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fix(router): preserve read protection for quiet sed options (#4521)
## Description With `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS=1`, `sed -n '1,60p' file.py` achieves byte-exact read protection, but equivalent `-ne`, `-En`, `--quiet`, and `--silent` forms currently do not. The classifier previously checked for a literal `-n` token across the raw command string, which also caused it to mistake `-n` inside an expression argument as a quiet flag. This PR properly parses sed options before classifying whether a command is a read. It handles grouped flags and long options, respects script arguments and `--` delimiters, and excludes in-place edits (`-i`). GNU and BSD `-l` forms remain recognized. Addresses the quiet-option parsing portion of item 3 in #4478 (quoted redirect parsing and other items in that issue remain separate). Note that `sed -n1,80p` is invalid GNU sed syntax and remains unhandled. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - Recognize quiet sed options using standard-library shell tokenization and robust option parsing. - Keep script arguments separate from options, and exclude in-place edits from protected reads. - Add command-classification unit tests and end-to-end `ContentRouter.apply()` regression coverage for all five quiet forms. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`): focused and related suites below - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`): native Linux pre-commit configuration - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [ ] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text # Focused tests against unchanged main's router: 16 failed, 44 passed # This patch: 60 passed # Read detection, Responses read protection, read audit, maturation, lifecycle: 147 passed # make ci-precheck-rust (Rust 1.95.0): # cargo fmt --all -- --check; cargo clippy --workspace -- -D warnings; # cargo test --workspace 1659 passed, 3 ignored # make ci-precheck-python (including native extension rebuild): 177 passed, 4 skipped # ruff check . All checks passed! # ruff format --check . 1834 files already formatted ``` The native extension rebuild and import verification pass cleanly. The repository's unmodified pre-commit configuration passes on native Linux (WSL Ubuntu, Python 3.14.4), including mypy, Ruff, formatting, conflict checks, version checks, and commit-message hooks. On Windows, the default mypy hook reports seven POSIX-only `os` attribute errors in unchanged files (`fileperms.py` and `proxy/interceptors/astgrep.py`), matching unmodified main (#4520). Similarly, broader Windows test failures (18 failed, 5367 passed, 190 skipped, 2 errors) reproduce identically on main and stem from known platform differences (symlink privileges, SIGHUP handling, and Windows environment-variable size limits). ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: Windows x86_64, Python 3.13.9, GNU sed 4.9, current-main Python sources with native `headroom._core` extension. ML and code compression are disabled to directly isolate the read-protection route. - Exact command / steps: Run the script below with main's router versus this patch. It executes real GNU sed against a temporary Python source file and passes each tool result through `ContentRouter.apply()`. - Observed result: The standard `-n` control is protected on both versions. On main, the other four forms miss `router:read_protected`. With this patch, all five forms correctly trigger read protection and preserve the 7,998-character output byte-for-byte. - Not tested: Focuses on command parsing and routing behavior. BSD option syntax is validated via parser unit tests; live proxy traffic and model calls were not required. Save as `repro_sed_quiet_reads.py`, then run `python repro_sed_quiet_reads.py`: ```python """Run real GNU sed output through ContentRouter, without a model or provider.""" import json import os from pathlib import Path import subprocess import tempfile os.environ["HEADROOM_OFFLINE"] = "1" os.environ["HEADROOM_TELEMETRY"] = "off" os.environ["HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS"] = "1" from headroom.transforms.content_router import ContentRouter, ContentRouterConfig from headroom.tokenizers.estimator import EstimatingTokenCounter sed = Path("C:/Program Files/Git/usr/bin/sed.exe") source = "\n\n".join( f"def compute_{i}(value):\n" ' """Compute a checked result for a caller."""\n' " result = value * 2\n" " if result < 0:\n" ' raise ValueError("negative result")\n' " return result\n" for i in range(45) ) with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: path = Path(tmp) / "sample.py" path.write_text(source, encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") for flags in [["-n"], ["-ne"], ["--quiet"], ["--silent"], ["-En"]]: output = subprocess.check_output( [str(sed), *flags, "1,400p", str(path)], text=True, encoding="utf-8" ) command = f"sed {' '.join(flags)} '1,400p' {path.as_posix()}" router = ContentRouter(ContentRouterConfig( enable_code_aware=False, enable_kompress=False, protect_analysis_context=False, protect_recent_reads_fraction=0.0, )) messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Read the module."}, {"role": "assistant", "content": None, "tool_calls": [{ "id": "read-1", "type": "function", "function": { "name": "Bash", "arguments": json.dumps({"command": command}) } }]}, {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "read-1", "content": output}, ] result = router.apply(messages, EstimatingTokenCounter(), protect_recent=0) actual = result.messages[2]["content"] print(json.dumps({ "flags": flags, "input_chars": len(output), "output_chars": len(actual), "byte_exact": output == actual, "transforms": result.transforms_applied, }), flush=True) ``` ## Runtime Rollout Safety - Rollout-managed feature(s): none. - Minimum rollout channel: stable. - Stable/default behavior changed: sed read classification; byte-exact routing changes when `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS` is enabled (default remains unchanged). - Kill switch / disable path: `HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS=0` disables read protection. - Unsafe override required: no. - Qualification impact: equivalent quiet reads now retain their original output; no savings or task-quality measurement is claimed. - Rollback path: revert this patch; no persisted-state migration. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing focused unit tests pass locally with my changes - [x] I did **not** edit `CHANGELOG.md` ## Additional Notes I implemented and verified this with Codex assistance for drafting and local tests. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
JerrettDavis
parent
65bcc4c313
commit
312ffec8ea
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Pipeline Usage:
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import getopt
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import hashlib
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import itertools
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import json
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@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ import logging
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import math
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import os
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import re
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import shlex
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import sys
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import threading
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import time
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@@ -907,8 +909,8 @@ def _segment_is_read(c: str) -> bool:
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return _is_read_command(" ".join(rest[j + 1 :]).strip("'\""))
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return False
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is_read = prog in _READ_VERBS or (
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# `sed -n '1,20p' file` prints a range (read); bare `sed` is a stream editor.
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prog == "sed" and bool(re.search(r"(^|\s)-n(\s|$)", c))
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# Quiet mode prints selected file contents; bare sed is a stream editor.
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prog == "sed" and _sed_is_quiet_read(rest)
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)
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if not is_read:
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return False
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@@ -916,6 +918,75 @@ def _segment_is_read(c: str) -> bool:
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return not _LOCKFILE_RE.search(c)
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def _strip_shell_comment(command: str) -> str:
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"""Strip a comment at an unquoted word boundary, retaining literal hashes."""
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quote = ""
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escaped = False
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word_start = True
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for i, char in enumerate(command):
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if escaped:
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escaped = False
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continue
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if char == "\\" and quote != "'":
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escaped = True
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word_start = False
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elif quote:
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if char == quote:
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quote = ""
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elif char in {"'", '"'}:
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quote = char
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word_start = False
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elif char == "#" and word_start:
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return command[:i]
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else:
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word_start = char.isspace()
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return command
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def _sed_is_quiet_read(rest: list[str]) -> bool:
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"""Recognize quiet sed options without treating script arguments as flags."""
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try:
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# _bash_program retains shell quotes in its whitespace-split arguments.
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# Reconstruct them before parsing options, including grouped flags (-ne).
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args = shlex.split(_strip_shell_comment(" ".join(rest)))
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except ValueError:
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return False
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# GNU -l takes a line length; BSD -l is a line-buffering flag. Recognize
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# either dialect so existing BSD reads do not lose their protection.
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is_quiet = False
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for short_options in ("anErsuzbiIe:f:l:", "anErsuzbliIe:f:"):
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try:
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options, _ = getopt.gnu_getopt(
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args,
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short_options,
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[
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"quiet",
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"silent",
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"expression=",
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"file=",
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"line-length=",
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"regexp-extended",
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"separate",
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"unbuffered",
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"null-data",
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"binary",
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"posix",
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"sandbox",
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"debug",
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"follow-symlinks",
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"in-place",
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],
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)
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except getopt.GetoptError:
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continue
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# Check both dialects: GNU -l may consume a BSD -n or in-place flag.
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# Any in-place interpretation takes precedence over quiet mode.
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if any(opt in {"-i", "-I", "--in-place"} for opt, _ in options):
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return False
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is_quiet |= any(opt in {"-n", "--quiet", "--silent"} for opt, _ in options)
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return is_quiet
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# Shell wrappers that prefix the real program — peeled to find it. Shell
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# grammar, not tunable policy: rtk (the user's token proxy), sudo/env/timeout/…
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_SHELL_WRAPPERS = frozenset(
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@@ -7,9 +7,16 @@ the first program was inspected, so `wc -l a.py && sed -n '1,60p' a.py` was
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classified as a `wc` run and the file content was word-dropped by Kompress.
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"""
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import json
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import pytest
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from headroom.transforms.content_router import _is_read_command
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from headroom.tokenizers.estimator import EstimatingTokenCounter
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from headroom.transforms.content_router import (
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ContentRouter,
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ContentRouterConfig,
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_is_read_command,
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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@@ -19,6 +26,19 @@ from headroom.transforms.content_router import _is_read_command
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"head -80 foo.py",
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"tail -n 50 foo.py",
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"sed -n '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -ne '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -En '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed --quiet '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed --silent '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed --quiet --expression='1,60p' foo.py",
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"timeout 30 sed -ne '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -n --follow-symlinks '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -a -n '1,60p' foo.py", # BSD sed.
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"sed -n -e '1,60p' foo.py -l", # BSD line buffering (no argument).
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"sed -l -n '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -ln '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -l 80 -n '1,60p' foo.py", # GNU line length takes an argument.
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"sed -nl80 '1,60p' foo.py",
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"cd /repo && cat foo.py",
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"sudo cat foo.py",
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"rtk cat foo.py",
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@@ -75,6 +95,19 @@ def test_chained_reads_are_detected(command: str) -> None:
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"cat foo.py > copy.py && echo done",
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"sed -n '1,60p' foo.py >> out.txt",
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"sed 's/a/b/' foo.py",
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"sed -n1,60p foo.py", # Invalid: a script cannot be attached to -n.
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"sed -ni '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -n -i '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -n -I .bak '1,60p' foo.py", # BSD in-place editing.
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"sed -n -I '' '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -n -l -i '' '1,60p' foo.py", # BSD -l must not hide in-place flags.
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"sed -n -l -I .bak '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -in '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed --quiet --in-place '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed --quiet --in-place=.bak '1,60p' foo.py",
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"sed -e 's/a/ -n /' foo.py", # Script text is not a quiet option.
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"sed -e ' -n ' foo.py",
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"sed -- -n foo.py", # Option parsing ends at --.
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# Lockfiles are regenerated, never byte-patched.
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"cat uv.lock",
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# `-n` from a sibling segment must not qualify a bare `sed`.
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@@ -95,3 +128,73 @@ def test_heredoc_body_is_not_split_into_a_bogus_read() -> None:
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read — the command as a whole writes a file."""
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command = "cat > foo.py <<EOF\nprint(1); head -5 bar.py\nEOF"
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assert _is_read_command(command) is False
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("flag", ["-n", "-ne", "-En", "--quiet", "--silent"])
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("comment", ["", " # avoid -i here", " # --unknown", " # author's note"])
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def test_quiet_sed_output_reaches_read_protection(flag: str, comment: str, monkeypatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROTECT_READS", "1")
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_SHELL_RESULT_MIN_CHARS", "2000")
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# Sixty source lines exceed the small-shell shortcut and reach read protection.
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content = "".join(
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f"def compute_{i}(value):\n"
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" return value * 2 # Preserve this source exactly for a later patch.\n"
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for i in range(30)
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)
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assert len(content) >= 2000
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messages = [
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{"role": "user", "content": "Read the module."},
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{
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"role": "assistant",
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"content": None,
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"tool_calls": [
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{
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"id": "read-1",
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"type": "function",
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"function": {
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"name": "Bash",
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"arguments": json.dumps({"command": f"sed {flag} '1,60p' foo.py{comment}"}),
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},
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}
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],
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},
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{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "read-1", "content": content},
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]
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router = ContentRouter(
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ContentRouterConfig(
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enable_code_aware=False,
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enable_kompress=False,
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protect_analysis_context=False,
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protect_recent_reads_fraction=0.0,
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)
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)
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result = router.apply(messages, EstimatingTokenCounter(), protect_recent=0)
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assert "router:shell_small_result_verbatim" not in result.transforms_applied
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assert "router:read_protected" in result.transforms_applied
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assert result.messages[2]["content"] == content
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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("command", "expected"),
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[
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # avoid -i here", True),
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # --unknown", True),
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # author's note", True),
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py # unclosed \"quote", True),
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("sed -n '1,60p' 'foo#bar.py'", True),
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('sed -n "1,60p" "foo#bar.py"', True),
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo#bar.py", True),
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(r"sed -n '1,60p' foo\#bar.py", True),
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("sed -n '/# marker/p' foo.py", True),
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# Literal hashes must not hide real in-place options that follow them.
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo#bar.py -i", False),
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("sed -n '1,60p' 'foo#bar.py' -i", False),
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(r"sed -n '1,60p' foo\#bar.py -i", False),
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(r"sed -n '1,60p' foo\ #bar.py -i", False),
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("sed -n '/# marker/p' foo.py -i", False),
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("sed -n '1,60p' foo.py -i # --quiet", False),
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("sed -n 'unterminated # quote", False),
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],
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)
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def test_sed_shell_comments_and_literal_hashes(command: str, expected: bool) -> None:
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assert _is_read_command(command) is expected
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