Files
ae57979b03 feat(mxc): add Windows ETW-to-OCSF audit trail (#3015)
* feat(mxc): ETW->OCSF audit consumer + Windows OCSF JSONL parity (cp6 P1)

Add a Windows MXC ETW->OCSF audit trail in openshell-driver-mxc: a real-time
Sandboxing-provider ETW consumer that decodes events (TDH), attributes each to
an OpenShell sandbox_id, and maps them to OCSF (lifecycle 6002, config 5019,
process 1007, finding 2004).

cp6 Phase 1 - durable OCSF JSONL audit-file parity with Linux:
- openshell-ocsf: add emit_ocsf_event_routed (populates the event-bridge
  thread-local AND stamps sandbox_id+message in one dispatch) plus public
  set/clear_current_event; OS-aware device (Device::windows/for_current_os) so
  device.os.name reflects the host instead of a hardcoded Linux stub.
- etw_consumer: emit via the routed emit (previously fired a bare info! that
  never populated the bridge, so the structured event was dropped).
- openshell-server: install OcsfJsonlLayer over a synchronous daily-rotated
  appender (durable under force-kill), gated by OPENSHELL_OCSF_JSON, path via
  %PROGRAMDATA%\OpenShell\logs (override OPENSHELL_OCSF_LOG_DIR).
- device.hostname now resolves to the real gateway machine name.

Box-proven on 7F203-MXC-001: JSONL lines == shorthand OCSF rows, all valid
OCSF JSON, per-sandbox attribution intact, disabled state writes nothing.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* feat(mxc): map remaining Sandboxing ETW events to OCSF

Close the last three ETW->OCSF gaps so the audit trail covers the full
set of events the Sandboxing provider emits (12/12):

- ProcessLaunched -> Process Activity [1007] "Launch" (confirmed start;
  carries the real processId/threadId, the twin of CreateProcessInSandbox
  which only has the request + command line).
- SandboxProxyConfigured -> Device Config State Change [5019] (the one
  network-plane setup event; surfaces proxyPort, "no proxy" when 0).
- SandboxConsoleReferencePlumbed -> Device Config State Change [5019]
  (console-handle plumbing).

map_config_state now handles the full config/hardening/setup family and
carries proxyPort/hasConsoleReference/creationFlags as unmapped fields.
Verified on 7F203-MXC-001: 11/12 event types emit OCSF without a proxy
(SandboxProxyConfigured requires proxy config to fire).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc): seed ETW attribution under registry lock + Device tests

Address CodeRabbit review on !31:

- Prevent stale ETW attribution on a delete/launch race: register the
  wxc-exec pid while holding the registry lock, and bail if the sandbox
  entry is already gone. Previously the attribution key could be seeded
  after `delete` had removed the sandbox, leaving a stale key that could
  misroute later Sandboxing ETW events to a dead sandbox_id. Lock order
  (registry -> attribution) matches the delete path, so no deadlock.
- Add unit tests for the new Device::windows and Device::for_current_os
  constructors to harden Windows/Linux OCSF device parity.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc-etw): buffer+replay racing events and harden attribution keys

Addresses two ETW->OCSF attribution review items (Shailendra #1, #2).

#2 early-event loss: ETW delivers the sandbox create/config burst the instant wxc-exec starts, which can beat the driver's register_launch (now under the registry lock post-Ready). process_event previously dropped anything unresolved, losing the racing burst. Add a bounded, time-bounded pending buffer (PENDING_MAX=4096, PENDING_TTL=5s): unresolved events are held and replayed once attribution lands, aged-out ones dropped. Consumer switched to a timed recv_timeout(200ms) so the buffer is re-driven after each event and on a tick. Emit path factored into shared emit_resolved().

#1 attribution collisions: a Windows PID is recycled after exit and a command line is commonly identical across sandboxes. register_launch now rebinds by_pid on reuse and clears the stale last_pid_sid hint (warns if the PID still pointed at a different, leaked sandbox); command line is held in by_cmd only while unique and demoted to a new ambiguous_cmds set on a second owner, so a duplicate command refuses to resolve rather than misroute.

Unit tests: buffer replay (direct + cross-link), buffer bound, PID-reuse rebind, duplicate-cmd non-resolution. Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001 (5 sandboxes, identical cmd -> 5 isolated sandbox_ids, 50/50 OCSF/JSONL, BuffersLost=0).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* docs(mxc-etw): note cmd_line is captured raw with no privacy filtering

Review item #3 (Shailendra): add a PRIVACY NOTE on map_process_launch stating cmd_line is copied verbatim into OCSF process.cmd_line with no redaction, so secrets/PII on a command line land unredacted in the durable audit trail (deliberate audit-fidelity trade-off; treat the log as sensitive). Redaction is owned by an upstream privacy layer, not this path; no general audit-output PII scrubber exists today (openshell_core::secrets [CREDENTIAL] redaction is scoped to the proxy HTTP-target logging, a separate egress path).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc-etw): open ETW trace on caller thread so start_session reports real status

Review item #4 (Shailendra): start_session previously returned Ok(EtwSession) as soon as the pump thread was spawned, but OpenTraceW ran later inside that thread; if it failed we still handed back a live-looking session and logged 'consumer started' (silent failure = false audit coverage).

Split the two Win32 calls instead of adding a channel handshake (avoids any lost-wakeup/hang risk): the quick, synchronous OpenTraceW now runs on the caller thread (open_trace), and only the blocking ProcessTrace runs on the pump thread (run_trace). start_session returns Err if OpenTraceW fails (reclaiming the boxed Sender so the consumer disconnects, stopping the session, joining the consumer) and returns Ok/logs 'started' only once capture is genuinely open. Opened handle + LoggerName buffer + boxed Sender are carried to the pump via a Send OpenedTrace so they outlive ProcessTrace.

Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001: consumer started=True, failed-to-start=False, 50 OCSF rows / 50 JSONL, BuffersLost=0 (no regression to capture/emit).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc-etw): guard pending-event replay against PID recycling

CodeRabbit flagged that drain_resolved() re-resolved buffered events
against the live by_pid map, so if Windows recycled a wxc-exec PID within
PENDING_TTL a stale event from the dead sandbox could be emitted under the
new owner.

Stamp each by_pid registration with its Instant and add resolve_replay(),
used only on the buffered/replay path. It (a) never falls back to the
recycle-/ambiguity-prone by_cmd or last_pid_sid keys, and (b) trusts a PID
match only when the registration is not newer than the buffered event by
more than REPLAY_PID_GRACE (2s) - a recycled PID's registration lands well
outside that window, so the stale event ages out instead of misattributing.
The legitimate #2 seed race (registration lands ~immediately) still replays.

Adds unit tests for the recycle-refusal, in-grace acceptance, and
weak-fallback exclusion.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc-etw): surface unexpected ProcessTrace termination (review #4)

start_session already returns Err on OpenTraceW failure (runs on the
caller thread since e41a7701), closing the first half of Shailendra's #4.
This closes the second half: ProcessTrace's result was discarded, so if
capture died mid-run the backend had no way to know.

Add a shared CaptureHealth (stopped/stopping/exit_code) between the pump
thread and EtwSession. run_trace now records ProcessTrace's WIN32_ERROR
and, when the pump returns without a deliberate stop, logs at ERROR that
MXC OCSF capture is no longer running. EtwSession::stop() sets `stopping`
before teardown so a normal shutdown isn't misreported, and
EtwSession::is_capture_alive() exposes the state for status/diagnostics.

Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001: 5 sandboxes, 50 attributed OCSF rows,
JSONL parity 50/50, BuffersLost=0, clean start/stop (no false failure).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* feat(mxc-ocsf): add ETW->OCSF audit-trail example kit; fix proxy-configured message

Add a runnable OCSF audit-trail example under examples/ (run-ocsf-audit.ps1,
mxc-ocsf-audit.toml, ocsf-audit.yaml, README) that spins up sandboxes with the
in-process ETW consumer and egress proxy on, emitting a full OCSF JSONL audit
trail across all four classes (6002/5019/1007/2004).

Fix SandboxProxyConfigured mapping to log "MXC sandbox proxy configured" instead
of a misleading "(no proxy)" when the provider reports proxyPort=0; the event's
presence already indicates proxy configuration. Verified on-box: 26 events, all
mapped ETW event types present.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* feat(mxc-ocsf): clearer audit report + client-safe run-ocsf-audit.ps1

Improve the ETW to OCSF audit-trail example output and make it safe to ship.

Report:
- Add an event-type coverage count ("N of M expected event types fired");
  the denominator auto-adjusts (8 with proxy on, 7 with -NoProxy).
- Split the checklist into expected event types vs anomaly findings
  (ActivityError/FallbackError), which are reported separately and not
  counted toward coverage (a clean run may emit none).
- Verdict is now coverage-based (all expected types must fire) instead of
  the looser "at least 3 OCSF classes".
- Call out the absolute path to the durable OCSF JSONL log prominently.

Client-safety:
- Default -ShareOut to empty (no auto-copy); pass -ShareOut a UNC path to
  opt in. Removes a hardcoded internal share path from a published example.
- Drop internal-team wording ("Hand that zip back for evaluation", "BUNDLE:")
  in favor of neutral "Results bundle:".
- Update README-ocsf-audit.txt to match the opt-in -ShareOut behavior.

Verified on both MXC boxes: 7F203-MXC-001 (base-container) -> PASS, 8 of 8
event types, 26 OCSF events across 4 classes; 7F203-MXC-003 (AppContainer
fallback) -> reduced set as expected, clean output.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc): configure OCSF audit workloads per sandbox

- remove unsupported gateway-scoped workload fields from the shipped MXC audit example.
- build the command, working directory, and filesystem grant from each run's ShareDir
- pass the workload through --driver-config-json.
- preserve the host CONNECT proxy configuration and conditional audit coverage for the future host_connect_proxy merge
- require the workload output when determining the audit verdict.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc): omit command arguments from OCSF audit logs

- record only the executable basename for MXC CreateProcessInSandbox audit events
- leave process.cmd_line unset so workload arguments cannot reach shorthand or JSONL logs
- cover tokens, passwords, signed URLs, and PII with a secret-leak regression test
- update the audit example, architecture guidance, and published logging documentation
- preserve ETW attribution and future host_connect_proxy enforcement behavior

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* feat(etw): enhance ETW session management with distinct naming for concurrent gateways

* fix(etw): bound the audit queue during overload

- replace the unbounded ETW callback channel with count- and byte-bounded buffering

- keep the ETW callback non-blocking and count records rejected during overload

- emit immediate, rate-limited warnings that identify resulting audit coverage gaps

- make the audit example fail when queue overload causes dropped ETW records

- cover stalled consumers, oversized events, and warning throttling with unit tests

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(etw): harden sandbox audit attribution

- remove command-line and persistent per-PID fallback keys from live and replay resolution

- retire the driver-owned wxc-exec PID before publishing child completion

- retain established identity, activity, and correlation-vector links only for the five-second late-event window

- prevent buffered records from crossing rapid PID retirement and reuse boundaries

- add resolver and lifecycle coverage and document the attribution trust boundary

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* chore(mxc): address rebase follow-ups

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc): align OCSF audit example with driver config

- remove unsupported egress proxy settings

- stop requiring the unavailable proxy audit event

- update example documentation for supported event coverage

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>

* fix(etw): redact command-line secrets in DecodedEtwEvent summary

* fix(etw): enhance PID resolution and event attribution logic for ETW records

* fix(ocsf): restrict gateway-local JSONL sink to Windows/MXC path with opt-in configuration

* address rebase issues

* fix(mxc): address ETW audit review feedback

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc): fail closed across ambiguous PID reuse

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

* fix(mxc): bind ETW attribution to process generation

Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Jamie King <jamiek@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
2026-09-11 02:04:26 +00:00

8.3 KiB

openshell-driver-mxc

OpenShell compute driver backed by Microsoft MXC (wxc-exec) on Windows.

Design

This driver implements the gateway's ordinary in-process ComputeDriver contract and is linked into openshell-gateway. It sets driver_reports_runtime_readiness, so the gateway accepts driver-reported readiness without a supervisor session. The canonical create-time SandboxPolicy is carried by DriverSandboxSpec.policy. process_container launches a one-shot AppContainer and is the default. The opt-in isolation_session backend uses the state-aware provision → start → exec → stop → deprovision lifecycle. The driver launches and monitors the configured workload itself and self-reports readiness; there is no in-sandbox supervisor or ConnectSupervisor relay.

Capability Matrix

Capability MXC driver
Filesystem policy Read-only/read-write grants come only from SandboxPolicy. process_container enforces default-deny; isolation_session is an explicit grant-only compatibility mode.
Network policy Rejected synchronously during sandbox creation until an enforcing egress path is bound.
Process policy Unsupported; MXC supplies OS isolation only.
Interactive exec/connect/forward Unsupported; the configured workload runs in-driver.
Restart durability Unsupported; the in-memory registry cannot recover live sessions.

The filesystem enforcement proof has two paths:

  • A write to a path granted by the sandbox policy succeeds.
  • A process_container write outside the sandbox policy fails with Windows access denied, and the driver reports the failed workload.

Configuration ([openshell.drivers.mxc])

Gateway configuration contains only host runtime settings:

[openshell.drivers.mxc]
wxc_exec_path = "C:\\path\\to\\wxc-exec.exe"
# Default: process_container. isolation_session is grant-only and opt-in.
backend = "process_container"
default_configuration_id = "composable"
pc_least_privilege = false
pc_capabilities = []
debug = false
etw_audit = false

Supply workload settings for each sandbox. The public config is keyed by driver name; the gateway forwards only the inner mxc object to the driver:

$config = '{"mxc":{"command":["cmd","/c","echo hello > C:\\\\work\\\\demo\\\\hello.txt"],"cwd":"C:\\\\work\\\\demo"}}'
openshell sandbox create --name mxc-demo --policy demo.yaml `
  --driver-config-json $config --env MODE=demo --no-tty

The command array is required and preserves Windows argument boundaries. cwd is optional. Environment variables come from the standard sandbox and template environment maps; the driver never copies values from the gateway host environment.

Network policy support depends on the selected containment path. Policy replacement and merge updates use the gateway's standard sandbox configuration revision contract.

When etw_audit is enabled, each gateway process owns a distinct real-time ETW session named from the stable OpenShell-MXC-ETW prefix, its process ID, and a per-start discriminator. Starting another gateway never stops an existing gateway's capture. Graceful shutdown stops the session by its owned handle. A force-killed gateway can leave a stale session; the audit example removes only matching sessions whose encoded owner process is no longer running.

The gateway-local OCSF JSONL sink is available only for the Windows/MXC path and is opt-in. Set OPENSHELL_OCSF_JSON=1 to enable it and optionally set OPENSHELL_OCSF_LOG_DIR to override its %PROGRAMDATA%\OpenShell\logs default. Other gateway deployments do not initialize this local file sink.

The ETW callback uses a non-blocking queue capped at 4,096 records and 16 MiB of copied event data. Records that exceed either limit are dropped instead of blocking the ETW pump or growing gateway memory. The gateway emits an immediate warning identifying the audit coverage gap and rate-limits follow-up warnings to once every 30 seconds while overload continues.

Audit attribution bootstraps only when the driver-owned wxc-exec PID and its kernel process start key both match the values attached to the ETW record; command text is never an ownership key. This generation key prevents a recycled PID from inheriting the previous process's attribution regardless of delivery delay. The process monitor retires the live PID at exit. Established identity, activity, and correlation-vector links remain available for five seconds so already in-flight ETW records can arrive, but retired PID evidence cannot resolve them. Records without matching generation evidence remain unattributed.

Prerequisites (live runs)

  • Windows 11 Insider build ≥ 26300.8553
  • IsoSessionApp.dll present and registered
  • wxc-exec.exe built with --features isolation_session

For off-box smoke tests against the in-process mock shim (no wxc-exec, no isolation session needed), set OPENSHELL_MXC_MOCK_WXC=1.

Policy mapping

The production driver maps the typed SandboxPolicy carried by the standard driver request to MXC configuration before it inserts a registry entry or invokes wxc-exec. Mapping failure therefore returns from CreateSandbox without leaving a partial sandbox. There is no in-process policy side channel or MXC-specific gateway composition variant.

EmbeddedPolicyMapper calls the embedded policy_map module directly and normalizes filesystem paths to Windows form. It does not add gateway-configured host paths. The policy supplied for the sandbox is the only source of filesystem grants.

The mapper retains an internal policy-splitting seam for future development, but the runtime exposes no governed-egress switch. Any network rule fails closed until an enforcing proxy is implemented and bound to the sandbox lifecycle.

Parity and matrix tests under tests/ cover the mapper on the Windows MSVC lane. The driver performs this mapping automatically; there is no separate policy-export command or example.

Packaging the demo for the demo box

Use examples/package-demo.ps1 to assemble the gateway EXE, CLI EXE, runtime DLLs (libz3.dll), demo.yaml, the gateway config, and the runbook into one folder, then copy that folder to the demo Windows host and follow mxc-demo-runbook.md inside it. The script prints a SHA256 manifest so the operator can sanity-check what landed before moving it.

Real-MXC test lane

Three tasks drive real wxc-exec.exe hardware; all are skip-safe — any test or scenario that requires an absent binary or backend prints a SKIP reason and exits 0 rather than failing.

Task What it runs When to use
windows:test:mxc-real:x64 tests/wxc_exec_real.rs — Tier-2 invoker tests with --ignored --test-threads=1 Pre-merge on any Windows host that has wxc-exec; dry-run tests always pass; enforcement tests probe-gate themselves
windows:e2e:mxc examples/run-mxc-e2e.ps1 — Tier-3 scenario runner, real binary, probe-gated Demo box / nightly; needs the gateway + CLI binaries in the script directory
windows:e2e:mxc:mock Same runner with -Mock — wiring-only, no real wxc-exec needed Any Windows host (CI, dev machine); validates wiring and the network-reject scenario

Probe script: examples/probe-mxc-host.ps1 is an operator/CI preflight that emits a JSON capability report (OS build, wxc-exec path/version, dry-run exit code, per-backend trial result, and a verdicts object). Run it before the real-MXC lane to understand what will PASS vs SKIP on a given host:

powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass `
  -File crates/openshell-driver-mxc/examples/probe-mxc-host.ps1

Skip semantics: tests in wxc_exec_real.rs are marked #[ignore = "requires real wxc-exec"] — the standard windows:test:x64 suite never runs them. OPENSHELL_WXC_EXEC_PATH overrides the default C:\mxc\wxc-exec.exe lookup. See docs4gtb/mxc-box-capabilities.md for the empirical capability snapshot of the development box (build 26200, processcontainer velocity keys not enabled, isolation_session absent).

Deferred work

  • Interactive exec/connect/forward → adapt-openshell-gateway-windows
  • Governed egress remains fail-closed until an enforcing proxy is implemented and bound to sandbox lifecycle.
  • Restart durability (deprovision orphaned sessions on startup) → follow-on
  • GPU passthrough → not pursued in host-side-governance design