pkhodade-NV
ab64e84bfc
* fix(core): enforce owner-only Windows ACLs on sensitive files and dirs set_dir_owner_only/set_file_owner_only were unconditional no-ops on Windows, so the CLI's mTLS client private key, OIDC/edge tokens, cached SSH keys, and the gateway's key-encryption key relied entirely on inherited NTFS ACLs with no OpenShell-applied restriction. Apply an owner-only DACL via SetEntriesInAclW/SetNamedSecurityInfoW with PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION to strip inherited ACEs, matching the 0700/0600 guarantee already provided on Unix. is_file_permissions_too_open now also works on Windows instead of being Unix-only, closing the detection gap alongside the prevention gap. Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com> (cherry picked from commit 71560e947f85819efbcddf70ddda94befab62b0b) * fix(core): treat a NULL DACL as too open in is_file_permissions_too_open has_foreign_trustee conflated a NULL DACL with an unreadable/invalid ACL and returned Some(false) (not too open) for both. Per the Win32 contract, a NULL DACL means the object grants full access to everyone -- the most permissive state possible -- so it must be flagged as too open. Split the null and invalid-ACL branches: null now returns Some(true), invalid ACL keeps the existing unreadable-ACL fallback (None, which the caller maps to false via unwrap_or). Adds a regression test that constructs a real NULL DACL via a SetNamedSecurityInfoW helper confined to the windows_acl module, consistent with the existing unsafe-FFI confinement in that module. Found by CodeRabbit review on MR !113. Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com> (cherry picked from commit 46e635a4ef1d6937cdb088f46aa85baee3d6ad28) * fix(core): close three false-negative gaps in the Windows ACL audit restrict_to_current_user() updated only the DACL, leaving a foreign owner's implicit WRITE_DAC right intact -- they could later replace the DACL we just set. Query OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION and take ownership in the same SetNamedSecurityInfoW call; if the caller can't (a genuinely foreign-owned object), the call now fails instead of silently leaving the object insecure. is_file_permissions_too_open() mapped every Win32 inspection failure (missing READ_CONTROL, an invalid ACL, a token-query failure) to "not too open" via unwrap_or(false). Fail closed instead: an inspection failure is a security false-negative risk, not a green light. has_foreign_trustee()'s ACE loop only recognized plain ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE and treated every other type as non-granting. Windows also defines access-allowed object, callback, and callback-object ACE variants that can grant rights to a foreign trustee; this audit doesn't parse their wider layouts, so their mere presence is now conservatively flagged as too open instead of silently skipped. Also updates architecture/gateway.md, which still described the SQLite file-tightening behavior only in terms of Unix mode 0o600, to distinguish it from the owner-only DACL behavior on Windows. Addresses review comments on PR #3495. Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com> * fix(core): conditional owner claim and audit owner in Windows ACL helpers restrict_to_current_user: query the current owner before calling SetNamedSecurityInfoW. Include OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION only when the path has a foreign owner -- requesting it unconditionally fails with ACCESS_DENIED (0x80070005) on standard credentials even when the current user is already the owner, because WRITE_OWNER is not implied by object ownership. A foreign-owned path still triggers an ownership claim and fails hard if the claim is denied, preserving the security contract. has_foreign_trustee: request OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION alongside DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION and reject paths with a foreign owner immediately, before inspecting the DACL. A foreign owner has implicit WRITE_DAC rights and can replace any DACL we set, so a clean DACL is not sufficient evidence of safety on a foreign-owned object. architecture/gateway.md: clarify that the Windows path-hardening behavior sets mode 0o600 on Unix and applies a protected owner-only DACL on Windows, with conditional ownership claim and fail-hard semantics for foreign-owned objects. Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
openshell-core
Shared types, constants, configuration, and helpers used across OpenShell crates.
Object Metadata
Top-level user-facing objects use a Kubernetes-style metadata convention. The metadata shape provides:
- Stable server-generated ID.
- Human-readable name.
- Creation timestamp.
- Optional labels for filtering and automation.
Code that works with object metadata should use the traits in
openshell_core::metadata instead of reaching into protobuf fields directly:
use openshell_core::{ObjectId, ObjectLabels, ObjectName};
let id = sandbox.object_id();
let name = sandbox.object_name();
let labels = sandbox.object_labels();
Trait methods must tolerate missing metadata and return safe empty values rather than panicking.
Label Rules
Labels follow Kubernetes-style key and value conventions:
- Keys may include an optional DNS-prefix followed by
/. - Names are limited to alphanumeric characters plus
-,_, and.. - Values use the same character set and may be empty.
- Selectors use comma-separated
key=valuepairs with AND semantics.
Validate labels at API ingress before persisting objects.
Inference Profiles
Provider inference profiles live in this crate so the gateway, sandbox, and router agree on provider defaults. Profiles define:
- Auth header style.
- Default upstream headers.
- Client-supplied passthrough headers.
- Supported inference protocol shapes.
Do not duplicate provider-specific inference behavior in callers. Add shared behavior here, then consume it from the gateway, sandbox, and router.
Middleware Contracts
Built-in supervisor middleware identifiers, host-selector matching, and pure
configuration validation live in openshell_core::middleware. Policy admission
and the supervisor runtime consume the same contract without introducing a
dependency from the policy crate to the supervisor implementation.
Protobuf Struct Conversion
Use openshell_core::proto_struct when crossing between serde_json values and
prost_types::{Struct, Value}. Both conversion directions live in this module;
JSON-to-protobuf conversion is fallible so callers cannot silently replace an
unrepresentable number.