Files
OpenShell/crates/openshell-core
Florent BENOIT a4c848adbd feat(vm): add host bind mount support via virtiofs (libkrun) (#3463)
* feat(vm): add host bind mount support via virtiofs (libkrun)

Introduce host directory bind mounts for libkrun VM sandboxes using
the virtiofs4 API with simplified permission semantics. The gateway
accepts `enable_bind_mounts` in the `[openshell.drivers.vm]` TOML
table and forwards it to the VM driver subprocess.

Mounts are specified per-sandbox in driver_config.mounts[] with
source, target, optional read_only (default: read-only), and an
optional `type` that must be `bind`, so Docker and Podman bind entries
(without `selinux_label`) parse unchanged.

At sandbox validation the driver rejects mounts unless bind mounts
are enabled and resource admission is disabled. It rejects GPU and
other QEMU launches, sources with control characters, and more mounts
than libkrun has interrupt lines for (32 on aarch64, 3 on x86_64), and
checks targets against reserved VM-internal directories and each other
(no nested targets). The QEMU check runs again once the launch backend
is resolved.

Host source directories are checked at provisioning, before image
preparation, so a briefly missing source fails provisioning visibly
instead of denying recovery of a persisted sandbox. Missing,
inaccessible, symlinked, non-directory, and unreadable sources are
rejected: libkrun does not follow a final symlink, and on macOS it
panics during guest boot when it cannot open the share root.

The driver generates virtiofs tags and always writes a guest-side
manifest into the overlay disk, together with the init drop-ins, so an
image-supplied manifest can never drive guest mounts. The launcher
parses its tab-separated --vm-mount arguments from the right, so a
source can never shift the tag or mode, and the driver logs each
shared directory at launch.

Guest init mounts the shares after every /sandbox ownership fixup
and the init drop-ins, so recursive chowns never reach host files.
It refuses targets that traverse symlinks in the image, hands newly
created mount point parents under /sandbox to the sandbox user, and
skips an empty manifest.

krun_add_virtiofs4 is resolved optionally, so older libkrun runtimes
still boot sandboxes without mounts.

The kernel config lists CONFIG_FUSE_FS and CONFIG_VIRTIO_FS
explicitly; the pinned libkrunfw base config already enables both.

A vm_bind_mount e2e test checks a read-write share round-trips data
with the host, accepts a new file, directory, and nested file that the
host then sees, and that a read-only share rejects writes. libkrun on
rootless Linux refuses file creation by a guest user whose UID/GID
differ from its own, so the VM e2e gateway runs the sandbox as the
gateway user there. It enables bind mounts like the Docker and Podman
e2e gateways.

The runtimes docs cover the mount limit, the symlink restriction, the
guest-kernel exposure, and the rootless Linux UID/GID note. The
debug-openshell-cluster skill lists VM bind mount checks.

Signed-off-by: Florent Benoit <fbenoit@redhat.com>

* fix(nix): refresh vm-runtime hashes to the libkrun v1.19.4 runtime

The Nix vm-runtime package fetches the rolling vm-runtime release with
fixed hashes pinned on 2026-09-16. The release was rebuilt on
2026-09-21 after the libkrun v1.19.4 / libkrunfw v5.6.1 bump (#3451),
but the hashes were not updated, so CI kept substituting the
2026-09-15 runtime (libkrun v1.17.4) from the binary cache.

That libkrun lacks krun_add_virtiofs4, which VM bind mounts need.
Point the hashes at the current release assets.

Signed-off-by: Florent Benoit <fbenoit@redhat.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Florent Benoit <fbenoit@redhat.com>
2026-10-16 07:56:32 +00:00
..

openshell-core

Shared types, constants, configuration, and helpers used across OpenShell crates.

Object Metadata

Top-level user-facing objects use a Kubernetes-style metadata convention. The metadata shape provides:

  • Stable server-generated ID.
  • Human-readable name.
  • Creation timestamp.
  • Optional labels for filtering and automation.

Code that works with object metadata should use the traits in openshell_core::metadata instead of reaching into protobuf fields directly:

use openshell_core::{ObjectId, ObjectLabels, ObjectName};

let id = sandbox.object_id();
let name = sandbox.object_name();
let labels = sandbox.object_labels();

Trait methods must tolerate missing metadata and return safe empty values rather than panicking.

Label Rules

Labels follow Kubernetes-style key and value conventions:

  • Keys may include an optional DNS-prefix followed by /.
  • Names are limited to alphanumeric characters plus -, _, and ..
  • Values use the same character set and may be empty.
  • Selectors use comma-separated key=value pairs with AND semantics.

Validate labels at API ingress before persisting objects.

Inference Profiles

Provider inference profiles live in this crate so the gateway, sandbox, and router agree on provider defaults. Profiles define:

  • Auth header style.
  • Default upstream headers.
  • Client-supplied passthrough headers.
  • Supported inference protocol shapes.

Do not duplicate provider-specific inference behavior in callers. Add shared behavior here, then consume it from the gateway, sandbox, and router.

Middleware Contracts

Built-in supervisor middleware identifiers, host-selector matching, and pure configuration validation live in openshell_core::middleware. Policy admission and the supervisor runtime consume the same contract without introducing a dependency from the policy crate to the supervisor implementation.

Protobuf Struct Conversion

Use openshell_core::proto_struct when crossing between serde_json values and prost_types::{Struct, Value}. Both conversion directions live in this module; JSON-to-protobuf conversion is fallible so callers cannot silently replace an unrepresentable number.