* feat(mxc): ETW->OCSF audit consumer + Windows OCSF JSONL parity (cp6 P1) Add a Windows MXC ETW->OCSF audit trail in openshell-driver-mxc: a real-time Sandboxing-provider ETW consumer that decodes events (TDH), attributes each to an OpenShell sandbox_id, and maps them to OCSF (lifecycle 6002, config 5019, process 1007, finding 2004). cp6 Phase 1 - durable OCSF JSONL audit-file parity with Linux: - openshell-ocsf: add emit_ocsf_event_routed (populates the event-bridge thread-local AND stamps sandbox_id+message in one dispatch) plus public set/clear_current_event; OS-aware device (Device::windows/for_current_os) so device.os.name reflects the host instead of a hardcoded Linux stub. - etw_consumer: emit via the routed emit (previously fired a bare info! that never populated the bridge, so the structured event was dropped). - openshell-server: install OcsfJsonlLayer over a synchronous daily-rotated appender (durable under force-kill), gated by OPENSHELL_OCSF_JSON, path via %PROGRAMDATA%\OpenShell\logs (override OPENSHELL_OCSF_LOG_DIR). - device.hostname now resolves to the real gateway machine name. Box-proven on 7F203-MXC-001: JSONL lines == shorthand OCSF rows, all valid OCSF JSON, per-sandbox attribution intact, disabled state writes nothing. Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * feat(mxc): map remaining Sandboxing ETW events to OCSF Close the last three ETW->OCSF gaps so the audit trail covers the full set of events the Sandboxing provider emits (12/12): - ProcessLaunched -> Process Activity [1007] "Launch" (confirmed start; carries the real processId/threadId, the twin of CreateProcessInSandbox which only has the request + command line). - SandboxProxyConfigured -> Device Config State Change [5019] (the one network-plane setup event; surfaces proxyPort, "no proxy" when 0). - SandboxConsoleReferencePlumbed -> Device Config State Change [5019] (console-handle plumbing). map_config_state now handles the full config/hardening/setup family and carries proxyPort/hasConsoleReference/creationFlags as unmapped fields. Verified on 7F203-MXC-001: 11/12 event types emit OCSF without a proxy (SandboxProxyConfigured requires proxy config to fire). Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): seed ETW attribution under registry lock + Device tests Address CodeRabbit review on !31: - Prevent stale ETW attribution on a delete/launch race: register the wxc-exec pid while holding the registry lock, and bail if the sandbox entry is already gone. Previously the attribution key could be seeded after `delete` had removed the sandbox, leaving a stale key that could misroute later Sandboxing ETW events to a dead sandbox_id. Lock order (registry -> attribution) matches the delete path, so no deadlock. - Add unit tests for the new Device::windows and Device::for_current_os constructors to harden Windows/Linux OCSF device parity. Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc-etw): buffer+replay racing events and harden attribution keys Addresses two ETW->OCSF attribution review items (Shailendra #1, #2). #2 early-event loss: ETW delivers the sandbox create/config burst the instant wxc-exec starts, which can beat the driver's register_launch (now under the registry lock post-Ready). process_event previously dropped anything unresolved, losing the racing burst. Add a bounded, time-bounded pending buffer (PENDING_MAX=4096, PENDING_TTL=5s): unresolved events are held and replayed once attribution lands, aged-out ones dropped. Consumer switched to a timed recv_timeout(200ms) so the buffer is re-driven after each event and on a tick. Emit path factored into shared emit_resolved(). #1 attribution collisions: a Windows PID is recycled after exit and a command line is commonly identical across sandboxes. register_launch now rebinds by_pid on reuse and clears the stale last_pid_sid hint (warns if the PID still pointed at a different, leaked sandbox); command line is held in by_cmd only while unique and demoted to a new ambiguous_cmds set on a second owner, so a duplicate command refuses to resolve rather than misroute. Unit tests: buffer replay (direct + cross-link), buffer bound, PID-reuse rebind, duplicate-cmd non-resolution. Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001 (5 sandboxes, identical cmd -> 5 isolated sandbox_ids, 50/50 OCSF/JSONL, BuffersLost=0). Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * docs(mxc-etw): note cmd_line is captured raw with no privacy filtering Review item #3 (Shailendra): add a PRIVACY NOTE on map_process_launch stating cmd_line is copied verbatim into OCSF process.cmd_line with no redaction, so secrets/PII on a command line land unredacted in the durable audit trail (deliberate audit-fidelity trade-off; treat the log as sensitive). Redaction is owned by an upstream privacy layer, not this path; no general audit-output PII scrubber exists today (openshell_core::secrets [CREDENTIAL] redaction is scoped to the proxy HTTP-target logging, a separate egress path). Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc-etw): open ETW trace on caller thread so start_session reports real status Review item #4 (Shailendra): start_session previously returned Ok(EtwSession) as soon as the pump thread was spawned, but OpenTraceW ran later inside that thread; if it failed we still handed back a live-looking session and logged 'consumer started' (silent failure = false audit coverage). Split the two Win32 calls instead of adding a channel handshake (avoids any lost-wakeup/hang risk): the quick, synchronous OpenTraceW now runs on the caller thread (open_trace), and only the blocking ProcessTrace runs on the pump thread (run_trace). start_session returns Err if OpenTraceW fails (reclaiming the boxed Sender so the consumer disconnects, stopping the session, joining the consumer) and returns Ok/logs 'started' only once capture is genuinely open. Opened handle + LoggerName buffer + boxed Sender are carried to the pump via a Send OpenedTrace so they outlive ProcessTrace. Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001: consumer started=True, failed-to-start=False, 50 OCSF rows / 50 JSONL, BuffersLost=0 (no regression to capture/emit). Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc-etw): guard pending-event replay against PID recycling CodeRabbit flagged that drain_resolved() re-resolved buffered events against the live by_pid map, so if Windows recycled a wxc-exec PID within PENDING_TTL a stale event from the dead sandbox could be emitted under the new owner. Stamp each by_pid registration with its Instant and add resolve_replay(), used only on the buffered/replay path. It (a) never falls back to the recycle-/ambiguity-prone by_cmd or last_pid_sid keys, and (b) trusts a PID match only when the registration is not newer than the buffered event by more than REPLAY_PID_GRACE (2s) - a recycled PID's registration lands well outside that window, so the stale event ages out instead of misattributing. The legitimate #2 seed race (registration lands ~immediately) still replays. Adds unit tests for the recycle-refusal, in-grace acceptance, and weak-fallback exclusion. Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc-etw): surface unexpected ProcessTrace termination (review #4) start_session already returns Err on OpenTraceW failure (runs on the caller thread since e41a7701), closing the first half of Shailendra's #4. This closes the second half: ProcessTrace's result was discarded, so if capture died mid-run the backend had no way to know. Add a shared CaptureHealth (stopped/stopping/exit_code) between the pump thread and EtwSession. run_trace now records ProcessTrace's WIN32_ERROR and, when the pump returns without a deliberate stop, logs at ERROR that MXC OCSF capture is no longer running. EtwSession::stop() sets `stopping` before teardown so a normal shutdown isn't misreported, and EtwSession::is_capture_alive() exposes the state for status/diagnostics. Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001: 5 sandboxes, 50 attributed OCSF rows, JSONL parity 50/50, BuffersLost=0, clean start/stop (no false failure). Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * feat(mxc-ocsf): add ETW->OCSF audit-trail example kit; fix proxy-configured message Add a runnable OCSF audit-trail example under examples/ (run-ocsf-audit.ps1, mxc-ocsf-audit.toml, ocsf-audit.yaml, README) that spins up sandboxes with the in-process ETW consumer and egress proxy on, emitting a full OCSF JSONL audit trail across all four classes (6002/5019/1007/2004). Fix SandboxProxyConfigured mapping to log "MXC sandbox proxy configured" instead of a misleading "(no proxy)" when the provider reports proxyPort=0; the event's presence already indicates proxy configuration. Verified on-box: 26 events, all mapped ETW event types present. Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * feat(mxc-ocsf): clearer audit report + client-safe run-ocsf-audit.ps1 Improve the ETW to OCSF audit-trail example output and make it safe to ship. Report: - Add an event-type coverage count ("N of M expected event types fired"); the denominator auto-adjusts (8 with proxy on, 7 with -NoProxy). - Split the checklist into expected event types vs anomaly findings (ActivityError/FallbackError), which are reported separately and not counted toward coverage (a clean run may emit none). - Verdict is now coverage-based (all expected types must fire) instead of the looser "at least 3 OCSF classes". - Call out the absolute path to the durable OCSF JSONL log prominently. Client-safety: - Default -ShareOut to empty (no auto-copy); pass -ShareOut a UNC path to opt in. Removes a hardcoded internal share path from a published example. - Drop internal-team wording ("Hand that zip back for evaluation", "BUNDLE:") in favor of neutral "Results bundle:". - Update README-ocsf-audit.txt to match the opt-in -ShareOut behavior. Verified on both MXC boxes: 7F203-MXC-001 (base-container) -> PASS, 8 of 8 event types, 26 OCSF events across 4 classes; 7F203-MXC-003 (AppContainer fallback) -> reduced set as expected, clean output. Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): configure OCSF audit workloads per sandbox - remove unsupported gateway-scoped workload fields from the shipped MXC audit example. - build the command, working directory, and filesystem grant from each run's ShareDir - pass the workload through --driver-config-json. - preserve the host CONNECT proxy configuration and conditional audit coverage for the future host_connect_proxy merge - require the workload output when determining the audit verdict. Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): omit command arguments from OCSF audit logs - record only the executable basename for MXC CreateProcessInSandbox audit events - leave process.cmd_line unset so workload arguments cannot reach shorthand or JSONL logs - cover tokens, passwords, signed URLs, and PII with a secret-leak regression test - update the audit example, architecture guidance, and published logging documentation - preserve ETW attribution and future host_connect_proxy enforcement behavior Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * feat(etw): enhance ETW session management with distinct naming for concurrent gateways * fix(etw): bound the audit queue during overload - replace the unbounded ETW callback channel with count- and byte-bounded buffering - keep the ETW callback non-blocking and count records rejected during overload - emit immediate, rate-limited warnings that identify resulting audit coverage gaps - make the audit example fail when queue overload causes dropped ETW records - cover stalled consumers, oversized events, and warning throttling with unit tests Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(etw): harden sandbox audit attribution - remove command-line and persistent per-PID fallback keys from live and replay resolution - retire the driver-owned wxc-exec PID before publishing child completion - retain established identity, activity, and correlation-vector links only for the five-second late-event window - prevent buffered records from crossing rapid PID retirement and reuse boundaries - add resolver and lifecycle coverage and document the attribution trust boundary Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * chore(mxc): address rebase follow-ups Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): align OCSF audit example with driver config - remove unsupported egress proxy settings - stop requiring the unavailable proxy audit event - update example documentation for supported event coverage Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> * fix(etw): redact command-line secrets in DecodedEtwEvent summary * fix(etw): enhance PID resolution and event attribution logic for ETW records * fix(ocsf): restrict gateway-local JSONL sink to Windows/MXC path with opt-in configuration * address rebase issues * fix(mxc): address ETW audit review feedback Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): fail closed across ambiguous PID reuse Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): bind ETW attribution to process generation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Jamie King <jamiek@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
8.3 KiB
openshell-driver-mxc
OpenShell compute driver backed by Microsoft MXC (wxc-exec) on Windows.
Design
This driver implements the gateway's ordinary in-process ComputeDriver
contract and is linked into openshell-gateway. It sets
driver_reports_runtime_readiness, so the gateway accepts driver-reported
readiness without a supervisor session. The canonical create-time
SandboxPolicy is carried by DriverSandboxSpec.policy. process_container launches a one-shot
AppContainer and is the default. The opt-in isolation_session backend uses the
state-aware provision → start → exec → stop → deprovision lifecycle.
The driver launches and monitors the configured workload itself and self-reports
readiness; there is no in-sandbox supervisor or ConnectSupervisor relay.
Capability Matrix
| Capability | MXC driver |
|---|---|
| Filesystem policy | Read-only/read-write grants come only from SandboxPolicy. process_container enforces default-deny; isolation_session is an explicit grant-only compatibility mode. |
| Network policy | Rejected synchronously during sandbox creation until an enforcing egress path is bound. |
| Process policy | Unsupported; MXC supplies OS isolation only. |
| Interactive exec/connect/forward | Unsupported; the configured workload runs in-driver. |
| Restart durability | Unsupported; the in-memory registry cannot recover live sessions. |
The filesystem enforcement proof has two paths:
- A write to a path granted by the sandbox policy succeeds.
- A
process_containerwrite outside the sandbox policy fails with Windows access denied, and the driver reports the failed workload.
Configuration ([openshell.drivers.mxc])
Gateway configuration contains only host runtime settings:
[openshell.drivers.mxc]
wxc_exec_path = "C:\\path\\to\\wxc-exec.exe"
# Default: process_container. isolation_session is grant-only and opt-in.
backend = "process_container"
default_configuration_id = "composable"
pc_least_privilege = false
pc_capabilities = []
debug = false
etw_audit = false
Supply workload settings for each sandbox. The public config is keyed by driver name; the gateway forwards only the inner mxc object to the driver:
$config = '{"mxc":{"command":["cmd","/c","echo hello > C:\\\\work\\\\demo\\\\hello.txt"],"cwd":"C:\\\\work\\\\demo"}}'
openshell sandbox create --name mxc-demo --policy demo.yaml `
--driver-config-json $config --env MODE=demo --no-tty
The command array is required and preserves Windows argument boundaries. cwd is optional. Environment variables come from the standard sandbox and template environment maps; the driver never copies values from the gateway host environment.
Network policy support depends on the selected containment path. Policy replacement and merge updates use the gateway's standard sandbox configuration revision contract.
When etw_audit is enabled, each gateway process owns a distinct real-time ETW
session named from the stable OpenShell-MXC-ETW prefix, its process ID, and a
per-start discriminator. Starting another gateway never stops an existing
gateway's capture. Graceful shutdown stops the session by its owned handle. A
force-killed gateway can leave a stale session; the audit example removes only
matching sessions whose encoded owner process is no longer running.
The gateway-local OCSF JSONL sink is available only for the Windows/MXC path
and is opt-in. Set OPENSHELL_OCSF_JSON=1 to enable it and optionally set
OPENSHELL_OCSF_LOG_DIR to override its %PROGRAMDATA%\OpenShell\logs default.
Other gateway deployments do not initialize this local file sink.
The ETW callback uses a non-blocking queue capped at 4,096 records and 16 MiB of copied event data. Records that exceed either limit are dropped instead of blocking the ETW pump or growing gateway memory. The gateway emits an immediate warning identifying the audit coverage gap and rate-limits follow-up warnings to once every 30 seconds while overload continues.
Audit attribution bootstraps only when the driver-owned wxc-exec PID and its
kernel process start key both match the values attached to the ETW record;
command text is never an ownership key. This generation key prevents a recycled
PID from inheriting the previous process's attribution regardless of delivery
delay. The process monitor retires the live PID at exit. Established identity,
activity, and correlation-vector links remain available for five seconds so
already in-flight ETW records can arrive, but retired PID evidence cannot resolve
them. Records without matching generation evidence remain unattributed.
Prerequisites (live runs)
- Windows 11 Insider build ≥ 26300.8553
IsoSessionApp.dllpresent and registeredwxc-exec.exebuilt with--features isolation_session
For off-box smoke tests against the in-process mock shim (no wxc-exec,
no isolation session needed), set OPENSHELL_MXC_MOCK_WXC=1.
Policy mapping
The production driver maps the typed SandboxPolicy carried by the standard
driver request to MXC configuration before it inserts a registry entry or
invokes wxc-exec. Mapping failure therefore returns from CreateSandbox
without leaving a partial sandbox. There is no in-process policy side channel
or MXC-specific gateway composition variant.
EmbeddedPolicyMapper calls the embedded policy_map module directly and normalizes filesystem paths to Windows form. It does not add gateway-configured host paths. The policy supplied for the sandbox is the only source of filesystem grants.
The mapper retains an internal policy-splitting seam for future development, but the runtime exposes no governed-egress switch. Any network rule fails closed until an enforcing proxy is implemented and bound to the sandbox lifecycle.
Parity and matrix tests under tests/ cover the mapper on the Windows MSVC lane. The driver performs this mapping automatically; there is no separate policy-export command or example.
Packaging the demo for the demo box
Use examples/package-demo.ps1 to assemble
the gateway EXE, CLI EXE, runtime DLLs (libz3.dll), demo.yaml, the
gateway config, and the runbook into one folder, then copy that folder to
the demo Windows host and follow mxc-demo-runbook.md inside it. The
script prints a SHA256 manifest so the operator can sanity-check what
landed before moving it.
Real-MXC test lane
Three tasks drive real wxc-exec.exe hardware; all are skip-safe — any test
or scenario that requires an absent binary or backend prints a SKIP reason and
exits 0 rather than failing.
| Task | What it runs | When to use |
|---|---|---|
windows:test:mxc-real:x64 |
tests/wxc_exec_real.rs — Tier-2 invoker tests with --ignored --test-threads=1 |
Pre-merge on any Windows host that has wxc-exec; dry-run tests always pass; enforcement tests probe-gate themselves |
windows:e2e:mxc |
examples/run-mxc-e2e.ps1 — Tier-3 scenario runner, real binary, probe-gated |
Demo box / nightly; needs the gateway + CLI binaries in the script directory |
windows:e2e:mxc:mock |
Same runner with -Mock — wiring-only, no real wxc-exec needed |
Any Windows host (CI, dev machine); validates wiring and the network-reject scenario |
Probe script: examples/probe-mxc-host.ps1 is an operator/CI preflight that emits a JSON capability report
(OS build, wxc-exec path/version, dry-run exit code, per-backend trial result,
and a verdicts object). Run it before the real-MXC lane to understand what
will PASS vs SKIP on a given host:
powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass `
-File crates/openshell-driver-mxc/examples/probe-mxc-host.ps1
Skip semantics: tests in wxc_exec_real.rs are marked
#[ignore = "requires real wxc-exec"] — the standard windows:test:x64 suite
never runs them. OPENSHELL_WXC_EXEC_PATH overrides the default
C:\mxc\wxc-exec.exe lookup. See docs4gtb/mxc-box-capabilities.md for the
empirical capability snapshot of the development box (build 26200, processcontainer
velocity keys not enabled, isolation_session absent).
Deferred work
- Interactive exec/connect/forward →
adapt-openshell-gateway-windows - Governed egress remains fail-closed until an enforcing proxy is implemented and bound to sandbox lifecycle.
- Restart durability (deprovision orphaned sessions on startup) → follow-on
- GPU passthrough → not pursued in host-side-governance design