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Jason T. Greene
f4a67c6442
`openshell forward service` minted an SSH session token before every forwarded TCP connection and revoked it afterwards: two store commits per connection. The token added nothing on that path. `ForwardTcp` already authenticates the caller and authorizes it against the sandbox's workspace on every stream before it looks at the token, the relay to the supervisor is opened with the sandbox id and target only, and the token is never forwarded, audited, or visible to the target service. The mechanism exists for `openshell sandbox ssh`, where the process that opens the stream is an ssh ProxyCommand holding nothing but the token. Reusing it per TCP connection put a store write on the connect path and serialized concurrent forwards on commit latency: #3494 measured the symptom, and #3543 made the commits cheaper, but each one still holds SQLite's writer lock for an fsync, so connection setup under a burst stayed linear in the number of concurrent connections. Let `target.tcp` streams omit `authorization_token`. The gateway admits them on the already-authorized principal, counts them against the same per-sandbox connection cap, and touches no store. `target.ssh` streams keep requiring the token. A token supplied with a TCP target is still validated and counted per token, so an older CLI against a new gateway is unchanged. The CLI stops minting and revoking a session per forwarded connection; against a gateway that predates this change it recognizes the `authorization_token is required` rejection once and falls back to per-connection tokens for the rest of that forward. Tests cover token-less TCP admission and slot release, SSH targets still rejected without a token, a supplied token still validated, and the per-sandbox cap for token-less forwards. CLI integration tests run `service_forward_tcp` against a mock gateway: token-less inits echo data with no CreateSshSession or RevokeSshSession call, and a gateway that rejects the empty token is detected once, after which every connection in that forward mints and revokes its own token. Architecture and security docs describe which targets carry a token, and the per-token connection limit now reads 3, matching the gateway. Signed-off-by: Jason T. Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com>