OpenShell/docs/reference/sandbox-compute-drivers.mdx

---
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
title: "Sandbox Compute Drivers"
sidebar-title: "Compute Drivers"
description: "Reference for Docker, Podman, MicroVM, and Kubernetes sandbox compute drivers."
keywords: "Generative AI, Cybersecurity, AI Agents, Sandboxing, Docker, Podman, MicroVM, Kubernetes, Reference"
position: 4
---

The gateway's configured compute driver determines how OpenShell creates each sandbox. The CLI workflow stays the same across drivers: you create, connect to, inspect, and delete sandboxes through the gateway API.

Every compute driver runs the OpenShell supervisor inside the sandbox workload. The supervisor launches the agent process, applies policy, routes egress through the proxy, injects configured credentials, and maintains the gateway session.

## Configure a Compute Driver

Configure the compute driver on the gateway. Current releases accept one driver per gateway. Set `compute_drivers` in the gateway TOML file:

```toml
[openshell.gateway]
compute_drivers = ["docker"]
```

Reserved built-in values are `docker`, `podman`, `kubernetes`, and `vm`.
Non-reserved names select an extension driver and require a
`socket_path` in `[openshell.drivers.<name>]`.

When `compute_drivers` is unset, the gateway auto-detects Kubernetes, then Podman, then Docker. Local container runtimes must respond to an API probe before the gateway selects them. The VM driver is never auto-detected; configure it explicitly with `compute_drivers = ["vm"]` or set `OPENSHELL_DRIVERS=vm` in the launch environment.

Common gateway options:

| Gateway TOML option | Description |
|---|---|
| `compute_drivers = ["<driver>"]` | Select the compute driver. Built-in values are `docker`, `podman`, `kubernetes`, and `vm`; custom names require `[openshell.drivers.<name>].socket_path`. |

Set driver-specific values such as sandbox images, callback endpoints, network names, TLS material, and VM sizing in the gateway TOML file. See the [Gateway Configuration File](./gateway-config) reference for the full `[openshell.drivers.<name>]` schema.

Extension drivers use the same `compute_driver.proto` gRPC surface as the
managed VM driver. For an out-of-tree driver, choose a driver name and point
the gateway at the Unix socket the operator has already provisioned:

```toml
[openshell.gateway]
compute_drivers = ["kyma"]

[openshell.drivers.kyma]
socket_path = "/run/openshell/kyma.sock"
```

For a launch-time socket override, pass the same non-reserved driver name with
the socket path:

```shell
openshell-gateway --drivers kyma --compute-driver-socket /run/openshell/kyma.sock
```

The gateway does not spawn, supervise, or delete extension drivers. The
operator must protect the socket so only the gateway uid can access it.
Reserved built-in names cannot be selected through unmanaged socket endpoints.

Sandbox create supports `--cpu` and `--memory` for per-sandbox compute sizing.
Docker and Podman apply them as runtime limits. Kubernetes applies them as both
container requests and limits. The VM driver accepts the fields but currently
ignores them.

Sandbox create also accepts experimental driver-owned config through
`--driver-config-json`. The value is a JSON object keyed by driver name. The
gateway forwards only the block for the active driver, so a Kubernetes gateway
receives the `kubernetes` object from a value such as:

Nested keys inside each driver block use snake_case. The top-level envelope keys
are driver names, such as `kubernetes`, and are not part of the nested schema.

```shell
openshell sandbox create \
  --driver-config-json '{"kubernetes":{"pod":{"runtime_class_name":"kata-containers","priority_class_name":"batch-low"}}}' \
  -- claude
```

Driver config is for fields without a stable public flag. Prefer `--cpu`,
`--memory`, and `--gpu` for supported resource intent. When `--gpu` is present
without a count, OpenShell treats it as a request for one GPU. Pass
`--gpu COUNT` when requesting more than one GPU.

Kubernetes maps the GPU count to the `nvidia.com/gpu` pod resource limit.
Docker and Podman satisfy count-only GPU requests by selecting the requested
number of NVIDIA CDI devices from the local CDI inventory in round-robin order.
The drivers refresh the CDI inventory before validating or creating the
sandbox, so CDI devices added or removed after gateway start can affect later
creates. On WSL2 all-only runtimes, Docker or Podman can use
`nvidia.com/gpu=all` as a compatibility fallback, where it counts as one
selectable device.

Exact GPU device selection remains driver-owned and requires `--gpu`. Docker
and Podman accept `cdi_devices` as opaque CDI device names; replace the
top-level `docker` key with `podman` when using the Podman driver, for example
`{"docker":{"cdi_devices":["nvidia.com/gpu=0"]}}`. Explicit CDI device lists
must not contain duplicates, and their length must match the effective GPU
count. A single exact CDI device is compatible with the default `--gpu`
request. The VM driver accepts `gpu_device_ids`, for example
`{"vm":{"gpu_device_ids":["0000:2d:00.0"]}}`; the current VM implementation
accepts at most one entry and allows either `--gpu` or `--gpu 1` when
`gpu_device_ids` is set.

For Kubernetes, `pod.runtime_class_name` maps to PodSpec `runtimeClassName`.
It overrides the gateway's configured default runtime class for that sandbox,
while a typed `SandboxTemplate.runtime_class_name` value from the API still
takes precedence.

Docker and Podman callback listeners accept only supervisor callback gRPC
methods. Use the gateway's primary endpoint for CLI, administrator, health,
reflection, inference-route management, and HTTP requests. A
`PermissionDenied` response from one of the sandbox-visible callback addresses
is expected for those requests. The gateway fails startup if a callback
requirement resolves to the exact primary listener address because one socket
cannot preserve both authorization scopes. For the IPv4-loopback callback used
by Podman Machine, bind the primary listener to a distinct address such as
`[::1]:17670`.

## Docker Driver

[Docker](https://www.docker.com/get-started/)-backed sandboxes run as containers on the gateway host. Use Docker for local development, single-machine gateways, and hosts that already use Docker Desktop or Docker Engine.

The gateway talks to the Docker daemon to create sandbox containers. Docker is also required for local image builds from directories or Dockerfiles.

For maintainer-level implementation details, refer to the [Docker driver README](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/crates/openshell-driver-docker/README.md).

Select Docker with `compute_drivers = ["docker"]` in `[openshell.gateway]`. Configure Docker driver values such as `socket_path`, `grpc_endpoint`, `network_name`, `supervisor_bin`, `supervisor_image`, `image_pull_policy`, `ssh_socket_path`, `sandbox_pids_limit`, and `guest_tls_*` in `[openshell.drivers.docker]`. When `socket_path` is unset, the driver uses the same responsive local socket selected by auto-detection. An explicitly selected Docker driver falls back to `/var/run/docker.sock` when no candidate responds.

For GPU-backed Docker sandboxes, configure Docker CDI before starting the gateway so OpenShell can detect the daemon capability.

### Docker Driver Config Mounts

Docker driver config accepts user-supplied `volume` and `tmpfs` mounts. It also
accepts `bind` mounts when `[openshell.drivers.docker]` sets
`enable_bind_mounts = true` in `gateway.toml`. See Docker's [storage documentation](https://docs.docker.com/engine/storage/) for more information.
Docker local-driver named volumes created with bind options also expose
gateway-host paths, so OpenShell treats them like bind mounts and requires
`enable_bind_mounts = true`.

Use a `volume` mount for existing Docker named volumes:

```shell
docker volume create openshell-work

openshell sandbox create \
  --driver-config-json '{"docker":{"mounts":[{"type":"volume","source":"openshell-work","target":"/sandbox/work","read_only":false}]}}' \
  -- claude
```

<Warning>
Bind mounts share gateway-host filesystem resources with the sandbox. They may
be considered insecure because they can negate OpenShell controls such as
workspace isolation and filesystem policy. Use them only when you understand and
accept that loss of isolation.
</Warning>

Use a `bind` mount only after enabling it in the Docker driver table:

```toml
[openshell.drivers.docker]
enable_bind_mounts = true
```

```shell
openshell sandbox create \
  --driver-config-json '{"docker":{"mounts":[{"type":"bind","source":"/srv/openshell/work","target":"/sandbox/work","read_only":false}]}}' \
  -- claude
```

Docker mount schema:

| Type | Fields |
|---|---|
| `bind` | `source`, `target`, optional `read_only` (`true` by default), optional `selinux_label` (`shared` for `:z` or `private` for `:Z`). `source` must be an absolute host path. Requires `enable_bind_mounts = true`. |
| `volume` | `source`, `target`, optional `read_only` (`true` by default), optional `subpath`. The named volume must already exist. Docker local-driver bind-backed volumes require `enable_bind_mounts = true`. |
| `tmpfs` | `target`, optional `options`, optional `size_bytes`, optional `mode`. |

OpenShell rejects mount `source`, `target`, and Docker volume `subpath` values
with surrounding whitespace. OpenShell also rejects mount targets that replace
the workspace root or container root, or contain or are contained by the
configured SSH socket or reserved `/opt/openshell`, `/etc/openshell`,
`/etc/openshell-tls`, `/run/openshell`, `/run/openshell-sidecar`, and network
namespace roots. These checks do not make host bind mounts safe.

## Podman Driver

[Podman](https://podman.io/)-backed sandboxes run as rootless containers on the gateway host. Use Podman for Linux workstation workflows that avoid a rootful Docker daemon.

The gateway talks to the Podman API socket. The Podman driver requires Podman 5.x, cgroups v2, rootless networking, and an active Podman user socket. When `socket_path` is not set, the driver probes for a responsive Podman socket and fails to start if none respond.

For maintainer-level implementation details, refer to the [Podman driver README](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/crates/openshell-driver-podman/README.md) and [Podman networking notes](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/crates/openshell-driver-podman/NETWORKING.md).

Select Podman with `compute_drivers = ["podman"]` in `[openshell.gateway]`. Configure Podman driver values such as `socket_path`, `network_name`, `supervisor_image`, `stop_timeout_secs`, `image_pull_policy`, `grpc_endpoint`, `host_gateway_ip`, `sandbox_ssh_socket_path`, `sandbox_pids_limit`, and `guest_tls_*` in `[openshell.drivers.podman]`.

Podman sandboxes default to a 45-second graceful stop window before Podman escalates from `SIGTERM` to `SIGKILL`. Set `stop_timeout_secs` in gateway config, or `OPENSHELL_STOP_TIMEOUT` for the standalone driver, when a local runtime needs a different teardown window.

For proxy-required networks, the Podman driver also accepts the corporate egress proxy keys `https_proxy`, `no_proxy`, `proxy_auth_file`, `proxy_auth_allow_insecure`, and `proxy_connect_by_hostname`. The supervisor chains policy-approved TLS tunnels through the proxy with HTTP CONNECT instead of dialing destinations directly. See the [Gateway Configuration File](./gateway-config) reference for the full contract, including the cleartext-credential acknowledgement and the validated-IP CONNECT behavior.

On macOS with `podman machine`, the driver uses gvproxy's host-loopback IP, `192.168.127.254`, for sandbox host aliases by default. Set `host_gateway_ip` only when your Podman machine uses a non-standard host-loopback address. On Linux, an empty `host_gateway_ip` keeps Podman's `host-gateway` resolver behavior. Direct local callbacks from rootless Podman require Podman to report the pasta network helper. Slirp4netns, other helpers, and Podman versions that do not report their helper require an explicitly remote `grpc_endpoint`; otherwise the gateway fails startup rather than leaving sandbox callbacks unreachable. Rootful Podman continues to use the configured network's bridge gateway address.

### Podman Driver Config Mounts

Podman driver config accepts user-supplied `volume`, `tmpfs`, and `image`
mounts. It also accepts `bind` mounts when `[openshell.drivers.podman]` sets
`enable_bind_mounts = true` in `gateway.toml`. Podman local-driver named
volumes created with bind options also expose gateway-host paths, so
OpenShell treats them like bind mounts and requires `enable_bind_mounts = true`.
Host bind mounts expose gateway host paths to sandbox requests, so they are
disabled by default.

Use a `volume` mount for existing Podman named volumes:

```shell
podman volume create openshell-work

openshell sandbox create \
  --driver-config-json '{"podman":{"mounts":[{"type":"volume","source":"openshell-work","target":"/sandbox/work","read_only":false}]}}' \
  -- claude
```

<Warning>
Bind mounts share gateway-host filesystem resources with the sandbox. They may
be considered insecure because they can negate OpenShell controls such as
workspace isolation and filesystem policy. Use them only when you understand and
accept that loss of isolation.
</Warning>

Use a `bind` mount only after enabling it in the Podman driver table:

```toml
[openshell.drivers.podman]
enable_bind_mounts = true
```

```shell
openshell sandbox create \
  --driver-config-json '{"podman":{"mounts":[{"type":"bind","source":"/srv/openshell/work","target":"/sandbox/work","read_only":false}]}}' \
  -- claude
```

Podman mount schema:

| Type | Fields |
|---|---|
| `bind` | `source`, `target`, optional `read_only` (`true` by default), optional `selinux_label` (`shared` for `:z` or `private` for `:Z`). `source` must be an absolute host path. Requires `enable_bind_mounts = true`. |
| `volume` | `source`, `target`, optional `read_only` (`true` by default). The named volume must already exist. Podman local-driver bind-backed volumes require `enable_bind_mounts = true`. |
| `tmpfs` | `target`, optional `options`, optional `size_bytes`, optional `mode`. |
| `image` | `source`, `target`, optional `read_only` (`true` by default). |

Podman `volume` and `image` mounts do not support `subpath` in OpenShell driver
config, and OpenShell rejects `subpath` for those mount types. OpenShell rejects
mount `source` and `target` values with surrounding whitespace. OpenShell also
rejects mount targets that replace the workspace root, container root, supervisor
files, `/etc/openshell`, `/etc/openshell-tls`, authentication material, or
network namespace paths. These checks do not make host bind mounts safe.

## MicroVM Driver

MicroVM-backed sandboxes run inside VM-backed isolation instead of a container boundary. Use MicroVM when workloads need a VM boundary instead of a local container boundary.

The gateway uses the VM compute driver to create VM-backed sandboxes. MicroVM requires host virtualization support. It uses [libkrun](https://github.com/containers/libkrun) with Apple's [Hypervisor framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/hypervisor) on macOS, KVM on Linux, and [QEMU](https://www.qemu.org/) for GPU-backed sandboxes on Linux.

The VM driver boots a cached immutable bootstrap ext4 root disk. When the requested sandbox image differs from the bootstrap image, the driver stages the registry image as an OCI layout, unpacks it inside a bootstrap VM with `umoci`, and caches the prepared image disk by image identity. Each sandbox receives that prepared disk read-only plus its own writable `overlay.ext4` disk for `/`, including `/sandbox` writes and runtime TLS material. The overlay persists for the sandbox lifetime and is deleted with the sandbox state directory.

VM sandbox creation follows the same progress model as Kubernetes-backed sandboxes. The gateway accepts the sandbox, then the VM driver publishes watch events while it resolves the image, prepares or reuses the bootstrap and prepared image caches, creates the writable overlay, and starts the VM launcher.

On gateway restart, the gateway starts a fresh VM driver process. The driver scans its state directory for accepted sandbox launch records, restarts those VMs, and reuses each sandbox's existing `overlay.ext4` so files written inside the sandbox remain available after the supervisor reconnects.

For maintainer-level implementation details, refer to the [VM driver README](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/crates/openshell-driver-vm/README.md).

### Enable the VM Driver

The VM driver is opt-in. Release packages can install `openshell-driver-vm`, but the gateway does not select it unless you configure the driver explicitly.

Enable VM by setting `compute_drivers = ["vm"]` in the gateway TOML file:

```toml
[openshell.gateway]
compute_drivers = ["vm"]
```

For a launch-time override, set `OPENSHELL_DRIVERS=vm` in the gateway environment and restart the service.

Configure VM driver values such as `grpc_endpoint`, `driver_dir`, `state_dir`, `default_image`, `bootstrap_image`, `vcpus`, `mem_mib`, `overlay_disk_mib`, `krun_log_level`, and `guest_tls_*` in `[openshell.drivers.vm]`. The VM `state_dir` stores overlay disks, console logs, runtime state, image-rootfs cache, and the private `run/compute-driver.sock` socket. The VM socket path is managed by the gateway and is not configurable through remote endpoint settings.

The gateway starts `openshell-driver-vm` over a private Unix socket and passes its process ID so the driver can reject unexpected local clients. The driver's standalone TCP listener is disabled unless `--allow-unauthenticated-tcp` is set for local development.

### Local image resolution

The VM driver resolves sandbox images from a local container engine before falling back to registry pulls. It tries Docker first, then falls back to the Podman socket (Docker-compatible API). On Linux with Podman, enable the API socket so the driver can find local images:

```shell
systemctl --user start podman.socket
```

### Host Firewall

The VM driver creates nftables rules on the host for each sandbox VM's TAP network interface. These rules provide NAT for VM connectivity and defense-in-depth isolation: unsolicited inbound connections to the VM are dropped, and the VM can only reach the gateway port on the host. Primary security enforcement (proxy-only egress and bypass detection) is handled by the sandbox supervisor inside the VM guest.

On hosts with restrictive firewalls (e.g. firewalld), the host firewall may additionally block VM traffic that the driver's rules accept. If VM sandboxes cannot reach the network, verify that the host firewall allows forwarding and input for `vmtap-*` interfaces. See the [VM driver README](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/crates/openshell-driver-vm/README.md#host-side-nftables-rules) for details.

## Kubernetes Driver

Kubernetes-backed sandboxes run as pods in the configured sandbox namespace. Use Kubernetes for shared clusters, remote compute, GPU scheduling, and operator-managed environments.

Helm deployments set Kubernetes driver values through the chart.

For maintainer-level implementation details, refer to the [Kubernetes driver README](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/blob/main/crates/openshell-driver-kubernetes/README.md).

| Gateway configuration | Helm value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `compute_drivers = ["kubernetes"]` | Not applicable | Select the Kubernetes compute driver. |
| `[openshell.drivers.kubernetes].namespace` | `server.sandboxNamespace` | Set the namespace for sandbox resources. The Helm chart defaults to the release namespace when left empty. |
| `service_account_name` | `sandboxServiceAccount.name` | Set the Kubernetes service account assigned to sandbox pods and accepted by the gateway TokenReview bootstrap path. The Helm chart creates a dedicated sandbox service account by default. |
| `default_image` | `server.sandboxImage` | Set the default sandbox image. |
| `image_pull_policy` | `server.sandboxImagePullPolicy` | Set the Kubernetes image pull policy for sandbox pods. |
| `image_pull_secrets` | `server.sandboxImagePullSecrets` | Attach Kubernetes image pull secrets to sandbox pods. Referenced Secrets must exist in the sandbox namespace. |
| `grpc_endpoint` | `server.grpcEndpoint` | Set the gateway callback endpoint reachable from sandbox pods. |
| `client_tls_secret_name` | `server.tls.clientTlsSecretName` | Mount sandbox client TLS materials from a Kubernetes secret. |
| `supervisor_image` | `supervisor.image.repository` / `supervisor.image.tag` | Override the supervisor image that provides the `openshell-sandbox` binary. The default repository with an empty tag uses the version-pinned image built into the gateway. Changing the repository uses the effective gateway image tag, while setting a tag pins that version explicitly. |
| `supervisor_image_pull_policy` | `supervisor.image.pullPolicy` | Set the Kubernetes image pull policy for the supervisor image. |
| `supervisor_sideload_method` | `supervisor.sideloadMethod` | How the supervisor binary is delivered into sandbox pods. Leave empty to auto-detect from cluster version. Set to `image-volume` to mount the supervisor OCI image directly as a volume (requires Kubernetes 1.33+ with the ImageVolume feature gate; GA in 1.36), or `init-container` to copy it through an init container on older clusters. |
| `topology` | `supervisor.topology` | Set `combined` for the default single supervisor path, or `sidecar` to move pod-level network enforcement and the gateway session into a dedicated sidecar. |
| `sidecar.proxy_uid` | `supervisor.sidecar.proxyUid` | Non-root UID used by the relaxed sidecar when process/binary-aware network policy is disabled. The default binary-aware sidecar runs as UID 0. The network init container exempts the effective sidecar UID from proxy redirection. |
| `sidecar.process_binary_aware_network_policy` | `supervisor.sidecar.processBinaryAwareNetworkPolicy` | Keep process/binary-aware network policy enabled in `sidecar` topology. The default runs the sidecar as UID 0 with `SYS_PTRACE` and `DAC_READ_SEARCH`. Set false to run as `proxy_uid`, drop both capabilities, and enforce endpoint/L7 policy without matching `policy.binaries`. |
| `app_armor_profile` | `server.appArmorProfile` | Set the sandbox agent container's AppArmor profile. Helm defaults this to `Unconfined` so AppArmor-enabled nodes do not block supervisor network namespace setup. Set the Helm value to an empty string to omit the field, or use `RuntimeDefault` or `Localhost/<profile-name>` for operator-managed profiles. |
| `workspace_default_storage_size` | `server.workspaceDefaultStorageSize` | Set the default workspace PVC size for new sandboxes. |
| `workspace_storage_class` | `server.workspaceStorageClass` | Set the `StorageClass` for the workspace PVC. Empty (default) omits `storageClassName` and uses the cluster's default `StorageClass`. Set this on clusters with no default `StorageClass`, otherwise the workspace PVC stays `Pending` and the sandbox never starts. |
| `sa_token_ttl_secs` | `server.sandboxJwt.k8sSaTokenTtlSecs` | Set the projected ServiceAccount token TTL used for the bootstrap token exchange. |

In `combined` topology, the agent container carries the Linux capabilities
needed by the supervisor for network namespace setup, Landlock filesystem
policy, process privilege changes, and network policy enforcement. In `sidecar`
topology, the agent container runs as the resolved sandbox UID/GID with no added
Linux capabilities. A root init container performs the nftables setup, and the
long-running binary-aware sidecar runs as UID 0, drops default capabilities,
and adds `SYS_PTRACE` plus `DAC_READ_SEARCH` for workload process identity
resolution through shared `/proc`. The
`sidecar.process_binary_aware_network_policy = false` setting runs it as the
configured non-root `proxy_uid`, removes both capabilities, and relaxes network
policy to endpoint/L7 matching only. The
network sidecar owns gateway authentication and writes local policy/provider
state to the process supervisor over a local control socket, so the agent
container does not mount the sandbox bootstrap token or client TLS secret in
the default sidecar path. The provider environment is refreshed by the network
sidecar after settings polls and streamed to the process supervisor so future
child processes can see updated provider env without gateway access in the
agent container.
Sidecar mode keeps gateway session and SSH behavior. The process supervisor
applies Landlock filesystem policy and child seccomp filters where supported,
but it does not perform root-to-sandbox privilege dropping or supervisor
identity mount isolation. Network policy still runs in the sidecar, and sidecar
pods set `shareProcessNamespace: true` so the network sidecar can resolve
process/binary identity through `/proc/<entrypoint-pid>`.

The Kubernetes driver creates namespaced `agents.x-k8s.io` `Sandbox` resources from the Kubernetes SIG Apps [agent-sandbox](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox) project. It detects the served Sandbox API at runtime, caches the selected API version for the gateway process, and uses `v1beta1` when available before falling back to `v1alpha1`, so supported Agent Sandbox installations work without version-specific operator configuration. The Agent Sandbox controller turns those resources into sandbox pods and related storage.

If Agent Sandbox is upgraded in place, restart the OpenShell gateway after the controller and CRD rollout completes so the gateway can detect the served API versions again.

<Note>
`Sandbox.spec.volumeClaimTemplates` is immutable after creation. To change storage configuration, delete the sandbox and create a new one with the updated spec.
</Note>

### Kubernetes Driver Config PVC Mounts

Kubernetes driver config can mount existing PersistentVolumeClaims into the
agent container. Use this when storage is provisioned outside OpenShell and a
sandbox should mount selected PVC subpaths instead of using the default
OpenShell-created `/sandbox` workspace PVC.

```shell
openshell sandbox create \
  --driver-config-json '{
    "kubernetes": {
      "volumes": [{
        "name": "user-data",
        "persistent_volume_claim": {
          "claim_name": "pvc-user-data-123",
          "read_only": false
        }
      }],
      "containers": {
        "agent": {
          "volume_mounts": [
            {
              "name": "user-data",
              "mount_path": "/sandbox/.openshell/workspace",
              "sub_path": "workspace",
              "read_only": false
            },
            {
              "name": "user-data",
              "mount_path": "/sandbox/.openshell/memory",
              "sub_path": "memory",
              "read_only": false
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  }' \
  -- claude
```

Kubernetes PVC mount schema:

| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| `volumes[].name` | Pod volume name. It must be a DNS-1123 label, unique, and not use OpenShell-managed volume names. |
| `volumes[].persistent_volume_claim.claim_name` | Existing PVC name in the sandbox namespace. It must be a DNS-1123 subdomain name. |
| `volumes[].persistent_volume_claim.read_only` | Optional. Defaults to `true`. Set `false` to allow read-write mounts. |
| `containers.agent.volume_mounts[].name` | References a volume declared in `volumes`. |
| `containers.agent.volume_mounts[].mount_path` | Absolute, normalized container path for the agent mount. |
| `containers.agent.volume_mounts[].sub_path` | Optional relative PVC subpath. Absolute paths and `..` are rejected. |
| `containers.agent.volume_mounts[].read_only` | Optional. Defaults to `true`. It cannot be `false` when the PVC volume is read-only. |

OpenShell rejects duplicate volume names, mounts that reference unknown volumes,
protected mount targets, and mounts that replace OpenShell TLS, supervisor,
ServiceAccount token, or SPIFFE paths. Read-write PVC access requires
`read_only: false` on both the PVC volume and each writable mount.

Any driver-config mount under `/sandbox` disables the default `/sandbox`
workspace PVC injection for that sandbox. Only the explicit mount paths persist
through the external PVC; other `/sandbox` paths come from the current sandbox
image.

## Sandbox User Identity

The policy can set `process.run_as_user` and `process.run_as_group`
independently. Each explicit field wins. The active compute driver supplies the
identity for omitted fields.

### Docker / Podman

Docker and Podman inspect the final image and use its OCI `USER` declaration as
a per-field fallback. Supported forms include `app`, `app:staff`, a numeric UID
whose passwd entry supplies its primary GID, and an accountless numeric pair
such as `1234:1235`.

The driver pins container creation to the immutable image ID it inspected. The
supervisor validates any required names inside that image and preserves the
declared name or numeric components for both direct and SSH children. When
`USER` omits the group, the supervisor uses the user's numeric primary GID. It
does not modify `/etc/passwd` or `/etc/group`.

Docker also inspects OCI `WorkingDir`. An absolute value becomes the
agent workspace; an empty, root (`/`), or explicit `/sandbox` value uses the
managed `/sandbox` compatibility workspace.
OpenShell creates and owns that compatibility workspace. Any other workdir must
already exist in the immutable image without symlink components. The completed
UID/GID and supplementary groups must already be able to traverse every parent
and write and enter the workdir. OpenShell does not change that directory's
ownership or mode. A one-shot validator drops to that identity and uses kernel
effective-access checks, including POSIX ACL grants and LSM denials. It rejects
workdirs that overlap the OCI runtime namespaces under `/proc`, `/sys`, or
`/dev`, and rejects overlap with actual OpenShell control paths. Docker checks
the original image filesystem in the final supervisor and rejects image
`VOLUME` declarations that would mask the workdir or one of its parents before
validation. The resolved workspace is the cwd and `HOME` for direct and SSH
children. The supervisor itself starts from `/`, so a missing or invalid
workspace is handled during readiness instead of preventing the container
runtime from starting it.

Sandbox creation fails before readiness if a required `USER` component is
missing, malformed, unknown, ambiguous, or resolves to UID/GID 0. An image
without `USER` therefore works only when policy explicitly provides both
identity fields.

### Kubernetes / OpenShift

The Kubernetes driver auto-detects the sandbox UID from OpenShift SCC namespace annotations:

- `openshift.io/sa.scc.uid-range` (format: `<start>/<size>`, e.g. `1000000000/10000`) provides the UID.
- `openshift.io/sa.scc.supplemental-groups` provides the GID when present; otherwise the resolved UID is used as the GID.
- On non-OpenShift clusters, or when annotations are absent, the driver falls back to `1000`.

You can override autodetection with explicit `sandbox_uid` / `sandbox_gid` config in `[openshell.drivers.kubernetes]`. When set, the driver skips namespace annotation lookup entirely.

The resolved UID/GID appear in:

- Supervisor container environment variables (`OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_UID`, `OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_GID`) for direct kernel-level privilege dropping without `/etc/passwd` lookups.
- PVC init container `securityContext.runAsUser/runAsGroup/fsGroup` for workspace ownership operations.

### VM Driver

The VM driver injects the sandbox UID into the rootfs guest's `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/group`, and `/etc/gshadow` during rootfs preparation. Default UID is `10001`; configure `sandbox_uid` in `[openshell.drivers.vm]` to use a different value.

### Custom Images

Docker and Podman custom images do not need a baked-in `"sandbox"` user. Declare
a non-root OCI `USER`, or set both process identity fields explicitly in policy.
Named image users require matching account entries; a numeric `UID:GID` pair
does not. For Docker, declare an absolute OCI `WORKDIR` to select the workspace.
Images with no working directory, `WORKDIR /`, or `WORKDIR /sandbox` use
OpenShell's managed `/sandbox` compatibility workspace. For any other Docker
path, create the directory in the image and grant the final process identity
write and execute permission in the Dockerfile. Podman, Kubernetes/OpenShift,
and VM sandboxes continue to use `/sandbox`.