip() for seg in segments if seg.strip()]
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def _mask_quoted(command: str) -> str:
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"""Return ``command`` with quoted, escaped and commented characters replaced by ``_``.
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The result has the same length, so match positions map back onto ``command``.
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Shell operators inside quotes (``sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py``), after a backslash, or
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inside a comment are not shell syntax, and a search over the masked string does
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not mistake them for a redirect, pipe or command separator. The quote characters
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themselves are kept.
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Two shell rules keep word boundaries intact: a backslash-newline is a line
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continuation, so both characters become spaces (``cat a.py \\<newline>> b.py``
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still writes ``b.py``); and a ``#`` at the start of a word starts a comment that
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runs to the end of the line, so quote marks inside it do not open a quote that
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would hide the next line's separators.
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"""
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out = list(command)
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quote = ""
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i = 0
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n = len(command)
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word_start = True
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while i < n:
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char = command[i]
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if char == "\\" and quote != "'":
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if i + 1 < n and command[i + 1] == "\n":
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# Line continuation: the shell removes both characters.
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out[i] = out[i + 1] = " "
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word_start = True
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else:
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out[i] = "_"
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if i + 1 < n:
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out[i + 1] = "_"
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word_start = False
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i += 2
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continue
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if quote:
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if char == quote:
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quote = ""
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else:
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out[i] = "_"
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elif char in {"'", '"'}:
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quote = char
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word_start = False
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elif char == "#" and word_start:
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# Comment to end of line; the newline itself stays visible.
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while i < n and command[i] != "\n":
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out[i] = "_"
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i += 1
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word_start = True
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continue
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else:
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word_start = char.isspace() or char in ";&|()"
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i += 1
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return "".join(out)
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def _segment_is_read(c: str) -> bool:
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@@ -890,9 +953,15 @@ def _segment_is_read(c: str) -> bool:
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# A redirect or `tee` in THIS segment means the segment writes a file rather than
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# reading one (`cat a.py > copy.py`, `cat a.py | tee copy.py`). Checked on the whole
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# segment — pipeline included — before reducing to the stage that touches the file.
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if re.search(r"(^|\s)(>>?|tee\b)", c):
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# Both checks run on the quote-masked segment: a `>` or `|` inside a quoted sed
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# script (`sed -n '/x >/p' a.py`) is part of the argument, not shell syntax.
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masked = _mask_quoted(c)
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if re.search(r"(^|\s)(>>?|tee\b)", masked):
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return False
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c = c.split("|", 1)[0].strip()
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pipe = masked.find("|")
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if pipe != -1:
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c = c[:pipe]
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c = c.strip()
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if not c:
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return False
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# Parse the real program with the SAME structural parser the search-fold uses
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@@ -123,6 +123,50 @@ def test_non_reads_are_not_detected(command: str) -> None:
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assert _is_read_command(command) is False
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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("command", "expected"),
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[
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# Shell operators inside a quoted sed script are part of the argument (#4478).
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("sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py", True),
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("sed -n '/x >> y/p' foo.py", True),
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('sed -n "/a > b/p" foo.py', True),
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("sed -n '/a|b/p' foo.py", True),
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("sed -n '/a;b/p' foo.py", True),
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("sed -n '/a && b/p' foo.py", True),
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("sed -n '/ tee /p' foo.py", True),
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("cat 'a > b.py'", True),
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# An escaped operator is a literal argument too.
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(r"cat foo.py \> out", True),
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# Real operators next to a quoted script still count.
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("sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py > out.txt", False),
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("sed -n '/a|b/p' foo.py | tee out.txt", False),
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("sed -n '/a;b/p' foo.py; echo done", True),
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("echo '>' && sed 's/a/b/' foo.py", False),
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# The -c argument of a shell is quoted at the outer level; the inner
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# command is checked on its own.
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('bash -lc "cat foo.py > copy.py"', False),
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('bash -lc "cat foo.py | tee copy.py"', False),
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('bash -lc "cat foo.py"', True),
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# A backslash-newline is a line continuation: the write on the next line
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# still counts (review of #4646).
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("cat foo.py \\\n> copy.py", False),
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("cat foo.py \\\n>> copy.py", False),
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("cat foo.py | \\\ntee copy.py", False),
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("sed -n '/x >/p' foo.py \\\n> out.txt", False),
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("sed -n '1,60p' \\\nfoo.py", True),
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# A comment ends at the newline; its quote marks do not open a quote that
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# would hide the next line's separators (review of #4646).
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('echo start # " unclosed in comment\nls; cat foo.py', True),
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("echo ok # author's note\ntrue; cat foo.py", True),
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("cat foo.py # > not a redirect", True),
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# A hash inside a word is not a comment.
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("cat foo#bar.py > out.txt", False),
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],
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)
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def test_quoted_shell_operators_are_arguments(command: str, expected: bool) -> None:
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assert _is_read_command(command) is expected
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def test_heredoc_body_is_not_split_into_a_bogus_read() -> None:
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"""A `;` inside a heredoc body must not produce a segment that looks like a
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read — the command as a whole writes a file."""
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