Files
OpenShell/e2e/python/oidc/workspace_authz_test.py
Derek Carr 9c019a93f5 Wire authorization into workspace model (#2445)
* feat(auth): implement RFC 0011 Phase 2 workspace authorization

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): address PR review feedback on workspace authorization

- Docker e2e: add --health-port and switch readiness probe from
  `openshell status` to `curl /healthz`, fixing a false-positive
  readiness check in OIDC mode where the CLI exited 0 without
  actually contacting the gateway

- ListWorkspaces: move membership filtering from post-query N+1
  lookups into a SQL EXISTS subquery so pagination applies to the
  visible set, not the global ordering. Add generic
  list_with_membership to the persistence layer.

- Descriptor validator: reject role/scope fields on unauthenticated
  and sandbox auth modes, and allow-list workspace_role as
  user/admin and global_role as platform_admin to catch typos at
  startup

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(server): use authed request in delete telemetry test

The workspace authorization added by the Phase 2 auth changes requires
a Principal on every delete request. The delete-telemetry test was still
using a bare Request::new, so extract_principal failed before the handler
could acquire the delete gate, causing a 5-second timeout flake.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): address gator review findings for workspace authorization

- Inject unauthenticated-local-dev principal in no-auth gateway mode so
  handlers that call extract_principal() always find one.
- Cap label-selector membership query at MAX_PAGE_SIZE instead of
  u32::MAX to bound the in-memory read.
- Authorize workspace membership before resolving workspace existence in
  all sandbox RPCs to prevent workspace-name enumeration by non-members.
- Remove dead_code allow on AuthorizedWorkspace.workspace now that
  callers use the normalized name from the authz result.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): close workspace-name oracle and label-selector truncation

Swap authorize-before-resolve ordering in 27 handlers across
provider.rs, service.rs, policy.rs, and workspace.rs to prevent
CWE-203 workspace-name enumeration by non-members.

Add combined membership+label SQL query (list_with_membership_and_selector)
to both persistence backends so ListWorkspaces with label selectors no
longer silently drops results beyond the first page of membership matches.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* test(auth): add non-member rejection and membership+label persistence tests

Add comprehensive test coverage for workspace authorization changes:
- Non-member rejection tests across all 44 workspace-scoped handlers
  (sandbox, provider, service, policy, workspace, inference) verifying
  PERMISSION_DENIED is returned instead of NOT_FOUND to prevent
  CWE-203 workspace-name oracle
- Persistence test for list_with_membership_and_selector verifying
  SQL-level membership EXISTS + label filtering, multiple predicates,
  no-match cases, and pagination

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): format merged import line in sandbox tests

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): address gator re-review findings on workspace authorization

- Fix TUI unconditionally setting providers_v2_enabled after provider
  refresh; read the actual gateway setting via GetGatewayConfig at
  startup instead
- Fix SQLite json_extract with dotted label keys (e.g. example.com/env)
  by quoting the key in the JSON path
- Add authed_request wrappers to upstream OCI identity tests that were
  missing a principal after rebase
- Add test proving GetGatewayConfig is accessible without Platform Admin
- Add test for dotted/prefixed Kubernetes-style label key filtering

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): address second gator re-review findings

- Loosen GetGatewayConfig from platform_admin to scope-only so workspace
  users can discover providers_v2_enabled during sandbox creation with
  inferred-provider commands; update proto descriptor, descriptor
  validation, and RFC 0011 access table
- Add validate_label_selector to handle_list_workspaces and escape
  single quotes in SQLite json_extract interpolation (CWE-89
  defense-in-depth)
- Re-fetch providers_v2_enabled after TUI gateway switch so the new
  gateway's capability is reflected
- Add e2e test for workspace user with inferred-provider command
- Add persistence test for adversarial label keys with SQL injection
  attempts
- Add handler test for invalid label selector rejection in
  ListWorkspaces

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): address third gator review findings

- Cap label selector pairs at 64 (CWE-400) to bound SQLite dynamic SQL
- Add SCOPE_ONLY_METHODS allowlist for scope-without-role RPCs (CWE-863)
- Normalize ID-based data-plane handlers to return NOT_FOUND for
  unauthorized sandboxes, closing the cross-workspace oracle (CWE-203)
- Fix TUI provider profile cache lookup key mismatch for legacy
  providers with empty profile_workspace
- Add whoami to CLI skill reference command tree
- Update TUI skill doc with workspace, provider, and settings coverage
- Document scope/workspace orthogonality on GetGatewayConfig proto

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): extend CWE-203 normalization to policy.rs sandbox handlers

GetSandboxConfig and GetSandboxLogs in policy.rs had the same
fetch-before-authorize pattern that leaked cross-workspace sandbox
existence. Promote fetch_and_authorize_sandbox to pub(super) and
use it from both sandbox.rs and policy.rs handlers.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* test(auth): update assertions for CWE-203 sandbox ID normalization

Cross-workspace sandbox access via ID-based handlers now returns
NOT_FOUND instead of PERMISSION_DENIED to prevent existence inference.
Update the unit test and OIDC e2e assertion to match.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(auth): narrow CWE-203 error mapping and correct whoami output formats

Only remap PERMISSION_DENIED to NOT_FOUND in fetch_and_authorize_sandbox
and RevokeSshSession, letting INTERNAL and UNAUTHENTICATED propagate
as-is. Fix whoami --output format values in cli-reference.md to match
the actual CLI (table/json/yaml, not text/json).

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(ci): share network namespace with Keycloak in containerized CI

In GitHub Actions job containers, Docker port publishing lands on the
host, not inside the job container. Detect this environment and attach
Keycloak to the job container's network namespace instead, with
hardened defaults (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, loopback-only
listener).

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>
2026-07-30 00:31:32 +00:00

1277 lines
42 KiB
Python

# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
"""End-to-end tests for workspace-scoped authorization enforcement.
Validates that every workspace-scoped RPC enforces membership and role
checks when OIDC is configured. Uses two Keycloak users:
- admin@test — openshell-admin role → Platform Admin (bypasses membership)
- user@test — openshell-user role → must be an explicit workspace member
Skip condition: set OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC=1 to enable these tests.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import os
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
import grpc
import pytest
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
from openshell._proto import (
datamodel_pb2,
inference_pb2,
inference_pb2_grpc,
openshell_pb2,
openshell_pb2_grpc,
)
from .helpers import extract_sub, get_token, grpc_channel, stub_with_token
WS = "e2e-authz-test"
pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(
os.environ.get("OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC") != "1",
reason="OIDC e2e tests disabled (set OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC=1)",
)
# ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _admin_token() -> str:
return get_token("admin@test", "admin", scopes="openid openshell:all")
def _user_token() -> str:
return get_token("user@test", "user", scopes="openid openshell:all")
def _add_member(
stub: openshell_pb2_grpc.OpenShellStub,
metadata: list[tuple[str, str]],
workspace: str,
subject: str,
role: int,
) -> None:
stub.AddWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.AddWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=workspace,
principal_subject=subject,
role=role,
),
metadata=metadata,
)
def _remove_member(
stub: openshell_pb2_grpc.OpenShellStub,
metadata: list[tuple[str, str]],
workspace: str,
subject: str,
) -> None:
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
stub.RemoveWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.RemoveWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=workspace,
principal_subject=subject,
),
metadata=metadata,
)
# ── RPC call builders for parametrized non-member rejection tests ────────
#
# Each entry is (test_id, callable(stub, metadata) -> response).
# The callable constructs a minimal valid request for the given RPC.
def _assert_non_member_denial(
error: grpc.RpcError,
workspace: str,
subject: str,
rpc_name: str,
) -> None:
assert error.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, (
f"{rpc_name}: expected PERMISSION_DENIED, got {error.code()}"
)
details = error.details()
assert f"not a member of workspace '{workspace}'" in details, (
f"{rpc_name}: denial came from the wrong authorization layer: {details}"
)
command = (
"openshell workspace member add "
f"--workspace '{workspace}' --subject '{subject}' --role user"
)
assert command in details, (
f"{rpc_name}: denial omitted the actionable membership command: {details}"
)
def _assert_workspace_admin_denial(
error: grpc.RpcError,
workspace: str,
subject: str,
rpc_name: str,
) -> None:
assert error.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, (
f"{rpc_name}: expected PERMISSION_DENIED, got {error.code()}"
)
details = error.details()
assert f"workspace role 'admin' required in workspace '{workspace}'" in details, (
f"{rpc_name}: denial came from the wrong authorization layer: {details}"
)
command = (
"openshell workspace member add "
f"--workspace '{workspace}' --subject '{subject}' --role admin"
)
assert command in details, (
f"{rpc_name}: denial omitted the admin remediation command: {details}"
)
def _workspace_rpcs() -> list[tuple[str, Callable]]:
"""All workspace-scoped RPCs that accept a workspace field."""
return [
# ── Workspace domain ──
(
"GetWorkspace",
lambda s, m: s.GetWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.GetWorkspaceRequest(name=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"ListWorkspaceMembers",
lambda s, m: s.ListWorkspaceMembers(
openshell_pb2.ListWorkspaceMembersRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"AddWorkspaceMember",
lambda s, m: s.AddWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.AddWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=WS,
principal_subject="fake",
role=openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"RemoveWorkspaceMember",
lambda s, m: s.RemoveWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.RemoveWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=WS,
principal_subject="fake",
),
metadata=m,
),
),
# ── Sandbox domain ──
(
"CreateSandbox",
lambda s, m: s.CreateSandbox(
openshell_pb2.CreateSandboxRequest(
workspace=WS,
spec=openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec(
template=openshell_pb2.SandboxTemplate(image="ubuntu:24.04")
),
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetSandbox",
lambda s, m: s.GetSandbox(
openshell_pb2.GetSandboxRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListSandboxes",
lambda s, m: s.ListSandboxes(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxesRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"DeleteSandbox",
lambda s, m: s.DeleteSandbox(
openshell_pb2.DeleteSandboxRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListSandboxProviders",
lambda s, m: s.ListSandboxProviders(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxProvidersRequest(
sandbox_name="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"AttachSandboxProvider",
lambda s, m: s.AttachSandboxProvider(
openshell_pb2.AttachSandboxProviderRequest(
sandbox_name="nonexistent",
provider_name="nonexistent",
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"DetachSandboxProvider",
lambda s, m: s.DetachSandboxProvider(
openshell_pb2.DetachSandboxProviderRequest(
sandbox_name="nonexistent",
provider_name="nonexistent",
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
# ── Provider domain ──
(
"CreateProvider",
lambda s, m: s.CreateProvider(
openshell_pb2.CreateProviderRequest(
workspace=WS,
provider=datamodel_pb2.Provider(
metadata=datamodel_pb2.ObjectMeta(
name="authz-test", workspace=WS
),
type="claude",
credentials={"K": "v"},
),
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetProvider",
lambda s, m: s.GetProvider(
openshell_pb2.GetProviderRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListProviders",
lambda s, m: s.ListProviders(
openshell_pb2.ListProvidersRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"UpdateProvider",
lambda s, m: s.UpdateProvider(
openshell_pb2.UpdateProviderRequest(
workspace=WS,
provider=datamodel_pb2.Provider(
metadata=datamodel_pb2.ObjectMeta(
name="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
type="claude",
credentials={"K": "v"},
),
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"DeleteProvider",
lambda s, m: s.DeleteProvider(
openshell_pb2.DeleteProviderRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.ListProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.ListProviderProfilesRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"GetProviderProfile",
lambda s, m: s.GetProviderProfile(
openshell_pb2.GetProviderProfileRequest(id="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ImportProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.ImportProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.ImportProviderProfilesRequest(workspace=WS, profiles=[]),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"UpdateProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.UpdateProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.UpdateProviderProfilesRequest(
workspace=WS, id="nonexistent"
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"LintProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.LintProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.LintProviderProfilesRequest(workspace=WS, profiles=[]),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"DeleteProviderProfile",
lambda s, m: s.DeleteProviderProfile(
openshell_pb2.DeleteProviderProfileRequest(
id="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetProviderRefreshStatus",
lambda s, m: s.GetProviderRefreshStatus(
openshell_pb2.GetProviderRefreshStatusRequest(
provider="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ConfigureProviderRefresh",
lambda s, m: s.ConfigureProviderRefresh(
openshell_pb2.ConfigureProviderRefreshRequest(
provider="nonexistent",
credential_key="k",
strategy=openshell_pb2.PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_STRATEGY_STATIC,
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"RotateProviderCredential",
lambda s, m: s.RotateProviderCredential(
openshell_pb2.RotateProviderCredentialRequest(
provider="nonexistent",
credential_key="k",
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"DeleteProviderRefresh",
lambda s, m: s.DeleteProviderRefresh(
openshell_pb2.DeleteProviderRefreshRequest(
provider="nonexistent",
credential_key="k",
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
# ── Service domain ──
(
"ExposeService",
lambda s, m: s.ExposeService(
openshell_pb2.ExposeServiceRequest(
sandbox="nonexistent",
service="svc",
target_port=8080,
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetService",
lambda s, m: s.GetService(
openshell_pb2.GetServiceRequest(
sandbox="nonexistent", service="svc", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListServices",
lambda s, m: s.ListServices(
openshell_pb2.ListServicesRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"DeleteService",
lambda s, m: s.DeleteService(
openshell_pb2.DeleteServiceRequest(
sandbox="nonexistent", service="svc", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
# ── Policy domain ──
(
"GetSandboxPolicyStatus",
lambda s, m: s.GetSandboxPolicyStatus(
openshell_pb2.GetSandboxPolicyStatusRequest(
name="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListSandboxPolicies",
lambda s, m: s.ListSandboxPolicies(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxPoliciesRequest(
name="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetDraftPolicy",
lambda s, m: s.GetDraftPolicy(
openshell_pb2.GetDraftPolicyRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ApproveDraftChunk",
lambda s, m: s.ApproveDraftChunk(
openshell_pb2.ApproveDraftChunkRequest(
name="nonexistent", chunk_id="x", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"RejectDraftChunk",
lambda s, m: s.RejectDraftChunk(
openshell_pb2.RejectDraftChunkRequest(
name="nonexistent", chunk_id="x", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ApproveAllDraftChunks",
lambda s, m: s.ApproveAllDraftChunks(
openshell_pb2.ApproveAllDraftChunksRequest(
name="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"EditDraftChunk",
lambda s, m: s.EditDraftChunk(
openshell_pb2.EditDraftChunkRequest(
name="nonexistent", chunk_id="x", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"UndoDraftChunk",
lambda s, m: s.UndoDraftChunk(
openshell_pb2.UndoDraftChunkRequest(
name="nonexistent", chunk_id="x", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ClearDraftChunks",
lambda s, m: s.ClearDraftChunks(
openshell_pb2.ClearDraftChunksRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetDraftHistory",
lambda s, m: s.GetDraftHistory(
openshell_pb2.GetDraftHistoryRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=m,
),
),
# ── Inference domain ──
(
"SetInferenceRoute",
lambda _s, m: _inference_stub().SetInferenceRoute(
inference_pb2.SetInferenceRouteRequest(
provider_name="nonexistent", workspace=WS
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"GetInferenceRoute",
lambda _s, m: _inference_stub().GetInferenceRoute(
inference_pb2.GetInferenceRouteRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
(
"DeleteInferenceRoute",
lambda _s, m: _inference_stub().DeleteInferenceRoute(
inference_pb2.DeleteInferenceRouteRequest(workspace=WS), metadata=m
),
),
]
def _platform_profile_rpcs() -> list[tuple[str, Callable]]:
"""Provider-profile RPCs targeting the explicit platform scope."""
return [
(
"ListProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.ListProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.ListProviderProfilesRequest(workspace=""), metadata=m
),
),
(
"GetProviderProfile",
lambda s, m: s.GetProviderProfile(
openshell_pb2.GetProviderProfileRequest(id="nonexistent", workspace=""),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ImportProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.ImportProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.ImportProviderProfilesRequest(workspace="", profiles=[]),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"UpdateProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.UpdateProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.UpdateProviderProfilesRequest(
id="nonexistent", workspace=""
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"LintProviderProfiles",
lambda s, m: s.LintProviderProfiles(
openshell_pb2.LintProviderProfilesRequest(workspace="", profiles=[]),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"DeleteProviderProfile",
lambda s, m: s.DeleteProviderProfile(
openshell_pb2.DeleteProviderProfileRequest(
id="nonexistent", workspace=""
),
metadata=m,
),
),
]
def _global_policy_read_rpcs() -> list[tuple[str, Callable]]:
"""Policy history reads targeting the explicit global scope."""
return [
(
"GetSandboxPolicyStatus",
lambda s, m: s.GetSandboxPolicyStatus(
openshell_pb2.GetSandboxPolicyStatusRequest(
workspace="", **{"global": True}
),
metadata=m,
),
),
(
"ListSandboxPolicies",
lambda s, m: s.ListSandboxPolicies(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxPoliciesRequest(
workspace="", **{"global": True}
),
metadata=m,
),
),
]
_cached_inference_stub: inference_pb2_grpc.InferenceStub | None = None
def _inference_stub() -> inference_pb2_grpc.InferenceStub:
global _cached_inference_stub
if _cached_inference_stub is None:
_cached_inference_stub = inference_pb2_grpc.InferenceStub(grpc_channel())
return _cached_inference_stub
# ── Test class ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class TestWorkspaceAuthorization:
"""Workspace-scoped authorization enforcement tests."""
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True, scope="class")
def workspace(self) -> Any:
"""Create a test workspace and tear it down after all tests."""
token = _admin_token()
stub, metadata = stub_with_token(token)
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
stub.CreateWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.CreateWorkspaceRequest(name=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
yield WS
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
stub.DeleteWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.DeleteWorkspaceRequest(name=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
@pytest.fixture(scope="class")
def admin_ctx(
self,
) -> tuple[openshell_pb2_grpc.OpenShellStub, list[tuple[str, str]]]:
token = _admin_token()
return stub_with_token(token)
@pytest.fixture(scope="class")
def user_ctx(
self,
) -> tuple[openshell_pb2_grpc.OpenShellStub, list[tuple[str, str]], str]:
token = _user_token()
stub, metadata = stub_with_token(token)
sub = extract_sub(token)
return stub, metadata, sub
@pytest.fixture(scope="class")
def seed_provider(self, admin_ctx: Any, workspace: str) -> Any:
"""Create a provider so read RPCs have data to return."""
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
prov_name = "e2e-authz-provider"
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
stub.CreateProvider(
openshell_pb2.CreateProviderRequest(
workspace=workspace,
provider=datamodel_pb2.Provider(
metadata=datamodel_pb2.ObjectMeta(
name=prov_name, workspace=workspace
),
type="claude",
credentials={"API_KEY": "test"},
),
),
metadata=metadata,
)
yield prov_name
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
stub.DeleteProvider(
openshell_pb2.DeleteProviderRequest(
name=prov_name, workspace=workspace
),
metadata=metadata,
)
# ── Test 1: Non-member rejection — workspace-field RPCs ──────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"rpc_name,call",
_workspace_rpcs(),
ids=[r[0] for r in _workspace_rpcs()],
)
def test_non_member_rejected(
self,
rpc_name: str,
call: Callable,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata, user_sub = user_ctx
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
call(stub, metadata)
_assert_non_member_denial(exc_info.value, WS, user_sub, rpc_name)
# ── Test 2: Non-member rejection — dual-mode RPCs ────────────────
def test_non_member_rejected_update_config(
self,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata, user_sub = user_ctx
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
stub.UpdateConfig(
openshell_pb2.UpdateConfigRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
_assert_non_member_denial(
exc_info.value,
WS,
user_sub,
"UpdateConfig",
)
# ── Test 3: Sandbox log authorization uses persisted workspace ───
def test_get_sandbox_logs_rejects_spoofed_workspace(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
other_workspace = "e2e-authz-log-b"
sandbox_name = "e2e-log-target"
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
admin_stub.DeleteWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.DeleteWorkspaceRequest(name=other_workspace),
metadata=admin_md,
)
admin_stub.CreateWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.CreateWorkspaceRequest(name=other_workspace),
metadata=admin_md,
)
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER
)
sandbox_id = ""
try:
response = admin_stub.CreateSandbox(
openshell_pb2.CreateSandboxRequest(
name=sandbox_name,
workspace=other_workspace,
spec=openshell_pb2.SandboxSpec(),
),
metadata=admin_md,
)
sandbox_id = response.sandbox.metadata.id
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.GetSandboxLogs(
openshell_pb2.GetSandboxLogsRequest(
sandbox_id=sandbox_id,
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=user_md,
)
# ID-based handlers normalize unauthorized responses to NOT_FOUND
# so cross-workspace sandbox existence cannot be inferred (CWE-203).
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND, (
"GetSandboxLogs: expected NOT_FOUND for cross-workspace sandbox, "
f"got {exc_info.value.code()}"
)
finally:
if sandbox_id:
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
admin_stub.DeleteSandbox(
openshell_pb2.DeleteSandboxRequest(
name=sandbox_name,
workspace=other_workspace,
),
metadata=admin_md,
)
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
admin_stub.DeleteWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.DeleteWorkspaceRequest(name=other_workspace),
metadata=admin_md,
)
# ── Test 4: Global config requires Platform Admin ────────────────
def test_global_update_rejected_for_default_workspace_admin(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, "default", user_sub)
_add_member(
admin_stub,
admin_md,
"default",
user_sub,
openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_ADMIN,
)
try:
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.UpdateConfig(
openshell_pb2.UpdateConfigRequest(
workspace="",
setting_key="log_level",
delete_setting=True,
**{"global": True},
),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED
assert "platform admin role required" in exc_info.value.details(), (
"UpdateConfig: denial came from the wrong authorization layer: "
f"{exc_info.value.details()}"
)
finally:
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, "default", user_sub)
# ── Test 5: Non-member ListWorkspaces returns filtered results ───
def test_non_member_list_workspaces_filtered(
self,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata, _ = user_ctx
resp = stub.ListWorkspaces(
openshell_pb2.ListWorkspacesRequest(),
metadata=metadata,
)
ws_names = [w.metadata.name for w in resp.workspaces]
assert WS not in ws_names, (
f"non-member should not see workspace {WS} in ListWorkspaces"
)
# ── Test 6: Platform Admin bypass ────────────────────────────────
@pytest.mark.usefixtures("seed_provider")
def test_platform_admin_get_workspace(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
resp = stub.GetWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.GetWorkspaceRequest(name=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
assert resp.workspace.metadata.name == WS
def test_platform_admin_list_sandboxes(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
stub.ListSandboxes(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxesRequest(workspace=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
def test_platform_admin_get_provider(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
seed_provider: str,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
resp = stub.GetProvider(
openshell_pb2.GetProviderRequest(name=seed_provider, workspace=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
assert resp.provider.metadata.name == seed_provider
def test_platform_admin_list_services(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
stub.ListServices(
openshell_pb2.ListServicesRequest(workspace=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
def test_platform_admin_get_draft_history(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
# May fail with NOT_FOUND for the sandbox name, but should not fail with PERMISSION_DENIED
try:
stub.GetDraftHistory(
openshell_pb2.GetDraftHistoryRequest(name="nonexistent", workspace=WS),
metadata=metadata,
)
except grpc.RpcError as e:
assert e.code() != grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED
# ── Test 7: User member — read operations succeed ────────────────
def test_user_member_read_operations(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
seed_provider: str,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER
)
try:
# GetWorkspace
resp = user_stub.GetWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.GetWorkspaceRequest(name=WS),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert resp.workspace.metadata.name == WS
# ListSandboxes
user_stub.ListSandboxes(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxesRequest(workspace=WS),
metadata=user_md,
)
# GetProvider
resp = user_stub.GetProvider(
openshell_pb2.GetProviderRequest(name=seed_provider, workspace=WS),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert resp.provider.metadata.name == seed_provider
# ListProviders
user_stub.ListProviders(
openshell_pb2.ListProvidersRequest(workspace=WS),
metadata=user_md,
)
# ListServices
user_stub.ListServices(
openshell_pb2.ListServicesRequest(workspace=WS),
metadata=user_md,
)
# ListWorkspaceMembers
user_stub.ListWorkspaceMembers(
openshell_pb2.ListWorkspaceMembersRequest(workspace=WS),
metadata=user_md,
)
finally:
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
# ── Test 8: User member — admin operations denied ────────────────
def test_user_member_admin_operations_denied(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER
)
try:
# CreateProvider requires workspace admin
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.CreateProvider(
openshell_pb2.CreateProviderRequest(
workspace=WS,
provider=datamodel_pb2.Provider(
metadata=datamodel_pb2.ObjectMeta(
name="user-blocked", workspace=WS
),
type="claude",
credentials={"K": "v"},
),
),
metadata=user_md,
)
_assert_workspace_admin_denial(
exc_info.value,
WS,
user_sub,
"CreateProvider",
)
# AddWorkspaceMember requires workspace admin
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.AddWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.AddWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=WS,
principal_subject="fake-subject",
role=openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER,
),
metadata=user_md,
)
_assert_workspace_admin_denial(
exc_info.value,
WS,
user_sub,
"AddWorkspaceMember",
)
# ApproveDraftChunk requires workspace admin
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.ApproveDraftChunk(
openshell_pb2.ApproveDraftChunkRequest(
name="nonexistent",
chunk_id="x",
workspace=WS,
),
metadata=user_md,
)
_assert_workspace_admin_denial(
exc_info.value,
WS,
user_sub,
"ApproveDraftChunk",
)
finally:
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
# ── Test 9: Workspace Admin — admin operations succeed ───────────
def test_workspace_admin_can_create_provider(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_ADMIN
)
prov_name = "e2e-authz-ws-admin-prov"
try:
user_stub.CreateProvider(
openshell_pb2.CreateProviderRequest(
workspace=WS,
provider=datamodel_pb2.Provider(
metadata=datamodel_pb2.ObjectMeta(name=prov_name, workspace=WS),
type="claude",
credentials={"K": "v"},
),
),
metadata=user_md,
)
# Also test AddWorkspaceMember with User role
user_stub.AddWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.AddWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=WS,
principal_subject="fake-member-subject",
role=openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER,
),
metadata=user_md,
)
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, "fake-member-subject")
finally:
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
admin_stub.DeleteProvider(
openshell_pb2.DeleteProviderRequest(name=prov_name, workspace=WS),
metadata=admin_md,
)
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
# ── Test 10: all_workspaces rejected for non-Platform-Admin ──────
def test_all_workspaces_rejected_for_workspace_admin(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_ADMIN
)
try:
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.ListSandboxes(
openshell_pb2.ListSandboxesRequest(all_workspaces=True),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.ListProviders(
openshell_pb2.ListProvidersRequest(all_workspaces=True),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.ListServices(
openshell_pb2.ListServicesRequest(all_workspaces=True),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED
finally:
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
# ── Test 11: Workspace Admin cannot assign Admin role ────────────
def test_workspace_admin_cannot_assign_admin_role(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_ADMIN
)
try:
# Workspace Admin cannot assign Admin role
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
user_stub.AddWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.AddWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=WS,
principal_subject="another-subject",
role=openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_ADMIN,
),
metadata=user_md,
)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED
# But User role assignment succeeds
user_stub.AddWorkspaceMember(
openshell_pb2.AddWorkspaceMemberRequest(
workspace=WS,
principal_subject="another-subject",
role=openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER,
),
metadata=user_md,
)
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, "another-subject")
finally:
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
# ── Test 12: ListWorkspaces filtered by membership ───────────────
def test_list_workspaces_filtered_by_membership(
self,
admin_ctx: Any,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
admin_stub, admin_md = admin_ctx
user_stub, user_md, user_sub = user_ctx
ws2 = "e2e-authz-test-2"
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
admin_stub.CreateWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.CreateWorkspaceRequest(name=ws2),
metadata=admin_md,
)
_add_member(
admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub, openshell_pb2.WORKSPACE_ROLE_USER
)
try:
resp = user_stub.ListWorkspaces(
openshell_pb2.ListWorkspacesRequest(),
metadata=user_md,
)
ws_names = [w.metadata.name for w in resp.workspaces]
assert WS in ws_names, f"member should see {WS}"
assert ws2 not in ws_names, f"non-member should not see {ws2}"
assert "default" not in ws_names, "non-member should not see default"
finally:
_remove_member(admin_stub, admin_md, WS, user_sub)
with contextlib.suppress(grpc.RpcError):
admin_stub.DeleteWorkspace(
openshell_pb2.DeleteWorkspaceRequest(name=ws2),
metadata=admin_md,
)
# ── Test 13: Platform provider profiles require Platform Admin ───
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"rpc_name,call",
_platform_profile_rpcs(),
ids=[r[0] for r in _platform_profile_rpcs()],
)
def test_platform_provider_profile_operations_require_platform_admin(
self,
rpc_name: str,
call: Callable,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata, _ = user_ctx
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
call(stub, metadata)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, (
f"{rpc_name}: expected PERMISSION_DENIED, got {exc_info.value.code()}"
)
assert "platform admin role required" in exc_info.value.details(), (
f"{rpc_name}: denial came from the wrong authorization layer: "
f"{exc_info.value.details()}"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"rpc_name,call",
_platform_profile_rpcs(),
ids=[r[0] for r in _platform_profile_rpcs()],
)
def test_platform_admin_can_access_platform_provider_profile_operations(
self,
rpc_name: str,
call: Callable,
admin_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
try:
call(stub, metadata)
except grpc.RpcError as error:
assert error.code() != grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, (
f"{rpc_name}: Platform Admin was denied: {error.details()}"
)
# ── Test 14: Global policy reads require Platform Admin ──────────
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"rpc_name,call",
_global_policy_read_rpcs(),
ids=[r[0] for r in _global_policy_read_rpcs()],
)
def test_global_policy_reads_require_platform_admin(
self,
rpc_name: str,
call: Callable,
user_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata, _ = user_ctx
with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
call(stub, metadata)
assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, (
f"{rpc_name}: expected PERMISSION_DENIED, got {exc_info.value.code()}"
)
assert "platform admin role required" in exc_info.value.details(), (
f"{rpc_name}: denial came from the wrong authorization layer: "
f"{exc_info.value.details()}"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"rpc_name,call",
_global_policy_read_rpcs(),
ids=[r[0] for r in _global_policy_read_rpcs()],
)
def test_platform_admin_can_access_global_policy_reads(
self,
rpc_name: str,
call: Callable,
admin_ctx: Any,
) -> None:
stub, metadata = admin_ctx
try:
call(stub, metadata)
except grpc.RpcError as error:
assert error.code() != grpc.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED, (
f"{rpc_name}: Platform Admin was denied: {error.details()}"
)