Files
OpenShell/python/openshell/sandbox.py
T
Mrunal Patel fb03e3819a feat(python-sdk): support OIDC Bearer auth on SandboxClient (#1621)
* feat(python-sdk): support OIDC Bearer auth on SandboxClient

PR #1596 hardened the gateway side of the OIDC story; the Python SDK
was the remaining gap — it only supported plaintext or mTLS, with no
Bearer metadata anywhere. Deployments with OIDC enabled (the
recommended posture since PR #935 / PR #1404) were unreachable from
the SDK.

Adds:

- `bearer_token: str | Callable[[], str] | None` kwarg on
  `SandboxClient`. Static strings or zero-arg callables (the latter
  is invoked per RPC, so callers can drop in a refresh loop or
  token-file watcher without reconstructing the client). Composes
  with `tls` for OIDC-over-mTLS deployments.
- `_BearerAuthInterceptor` implementing all four
  `grpc.{Unary,Stream}{Unary,Stream}ClientInterceptor` types.
  Appends `authorization: Bearer <token>` to outgoing metadata.
  Implemented as an interceptor (not call credentials) so it works
  on both plaintext (`disableTls=true` dev) and TLS channels without
  `grpc.composite_channel_credentials`.
- `TlsConfig` ergonomics: all three fields (`ca_path`, `cert_path`,
  `key_path`) are now optional with `cert_path` / `key_path`
  required-together-or-not-at-all (enforced in `__post_init__`). This
  unlocks three transport profiles from one dataclass:
    * full mTLS (all three)
    * CA-only trust (`ca_path` only)
    * system roots (`TlsConfig()` — for OIDC gateways behind a
      public CA)
- `from_active_cluster` mirrors `crates/openshell-tui/src/lib.rs`
  `build_oidc_channel`:
    * For any `https://` gateway, always build a secure channel.
      Pick the strongest TLS profile available in `mtls/` (full
      mTLS → CA-only → system roots). No more `insecure_channel`
      fallback for HTTPS.
    * Gate OIDC bearer attachment on
      `metadata.json["auth_mode"] == "oidc"`. Matches
      `crates/openshell-cli/src/main.rs:132` and the TUI; a stale
      `oidc_token.json` next to a non-OIDC gateway no longer causes
      the SDK to attach a bearer.
- `_OidcRefresher` — thread-safe, in-process native OAuth2 refresh
  modeled on `google.oauth2.credentials.Credentials` and
  `botocore.tokens.SSOTokenProvider`. Lazily checks expiry on every
  RPC; when stale, re-reads disk first (the CLI may have rotated
  the bundle), and only then exchanges the refresh_token against
  the IdP's token endpoint discovered via OIDC discovery
  (`/.well-known/openid-configuration`, cached after first call).
  Concurrent RPCs share a single refresh via `threading.Lock` (no
  IdP stampede). Honors refresh-token rotation. Surfaces IdP
  failures as `SandboxError` with the RFC 6749 error body included
  for diagnostics.

  Mirrors the Rust CLI's HTTP-policy posture from
  `crates/openshell-cli/src/oidc_auth.rs`:
    * `follow_redirects=False` so a 3xx during discovery can't
      steer us to an attacker-controlled token endpoint.
    * Discovery `issuer` is validated against the configured
      issuer; a discovery document claiming a different issuer is
      rejected, preventing the SDK from POSTing the refresh_token
      to a malicious endpoint.
    * `insecure: bool` flag plumbed through to httpx's
      `verify=` so self-signed-cert deployments work the same way
      they do in the Rust CLI.

  Built on `httpx` (chosen over `urllib` specifically for
  follow_redirects + verify control as kwargs). The OAuth2
  refresh-token grant itself (RFC 6749 §6) is one form-encoded
  POST — handled inline rather than via a dedicated OAuth library;
  tried `authlib`'s `OAuth2Client` first but it auto-injects an
  Authorization header on every request, which breaks the
  unauthenticated discovery GET.
- `_make_cluster_bearer_provider(..., auto_refresh=True,
  write_back=True, insecure=False)` factory. Defaults to the
  refresher path with write-back enabled; `auto_refresh=False`
  falls back to the read-only fail-closed behavior for callers that
  don't want the SDK to make outbound HTTP calls to the IdP.

  `write_back=True` is the default (changed from the first round of
  review): IdPs with refresh-token rotation (Keycloak with
  rotation, Entra in strict mode) invalidate the old refresh_token
  on each refresh, so an in-memory-only refresh would leave the
  on-disk bundle pointing at an invalidated value — any second
  process starting from disk would `invalid_grant`. With write-back
  enabled by default, the SDK keeps the shared cache consistent
  with the IdP.
- `from_active_cluster` exposes `auto_refresh`, `write_back`, and
  `insecure` kwargs (defaults: True / True / False). The
  high-level `Sandbox` context manager surfaces the same three
  kwargs and forwards them through, so callers using the wrapper
  have parity with `SandboxClient` for OIDC-protected gateways.
- `SandboxClient.close()` chains to a `_bearer_close` hook so the
  `_OidcRefresher`'s underlying `httpx.Client` is released
  deterministically instead of leaking sockets/FDs until GC runs
  `__del__`. Idempotent.
- `_OidcRefresher._write_to_disk` uses `tempfile.mkstemp` (PID +
  random suffix) instead of a fixed `.oidc_token.json.tmp` path,
  so two writers racing on the same gateway directory don't
  trample each other's tmp content. Success path atomically
  replaces; failure path unlinks the orphan.

OAuth2 refresh policy and write-back semantics deliberately mirror
what the major Python SDKs do — see
github.com/googleapis/google-auth-library-python (`Credentials`)
and github.com/boto/botocore (`SSOTokenProvider`):

| Library                       | Native refresh | Writes back |
|-------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| google-auth Credentials       | yes            | no          |
| botocore SSOTokenProvider     | yes            | yes         |
| openshell SandboxClient (here)| yes (opt-out)  | yes (opt-out)|

OpenShell sits between the two; chose write-back-by-default because
the rotation invariant matters more for our deployments than the
"CLI is the only writer" assumption that fits google-auth.

Adds `httpx>=0.27` as a runtime dependency. No new OAuth2 library —
the refresh grant is a single POST.

Tested:

- 42 sandbox_test.py tests pass (5 pre-existing + 37 new across
  the bearer interceptor, fail-closed provider, refresher
  behavior, TlsConfig validation, from_active_cluster auth ladder,
  security-review regressions, Sandbox-wrapper kwarg forwarding,
  and lifecycle / concurrency probes).
  `mise run test:python` → 47 passed total across the python
  suite.
- `mise run python:lint` (ruff) clean.
- End-to-end against a Keycloak-protected gateway on OpenShift:
    * unauthenticated `Health` bypass works
    * admin + `openshell:all` reaches user-callable methods
    * reader (`sandbox:read`) denied on `CreateSandbox` by scope
    * admin + `openshell:all` denied on PR #1596 sandbox-only
      methods at the router (the new gate is honored from the SDK)
    * full provider CRUD lifecycle via the SDK
    * callable token provider rotates per RPC as expected
- Regression-probed against three pre-review security findings:
    * **Discovery issuer validation** — a discovery document
      claiming a different `issuer` than the configured one is
      rejected with a clear `SandboxError` before any refresh POST
      can reach the attacker-controlled endpoint.
    * **Redirect during discovery** — `follow_redirects=False` on
      the underlying httpx client means a 3xx during discovery
      surfaces as a SandboxError rather than silently chasing the
      redirect.
    * **Cross-process rotation** — a two-process simulation shows
      process B starting from disk and successfully refreshing
      with the rotated refresh_token, because process A's
      write-back updated the shared cache.
- Refresher unit tests cover: cached-fresh fast path, disk-rotated
  re-read before refresh, OAuth2 exchange against the discovered
  token endpoint, refresh-token rotation, atomic write-back at
  0600 mode (default), default-on write_back proven by test,
  concurrent N-thread coordination (one refresh shared across 8
  threads), IdP failure surfaced with the error body, the
  client_credentials / no-refresh_token error path, issuer-
  mismatch rejection, redirect-during-discovery rejection,
  insecure flag plumbing.
- Lifecycle / concurrency regression tests added: `close()`
  invokes the `_bearer_close` hook (idempotent), the refresher's
  `httpx.Client` is marked closed after `SandboxClient.close()`,
  and 16 concurrent writers don't leave orphan tmp files behind
  while producing a valid final bundle. The `Sandbox` wrapper has
  direct forwarding tests proving `auto_refresh`, `write_back`,
  and `insecure` reach `from_active_cluster` (both explicit
  values and defaults).
- End-to-end against a real OpenShift + Keycloak cluster from
  inside a pod: real OIDC discovery against
  `keycloak.keycloak.svc.cluster.local:8080`, refresh-token grant
  POST, atomic write-back of the rotated bundle at 0600, and a
  follow-up RPC reusing the freshly-rotated in-memory token —
  full round-trip in ~170ms.

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>

* fix(python-sdk): adopt newer on-disk OIDC bundle before refreshing

_OidcRefresher.current_access_token() only adopted the on-disk
oidc_token.json when its access token was still fresh; otherwise it
refreshed using the in-memory bundle. With refresh-token rotation
enabled (Keycloak with rotation, Entra strict mode), this let a process
keep using an invalidated refresh_token:

1. Process A holds a stale in-memory bundle with refresh_token=r1.
2. Process B refreshes first and writes a rotated (r2) but now
   near-expiry bundle to disk.
3. Process A re-reads disk, sees the access token is not fresh, ignores
   the disk bundle, and POSTs the stale r1 — which the IdP has already
   invalidated, yielding invalid_grant.

Fix: when the cached bundle is stale, adopt the on-disk bundle if it was
refreshed more recently than ours, even when its access token is also
stale. "More recently" is decided by expires_at — a refresh mints a new
access token with a forward expiry alongside the rotated refresh_token,
so the later expiry carries the newest refresh_token. Comparing by
expiry (rather than unconditionally preferring disk) preserves the
write_back=False case, where the in-memory bundle has already rotated
past the on-disk copy and must not be clobbered. When the adopted
bundle's issuer differs, the cached token endpoint is reset so the
refresh re-discovers against the new issuer.

Adds regression tests for the cross-process rotation race and the
issuer-change re-discovery path.

* fix(python-sdk): recover from invalid_grant on lost rotation race

The expiry-based disk re-read narrows but does not fully close the
cross-process refresh-token rotation race: two processes sharing a
gateway directory can both enter their refresh window, both POST their
copy of the refresh_token, and with rotation enabled the IdP invalidates
the loser's token (invalid_grant). Neither google-auth nor botocore
close this window without an OS file lock; a Python-only flock would not
coordinate with the Rust CLI/TUI that also write oidc_token.json, so
locking is not worth its cost here.

Recover instead of prevent: distinguish an OAuth2 invalid_grant (the
refresh_token was rejected) from transport/5xx failures via a private
_InvalidGrantError, and on invalid_grant re-read oidc_token.json once. If
a peer wrote a different refresh_token (it won the race), adopt and retry
with it — returning early if it is already fresh — so the loser succeeds
transparently instead of forcing a re-authenticate. If disk offers no new
token, the rejection is genuine and surfaces the re-authenticate hint as
before. The retry is single-shot; a second invalid_grant propagates.

Adds tests for the peer-rotation recovery and the genuine-rejection
(no-retry) paths.

---------

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
2026-05-29 11:44:20 -04:00

1360 lines
52 KiB
Python

# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import contextlib
import json
import os
import pathlib
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import grpc
import httpx
from ._proto import (
inference_pb2,
inference_pb2_grpc,
openshell_pb2,
openshell_pb2_grpc,
)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
import builtins
from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator, Mapping, Sequence
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class TlsConfig:
"""Channel TLS material.
All three fields are optional so callers can pick the trust profile:
- Full mTLS: pass all three (server trusts client identity).
- CA-only: pass `ca_path` (custom CA, no client identity).
- System roots: pass no fields (`TlsConfig()`) — uses the OS trust
store. Useful for OIDC gateways behind a public CA.
`cert_path` and `key_path` must be set together or not at all.
"""
ca_path: pathlib.Path | None = None
cert_path: pathlib.Path | None = None
key_path: pathlib.Path | None = None
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if (self.cert_path is None) != (self.key_path is None):
raise ValueError("TlsConfig: cert_path and key_path must be set together")
class _BearerAuthInterceptor(
grpc.UnaryUnaryClientInterceptor,
grpc.UnaryStreamClientInterceptor,
grpc.StreamUnaryClientInterceptor,
grpc.StreamStreamClientInterceptor,
):
"""Add `authorization: Bearer <token>` to every outgoing RPC.
Implemented as an interceptor (not call credentials) so it works on
both plaintext and TLS channels without needing
`grpc.composite_channel_credentials`. The token provider is invoked
per call, so callers can swap tokens at runtime by mutating shared
state or returning a fresh value from the callable.
"""
def __init__(self, token_provider: Callable[[], str]) -> None:
self._token_provider = token_provider
def _attach(self, details: grpc.ClientCallDetails) -> grpc.ClientCallDetails:
metadata = list(details.metadata) if details.metadata else []
metadata.append(("authorization", f"Bearer {self._token_provider()}"))
return details._replace(metadata=metadata)
def intercept_unary_unary(self, continuation, details, request):
return continuation(self._attach(details), request)
def intercept_unary_stream(self, continuation, details, request):
return continuation(self._attach(details), request)
def intercept_stream_unary(self, continuation, details, request_iterator):
return continuation(self._attach(details), request_iterator)
def intercept_stream_stream(self, continuation, details, request_iterator):
return continuation(self._attach(details), request_iterator)
def _normalize_bearer(
bearer: str | Callable[[], str] | None,
) -> Callable[[], str] | None:
if bearer is None:
return None
if callable(bearer):
return bearer
token = bearer
return lambda: token
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SandboxStatusRef:
phase: int
current_policy_version: int
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SandboxRef:
id: str
name: str
status: SandboxStatusRef
@property
def phase(self) -> int:
return self.status.phase
@property
def current_policy_version(self) -> int:
return self.status.current_policy_version
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ExecChunk:
stream: str
data: bytes
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ExecResult:
exit_code: int
stdout: str
stderr: str
class SandboxError(RuntimeError):
pass
class SandboxSession:
def __init__(self, client: SandboxClient, sandbox: SandboxRef) -> None:
self._client = client
self.sandbox = sandbox
@property
def id(self) -> str:
return self.sandbox.id
def exec(
self,
command: Sequence[str],
*,
stream_output: bool = False,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
stdin: bytes | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
return self._client.exec(
self.sandbox.id,
command,
stream_output=stream_output,
workdir=workdir,
env=env,
stdin=stdin,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
def exec_python(
self,
function: Callable[..., object],
*,
args: Sequence[object] = (),
kwargs: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
stream_output: bool = False,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
return self._client.exec_python(
self.sandbox.id,
function,
args=args,
kwargs=kwargs,
stream_output=stream_output,
workdir=workdir,
env=env,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
def delete(self) -> bool:
return self._client.delete(self.sandbox.name)
class SandboxClient:
"""gRPC client for sandbox CRUD and command execution."""
def __init__(
self,
endpoint: str,
*,
tls: TlsConfig | None = None,
bearer_token: str | Callable[[], str] | None = None,
timeout: float = 30.0,
cluster_name: str | None = None,
_bearer_close: Callable[[], None] | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Create a SandboxClient.
Args:
endpoint: host:port for the gateway gRPC service.
tls: mTLS material. None for a plaintext channel.
bearer_token: OIDC access token, or a zero-arg callable
returning the current token (called per RPC; supports
runtime refresh). Combines with `tls` — pass both when
the gateway uses mTLS for transport identity and OIDC
for user identity.
timeout: default per-call timeout in seconds.
cluster_name: optional friendly name for error messages.
_bearer_close: internal — wired by `from_active_cluster`
when an `_OidcRefresher` owns the bearer callable, so
`close()` can release the refresher's HTTP client.
Public callers should not pass this; they own the
lifecycle of any callable they supplied as
`bearer_token`.
"""
self._endpoint = endpoint
self._timeout = timeout
self._cluster_name = cluster_name
self._bearer_close = _bearer_close
if tls is None:
self._channel = grpc.insecure_channel(endpoint)
else:
# Build credentials from whatever subset of mTLS material the
# caller supplied. None for `root_certificates` makes gRPC use
# the system trust store, which is what we want for OIDC
# gateways behind a public CA.
credentials = grpc.ssl_channel_credentials(
root_certificates=(tls.ca_path.read_bytes() if tls.ca_path else None),
private_key=(tls.key_path.read_bytes() if tls.key_path else None),
certificate_chain=(
tls.cert_path.read_bytes() if tls.cert_path else None
),
)
self._channel = grpc.secure_channel(endpoint, credentials)
provider = _normalize_bearer(bearer_token)
if provider is not None:
self._channel = grpc.intercept_channel(
self._channel,
_BearerAuthInterceptor(provider),
)
self._stub = openshell_pb2_grpc.OpenShellStub(self._channel)
@classmethod
def from_active_cluster(
cls,
*,
cluster: str | None = None,
timeout: float = 30.0,
auto_refresh: bool = True,
write_back: bool = True,
insecure: bool = False,
) -> SandboxClient:
"""Construct a `SandboxClient` from the active gateway's on-disk state.
Args:
cluster: explicit gateway name; otherwise reads
`$OPENSHELL_GATEWAY` or `~/.config/openshell/active_gateway`.
timeout: per-call gRPC timeout in seconds.
auto_refresh: when True (default) and the gateway uses OIDC,
lazily refresh the access token via the IdP's token endpoint
if the cached `oidc_token.json` is near expiry. Matches the
lazy-refresh patterns used by `google-auth` and `botocore`.
Set False to keep the SDK as a read-only consumer of the
CLI's cache (fail closed on expiry).
write_back: when True (default, and `auto_refresh=True`),
atomically persist refreshed bundles back to
`oidc_token.json` so other processes — including the
Rust CLI — see the rotation. Required for IdPs with
refresh-token rotation enabled (Keycloak, Entra in
strict mode): an in-memory-only refresh would leave the
on-disk `refresh_token` pointing at an invalidated
value, and any other process starting from that disk
state would fail on its first refresh. Set False only
when you know the SDK is the sole consumer of this
gateway directory.
insecure: when True, disables TLS certificate verification
for OIDC discovery and refresh calls. Mirrors the Rust
CLI's `--insecure` flag for issuers behind self-signed
certs. Off by default.
"""
cluster_name = cluster or _resolve_active_cluster()
gateway_dir = _xdg_config_home() / "openshell" / "gateways" / cluster_name
metadata_path = gateway_dir / "metadata.json"
try:
metadata = json.loads(metadata_path.read_text())
except FileNotFoundError:
raise SandboxError(f"gateway '{cluster_name}' not found") from None
if "gateway_endpoint" not in metadata:
raise SandboxError(f"gateway '{cluster_name}' metadata missing endpoint")
parsed = urlparse(metadata["gateway_endpoint"])
host = parsed.hostname or "127.0.0.1"
port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
endpoint = f"{host}:{port}"
# TLS transport. Mirror crates/openshell-tui/src/lib.rs
# `build_oidc_channel` — for an https gateway, always build a
# secure channel and pick the strongest available trust profile.
tls: TlsConfig | None = None
if parsed.scheme == "https":
mtls_dir = gateway_dir / "mtls"
ca = mtls_dir / "ca.crt" if (mtls_dir / "ca.crt").exists() else None
cert = mtls_dir / "tls.crt" if (mtls_dir / "tls.crt").exists() else None
key = mtls_dir / "tls.key" if (mtls_dir / "tls.key").exists() else None
if ca is not None and cert is not None and key is not None:
# Full mTLS.
tls = TlsConfig(ca_path=ca, cert_path=cert, key_path=key)
elif ca is not None:
# CA-only trust (no client identity).
tls = TlsConfig(ca_path=ca)
else:
# System roots (e.g. OIDC gateway behind a public CA).
tls = TlsConfig()
# OIDC bearer. Mirror the Rust CLI/TUI: the gateway metadata's
# `auth_mode` is authoritative — a stale oidc_token.json next to
# a non-OIDC gateway should NOT cause us to attach a bearer.
bearer_token: Callable[[], str] | None = None
bearer_close: Callable[[], None] | None = None
if metadata.get("auth_mode") == "oidc":
bearer_token, bearer_close = _make_cluster_bearer_provider(
gateway_dir,
cluster_name,
auto_refresh=auto_refresh,
write_back=write_back,
insecure=insecure,
)
return cls(
endpoint,
tls=tls,
bearer_token=bearer_token,
timeout=timeout,
cluster_name=cluster_name,
_bearer_close=bearer_close,
)
def close(self) -> None:
"""Release the gRPC channel and any bearer-auth resources.
Idempotent. If `from_active_cluster` wired up an OIDC refresher
for this client, the refresher's underlying httpx.Client is
closed here too — otherwise long-lived services that churn
clients would leak sockets / file descriptors until GC.
"""
self._channel.close()
if self._bearer_close is not None:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
self._bearer_close()
self._bearer_close = None
def __enter__(self) -> SandboxClient:
return self
def __exit__(self, *args: object) -> None:
self.close()
def health(self) -> openshell_pb2.HealthResponse:
return self._stub.Health(openshell_pb2.HealthRequest(), timeout=self._timeout)
def create(
self,
*,
spec: openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec | None = None,
) -> SandboxRef:
request_spec = spec if spec is not None else _default_spec()
response = self._stub.CreateSandbox(
openshell_pb2.CreateSandboxRequest(spec=request_spec),
timeout=self._timeout,
)
sandbox_ref = _sandbox_ref(response.sandbox)
if sandbox_ref.id == "":
raise SandboxError("CreateSandbox returned empty sandbox id")
return sandbox_ref
def create_session(
self,
*,
spec: openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec | None = None,
) -> SandboxSession:
return SandboxSession(self, self.create(spec=spec))
def get(self, sandbox_name: str) -> SandboxRef:
response = self._stub.GetSandbox(
openshell_pb2.GetSandboxRequest(name=sandbox_name),
timeout=self._timeout,
)
return _sandbox_ref(response.sandbox)
def get_session(self, sandbox_name: str) -> SandboxSession:
return SandboxSession(self, self.get(sandbox_name))
def list(self, *, limit: int = 100, offset: int = 0) -> builtins.list[SandboxRef]:
response = self._stub.ListSandboxes(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxesRequest(limit=limit, offset=offset),
timeout=self._timeout,
)
return [_sandbox_ref(item) for item in response.sandboxes]
def list_ids(self, *, limit: int = 100, offset: int = 0) -> builtins.list[str]:
return [item.id for item in self.list(limit=limit, offset=offset)]
def delete(self, sandbox_name: str) -> bool:
response = self._stub.DeleteSandbox(
openshell_pb2.DeleteSandboxRequest(name=sandbox_name),
timeout=self._timeout,
)
return bool(response.deleted)
def wait_deleted(self, sandbox_name: str, *, timeout_seconds: float = 60.0) -> None:
deadline = time.time() + timeout_seconds
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
self.get(sandbox_name)
except grpc.RpcError as exc:
if (
isinstance(exc, grpc.Call)
and exc.code() == grpc.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND
):
return
raise
time.sleep(1)
raise SandboxError(f"sandbox {sandbox_name} was not deleted within timeout")
def wait_ready(
self, sandbox_name: str, *, timeout_seconds: float = 300.0
) -> SandboxRef:
deadline = time.time() + timeout_seconds
while time.time() < deadline:
sandbox = self.get(sandbox_name)
if sandbox.status.phase == openshell_pb2.SANDBOX_PHASE_READY:
return sandbox
if sandbox.status.phase == openshell_pb2.SANDBOX_PHASE_ERROR:
raise SandboxError(f"sandbox {sandbox_name} entered error phase")
time.sleep(1)
raise SandboxError(f"sandbox {sandbox_name} was not ready within timeout")
def exec_stream(
self,
sandbox_id: str,
command: Sequence[str],
*,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
stdin: bytes | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> Iterator[ExecChunk | ExecResult]:
if not command:
raise SandboxError("command must not be empty")
request = openshell_pb2.ExecSandboxRequest(
sandbox_id=sandbox_id,
command=list(command),
workdir=workdir or "",
environment=dict(env or {}),
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds or 0,
stdin=stdin or b"",
)
# Use whichever is larger: the default client timeout or the command
# timeout plus headroom for SSH setup / teardown overhead.
grpc_deadline = self._timeout
if timeout_seconds and timeout_seconds + 10 > grpc_deadline:
grpc_deadline = timeout_seconds + 10
stream = self._stub.ExecSandbox(request, timeout=grpc_deadline)
stdout_parts: list[bytes] = []
stderr_parts: list[bytes] = []
exit_code: int | None = None
for event in stream:
payload = event.WhichOneof("payload")
if payload == "stdout":
data = bytes(event.stdout.data)
stdout_parts.append(data)
yield ExecChunk(stream="stdout", data=data)
elif payload == "stderr":
data = bytes(event.stderr.data)
stderr_parts.append(data)
yield ExecChunk(stream="stderr", data=data)
elif payload == "exit":
exit_code = int(event.exit.exit_code)
if exit_code is None:
raise SandboxError("ExecSandbox stream ended without an exit event")
yield ExecResult(
exit_code=exit_code,
stdout=b"".join(stdout_parts).decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
stderr=b"".join(stderr_parts).decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
)
def exec(
self,
sandbox_id: str,
command: Sequence[str],
*,
stream_output: bool = False,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
stdin: bytes | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
result: ExecResult | None = None
for item in self.exec_stream(
sandbox_id,
command,
workdir=workdir,
env=env,
stdin=stdin,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
):
if stream_output and isinstance(item, ExecChunk):
if item.stream == "stdout":
sys.stdout.buffer.write(item.data)
sys.stdout.flush()
else:
sys.stderr.buffer.write(item.data)
sys.stderr.flush()
if isinstance(item, ExecResult):
result = item
if result is None:
raise SandboxError("ExecSandbox did not return a result")
return result
def exec_python(
self,
sandbox_id: str,
function: Callable[..., object],
*,
args: Sequence[object] = (),
kwargs: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
stream_output: bool = False,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
exec_env = dict(env or {})
exec_env["OPENSHELL_PYFUNC_B64"] = _serialize_python_callable(
function,
args=args,
kwargs=kwargs,
)
return self.exec(
sandbox_id,
[_SANDBOX_PYTHON_BIN, "-c", _PYTHON_CLOUDPICKLE_BOOTSTRAP],
stream_output=stream_output,
workdir=workdir,
env=exec_env,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ClusterInferenceConfig:
provider_name: str
model_id: str
version: int
class InferenceRouteClient:
"""gRPC client for cluster-level inference configuration."""
def __init__(self, channel: grpc.Channel, *, timeout: float = 30.0) -> None:
self._stub = inference_pb2_grpc.InferenceStub(channel)
self._timeout = timeout
@classmethod
def from_sandbox_client(cls, client: SandboxClient) -> InferenceRouteClient:
return cls(client._channel, timeout=client._timeout)
def set_cluster(
self,
*,
provider_name: str,
model_id: str,
no_verify: bool = False,
) -> ClusterInferenceConfig:
response = self._stub.SetClusterInference(
inference_pb2.SetClusterInferenceRequest(
provider_name=provider_name,
model_id=model_id,
no_verify=no_verify,
),
timeout=self._timeout,
)
return ClusterInferenceConfig(
provider_name=response.provider_name,
model_id=response.model_id,
version=response.version,
)
def get_cluster(self) -> ClusterInferenceConfig:
response = self._stub.GetClusterInference(
inference_pb2.GetClusterInferenceRequest(),
timeout=self._timeout,
)
return ClusterInferenceConfig(
provider_name=response.provider_name,
model_id=response.model_id,
version=response.version,
)
class Sandbox:
"""Context-managed sandbox session bound to one sandbox id."""
def __init__(
self,
*,
cluster: str | None = None,
sandbox: str | SandboxRef | None = None,
delete_on_exit: bool = True,
spec: openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec | None = None,
timeout: float = 30.0,
ready_timeout_seconds: float = 120.0,
auto_refresh: bool = True,
write_back: bool = True,
insecure: bool = False,
) -> None:
"""Bind a Sandbox context to the active gateway.
OIDC kwargs (`auto_refresh`, `write_back`, `insecure`) forward
directly to `SandboxClient.from_active_cluster` and have the
same semantics. They're surfaced on `Sandbox` so callers using
the higher-level wrapper get parity with `SandboxClient` for
OIDC-protected gateways (e.g. passing `insecure=True` for a
self-signed dev IdP). Non-OIDC gateways ignore them.
"""
self._cluster = cluster
self._sandbox_input = sandbox
self._delete_on_exit = delete_on_exit
self._spec = spec
self._timeout = timeout
self._ready_timeout_seconds = ready_timeout_seconds
self._auto_refresh = auto_refresh
self._write_back = write_back
self._insecure = insecure
self._client: SandboxClient | None = None
self._session: SandboxSession | None = None
@property
def id(self) -> str:
if self._session is None:
raise SandboxError("sandbox context has not been entered")
return self._session.id
@property
def sandbox(self) -> SandboxRef:
if self._session is None:
raise SandboxError("sandbox context has not been entered")
return self._session.sandbox
def __enter__(self) -> Sandbox:
client = SandboxClient.from_active_cluster(
cluster=self._cluster,
timeout=self._timeout,
auto_refresh=self._auto_refresh,
write_back=self._write_back,
insecure=self._insecure,
)
self._client = client
if self._sandbox_input is None:
self._session = client.create_session(spec=self._spec)
elif isinstance(self._sandbox_input, SandboxRef):
self._session = SandboxSession(client, self._sandbox_input)
else:
self._session = client.get_session(self._sandbox_input)
ready = client.wait_ready(
self._session.sandbox.name,
timeout_seconds=self._ready_timeout_seconds,
)
self._session = SandboxSession(client, ready)
return self
def __exit__(self, *args: object) -> None:
try:
if (
self._delete_on_exit
and self._session is not None
and self._client is not None
):
try:
deleted = self._session.delete()
if deleted:
self._client.wait_deleted(self._session.sandbox.name)
except grpc.RpcError as exc:
if (
not isinstance(exc, grpc.Call)
or exc.code() != grpc.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND
):
raise
finally:
if self._client is not None:
self._client.close()
self._session = None
self._client = None
def exec(
self,
command: Sequence[str],
*,
stream_output: bool = False,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
stdin: bytes | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
if self._session is None:
raise SandboxError("sandbox context has not been entered")
return self._session.exec(
command,
stream_output=stream_output,
workdir=workdir,
env=env,
stdin=stdin,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
def exec_python(
self,
function: Callable[..., object],
*,
args: Sequence[object] = (),
kwargs: Mapping[str, object] | None = None,
stream_output: bool = False,
workdir: str | None = None,
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
timeout_seconds: int | None = None,
) -> ExecResult:
if self._session is None:
raise SandboxError("sandbox context has not been entered")
return self._session.exec_python(
function,
args=args,
kwargs=kwargs,
stream_output=stream_output,
workdir=workdir,
env=env,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
_PYTHON_CLOUDPICKLE_BOOTSTRAP = (
"import base64,cloudpickle,os;"
"payload=base64.b64decode(os.environ['OPENSHELL_PYFUNC_B64']);"
"func,args,kwargs=cloudpickle.loads(payload);"
"result=func(*args,**kwargs);"
"print(result) if result is not None else None"
)
_SANDBOX_PYTHON_BIN = "python"
def _serialize_python_callable(
function: Callable[..., object],
*,
args: Sequence[object],
kwargs: Mapping[str, object] | None,
) -> str:
try:
import cloudpickle
except ImportError as exc: # pragma: no cover - import error path
raise SandboxError("cloudpickle is required for exec_python") from exc
payload = cloudpickle.dumps((function, tuple(args), dict(kwargs or {})))
return base64.b64encode(payload).decode("ascii")
def _sandbox_ref(sandbox: openshell_pb2.Sandbox) -> SandboxRef:
status = sandbox.status if sandbox.HasField("status") else None
return SandboxRef(
id=sandbox.metadata.id if sandbox.metadata else "",
name=sandbox.metadata.name if sandbox.metadata else "",
status=SandboxStatusRef(
phase=status.phase if status else 0,
current_policy_version=status.current_policy_version if status else 0,
),
)
def _default_spec() -> openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec:
# Omit the policy field so the sandbox container discovers its policy
# from /etc/openshell/policy.yaml (baked into the image at build time).
# This avoids duplicating policy defaults between the SDK and the
# container image and ensures sandboxes get the full dev-sandbox-policy
# (including network_policies) out of the box.
return openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec()
def _xdg_config_home() -> pathlib.Path:
configured = os.environ.get("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")
if configured:
return pathlib.Path(configured)
return pathlib.Path.home() / ".config"
# Re-check the cached token roughly 30 seconds before the issuer's
# stated expiry, to leave room for in-flight RPCs and clock skew. This
# matches `openshell-bootstrap::oidc_token::is_token_expired`.
_OIDC_TOKEN_EXPIRY_GRACE_SECONDS = 30
def _read_oidc_token_bundle(gateway_dir: pathlib.Path) -> dict | None:
"""Read and parse `oidc_token.json` for a gateway.
Returns the parsed dict, or `None` if the file is absent or unreadable.
See `openshell-bootstrap::oidc_token::store_oidc_token` for the writer.
"""
token_path = gateway_dir / "oidc_token.json"
try:
return json.loads(token_path.read_text())
except FileNotFoundError:
return None
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return None
def _normalize_issuer(bundle: dict) -> str | None:
"""Return the bundle's issuer with a trailing slash stripped.
Used to detect whether the issuer changed when adopting a bundle
re-read from disk, so a cached token endpoint computed for the old
issuer can be invalidated. Trailing-slash differences are treated as
equal, matching `_discover_token_endpoint`'s normalization.
"""
issuer = bundle.get("issuer")
return issuer.rstrip("/") if isinstance(issuer, str) else None
def _load_cluster_bearer_token(gateway_dir: pathlib.Path) -> str | None:
"""Read a single (possibly expired) access token from disk.
Lower-level helper used by both the legacy single-shot path and the
refreshing provider. Returns the raw access_token string or None.
"""
bundle = _read_oidc_token_bundle(gateway_dir)
if bundle is None:
return None
access_token = bundle.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access_token, str) or not access_token:
return None
return access_token
def _make_fail_closed_bearer_provider(
gateway_dir: pathlib.Path,
cluster_name: str,
) -> Callable[[], str]:
"""Per-RPC provider that re-reads `oidc_token.json` but does NOT refresh.
Raises `SandboxError` when the token is missing or expired. Available as
an opt-out from the default `_OidcRefresher` for callers (e.g. tests)
that want to assert expiry behavior or that don't want the SDK to make
outbound HTTP calls to the IdP.
"""
def provider() -> str:
bundle = _read_oidc_token_bundle(gateway_dir)
if bundle is None:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC token for gateway '{cluster_name}' is missing or "
f"unreadable. Re-authenticate with: openshell gateway login"
)
access_token = bundle.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access_token, str) or not access_token:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC token for gateway '{cluster_name}' has no access "
f"token. Re-authenticate with: openshell gateway login"
)
expires_at = bundle.get("expires_at")
if isinstance(expires_at, int):
now = int(time.time())
if now + _OIDC_TOKEN_EXPIRY_GRACE_SECONDS >= expires_at:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC token for gateway '{cluster_name}' has expired. "
f"Re-authenticate with: openshell gateway login"
)
return access_token
return provider
class _InvalidGrantError(SandboxError):
"""Refresh failed with OAuth2 `invalid_grant` (RFC 6749 §5.2).
The refresh_token was rejected — expired, revoked, or rotated out by
a concurrent refresh in another process. Subclass of `SandboxError`
so an uncaught instance still surfaces the standard re-authenticate
hint; `current_access_token` catches it to retry once with a
peer-rotated bundle before giving up.
"""
class _OidcRefresher:
"""Thread-safe in-process OAuth2 refresh for a gateway's `oidc_token.json`.
Mirrors the lazy-refresh pattern used by `google-auth`'s `Credentials`
and `botocore`'s `SSOTokenProvider`. Uses `httpx` for transport so
we can pin `follow_redirects=False` and the TLS verification policy
explicitly — same posture as the Rust CLI's use of `reqwest` with
`Policy::none()` and an opt-in `danger_accept_invalid_certs` (see
`crates/openshell-cli/src/oidc_auth.rs::http_client`). The OAuth2
refresh-token grant itself (RFC 6749 §6) is a single form-encoded
POST, handled inline rather than via an OAuth2 library.
Properties:
- **Lazy**: check expiry on every RPC; refresh only when stale.
- **Lock-coordinated**: concurrent RPCs share a single refresh, not
one per call. Plain `threading.Lock` (no separate worker thread,
unlike `google-auth`'s `RefreshThreadManager` — sufficient for
our use case).
- **Disk-aware**: before refreshing, re-read `oidc_token.json` —
the CLI or another process may have already rotated the bundle.
- **Discovery-validated**: fetches the OIDC discovery document
from `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration`, rejects
responses whose `issuer` field doesn't match the configured one
(preventing SSRF / misdirection of the refresh_token to an
attacker-controlled endpoint). Mirrors the Rust CLI's
`discover()` function.
- **Redirect-hardened**: `follow_redirects=False` on the underlying
`httpx.Client` so a 3xx during discovery or refresh is treated
as a failure rather than silently chasing the redirect to an
arbitrary host.
- **Write-back by default**: when `auto_refresh=True`, refreshed
bundles are atomically persisted to `oidc_token.json` at mode
0600 so other processes (Rust CLI, TUI, other Python clients)
see the rotated `refresh_token`. Required for IdPs that
invalidate the old `refresh_token` on rotation (Keycloak with
rotation enabled, Entra in strict mode); without write-back, a
second process would `invalid_grant` on next refresh.
- **`insecure=True` flag** disables TLS certificate verification
for the discovery and refresh calls. Matches the Rust CLI's
`--insecure` plumbing for OIDC issuers behind self-signed certs.
- **Refresh failures** surface as `SandboxError` with a
"re-authenticate with: openshell gateway login" hint.
"""
def __init__(
self,
gateway_dir: pathlib.Path,
cluster_name: str,
*,
write_back: bool = True,
insecure: bool = False,
) -> None:
self._gateway_dir = gateway_dir
self._cluster_name = cluster_name
self._write_back = write_back
self._lock = threading.Lock()
self._bundle: dict | None = None
self._token_endpoint: str | None = None
# Single httpx.Client serves both discovery (unauthenticated
# GET) and refresh (POST with form-encoded body) — they share
# the same security posture.
#
# - follow_redirects=False: a 3xx during discovery would
# otherwise steer us to an attacker-controlled token
# endpoint. Matches `reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()` in
# the Rust CLI's `oidc_auth.rs::http_client`.
# - verify=not insecure: opt-in TLS-verification disable for
# self-signed issuers. Matches the Rust CLI's `--insecure`
# flag plumbing.
#
# We don't use authlib's `OAuth2Client` here because it
# auto-injects an Authorization header on every request from
# its stored token, which would break the unauthenticated
# discovery GET. The refresh_token grant for a public client
# is a single form-encoded POST — small enough to spell out
# directly with httpx, and easier to test.
self._http = httpx.Client(
follow_redirects=False,
verify=not insecure,
timeout=15.0,
)
def close(self) -> None:
self._http.close()
def __del__(self) -> None:
# Best-effort cleanup; tests + short-lived callers may not call
# close() explicitly.
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
self._http.close()
def current_access_token(self) -> str:
"""Return a non-expired access token, refreshing if needed."""
with self._lock:
if self._bundle is None:
self._bundle = _read_oidc_token_bundle(self._gateway_dir)
if self._bundle is None:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC token for gateway '{self._cluster_name}' is "
f"missing or unreadable. Re-authenticate with: "
f"openshell gateway login"
)
if self._is_fresh(self._bundle):
return self._bundle["access_token"]
# Cached bundle is stale. Before refreshing, re-read disk —
# another process (CLI, TUI, another SDK client) may have
# rotated the bundle while we were idle. Adopt the disk
# bundle when it was refreshed more recently than ours, EVEN
# WHEN its access token is also stale: otherwise we'd refresh
# with our in-memory refresh_token, which a rotating IdP may
# have already invalidated when the other process refreshed
# (Keycloak with rotation, Entra in strict mode).
#
# "More recently" is judged by `expires_at`: a refresh issues
# a new access token with a forward expiry alongside the
# (possibly rotated) refresh_token, so the bundle with the
# later expiry carries the newest refresh_token. This also
# preserves the write_back=False case, where our in-memory
# bundle has already rotated past the on-disk one and must
# NOT be clobbered by the older disk copy.
disk = _read_oidc_token_bundle(self._gateway_dir)
if disk is not None and self._expiry(disk) > self._expiry(self._bundle):
# If the issuer changed under us, the cached token
# endpoint no longer applies — force re-discovery.
if _normalize_issuer(disk) != _normalize_issuer(self._bundle):
self._token_endpoint = None
self._bundle = disk
if self._is_fresh(disk):
return disk["access_token"]
# Truly stale; refresh against the IdP using the freshest
# bundle we have (disk if it was newer, else in-memory).
try:
self._bundle = self._refresh(self._bundle)
except _InvalidGrantError as exc:
# We lost a cross-process rotation race: between our disk
# re-read above and our refresh POST, a peer (CLI, TUI,
# another SDK client) rotated the refresh_token and the
# IdP invalidated ours. This is the residual window that
# neither google-auth nor botocore close without an OS
# file lock. Rather than lock, recover: re-read disk once
# and, if a peer wrote a *different* refresh_token, retry
# with it before surfacing a re-authenticate error.
self._bundle = self._recover_from_invalid_grant(self._bundle, exc)
if self._write_back:
self._write_to_disk(self._bundle)
return self._bundle["access_token"]
def _recover_from_invalid_grant(
self, attempted: dict, exc: _InvalidGrantError
) -> dict:
"""Re-read disk after an `invalid_grant` and retry once if a peer
rotated the refresh_token.
`attempted` is the bundle whose refresh_token the IdP just
rejected. If disk now holds a different refresh_token, a
concurrent process won the rotation race — adopt and reuse it
(returning early if it is already fresh, otherwise refreshing
with it). If disk offers nothing new, the rejection is genuine:
re-raise so the caller sees the re-authenticate hint.
"""
disk = _read_oidc_token_bundle(self._gateway_dir)
if disk is None or disk.get("refresh_token") == attempted.get("refresh_token"):
# No peer rotation — the refresh_token really is dead.
raise exc
if _normalize_issuer(disk) != _normalize_issuer(attempted):
self._token_endpoint = None
if self._is_fresh(disk):
return disk
# Single retry with the peer's rotated token; a second
# _InvalidGrantError here propagates (no further retry).
return self._refresh(disk)
@staticmethod
def _is_fresh(bundle: dict) -> bool:
access_token = bundle.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access_token, str) or not access_token:
return False
exp = bundle.get("expires_at")
if not isinstance(exp, int):
# No expiry info — treat as fresh (matches the
# `is_token_expired` semantics in the Rust CLI).
return True
return int(time.time()) + _OIDC_TOKEN_EXPIRY_GRACE_SECONDS < exp
@staticmethod
def _expiry(bundle: dict) -> float:
"""Access-token expiry as a comparable number.
A bundle without an `expires_at` is treated as non-expiring
(`+inf`) — consistent with `_is_fresh`, which treats a missing
expiry as always fresh. Used to decide which of two stale
bundles (in-memory vs. on-disk) was refreshed more recently and
therefore holds the newest refresh_token.
"""
exp = bundle.get("expires_at")
return float(exp) if isinstance(exp, int) else float("inf")
def _discover_token_endpoint(self, bundle: dict) -> str:
if self._token_endpoint is not None:
return self._token_endpoint
issuer = bundle.get("issuer")
if not isinstance(issuer, str) or not issuer:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC bundle for gateway '{self._cluster_name}' has no "
f"`issuer`; cannot refresh. Re-authenticate with: openshell "
f"gateway login"
)
normalized_issuer = issuer.rstrip("/")
discovery_url = f"{normalized_issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration"
try:
resp = self._http.get(discovery_url)
except httpx.HTTPError as e:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC discovery failed for gateway "
f"'{self._cluster_name}': {e}. Re-authenticate with: "
f"openshell gateway login"
) from e
# follow_redirects=False means a 3xx surfaces as a non-2xx
# status; treat any non-success as a discovery failure rather
# than silently following.
if not 200 <= resp.status_code < 300:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC discovery failed for gateway "
f"'{self._cluster_name}': HTTP {resp.status_code} "
f"from {discovery_url}. Re-authenticate with: openshell "
f"gateway login"
)
try:
disco = resp.json()
except ValueError as e:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC discovery returned invalid JSON for gateway "
f"'{self._cluster_name}': {e}"
) from e
# Critical: validate that the discovery document's `issuer`
# matches the configured one. Without this, a misdirected or
# malicious discovery response could steer the refresh_token
# POST to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
discovered_issuer = disco.get("issuer", "")
if not isinstance(discovered_issuer, str) or (
discovered_issuer.rstrip("/") != normalized_issuer
):
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC discovery issuer mismatch for gateway "
f"'{self._cluster_name}': expected '{normalized_issuer}', "
f"got '{discovered_issuer}'."
)
endpoint = disco.get("token_endpoint")
if not isinstance(endpoint, str) or not endpoint:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC discovery for gateway '{self._cluster_name}' did "
f"not include a token_endpoint."
)
self._token_endpoint = endpoint
return endpoint
def _refresh(self, bundle: dict) -> dict:
refresh_token = bundle.get("refresh_token")
if not isinstance(refresh_token, str) or not refresh_token:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC token for gateway '{self._cluster_name}' has no "
f"refresh token. Re-authenticate with: openshell gateway "
f"login"
)
token_endpoint = self._discover_token_endpoint(bundle)
client_id = bundle.get("client_id", "openshell-cli")
# RFC 6749 §6: refresh_token grant. Form-encoded POST with
# grant_type, refresh_token, and (for a public client) client_id.
# No Authorization header (token_endpoint_auth_method="none").
try:
resp = self._http.post(
token_endpoint,
data={
"grant_type": "refresh_token",
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
"client_id": client_id,
},
)
except httpx.HTTPError as e:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC token refresh failed for gateway "
f"'{self._cluster_name}': {type(e).__name__}: {e}. "
f"Re-authenticate with: openshell gateway login"
) from e
if resp.status_code != 200:
# Include the IdP's error body for diagnostics — RFC 6749
# mandates a JSON body like {"error":"invalid_grant", ...}
# on failure, which is the most useful signal to surface.
error_code = None
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
body = resp.json()
if isinstance(body, dict):
error_code = body.get("error")
detail = ""
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
detail = f": {resp.text[:200]}"
message = (
f"OIDC token refresh failed for gateway "
f"'{self._cluster_name}': HTTP {resp.status_code}"
f"{detail}. Re-authenticate with: openshell gateway "
f"login"
)
# `invalid_grant` specifically means the refresh_token was
# rejected — distinguished from transport/5xx errors so the
# caller can retry once with a peer-rotated bundle (a lost
# cross-process rotation race) before surfacing the failure.
if error_code == "invalid_grant":
raise _InvalidGrantError(message)
raise SandboxError(message)
try:
token = resp.json()
except ValueError as e:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC refresh response for gateway '{self._cluster_name}' "
f"is not JSON: {e}"
) from e
access_token = token.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access_token, str) or not access_token:
raise SandboxError(
f"OIDC refresh response for gateway '{self._cluster_name}' "
f"is missing access_token."
)
expires_at = token.get("expires_at")
if expires_at is None:
expires_in = token.get("expires_in")
if isinstance(expires_in, (int, float)):
expires_at = int(time.time()) + int(expires_in)
return {
"access_token": access_token,
# Refresh-token rotation: some IdPs (Keycloak with rotation
# enabled, Entra in strict mode) reissue and invalidate the
# old one. Honor the new value when present.
"refresh_token": token.get("refresh_token", refresh_token),
"expires_at": int(expires_at) if expires_at is not None else None,
"issuer": bundle.get("issuer", ""),
"client_id": client_id,
}
def _write_to_disk(self, bundle: dict) -> None:
"""Atomic-replace `oidc_token.json` with the refreshed bundle.
Strips `None` values to match the Rust writer's
`skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none"` behavior so a Python-
written file is byte-identical in shape to what the CLI writes.
Uses `tempfile.mkstemp` (PID + random suffix) so two writers
racing on the same gateway directory don't share a tmp file
and trample each other's content. Each writer gets a unique
path; `.replace()` is atomic per-writer, and POSIX rename
semantics ensure the final `oidc_token.json` is always
complete-and-readable to anyone observing.
"""
path = self._gateway_dir / "oidc_token.json"
serializable = {k: v for k, v in bundle.items() if v is not None}
payload = json.dumps(serializable, indent=2)
# mkstemp creates the file with mode 0600 already on POSIX
# (it uses O_CREAT | O_EXCL with restrictive umask), so chmod
# is a belt-and-braces step for filesystems that don't honor
# the initial mode.
fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=".oidc_token.",
suffix=".tmp",
dir=str(self._gateway_dir),
)
tmp_path = pathlib.Path(tmp_name)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
f.write(payload)
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
tmp_path.chmod(0o600)
tmp_path.replace(path)
except BaseException:
# Clean up our tmp on failure so we don't leave orphaned
# `.oidc_token.<rand>.tmp` files lying around. The replace
# already moved the file on the success path.
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
tmp_path.unlink()
raise
def _make_cluster_bearer_provider(
gateway_dir: pathlib.Path,
cluster_name: str,
*,
auto_refresh: bool = True,
write_back: bool = True,
insecure: bool = False,
) -> tuple[Callable[[], str], Callable[[], None] | None]:
"""Build a per-RPC token provider for a gateway directory.
Returns `(token_provider, close_fn_or_none)`. `close_fn` is non-None
only when an `_OidcRefresher` was constructed; callers that own the
provider's lifecycle (e.g. `SandboxClient.close()`) should invoke
it during teardown so the underlying httpx.Client is released
rather than relying on `__del__`.
With `auto_refresh=True` (the default), returns an `_OidcRefresher`-
backed callable that lazily refreshes against the IdP's token endpoint
when the cached bundle is stale. This mirrors the lazy-refresh pattern
used by `google.oauth2.credentials.Credentials` and
`botocore.tokens.SSOTokenProvider` and lets long-running scripts
survive token rotation without intervention.
With `auto_refresh=False`, falls back to the read-only / fail-closed
behavior: the SDK consumes whatever the CLI most recently wrote and
raises `SandboxError` when the token expires. Useful for tests or
callers that don't want the SDK to make outbound HTTP calls to the
IdP. No close_fn is returned in this case.
`write_back=True` (only meaningful when `auto_refresh=True`) makes the
refresher atomically persist the rotated bundle back to
`oidc_token.json` so other processes — including the Rust CLI — see
the new token. Defaults to True because OIDC providers with
refresh-token rotation (Keycloak, Entra) invalidate the old
refresh_token on rotation; an in-memory-only refresh would leave the
on-disk bundle pointing at an invalidated value, and any other
process starting from that disk state would fail on its first
refresh.
`insecure=True` disables TLS certificate verification for both the
OIDC discovery document fetch and the refresh-token POST. Mirrors
the Rust CLI's `--insecure` flag for OIDC issuers behind self-signed
certs.
"""
if not auto_refresh:
return _make_fail_closed_bearer_provider(gateway_dir, cluster_name), None
refresher = _OidcRefresher(
gateway_dir,
cluster_name,
write_back=write_back,
insecure=insecure,
)
return refresher.current_access_token, refresher.close
def _resolve_active_cluster() -> str:
env_gateway = os.environ.get("OPENSHELL_GATEWAY")
if env_gateway:
return env_gateway
active_file = _xdg_config_home() / "openshell" / "active_gateway"
try:
value = active_file.read_text().strip()
except FileNotFoundError:
raise SandboxError("no active gateway configured") from None
if value == "":
raise SandboxError("no active gateway configured")
return value