OpenShell/architecture/sandbox.md

Sandbox

A sandbox is the runtime boundary where agent code executes. It is created by a compute runtime and managed inside the workload by openshell-sandbox, the sandbox supervisor.

Runtime Model

Each sandbox workload has two trust levels:

Process	Role
Supervisor	Starts as root inside the workload, prepares isolation, runs the proxy, fetches config, injects credentials, serves the relay socket, and launches child processes.
Agent child	Runs as an unprivileged user with filesystem, process, and network restrictions applied.

The supervisor keeps enough privilege to manage the sandbox, but the agent child loses that privilege before user code runs. On Linux, child setup clears the capability bounding set during privilege drop so later execs cannot regain container-granted capabilities. This is fail-closed: the supervisor retains CAP_SETPCAP solely to perform the clear, and spawning the workload or SSH shell aborts unless the bounding set ends up empty. A setpcap EPERM is tolerated only when the set is already empty; any other outcome fails the spawn.

Startup Flow

1. The compute runtime starts the workload with sandbox identity, callback endpoint, TLS or secret material, image metadata, and initial command.
2. The supervisor loads policy and runtime settings from local files or the gateway, depending on mode.
3. It prepares filesystem access, process restrictions, network namespace routing, trust stores, provider credential resolution, and inference routes.
4. It starts the policy proxy and local SSH server.
5. It opens a supervisor session back to the gateway for connect, exec, file sync, config polling, and log push.
6. It launches the agent command as the restricted sandbox user.

Isolation Layers

OpenShell uses overlapping controls rather than a single sandbox primitive:

Layer	Purpose
Filesystem policy	Landlock restricts the paths the agent can read or write.
Process policy	The child process runs as a non-root user with reduced privileges.
Seccomp	Blocks dangerous syscalls, including raw socket paths that bypass the proxy.
Network namespace	Forces ordinary agent egress through the local CONNECT proxy.
Policy proxy	Evaluates destination, binary identity, TLS/L7 rules, SSRF checks, and inference interception.

The supervisor may enrich baseline filesystem allowances for runtime-required paths, such as proxy support files or GPU device paths when a GPU is present.

Network and Inference

All ordinary agent egress is routed through the sandbox proxy. The proxy identifies the calling binary, checks trust-on-first-use binary identity, rejects unsafe internal destinations, and evaluates the active policy. For inspected HTTP traffic, the proxy can enforce REST method/path rules, WebSocket upgrade and text-message rules, GraphQL operation rules, and MCP method, tool, and supported params rules or generic JSON-RPC method rules on sandbox-to-server request bodies. MCP and JSON-RPC inspection buffers up to the endpoint mcp.max_body_bytes or json_rpc.max_body_bytes limit. MCP tools/call tool names are checked against the spec-recommended syntax by default before policy evaluation, with a per-endpoint mcp.strict_tool_names compatibility opt-out. Generic JSON-RPC policies do not support params matchers; generic JSON-RPC rules match only the method. JSON-RPC responses and server-to-client MCP messages on response or SSE streams are relayed but are not currently parsed for policy enforcement.

https://inference.local is special. It bypasses OPA network policy and is handled by the inference interception path:

1. The proxy terminates the local TLS connection with the sandbox CA.
2. It detects known OpenAI, Anthropic, and compatible inference request shapes.
3. It strips caller-supplied credentials and disallowed headers.
4. It forwards through openshell-router using the route bundle fetched from the gateway.

External inference endpoints that do not use inference.local are treated like ordinary network traffic and must be allowed by policy.

Credentials

Provider credentials are stored at the gateway and fetched by the supervisor at runtime. The supervisor injects resolved environment variables into the initial agent process and SSH child processes. Driver-controlled environment variables override template values so sandbox images cannot spoof identity, callback, or relay settings.

Supervisor bootstrap identity is not inherited by agent child processes. When provider token grants mount a SPIFFE Workload API socket, the socket path must live under a dedicated directory. Children also enter a private mount namespace where that socket directory is hidden before privilege drop.

Credential placeholders in proxied HTTP requests can be resolved by the proxy when policy allows the target endpoint. For GCP providers, a loopback metadata server inside the network namespace serves placeholders to SDKs that bypass the proxy (e.g. Go's cloud.google.com/go/compute/metadata). Secrets must not be logged in OCSF or plain tracing output. The supervisor uses revision-scoped placeholders for rotating provider credentials; provider environment keys beginning with v<digits>_ are reserved for that placeholder namespace.

Provider profiles can also declare dynamic token grants. For matching HTTP endpoints, the supervisor obtains a SPIFFE JWT-SVID from the local Workload API, exchanges it for an OAuth2 access token, caches the token, and injects it as an Authorization: Bearer header before forwarding the request. Token grant endpoints are HTTPS-only except for loopback and Kubernetes service DNS hosts, and returned access tokens must be bearer-compatible before they are cached or injected. Token response lifetimes are capped and cached with an expiry margin unless a profile supplies an explicit cache TTL override.

For AWS endpoints that require request-level signing, the proxy supports SigV4 re-signing. When credential_signing: sigv4 is set on an L7 endpoint, the proxy strips the client's placeholder-based AWS auth headers, re-signs with real credentials from the provider, and forwards the request upstream. The signing mode is auto-detected from the client SDK's x-amz-content-sha256 header:

• Signed body (hex hash): buffers the request body (up to 10 MiB), computes its SHA-256, and includes the hash in the signature. Used by Bedrock and most AWS services.
• Streaming unsigned (STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER): signs headers only and streams the body through without buffering. Used by S3 uploads with aws-chunked encoding.
• Unsigned payload (UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD): signs headers only with no body hash. Used by S3 over HTTPS for non-chunked requests.

Chunk-signed streaming modes (STREAMING-AWS4-HMAC-SHA256-PAYLOAD and other STREAMING-* variants) are rejected — the proxy cannot reproduce per-chunk signatures. Use sigv4:no_body for those clients.

Two explicit overrides are available: credential_signing: sigv4:body (always buffer and hash) and sigv4:no_body (always unsigned). The Expect: 100-continue header is handled within the SigV4 path so clients like boto3 transmit the body before the proxy forwards to upstream.

The AWS region is extracted from the endpoint hostname. For non-standard endpoints (VPC endpoints, custom proxies), set signing_region in the policy endpoint to provide an explicit override. The proxy rejects requests when neither hostname extraction nor signing_region yields a region.

credential_signing and request_body_credential_rewrite are mutually exclusive on the same endpoint. The policy validator rejects policies that set both.

Connect and Logs

The supervisor runs an SSH server on a Unix socket inside the sandbox. The gateway reaches it through the outbound supervisor relay, not by dialing the sandbox workload directly. The relay supports:

• Interactive shell sessions.
• Command execution.
• Tar-based file sync.
• Port forwarding where supported by the CLI/TUI surface.

Sandbox logs are emitted locally and can also be pushed back to the gateway. Security-relevant sandbox behavior uses OCSF structured events; internal diagnostics use ordinary tracing.

Policy Proposals

When an L4 CONNECT is denied, the proxy emits a DenialEvent. The denial aggregator batches these events and flushes summaries to the gateway every 10 seconds (configurable via OPENSHELL_DENIAL_FLUSH_INTERVAL_SECS). The gateway runs them through the mechanistic mapper, which generates a pending NetworkPolicyRule proposal visible under openshell rule get --status pending.

L7 denials (HTTP 403 from method/path rules) are intentionally excluded from mechanistic mapping. L4 denials carry only host:port, which a deterministic mapper can handle. L7 denials carry method, path, query, and body context. The agent loop reads the structured 403 and authors the narrowest rule. Mechanistically mapping L7 would either over-broaden rules or require path-templating logic that rots quickly.

Failure Behavior

• If gateway config polling fails, the sandbox keeps its last-known-good policy.
• If a live policy update is invalid, the supervisor rejects it and keeps the current policy.
• Existing raw byte streams are connection scoped. Dynamic policy changes apply to new connections or the next parsed HTTP request where the proxy can safely re-evaluate.
• If the supervisor relay drops, the sandbox can keep running, but connect and exec operations fail until the supervisor registers again.