daemon_runtime_rejects_forged_identity_extension failed on the
macos-15-intel CI leg. The suite is untouched by this branch and no
daemon production code changed here; the leg flakes on main too, so this
is a pre-existing defect the lane surfaced rather than a regression.
The test asserted that transmitting the forged frame SUCCEEDS. It cannot
be relied on to. The forged HELLO is 149 bytes against the 137-byte
first-frame envelope cap, so the worker rejects it from the header and
closes without ever reading the payload -- deliberately, so that no
attacker-controlled bytes are read. send_frame writes the header and the
payload as two separate writes, so whether the payload write lands before
that close is pure scheduling: it wins on an idle host and loses on a
loaded 4-vCPU runner. Both outcomes ARE the rejection, so the transmit
result is now recorded and not asserted.
Anti-vacuousness is preserved rather than dropped: the test now asserts
it connected at all, and the drain check waits for the state it asserts
(wait_for_clients 0) instead of sampling the count once, so the bound is
a liveness backstop and never the verdict.
Verified by mutation, not just by passing: with the envelope cap raised
to 512 and the exact-length check removed -- a daemon that accepts the
forged identity -- the repaired test goes RED on ASSERT(rejected). The
mutation was reverted and the suite is 43/43 green.
Signed-off-by: Martin Vogel <martin.vogel.tech@gmail.com>