OpenShell/e2e/rust/tests/sync.rs

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

#![cfg(feature = "e2e")]

//! E2E test: bidirectional file upload/download with a sandbox.
//!
//! Prerequisites:
//! - A running openshell gateway (`mise run gateway:docker`)
//! - The `openshell` binary (built automatically from the workspace)

use std::fs;
use std::io::Write;
use std::process::Stdio;

use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

use openshell_e2e::harness::sandbox::SandboxGuard;

/// Create a long-running sandbox, upload and download files, and verify
/// contents.
///
/// Covers:
/// 1. Directory round-trip (nested files)
/// 2. Large file round-trip (~512 KiB) with SHA-256 checksum verification
/// 3. Single-file round-trip
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_file_upload_download_round_trip() {
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 1 — Create a sandbox with `--keep` running `sleep infinity`.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 2 — Upload: push a local directory into the sandbox.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let upload_dir = tmpdir.path().join("upload");
    fs::create_dir_all(upload_dir.join("subdir")).expect("create upload dirs");
    fs::write(upload_dir.join("greeting.txt"), "hello-from-local").expect("write greeting.txt");
    fs::write(upload_dir.join("subdir/nested.txt"), "nested-content").expect("write nested.txt");

    let upload_str = upload_dir.to_str().expect("upload path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .upload(upload_str, "/sandbox/uploaded")
        .await
        .expect("upload directory");

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 3 — Download: pull the uploaded files back and verify.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let download_dir = tmpdir.path().join("download");
    fs::create_dir_all(&download_dir).expect("create download dir");

    let download_str = download_dir.to_str().expect("download path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .download("/sandbox/uploaded/upload", download_str)
        .await
        .expect("download directory");

    // Verify top-level file.
    let greeting = fs::read_to_string(download_dir.join("greeting.txt"))
        .expect("read greeting.txt after download");
    assert_eq!(
        greeting, "hello-from-local",
        "greeting.txt content mismatch"
    );

    // Verify nested file.
    let nested = fs::read_to_string(download_dir.join("subdir/nested.txt"))
        .expect("read subdir/nested.txt after download");
    assert_eq!(nested, "nested-content", "subdir/nested.txt content mismatch");

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 4 — Large-file round-trip (~512 KiB) to exercise multi-chunk
    //          SSH transport.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let large_dir = tmpdir.path().join("large_upload");
    fs::create_dir_all(&large_dir).expect("create large_upload dir");

    let large_file = large_dir.join("large.bin");
    {
        let mut f = fs::File::create(&large_file).expect("create large.bin");
        let mut rng_data = vec![0u8; 512 * 1024]; // 512 KiB
        rand::fill(&mut rng_data[..]);
        f.write_all(&rng_data).expect("write large.bin");
    }

    let expected_hash = {
        let data = fs::read(&large_file).expect("read large.bin for hash");
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(&data);
        hex::encode(hasher.finalize())
    };

    let large_dir_str = large_dir.to_str().expect("large_dir path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .upload(large_dir_str, "/sandbox/large_test")
        .await
        .expect("upload large file");

    let large_down = tmpdir.path().join("large_download");
    fs::create_dir_all(&large_down).expect("create large_download dir");

    let large_down_str = large_down.to_str().expect("large_down path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .download("/sandbox/large_test/large_upload", large_down_str)
        .await
        .expect("download large file");

    let actual_data = fs::read(large_down.join("large.bin")).expect("read large.bin after download");
    let actual_hash = {
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(&actual_data);
        hex::encode(hasher.finalize())
    };

    assert_eq!(
        expected_hash, actual_hash,
        "large.bin SHA-256 mismatch after round-trip"
    );
    assert_eq!(
        actual_data.len(),
        512 * 1024,
        "large.bin size mismatch: expected {} bytes, got {}",
        512 * 1024,
        actual_data.len()
    );

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 5 — Single-file round-trip.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let single_file = tmpdir.path().join("single.txt");
    fs::write(&single_file, "single-file-payload").expect("write single.txt");

    let single_str = single_file.to_str().expect("single path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .upload(single_str, "/sandbox")
        .await
        .expect("upload single file");

    let single_down = tmpdir.path().join("single_down");
    fs::create_dir_all(&single_down).expect("create single_down dir");

    let single_down_str = single_down.to_str().expect("single_down path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .download("/sandbox/single.txt", single_down_str)
        .await
        .expect("download single file");

    let single_content = fs::read_to_string(single_down.join("single.txt"))
        .expect("read single.txt after download");
    assert_eq!(
        single_content, "single-file-payload",
        "single.txt content mismatch"
    );

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Cleanup (guard also cleans up on drop).
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    guard.cleanup().await;
}

/// Verify that `sandbox upload` respects `.gitignore` by default.
///
/// Creates a temporary git repository with a `.gitignore` that excludes
/// `*.log` files, uploads the directory (without `--no-git-ignore`), and
/// confirms that tracked files arrive but ignored files do not.
#[tokio::test]
async fn upload_respects_gitignore_by_default() {
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 1 — Create a sandbox with `--keep`.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 2 — Set up a temp git repo with tracked + ignored files.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");
    let repo = tmpdir.path().join("repo");
    fs::create_dir_all(&repo).expect("create repo dir");

    // Initialize git repo and add files.
    let git_init = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["init"])
        .current_dir(&repo)
        .stdout(Stdio::null())
        .stderr(Stdio::null())
        .status()
        .await
        .expect("git init");
    assert!(git_init.success(), "git init should succeed");

    // Configure git user for the commit.
    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["config", "user.email", "test@test.com"])
        .current_dir(&repo)
        .stdout(Stdio::null())
        .stderr(Stdio::null())
        .status()
        .await;
    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["config", "user.name", "Test"])
        .current_dir(&repo)
        .stdout(Stdio::null())
        .stderr(Stdio::null())
        .status()
        .await;

    // Create .gitignore, a tracked file, and an ignored file.
    fs::write(repo.join(".gitignore"), "*.log\nbuild/\n").expect("write .gitignore");
    fs::write(repo.join("tracked.txt"), "i-am-tracked").expect("write tracked.txt");
    fs::write(repo.join("ignored.log"), "i-should-be-filtered").expect("write ignored.log");
    fs::create_dir_all(repo.join("build")).expect("create build dir");
    fs::write(repo.join("build/output.bin"), "build-artifact").expect("write build/output.bin");

    // git add + commit so git ls-files works.
    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["add", "."])
        .current_dir(&repo)
        .stdout(Stdio::null())
        .stderr(Stdio::null())
        .status()
        .await
        .expect("git add");
    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["commit", "-m", "init"])
        .current_dir(&repo)
        .stdout(Stdio::null())
        .stderr(Stdio::null())
        .status()
        .await
        .expect("git commit");

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 3 — Upload WITH gitignore filtering (default).
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    let repo_str = repo.to_str().expect("repo path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .upload_with_gitignore(repo_str, "/sandbox/filtered", &repo)
        .await
        .expect("upload with gitignore filtering");

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Step 4 — Verify: tracked file exists, ignored files do not.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Download the uploaded directory and verify contents.
    let download_dir = tmpdir.path().join("verify");
    fs::create_dir_all(&download_dir).expect("create verify dir");
    let download_str = download_dir.to_str().expect("verify path is UTF-8");

    guard
        .download("/sandbox/filtered", download_str)
        .await
        .expect("download filtered upload");

    // Filtered uploads of a directory preserve the source basename, so
    // contents land under `<download>/repo/...` (matches `openshell sandbox
    // upload <dir> <dest>` semantics from the unfiltered path).
    let uploaded_root = download_dir.join("repo");

    // tracked.txt should be present.
    let tracked = fs::read_to_string(uploaded_root.join("tracked.txt"))
        .expect("tracked.txt should exist after filtered upload");
    assert_eq!(tracked, "i-am-tracked", "tracked.txt content mismatch");

    // .gitignore itself should be present (it's tracked).
    assert!(
        uploaded_root.join(".gitignore").exists(),
        ".gitignore should be uploaded (it's a tracked file)"
    );

    // ignored.log should NOT be present.
    assert!(
        !uploaded_root.join("ignored.log").exists(),
        "ignored.log should be filtered out by .gitignore"
    );

    // build/ directory should NOT be present.
    assert!(
        !uploaded_root.join("build").exists(),
        "build/ directory should be filtered out by .gitignore"
    );

    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    // Cleanup.
    // ---------------------------------------------------------------
    guard.cleanup().await;
}

/// Verify that uploading a single tracked file from inside a git repo does not
/// expand to the entire repository.
#[tokio::test]
async fn upload_single_file_from_git_repo_only_uploads_that_file() {
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");
    let repo = tmpdir.path().join("repo");
    fs::create_dir_all(repo.join("nested")).expect("create repo dir");

    let git_init = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
        .args(["init"])
        .current_dir(&repo)
        .stdout(Stdio::null())
        .stderr(Stdio::null())
        .status()
        .await
        .expect("git init");
    assert!(git_init.success(), "git init should succeed");

    fs::write(repo.join(".gitignore"), "*.log\n").expect("write .gitignore");
    fs::write(repo.join("nested/config.txt"), "single-file-from-repo").expect("write config.txt");
    fs::write(repo.join("tracked.txt"), "should-not-upload").expect("write tracked.txt");
    fs::write(repo.join("ignored.log"), "ignored").expect("write ignored.log");

    let local_path = repo.join("nested/config.txt");
    let local_str = local_path.to_str().expect("local path is UTF-8");
    guard
        .upload_with_gitignore(local_str, "/sandbox/single-file", &repo)
        .await
        .expect("upload single tracked file with gitignore");

    let download_dir = tmpdir.path().join("single-file-download");
    fs::create_dir_all(&download_dir).expect("create download dir");
    let download_str = download_dir.to_str().expect("download path is UTF-8");

    guard
        .download("/sandbox/single-file", download_str)
        .await
        .expect("download uploaded single file");

    let uploaded = fs::read_to_string(download_dir.join("config.txt")).expect("read config.txt");
    assert_eq!(uploaded, "single-file-from-repo");
    assert!(
        !download_dir.join("tracked.txt").exists(),
        "tracked.txt should not have been uploaded"
    );
    assert!(
        !download_dir.join("ignored.log").exists(),
        "ignored.log should not have been uploaded"
    );

    guard.cleanup().await;
}

/// Pre-populate a single file on the sandbox side via `sandbox exec` and pull
/// it back with `sandbox download`. Exercises `sandbox_sync_down_file` in
/// isolation (no upload phase).
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_download_file_only() {
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    guard
        .exec(&["sh", "-c", "printf greeting-payload > /sandbox/greeting.txt"])
        .await
        .expect("seed greeting.txt inside the sandbox");

    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");
    let dest = tmpdir.path().join("out");
    fs::create_dir_all(&dest).expect("create download dir");
    let dest_str = dest.to_str().expect("dest path is UTF-8");

    guard
        .download("/sandbox/greeting.txt", dest_str)
        .await
        .expect("download greeting.txt");

    let actual = fs::read_to_string(dest.join("greeting.txt")).expect("read greeting.txt");
    assert_eq!(
        actual, "greeting-payload",
        "downloaded file content mismatch"
    );

    guard.cleanup().await;
}

/// Pre-populate a small directory tree on the sandbox side via `sandbox exec`
/// and pull it recursively with `sandbox download`. Exercises
/// `sandbox_sync_down_directory` in isolation (no upload phase).
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_download_directory_only() {
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    guard
        .exec(&[
            "sh",
            "-c",
            "mkdir -p /sandbox/tree/sub \
             && printf top-level > /sandbox/tree/root.txt \
             && printf nested > /sandbox/tree/sub/child.txt",
        ])
        .await
        .expect("seed directory tree inside the sandbox");

    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");
    let dest = tmpdir.path().join("out");
    fs::create_dir_all(&dest).expect("create download dir");
    let dest_str = dest.to_str().expect("dest path is UTF-8");

    guard
        .download("/sandbox/tree", dest_str)
        .await
        .expect("download directory tree");

    let root = fs::read_to_string(dest.join("root.txt")).expect("read root.txt");
    assert_eq!(root, "top-level", "root.txt content mismatch");
    let child = fs::read_to_string(dest.join("sub/child.txt")).expect("read sub/child.txt");
    assert_eq!(child, "nested", "sub/child.txt content mismatch");

    guard.cleanup().await;
}

/// Assert that an error string carries the two markers of a remote-side
/// canonicalisation refusal: `resolves to` (proving `realpath -e` ran) and
/// `outside the` + `sandbox workspace` (proving the boundary check fired).
///
/// miette renders the long single-line error wrapped across multiple lines
/// at terminal width and inserts a `│ ` continuation marker, so a single
/// long substring like `"outside the sandbox workspace"` is fragile —
/// match the short markers individually instead.
fn assert_resolves_outside_workspace(err: &str, label: &str) {
    assert!(
        err.contains("resolves to") && err.contains("outside the") && err.contains("sandbox workspace"),
        "expected resolves-outside-workspace error for {label}, got: {err}"
    );
}

/// Regression for the Codex high-severity finding: `validate_sandbox_source_path`
/// is purely lexical, so a sandbox-side symlink that escapes `/sandbox` could
/// slip through and let `tar -C` follow the link into the host filesystem.
/// `resolve_sandbox_source_path` re-validates after `realpath -e` resolves
/// every component. Cover both shapes from the Codex example: the symlink as
/// the full source (directory case) and the symlink as a component of the
/// source path (file case).
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_download_rejects_symlinks_pointing_outside_workspace() {
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    guard
        .exec(&[
            "sh",
            "-c",
            "ln -s /etc /sandbox/etc-link && ln -s /etc/passwd /sandbox/passwd-link",
        ])
        .await
        .expect("plant escape symlinks inside the sandbox");

    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");
    let dest = tmpdir.path().join("out");
    fs::create_dir_all(&dest).expect("create download dir");
    let dest_str = dest.to_str().expect("dest path is UTF-8");

    // Directory-source symlink: /sandbox/etc-link -> /etc
    let err = guard
        .download("/sandbox/etc-link", dest_str)
        .await
        .expect_err("download of a directory symlink to /etc must be refused");
    assert_resolves_outside_workspace(&err, "directory symlink");

    // File-source symlink: /sandbox/passwd-link -> /etc/passwd
    let err = guard
        .download("/sandbox/passwd-link", dest_str)
        .await
        .expect_err("download of a file symlink to /etc/passwd must be refused");
    assert_resolves_outside_workspace(&err, "file symlink");

    // Path with a symlinked component: /sandbox/etc-link/passwd
    let err = guard
        .download("/sandbox/etc-link/passwd", dest_str)
        .await
        .expect_err("download via a symlinked path component must be refused");
    assert_resolves_outside_workspace(&err, "symlinked component");

    // Sanity check: the host destination should still be empty — no file from
    // /etc should have leaked through on any of the three attempts.
    assert!(
        !dest.join("passwd").exists() && !dest.join("etc-link").exists(),
        "no file should have been written when the source resolves outside the workspace"
    );

    guard.cleanup().await;
}

/// Regression for the Codex medium-severity finding: the single-file tar
/// invocation must wrap the basename behind a `--` separator, otherwise a
/// sandbox-side filename whose basename starts with `--` (e.g. created by a
/// malicious agent inside the sandbox) is parsed by GNU tar as an option
/// rather than a member to archive.
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_download_handles_dash_leading_basename() {
    let mut guard =
        SandboxGuard::create_keep(&["sh", "-c", "echo Ready && sleep infinity"], "Ready")
            .await
            .expect("sandbox create --keep");

    // Quoting the redirect target keeps the leading dashes intact across the
    // shell parse; the sandbox-side filesystem ends up with a basename that
    // would be parsed as an option by an unprotected tar invocation.
    guard
        .exec(&[
            "sh",
            "-c",
            "printf dash-payload > '/sandbox/--checkpoint-action=evil'",
        ])
        .await
        .expect("seed dash-leading file inside the sandbox");

    let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create tmpdir");
    let dest = tmpdir.path().join("out");
    fs::create_dir_all(&dest).expect("create download dir");
    let dest_str = dest.to_str().expect("dest path is UTF-8");

    guard
        .download("/sandbox/--checkpoint-action=evil", dest_str)
        .await
        .expect("download dash-leading basename");

    let actual =
        fs::read_to_string(dest.join("--checkpoint-action=evil")).expect("read dash-leading file");
    assert_eq!(
        actual, "dash-payload",
        "dash-leading file content mismatch — tar may have parsed the basename as an option"
    );

    guard.cleanup().await;
}