Files
pkhodade-NV ab64e84bfc fix(core): enforce owner-only Windows ACLs on sensitive files and dirs (#3495)
* fix(core): enforce owner-only Windows ACLs on sensitive files and dirs

set_dir_owner_only/set_file_owner_only were unconditional no-ops on
Windows, so the CLI's mTLS client private key, OIDC/edge tokens, cached
SSH keys, and the gateway's key-encryption key relied entirely on
inherited NTFS ACLs with no OpenShell-applied restriction. Apply an
owner-only DACL via SetEntriesInAclW/SetNamedSecurityInfoW with
PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION to strip inherited ACEs, matching
the 0700/0600 guarantee already provided on Unix. is_file_permissions_too_open
now also works on Windows instead of being Unix-only, closing the
detection gap alongside the prevention gap.

Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
(cherry picked from commit 71560e947f85819efbcddf70ddda94befab62b0b)

* fix(core): treat a NULL DACL as too open in is_file_permissions_too_open

has_foreign_trustee conflated a NULL DACL with an unreadable/invalid
ACL and returned Some(false) (not too open) for both. Per the Win32
contract, a NULL DACL means the object grants full access to everyone
-- the most permissive state possible -- so it must be flagged as too
open. Split the null and invalid-ACL branches: null now returns
Some(true), invalid ACL keeps the existing unreadable-ACL fallback
(None, which the caller maps to false via unwrap_or). Adds a
regression test that constructs a real NULL DACL via a
SetNamedSecurityInfoW helper confined to the windows_acl module,
consistent with the existing unsafe-FFI confinement in that module.

Found by CodeRabbit review on MR !113.

Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
(cherry picked from commit 46e635a4ef1d6937cdb088f46aa85baee3d6ad28)

* fix(core): close three false-negative gaps in the Windows ACL audit

restrict_to_current_user() updated only the DACL, leaving a foreign
owner's implicit WRITE_DAC right intact -- they could later replace
the DACL we just set. Query OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION and take
ownership in the same SetNamedSecurityInfoW call; if the caller can't
(a genuinely foreign-owned object), the call now fails instead of
silently leaving the object insecure.

is_file_permissions_too_open() mapped every Win32 inspection failure
(missing READ_CONTROL, an invalid ACL, a token-query failure) to
"not too open" via unwrap_or(false). Fail closed instead: an
inspection failure is a security false-negative risk, not a green
light.

has_foreign_trustee()'s ACE loop only recognized plain
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE and treated every other type as non-granting.
Windows also defines access-allowed object, callback, and
callback-object ACE variants that can grant rights to a foreign
trustee; this audit doesn't parse their wider layouts, so their mere
presence is now conservatively flagged as too open instead of
silently skipped.

Also updates architecture/gateway.md, which still described the
SQLite file-tightening behavior only in terms of Unix mode 0o600, to
distinguish it from the owner-only DACL behavior on Windows.

Addresses review comments on PR #3495.

Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>

* fix(core): conditional owner claim and audit owner in Windows ACL helpers

restrict_to_current_user: query the current owner before calling
SetNamedSecurityInfoW. Include OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION only when the
path has a foreign owner -- requesting it unconditionally fails with
ACCESS_DENIED (0x80070005) on standard credentials even when the current
user is already the owner, because WRITE_OWNER is not implied by object
ownership. A foreign-owned path still triggers an ownership claim and
fails hard if the claim is denied, preserving the security contract.

has_foreign_trustee: request OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION alongside
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION and reject paths with a foreign owner
immediately, before inspecting the DACL. A foreign owner has implicit
WRITE_DAC rights and can replace any DACL we set, so a clean DACL is not
sufficient evidence of safety on a foreign-owned object.

architecture/gateway.md: clarify that the Windows path-hardening behavior
sets mode 0o600 on Unix and applies a protected owner-only DACL on
Windows, with conditional ownership claim and fail-hard semantics for
foreign-owned objects.

Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
2026-09-23 10:13:32 -07:00
..

Governance Interceptor Example

This standalone example implements the openshell.gateway_interceptor.v1.GatewayInterceptor service. It demonstrates how an interceptor can vend provider profiles and make them the gateway's authoritative profile source.

  • provider profile YAML lives in profiles/*.yaml
  • provider list-profiles shows only the profiles vended by this interceptor
  • providers can only be created with a type that matches one of those vended profile IDs
  • every vended provider profile gets governance annotations for its hash, signature, and signing key ID
  • every new sandbox receives policy.yaml during CreateSandbox
  • requested sandbox providers must match one of the vended profile IDs
  • every new sandbox gets an openshell.nvidia.com/policy-signature metadata annotation that is used to verify the policy
  • sandbox creation evaluations add a correlation_id log annotation for gateway audit logs, plus non-secret policy hash/signing key metadata
  • sandbox policy synchronization must carry the current signed governance policy; unsigned, stale, or modified policies are denied for every caller
  • sandbox policy analysis may report telemetry, but sandbox-authored policy proposals are denied before they reach the gateway handler
  • proposal_approval_mode=auto is blocked at both sandbox and global scope
  • users cannot import or update provider profiles outside the vended set
  • provider profile deletion is blocked by the interceptor

Run the interceptor:

cargo run -- \
  --listen 127.0.0.1:18081 \
  --policy policy.yaml \
  --profiles profiles \
  --gateway-endpoint http://127.0.0.1:8080

At startup the example parses policy.yaml, converts it to the protobuf JSON shape used by sandbox creation, computes a canonical SHA-256 digest, and signs that digest as an EdDSA JWT. The interceptor adds that JWT to each governed sandbox under metadata.annotations["openshell.nvidia.com/policy-signature"] and verifies the JWT against the sandbox policy during the CreateSandbox validate phase. The signing key is generated in memory on each interceptor start. This keeps the example self-contained. Production governance services should load managed signing keys, publish verifier keys, and define a rotation process.

The example owns this digest contract independently of the gateway. It uses a local reflected protobuf codec, recursively sorts ProtoJSON object keys, and preserves repeated-field order. Policy and profile hashes use the sha256:v2:<hex> format, and their JWTs require hash_algorithm=openshell-governance-protojson-sha256-v2. The gateway's policy hash is a separate operational revision identifier and is not expected to match the signed governance hash.

The interceptor polls the policy file every second by default. When policy.yaml changes and parses successfully, the interceptor re-signs it immediately. New sandboxes receive the updated signed policy through CreateSandbox. If --gateway-endpoint is set, the example also lists running sandboxes and calls UpdateConfig for ready or provisioning sandboxes so dynamic policy changes propagate through the normal sandbox config polling path. Static baseline changes that the gateway rejects for existing sandboxes are logged and still apply to newly created sandboxes.

The example also validates SubmitPolicyAnalysis. Requests without proposed policy chunks remain available for denial and network-activity telemetry. Requests containing proposed chunks are denied, so a sandbox cannot use the gateway's optional auto-approval path to widen its governed policy. This rule belongs to the example: gateways without this binding retain the standard proposal workflow.

Provider profile YAML files are loaded by the interceptor from --profiles (default: this example's profiles/ directory). The interceptor names each profile from its filename without the extension: profiles/github.yaml becomes profile ID github, and profiles/slack.yaml becomes profile ID slack. The YAML files do not need an id field; if one is present, the filename still wins.

The interceptor advertises provider_profiles = true in its manifest and vends the current profile set through SnapshotProviderProfiles. The gateway config selects the interceptor as its only provider profile source, so provider list-profiles shows only github and slack; built-in and user sources are omitted. The example signs each profile's canonical protobuf payload and exposes the JWT under annotations["openshell.nvidia.com/profile-signature"]; the signed hash and key ID are exposed beside it. These annotations demonstrate logic an interceptor can own; the gateway treats them as opaque metadata and does not verify them. Valid edits to files under profiles/ change the profile signature and snapshot revision, so running sandboxes that use the edited provider profile reload their effective provider-derived policy through the normal gateway config polling path. Invalid edits keep the last valid snapshot active.

Gateway TOML snippet:

[openshell.gateway]
provider_profile_sources = [
  { type = "interceptor", name = "provider-governance" },
]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors]]
name               = "provider-governance"
grpc_endpoint      = "http://127.0.0.1:18081"
order              = 10
failure_policy     = "fail_closed"
binding_policy     = "allowlist"
timeout            = "500ms"
max_response_bytes = 1048576
max_patches        = 32

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/CreateSandbox"
phases = ["modify_operation", "validate"]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/CreateProvider"
phases = ["validate"]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/UpdateConfig"
phases = ["validate"]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/SubmitPolicyAnalysis"
phases = ["validate"]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/ImportProviderProfiles"
phases = ["validate"]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/UpdateProviderProfiles"
phases = ["validate"]

[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc    = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/DeleteProviderProfile"
phases = ["validate"]

Run the launcher script to start a local gateway with the interceptor attached. The script prints the gateway endpoint and log paths, then keeps the gateway and interceptor running until you press Ctrl-C:

./smoke.sh

To run the governance smoke test suite and stop the gateway when it completes:

./smoke.sh --test-suite

The suite uses a gateway-signed JWT for the created sandbox identity to attempt an unsigned policy widening and a policy proposal. It verifies that both are denied, telemetry is accepted, and the active policy version and hash remain unchanged.