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* feat(proxy): support plain HTTP forward proxy for private IP endpoints Add forward proxy mode to the sandbox proxy so that standard HTTP libraries (httpx, requests, etc.) work with HTTP_PROXY for plain HTTP calls to private IP endpoints. Previously, non-CONNECT methods were unconditionally rejected with 403. The forward proxy path requires all three conditions to be met: - OPA policy explicitly allows the destination - The matched endpoint has allowed_ips configured - All resolved IPs are RFC 1918 private This ensures plain HTTP never reaches the public internet while enabling seamless access to internal services without custom CONNECT tunnel code. Implementation: - parse_proxy_uri(): parses absolute-form URIs into components - rewrite_forward_request(): rewrites to origin-form, strips hop-by-hop headers, adds Via and Connection: close - handle_forward_proxy(): full handler with OPA eval, SSRF checks, private-IP gate, upstream connect, and bidirectional relay - Updated dispatch in handle_tcp_connection to route non-CONNECT methods Includes 14 unit tests and 6 E2E tests (FWD-1 through FWD-6). CONNECT path remains completely untouched. Closes #155 * fix(proxy): remove InspectForInference match arm removed by #146 The inference routing simplification in #146 reduced NetworkAction to Allow/Deny, removing InspectForInference. Drop the dead match arm from handle_forward_proxy. * fix(sandbox): restore BestEffort as default Landlock compatibility The Landlock V2 upgrade in #151 changed the default from BestEffort to HardRequirement. This causes all proxy-mode sandboxes to crash with Permission denied when the policy omits the landlock field, because the child process gets locked to only /etc/navigator-tls and /sandbox. Restore BestEffort as the default so policies without an explicit landlock field degrade gracefully. Fixes #161 * fix(sandbox): inject baseline filesystem paths for proxy-mode sandboxes Proxy-mode sandboxes need baseline filesystem paths (/usr, /lib, /etc, /app, /var/log read-only; /sandbox, /tmp read-write) for the child process to function under Landlock. Without these, the child can't exec binaries, resolve DNS, or load shared libraries. The supervisor now enriches the policy with these baseline paths at startup, covering both standalone (file) and gateway (gRPC) modes. For gateway mode, the enriched policy is synced back so users see the effective policy via 'nemoclaw sandbox get'. The gateway validation is relaxed to allow additive filesystem changes (new paths can be added, existing paths cannot be removed) to support the supervisor's enrichment sync-back. Includes 2 E2E tests: BFS-1 (missing filesystem_policy) and BFS-2 (incomplete filesystem_policy). Fixes #161 * fix(e2e): update assertion for relaxed filesystem validation message --------- Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
165 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
165 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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"""E2E tests for server-side policy safety validation.
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These tests verify that the gRPC server rejects sandbox creation and policy
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updates that contain unsafe content (root process identity, path traversal,
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overly broad filesystem paths).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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import grpc
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import pytest
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from navigator._proto import datamodel_pb2, navigator_pb2, sandbox_pb2
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from collections.abc import Callable
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from navigator import Sandbox, SandboxClient
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# =============================================================================
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# Policy helpers
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# =============================================================================
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_SAFE_FILESYSTEM = sandbox_pb2.FilesystemPolicy(
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include_workdir=True,
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read_only=["/usr", "/lib", "/etc", "/app", "/var/log"],
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read_write=["/sandbox", "/tmp"],
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)
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_SAFE_LANDLOCK = sandbox_pb2.LandlockPolicy(compatibility="best_effort")
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_SAFE_PROCESS = sandbox_pb2.ProcessPolicy(run_as_user="sandbox", run_as_group="sandbox")
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def _safe_policy() -> sandbox_pb2.SandboxPolicy:
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"""Build a safe baseline policy for testing."""
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return sandbox_pb2.SandboxPolicy(
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version=1,
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filesystem=_SAFE_FILESYSTEM,
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landlock=_SAFE_LANDLOCK,
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process=_SAFE_PROCESS,
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)
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# =============================================================================
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# Tests
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# =============================================================================
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def test_create_sandbox_rejects_root_user(
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sandbox_client: SandboxClient,
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) -> None:
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"""Server rejects CreateSandbox with run_as_user='root'."""
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policy = sandbox_pb2.SandboxPolicy(
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version=1,
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filesystem=_SAFE_FILESYSTEM,
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landlock=_SAFE_LANDLOCK,
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process=sandbox_pb2.ProcessPolicy(
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run_as_user="root",
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run_as_group="sandbox",
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),
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)
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spec = datamodel_pb2.SandboxSpec(policy=policy)
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stub = sandbox_client._stub
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with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
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stub.CreateSandbox(navigator_pb2.CreateSandboxRequest(name="", spec=spec))
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assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT
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assert "root" in exc_info.value.details().lower()
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def test_create_sandbox_rejects_path_traversal(
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sandbox_client: SandboxClient,
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) -> None:
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"""Server rejects CreateSandbox with '..' in filesystem paths."""
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policy = sandbox_pb2.SandboxPolicy(
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version=1,
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filesystem=sandbox_pb2.FilesystemPolicy(
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include_workdir=True,
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read_only=["/usr/../etc/shadow"],
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read_write=["/tmp"],
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),
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landlock=_SAFE_LANDLOCK,
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process=_SAFE_PROCESS,
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)
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spec = datamodel_pb2.SandboxSpec(policy=policy)
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stub = sandbox_client._stub
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with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
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stub.CreateSandbox(navigator_pb2.CreateSandboxRequest(name="", spec=spec))
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assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT
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assert "traversal" in exc_info.value.details().lower()
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def test_create_sandbox_rejects_overly_broad_paths(
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sandbox_client: SandboxClient,
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) -> None:
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"""Server rejects CreateSandbox with read_write=['/']."""
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policy = sandbox_pb2.SandboxPolicy(
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version=1,
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filesystem=sandbox_pb2.FilesystemPolicy(
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include_workdir=True,
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read_only=["/usr"],
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read_write=["/"],
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),
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landlock=_SAFE_LANDLOCK,
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process=_SAFE_PROCESS,
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)
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spec = datamodel_pb2.SandboxSpec(policy=policy)
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stub = sandbox_client._stub
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with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
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stub.CreateSandbox(navigator_pb2.CreateSandboxRequest(name="", spec=spec))
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assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT
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assert "broad" in exc_info.value.details().lower()
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def test_update_policy_rejects_immutable_fields(
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sandbox: Callable[..., Sandbox],
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sandbox_client: SandboxClient,
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) -> None:
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"""UpdateSandboxPolicy rejects removal of filesystem paths on a live sandbox.
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Filesystem paths are enforced by Landlock at sandbox startup and cannot be
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removed after the fact. This test verifies that the server rejects updates
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that remove existing read_only paths, which also prevents unsafe content
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from being introduced via policy updates.
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"""
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safe_policy = _safe_policy()
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spec = datamodel_pb2.SandboxSpec(policy=safe_policy)
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with sandbox(spec=spec, delete_on_exit=True) as sb:
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sandbox_name = sb.sandbox.name
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stub = sandbox_client._stub
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# Try to update with a modified filesystem policy (immutable field)
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unsafe_policy = sandbox_pb2.SandboxPolicy(
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version=1,
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filesystem=sandbox_pb2.FilesystemPolicy(
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include_workdir=True,
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read_only=["/usr/../etc/shadow"],
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read_write=["/tmp"],
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),
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landlock=_SAFE_LANDLOCK,
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process=_SAFE_PROCESS,
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)
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with pytest.raises(grpc.RpcError) as exc_info:
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stub.UpdateSandboxPolicy(
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navigator_pb2.UpdateSandboxPolicyRequest(
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name=sandbox_name,
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policy=unsafe_policy,
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)
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)
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assert exc_info.value.code() == grpc.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT
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assert "cannot be removed" in exc_info.value.details().lower()
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