Files
Aaron Erickson 🦞andJohn Myers 9ea94b645d fix(sandbox): rewrite messaging credential placeholders (#1286)
* fix(sandbox): rewrite credential placeholders in websocket text frames

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(sandbox): harden websocket credential rewrite

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* feat(sandbox): add websocket l7 inspection and compression

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(sandbox): harden websocket upgrade validation

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* test(sandbox): cover route-selected websocket upgrades

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(sandbox): harden websocket negotiation parsing

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* test(sandbox): add websocket conformance relay matrix

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* test(e2e): add websocket conformance lane

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(policy): support websocket incremental rules

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* feat(policy): enable websocket credential rewrite updates

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(cli): make websocket rewrite endpoint-local

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* feat(sandbox): support graphql websocket policy

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(policy): allow private IPs for websocket endpoints

* feat(sandbox): rewrite REST credential placeholders

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* refactor(sandbox): generalize credential aliases

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(sandbox): rewrite encoded form credentials

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(sandbox): close websocket policy and provider alias gaps

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>

* fix(e2e): route websocket probe through host gateway

* fix(e2e): stabilize websocket probe handshake

* fix(e2e): exercise websocket probe through proxy

* ci: remove websocket conformance workflow

---------

Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-11 22:40:44 -07:00
..

openshell-driver-docker

Docker-backed compute driver for local OpenShell gateways.

The driver manages sandbox containers through the local Docker daemon with the bollard client. It is intended for developer environments where Docker is already available and running Kubernetes would be unnecessary.

Runtime Model

The gateway runs as a host process. The Docker driver creates one container per sandbox and starts the openshell-sandbox supervisor inside that container. The supervisor then creates the nested sandbox namespace for the agent process.

Docker containers currently use host networking. This lets a supervisor reach a gateway bound to 127.0.0.1 without requiring a separate bridge listener, NAT rule, or userland proxy. The container also receives host.openshell.internal -> 127.0.0.1 so local host services have a stable OpenShell-owned name.

Container Contract

The driver-controlled container settings are part of the sandbox security contract:

Setting Purpose
user = "0" The supervisor needs root inside the container to prepare namespaces, mounts, Landlock, and seccomp.
network_mode = "host" Lets the supervisor call back to loopback gateway endpoints.
cap_add Grants supervisor-only capabilities required for namespace setup and process inspection.
apparmor=unconfined Avoids Docker's default profile blocking required mount operations.
restart_policy = unless-stopped Keeps managed sandboxes resumable across daemon or gateway restarts.
CDI GPU request Uses the sandbox gpu_device value when set; otherwise requests all NVIDIA GPUs when the sandbox spec asks for GPU support and daemon CDI support is detected.

The agent child process does not retain these supervisor privileges.

Supervisor Binary Resolution

The Docker driver bind-mounts a host-side Linux openshell-sandbox binary into each sandbox container. Resolution order is:

  1. --docker-supervisor-bin / OPENSHELL_DOCKER_SUPERVISOR_BIN.
  2. A sibling openshell-sandbox next to the running openshell-gateway binary.
  3. A local Linux cargo target build for the Docker daemon architecture.
  4. --docker-supervisor-image / OPENSHELL_DOCKER_SUPERVISOR_IMAGE, or the release-matched default supervisor image, extracting /openshell-sandbox.

Release and Docker-image gateway builds bake the matching supervisor image tag into the binary at compile time. The default Docker supervisor image is not :latest unless a custom build explicitly sets that tag.

Callback and TLS

OPENSHELL_ENDPOINT is injected from the gateway's configured gRPC endpoint without rewriting. Because the container uses host networking, loopback endpoints such as http://127.0.0.1:8080 resolve to the host gateway.

For HTTPS endpoints, the server certificate must include the endpoint host as a subject alternative name. Docker sandboxes also need the client TLS bundle mounted into the container and exposed with:

  • OPENSHELL_TLS_CA
  • OPENSHELL_TLS_CERT
  • OPENSHELL_TLS_KEY

HTTP endpoints reject TLS material because the supervisor would not use it.

Environment Ownership

The driver merges template environment and sandbox spec environment first, then overwrites security-critical keys:

  • OPENSHELL_ENDPOINT
  • OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_ID
  • OPENSHELL_SANDBOX
  • OPENSHELL_SSH_SOCKET_PATH
  • OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_COMMAND
  • TLS path variables when HTTPS is enabled

Do not allow sandbox images or templates to override these values.