Files
OpenShell/rfc
Jesse Jaggars 2c31ac7e60 feat(network): support additional destination CAs (#3292)
* feat(network): support additional destination CAs

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(network): harden additional CA propagation

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(network): narrow additional CA review scope

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(network): harden additional CA rotation

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* feat(network): complete additional CA delivery

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(docker): remove stale runtime fixture field

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(network): adapt additional CA series to upstream main

Resolve rebase fallout against current upstream main after the series was
rebased 214 commits forward:

- follow upstream #3110: supervisor→gateway TLS is CA-only, so
  configure_gateway_tls and its isolation tests drop the client identity
- follow upstream tls_secret_names reduction to [String; 1] in the Podman
  driver while keeping the network trust bundle delivery
- port [openshell.supervisor.network] rendering into the
  openshell.gatewayConfigToml serializer in _toml.tpl
- adapt tests to upstream struct/function changes (DriverStartupContext,
  SandboxRunConfig, IsolationSpecInput, supervisor_pod, VM bootstrap image)
- drop conformance-artifact-prefix plumbing removed upstream

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* refactor(network): adopt upstream additional CA bundle surface

Unify the additional destination CA series on the mechanism merged to
main in #3996: one operator pre-assembled PEM bundle, the
--additional-ca-bundle supervisor flag, and the
/etc/openshell/tls/additional/ca-bundle.pem staging path.

- Replace the gateway-level additional_ca_cert_paths list with a single
  additional_ca_bundle file validated and staged at gateway startup.
- Restore the upstream supervisor argument path and fold-into-roots
  behavior; drop the --network-additional-ca-bundle and
  --network-additional-ca-digest contracts.
- Keep gateway normalization bounds, content-addressed staging,
  digest-based driver reconciliation, and stop/start rotation; the
  freshness check now runs at the gateway/driver boundary instead of
  the supervisor boundary.
- Reject additional_ca_bundle in operator driver JSON config; standalone
  drivers self-source the bundle from --sandbox-additional-ca-bundle
  with the same validation.
- Extend the Kubernetes ConfigMap name digest segment to keep the full
  63-byte budget after the prefix rename.
- Box the persisted-sandbox reconciliation futures so callers stay
  under the clippy::large_futures threshold.

Updates Docker, Podman, Kubernetes, and VM delivery, Helm chart and
tests, e2e wiring, gateway configuration docs, and the cluster
debugging skill to the single mechanism.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(ci): make gateway startup tests wrap-tolerant and refresh example lockfile

The network trust startup tests asserted on raw substrings of gateway
diagnostics, but the CLI renderer wraps output at a fixed width with
continuation markers and hard-breaks long paths. Compare assertions on
whitespace- and continuation-squashed text so they hold regardless of
wrap position.

Format the e2e workspace (separate cargo workspace, not covered by the
root cargo fmt run) and refresh examples/isolation-backend-v8/Cargo.lock
for the libc dependency added to the network trust crate.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(podman): reuse TLS CA secret during stopped-pair trust replacement

The additional CA e2e never ran in CI before the first maintainer test
dispatch, and its local container inspection was broken in two ways: it
located the supervisor container through e2e network membership (the
supervisor is host-networked or runtime-bridged, so the filter matched
the CI job container instead), and it required the gateway mTLS CA as a
bind mount (Podman delivers it as a container secret when user
namespaces remap UIDs). Select the supervisor by managed labels and
accept the secret delivery form.

The lifecycle leg then exposed a driver bug: stopped-pair trust
replacement re-created the per-sandbox TLS CA secret, colliding with
the secret still owned by the renamed stopped pair. Mirror the token
and resolver secret handling: require and reuse the existing secret
during replacement instead of creating it.

Validated end-to-end with the Podman additional CA e2e lane.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(server): restore upstream recovery semantics for start-request failures

Recovery no longer marks sandboxes Error/InvalidPersistedSandbox when
driver_start_request fails during the startup or lifecycle sweeps.
Gateway configuration problems (for example a missing launch signer)
must not permanently fail unrelated sandbox records; the sweep logs a
warning and skips them, matching the behavior before the additional CA
work. Sandbox-record failures surface through the normal start path.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* refactor(podman): refresh stale supervisors without replacing workloads

Replace the stopped-pair trust reconciliation with supervisor-only
recreation. The destination-trust generation label moves from the
workload to the supervisor container, and start_sandbox recreates only
the supervisor when its generation is missing or stale. The workload
container, its volumes, its secrets, and its workspace data are never
replaced: the additional CA bundle is mounted only into the supervisor.

Running sandboxes are never gated on trust labels, and recovery without
fresh launch credentials keeps the existing supervisor. The intentional
-removal fence machinery in the watcher existed only for workload
replacement and is removed with it.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* refactor(docker): drop workload replacement for destination-trust changes

Delete the stopped-workload trust reconciliation path and all of its
machinery: the trust-generation label on workload containers, the
generation match check in the start fence, the stopped-sandbox
replacement, the bounded workspace archive copy with its 512 MiB cap
and regular-file-only validation, and the boundary-state rollback
helpers.

No replacement machinery is needed: the trusted supervisor container
is already re-created from the gateway's current configuration on
every start via ensure_control_process_for_container, so stop/start
picks up the current additional CA bundle while the workload
container, its volumes, and its workspace data are never replaced.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* docs(configuration): drop reconciliation wording from additional CA lifecycle

The stop/start lifecycle description already matches the
supervisor-only refresh model; remove the two remaining references to
restart reconciliation of workload containers.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(network): port additional CA test fixtures to the crypto interface

Route the gateway TLS isolation test PKI, the destination CA source
fixtures, and the gateway startup trust tests through
openshell_crypto::pki now that rcgen access is centralized there:
generate_keypair/self_signed/signed_by replace the direct rcgen calls
and CertifiedKey field access follows the wrapper's shape.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(e2e): repair additional CA lane for Docker and non-container builds

The first maintainer test dispatch revealed two latent issues in the
additional CA e2e that no local run had exercised: the Podman gateway
CA secret helper referenced ContainerEngine without the container
feature gate, breaking Kubernetes and VM builds of the test, and the
Docker branch asserted a client ca.crt bind mount that the Docker
driver never creates. Gate the helper like its callers, and assert
Docker's actual delivery path instead: the gateway mTLS CA staged as
tls/ca.pem inside the read-only supervisor state volume, selected
through the OPENSHELL_TLS_CA environment pointer.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(helm): restore alphabetical README ordering for supervisor keys

The helm:docs check regenerates the chart README with helm-docs, which
orders rows alphabetically; a conflict resolution had placed
supervisor.network.additionalCaConfigMapName after the
supervisor.podSecurityContext rows. Regenerate with mise run
helm:docs.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* chore: refresh testkit lockfile for openshell-core libc dependency

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(driver-podman): stage operator CA bundle as driver-owned artifact

Standalone Podman drivers accepting --sandbox-additional-ca-bundle
previously kept the operator's source path as the trust artifact path.
The immutable-artifact verification performed on every create/start
requires exactly mode 0444, which an operator-owned source path cannot
guarantee, so a readable-but-writable source failed reconciliation.

Read the operator bundle with the same bounded, no-symlink validation,
then stage the normalized material into a driver-owned artifact inside a
private tempdir held for the driver process lifetime. The artifact is
created 0600, synced, and only then restricted to 0444 so no observer
ever sees a writable artifact. The operator source and its permissions
are never referenced after startup.

Addresses GATOR-291f43b2-02.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(driver-podman): pin retained workload image during supervisor refresh

Supervisor-only trust reconciliation re-entered
create_sandbox_with_existing_token, which re-pulled and re-resolved the
workload image tag even though the workload container is retained. If
the tag moved to a different image between stop and start, identity
resolution and child-environment construction would reflect the new
image while the retained workload still runs the original one, leaving
mode-0600 bootstrap files the retained user cannot read.

During a refresh with a retained workload, inspect the stopped container
and pin to the immutable image ID it was created from (Config.Image);
never pull or resolve the request tag. The requested reference is still
used for child metadata so the retained workload's environment is
byte-identical to its original launch.

Addresses GATOR-291f43b2-01.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* test(e2e): verify host-only VM trust delivery and drop curl dependency

The additional-CA lane's VM assertions read the destination CA out of the
guest overlay and a guest-side supervisor-argv marker — artifacts from
the guest-supervisor design that no longer exist now that the VM driver
stages the CA host-only and runs the supervisor on the host. Inspect the
driver-staged host artifact (digest-compared against the source), assert
the guest overlay contains no CA material at the old mount paths, and
keep the serial-console no-disclosure check.

The workload validation scripts also ran curl, which exists only in the
container-engine fixture image; the Kubernetes and VM lanes use the
uv-based workload image and died instantly with "canonical main process
already finished". Rewrite the main-process, exec, and lifecycle
validation scripts in python3 (present in every lane's workload image).
The network-policy binary identity is the resolved /proc/<pid>/exe
target, so the versioned python3.12 binaries are allowlisted rather
than the unversioned symlinks. The hostname mismatch check keeps its
semantics: same reachable fixture, mismatched TLS SNI, and the failure
must specifically be hostname verification.

Addresses GATOR-291f43b2-04.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(kubernetes): allow admission-added labels on destination-trust ConfigMaps

The destination-trust ConfigMap validation compared the whole label map
for equality. A mutating admission webhook that attaches an
organizational label to the created ConfigMap made the create response
fail validation, and the retained ConfigMap then failed every subsequent
create/start through the existing-object path, blocking sandbox launches
despite the ownership labels, immutable flag, digest, and certificate
bytes remaining correct.

Validate the gateway-owned label pairs individually and allow unrelated
labels; the exact trust-material checks are unchanged. Covered by a
regression test with an admission-added label and a missing
gateway-owned label.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(podman): close supervisor-refresh rollback gaps

The supervisor-only trust refresh renamed the previous supervisor to a
random rollback name and then performed the token-secret lookup. A
transient lookup failure returned with the supervisor still renamed,
where a normal delete could never find it, and the rollback rename and
final rollback removal ignored their own failures, leaving orphans with
attached control and channel resources.

Complete every fallible preparation before the rename. On a failed
replacement, restore the canonical name; if the restore itself fails,
return an error naming the rollback container so the orphan stays
identifiable — a later retry still succeeds because the canonical name
is absent and the replacement path recreates a fresh supervisor. Treat
not-found during the final rollback removal as success and name the
orphan in both the log and the error on other removal failures; a retry
observes the fresh canonical supervisor and resumes the normal start
path.

Covered by failure-injection tests for each transaction boundary:
preparation failure before any rename, replacement failure restoring
the canonical name, and restore failure naming the orphaned rollback
container.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* docs: address destination-trust review corrections

The gateway-configuration RFC documented an additional_ca_cert_paths
list that the strict configuration parser never accepted; document the
additional_ca_bundle single-path setting the parser actually enforces.

The debug-openshell-cluster skill named the wrong generation annotation
(openshell.ai/network-supervisor-trust-generation) and described digest
argv and network-init canonicalization checks the implementation does
not perform. Correct it to openshell.ai/additional-ca-generation and
describe the actual delivery: the supervisor Pod mounts the immutable
ConfigMap read-only and receives --additional-ca-bundle for the mount
path, with the driver validating the digest annotation and exact bytes
per creation.

Classify the destination-trust generation hashes as deterministic
identity derivation rather than authenticity proofs, following the
openshell-crypto exclusions table: trust decisions come from the
gateway's normalization, immutable staging, exact-byte validation, and
TLS verification. Record the classification in the crypto README and at
each hashing site.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(network): reconcile additional CA tests with suspend/resume and auth changes

Upstream's suspend/resume lifecycle took StartSandboxRequest fields 7
and 8, so the durable-snapshot field moves from 7 to 9; update the
wire-format test to assert the field-9 key (0x4a) and initialize the
new resume controls. Repair the cli test module after the auth opt-in
test merged alongside the environment-guard helpers, and initialize the
gateway driver-startup context's network-trust fields in the shared
supervision test.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

* fix(server): box start-recovery futures for clippy large-futures

The durable-snapshot field grows StartSandboxRequest enough that the
start-recovery match and the recovery-expiry test exceed the
large-futures limit under -D warnings. Box::pin both futures, matching
the pattern the recovery path used before the suspend/resume rework.

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com>
2026-10-27 18:31:11 +00:00
..

OpenShell RFCs

Substantial changes to OpenShell should be proposed in writing before implementation begins. New features always start as a GitHub issue using the feature request template, not as an RFC pull request. RFCs drive nuanced discussions that need structured iteration, broad stakeholder input, and a durable record of the reasoning beyond what issue comments can fully capture.

An RFC provides a consistent way to collect broad feedback, build consensus, and document the decision for future contributors. An RFC is created only when maintainers decide the originating issue needs that level of design review.

Start with a GitHub issue

Before writing an RFC, you must open a GitHub issue to scope the problem, gauge interest, and get early feedback. For new features, use the feature request template. This helps:

  • Validate that the problem is worth solving
  • Surface potential concerns early
  • Build consensus before investing in a detailed proposal
  • Identify the right reviewers and stakeholders

If the ticket shows sufficient interest and maintainers decide the idea needs broad design review, they will ask for an RFC from that issue. Maintainers assign the RFC number and add the needs-rfc label in the issue before the RFC is created, preventing number clashes across branches and making pending RFC work searchable.

RFCs vs other artifacts

OpenShell has several places where design information lives. Use this guide to pick the right one:

Artifact Purpose When to use
GitHub issue Track and scope a bug, feature request, or rough idea Always start here; new features use the feature request template
Spike issue (create-spike) Investigate implementation feasibility for a scoped change You need to explore the codebase and produce a buildable issue for a specific component or feature
RFC Propose a cross-cutting decision that needs broad consensus Maintainers requested an RFC from an existing issue and assigned an RFC number

The key distinction: spikes investigate whether and how something can be done; RFCs propose that we should do it and seek agreement on the approach. A spike may precede an RFC (to gather data) or follow one (to flesh out implementation details).

When to use an RFC

Use an RFC when the discussion itself needs structure: multiple rounds of feedback, competing tradeoffs, broad stakeholder input, or a durable design record. If the important context would get lost across issue comments, an RFC is the right tool. The following are examples of when maintainers may ask for one after an issue is opened:

  • An architectural or design decision for the platform
  • Change to an API or command-line tool
  • Change to an internal API or tool
  • Add or change a company or team process
  • A design for testing

RFCs don't only apply to technical ideas but overall project ideas and processes as well. If you have an idea to improve the way something is being done, you have the power to make your voice heard.

When NOT to use an RFC

Not everything needs an RFC. Skip the RFC process for:

  • Bug fixes
  • Small feature additions scoped to a single component (use a spike instead)
  • Feature requests that can be resolved through the issue, spike, and pull request workflow
  • Documentation changes
  • Dependency updates
  • Refactoring that doesn't change public interfaces

If a change doesn't require cross-team consensus, a GitHub issue or spike issue is the right vehicle.

RFC metadata and state

At the start of every RFC document, we include a brief amount of metadata in YAML front matter:

---
authors:
  - "@username"
state: draft
links:
  - https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/issues/456
  - https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/pull/123
---

We track the following metadata:

  • authors: The authors (and therefore owners) of an RFC. Listed as GitHub usernames.
  • state: Must be one of the states discussed below.
  • links: Related PRs or issues. The first link should be the originating issue where maintainers requested the RFC and assigned its number. Add entries as the RFC progresses.
  • superseded_by: (optional) For RFCs in the superseded state, the RFC number that replaces this one (e.g., 0005).

An RFC can be in one of the following states:

State Description
draft The RFC is being written and is not yet ready for formal review.
review Under active discussion in a pull request.
accepted The proposal has been accepted and is ready for implementation.
rejected The proposal was reviewed and declined.
implemented The idea has been entirely implemented. Changes would be infrequent.
superseded Replaced by a newer RFC. The superseded_by field should reference the replacement.

RFC lifecycle

1. Open a GitHub issue

Start with a GitHub issue. New features must use the feature request template and include enough design context for maintainers and contributors to evaluate the idea. Do not open an RFC PR before an issue exists.

2. Get maintainer confirmation

Maintainers decide from the issue whether an RFC is necessary. If it is, they assign the RFC number in the issue before anyone creates the RFC branch or folder, and add the needs-rfc label to the originating issue so pending RFC work is searchable. Authors should use the assigned number instead of choosing one locally.

3. Create your RFC

Each RFC lives in its own folder:

rfc/NNNN-my-feature/
    README.md
    (optional: diagrams, images, supporting files)

Where NNNN is the maintainer-assigned RFC number (zero-padded to 4 digits) and my-feature is a short descriptive name. The main proposal goes in README.md so GitHub renders it when browsing the folder.

To start a new RFC, copy the template folder:

cp -r rfc/0000-template rfc/NNNN-my-feature

Fill in the metadata, include the originating issue in links, and start writing. The state should be draft while you're iterating.

4. Open a pull request

When you're ready for feedback, update the state to review and open a pull request. Add the PR link to links in the metadata. Maintainers should add the rfc label to the PR and add it to the RFC board.

The PR is where discussion happens. Anyone subscribed to the repo will get a notification and can read your RFC and provide feedback.

5. Iterate and build consensus

The comments you choose to accept are up to you as the owner of the RFC, but you should remain empathetic in how you engage. For those giving feedback, be sure that all feedback is constructive.

RFCs rarely go through this process unchanged. Make edits as new commits to the PR and leave comments explaining your changes.

6. Merge the pull request

After there has been time for folks to comment, the RFC author requests merge and a maintainer approves and merges. The state should be updated from review to accepted. If the proposal is declined, the state should be set to rejected. The timing is left to the author's discretion. As a guideline, a few business days seems reasonable, but circumstances may dictate a different timeline.

When an RFC is accepted, maintainers should update any RFC board fields that track review state.

In general, RFCs shouldn't be merged if no one else has read or commented on it. If no one is reading your RFC, it's time to explicitly ask someone to give it a read!

7. Implementation

Once an RFC has been entirely implemented, its state should be moved to implemented. This represents ideas that have been fully developed. While discussion on implemented RFCs is permitted, changes would be expected to be infrequent.

Diagrams

When an RFC needs diagrams to illustrate architecture, data flow, or component interactions, use Mermaid diagrams embedded directly in the Markdown. Mermaid renders natively on GitHub and keeps diagrams version-controlled alongside the text.

```mermaid
graph LR
    A[Client] --> B[Gateway]
    B --> C[Sandbox]
```

Prefer Mermaid over external image files whenever possible. If a diagram is too complex for Mermaid (e.g., detailed UI mockups), commit the image to the RFC's folder alongside its README.md and reference it with a relative path.

Making changes to an RFC

After your RFC has been merged, there is always opportunity to make changes. Open a pull request with the change you would like to make. If you are not the original author, be sure to @ the original authors to make sure they see and approve of the changes.

RFC postponement

Some RFCs are marked rejected when the proposal is declined or when we want neither to think about evaluating the proposal nor about implementing it until some time in the future. Rejected RFCs may be revisited when the time is right.