* feat(sandbox): default to official Alpine sandbox image default_sandbox_image() now returns docker.io/library/alpine:3.22, a generic version-qualified official image, so a fresh install no longer depends on the community sandbox image catalog. All compute drivers (docker, podman, kubernetes, vm) inherit this fallback. Part of #3116. Signed-off-by: Akram Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * feat(deploy): default deployment configs to the official Alpine sandbox image Update the shared gateway default_image, Helm chart values, the standalone Kubernetes manifest, and the dev gateway task scripts to use docker.io/library/alpine:3.22 instead of the community base image, consistent with default_sandbox_image(). GPU e2e image-build base is left unchanged (CUDA needs a glibc base). Part of #3116. Signed-off-by: Akram Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * feat(driver): default to numeric non-root identity for USER-less images With the default sandbox image now Alpine, images that declare no OCI USER must start instead of being rejected. When the image declares no USER and the policy requests none, the Podman and Docker drivers now supply a numeric non-root identity (DEFAULT_SANDBOX_UID/GID = 1000) instead of rejecting, matching the numeric-identity behavior of the Kubernetes and VM drivers. The supervisor's resolved-identity path runs the sandbox as a synthesized non-root account without the account existing in the image. Images that declare a USER keep the OCI resolution path unchanged. Part of #3116. Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(conformance): use Alpine workload image Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(policy): drop community image /app path from default policy The restrictive default policy granted read-only access to /app, a directory that only existed in the community base image. A generic Alpine default has no /app, so remove it. Landlock best-effort already ignores absent paths; this just stops advertising a community-specific layout in the default. Part of #3116. Signed-off-by: Akram Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * docs(config): document Alpine default images Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): report early sandbox termination Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): initialize rootless workspace ownership Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): qualify NVIDIA Ubuntu default Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): initialize rootful default workspace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sftp): add native sandbox adapter Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sftp): gate runtime helper support to Linux Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sftp): support standard OpenSSH file operations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sftp): harden rename and special file handling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(runtime): remove community image dependencies Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): build provider readiness tool fixture Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): use a dedicated Noble fixture for Docker tests Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Akram Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
Private IP Routing via allowed_ips
Demonstrates the allowed_ips sandbox policy feature, which lets sandboxes
reach services on private IP space (e.g. cluster-internal pods) that would
normally be blocked by the proxy's SSRF protection.
How it works
The sandbox proxy blocks all connections to RFC 1918 addresses by default.
When an endpoint in the sandbox policy includes an allowed_ips field, the
proxy validates the resolved IP against that CIDR allowlist instead of
blanket-blocking. Loopback and link-local remain always-blocked regardless.
Save an explicit policy as private-policy.yaml that allows the client binary
to reach port 8080 on the configured pod network:
cluster_pods:
name: cluster_pods
endpoints:
- port: 8080
allowed_ips:
- "10.42.0.0/16"
binaries:
- { path: "/**" }
Launch the demo server
Build the image and push it to a registry that your Kubernetes cluster can pull from:
docker build -t registry.example.com/demo/private-api:latest examples/private-ip-routing/
docker push registry.example.com/demo/private-api:latest
Deploy the pod:
kubectl run private-api \
--image=registry.example.com/demo/private-api:latest \
--port=8080 \
--restart=Never
Wait for it to be running and note the pod IP:
kubectl get pod private-api -o wide
Example output:
NAME READY STATUS IP NODE
private-api 1/1 Running 10.42.0.128 ...
Verify from a sandbox
Create a sandbox and curl the private API through the proxy. Replace the IP
with whatever kubectl get pod showed above:
openshell sandbox create \
--from registry.example.com/tools/curl:latest \
--policy ./private-policy.yaml \
-- bash -c \
'curl -s --proxytunnel -x http://10.200.0.1:3128 http://10.42.0.128:8080/'
Expected output:
{
"message": "Hello from the private network!",
"hostname": "private-api",
"path": "/",
"client": "10.42.0.130",
"timestamp": 1772501542.15
}
The proxy allowed the connection because 10.42.0.128 matches the
10.42.0.0/16 CIDR in allowed_ips. Without that policy field, the same
request returns HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden.
Cleanup
kubectl delete pod private-api