Files
OpenShell/scripts/smoke-test-network-policy.sh
John T. Myers b7779bdefa feat(sandbox): integrate OCSF structured logging for sandbox events (#720)
* feat(sandbox): integrate OCSF structured logging for all sandbox events

WIP: Replace ad-hoc tracing calls with OCSF event builders across all
sandbox subsystems (network, SSH, process, filesystem, config, lifecycle).

- Register ocsf_logging_enabled setting (defaults false)
- Replace stdout/file fmt layers with OcsfShorthandLayer
- Add conditional OcsfJsonlLayer for /var/log/openshell-ocsf.log
- Update LogPushLayer to extract OCSF shorthand for gRPC push
- Migrate ~106 log sites to OCSF builders (NetworkActivity, HttpActivity,
  SshActivity, ProcessActivity, DetectionFinding, ConfigStateChange,
  AppLifecycle)
- Add openshell-ocsf to all Docker build contexts

* fix(scripts): attach provider to all smoke test phases to avoid rate limits

GitHub's unauthenticated API rate limit (60/hour) causes flaky 403s for
Phases 1, 2, and 4. Fix by attaching the provider to all sandboxes and
upgrading the Phase 1 policy to L7 so credential injection works.

Phase 4 (tls:skip) cannot inject credentials by design, so relax the
assertion to accept either 200 or 403 from upstream -- both prove the
proxy forwarded the request.

* fix(ocsf): remove timestamp from shorthand format to avoid double-timestamp

The display layer (gateway logs, TUI, sandbox logs CLI) already prepends
a timestamp. Having one in the shorthand output too produces redundant
double-timestamps like:

  15:49:11 sandbox INFO  15:49:11.649 I NET:OPEN ALLOWED ...

Now the shorthand is just the severity + structured content:

  15:49:11 sandbox INFO  I NET:OPEN ALLOWED ...

* refactor(ocsf): replace single-char severity with bracketed labels

Replace cryptic single-character severity codes (I/L/M/H/C/F) with
readable bracketed labels: [LOW], [MED], [HIGH], [CRIT], [FATAL].

Informational severity (the happy-path default) is omitted entirely to
keep normal log output clean and avoid redundancy with the tracing-level
INFO that the display layer already provides.

Before: sandbox INFO  I NET:OPEN ALLOWED ...
After:  sandbox INFO  NET:OPEN ALLOWED ...

Before: sandbox INFO  M NET:OPEN DENIED ...
After:  sandbox INFO  [MED] NET:OPEN DENIED ...

* feat(sandbox): use OCSF level label for structured events in log push

Set the level field to 'OCSF' instead of 'INFO' for OCSF events in the
gRPC log push. This visually distinguishes structured OCSF events from
plain tracing output in the TUI and CLI sandbox logs:

  sandbox OCSF  NET:OPEN [INFO] ALLOWED python3(42) -> api.example.com:443
  sandbox OCSF  NET:OPEN [MED] DENIED python3(42) -> blocked.com:443
  sandbox INFO  Fetching sandbox policy via gRPC

* fix(sandbox): convert new Landlock path-skip warning to OCSF

PR #677 added a warn!() for inaccessible Landlock paths in best-effort
mode. Convert to ConfigStateChangeBuilder with degraded state so it
flows through the OCSF shorthand format consistently.

* fix(sandbox): use rolling appender for OCSF JSONL file

Match the main openshell.log rotation mechanics (daily, 3 files max)
instead of a single unbounded append-only file. Prevents disk exhaustion
when ocsf_logging_enabled is left on in long-running sandboxes.

* fix(sandbox): address reviewer warnings for OCSF integration

W1: Remove redundant 'OCSF' prefix from shorthand file layer — the
    class name (NET:OPEN, HTTP:GET) already identifies structured events
    and the LogPushLayer separately sets the level field.

W2: Log a debug message when OCSF_CTX.set() is called a second time
    instead of silently discarding via let _.

W3: Document the boundary between OCSF-migrated events and intentionally
    plain tracing calls (DEBUG/TRACE, transient, internal plumbing).

W4: Migrate remaining iptables LOG rule failure warnings in netns.rs
    (IPv4 TCP/UDP, IPv6 TCP/UDP) to ConfigStateChangeBuilder for
    consistency with the IPv4 bypass rule failure already migrated.

W5: Migrate malformed inference request warn to NetworkActivity with
    ActivityId::Refuse and SeverityId::Medium.

W6: Use Medium severity for L7 deny decisions (both CONNECT tunnel and
    FORWARD proxy paths) to match the CONNECT deny severity pattern.
    Allows and audits remain Informational.

* refactor(sandbox): rename ocsf_logging_enabled to ocsf_json_enabled

The shorthand logs are already OCSF-structured events. The setting
specifically controls the JSONL file export, so the name should reflect
that: ocsf_json_enabled.

* fix(ocsf): add timestamps to shorthand file layer output

The OcsfShorthandLayer writes directly to the log file with no outer
display layer to supply timestamps. Add a UTC timestamp prefix to every
line so the file output matches what tracing::fmt used to provide.

Before: CONFIG:VALIDATED [INFO] Validated 'sandbox' user exists in image
After:  2026-04-01T15:49:11.649Z CONFIG:VALIDATED [INFO] Validated ...

* fix(docker): touch openshell-ocsf source to invalidate cargo cache

The supervisor-workspace stage touches sandbox and core sources to force
recompilation over the rust-deps dummy stubs, but openshell-ocsf was
missing. This caused the Docker cargo cache to use stale ocsf objects
from the deps stage, preventing changes to the ocsf crate (like the
timestamp fix) from appearing in the final binary.

Also adds a shorthand layer test verifying timestamp output, and drafts
the observability docs section.

* fix(ocsf): add OCSF level prefix to file layer shorthand output

Without a level prefix, OCSF events in the log file have no visual
anchor at the position where standard tracing lines show INFO/WARN.
This makes scanning the file harder since the eye has nothing consistent
to lock onto after the timestamp.

Before: 2026-04-01T04:04:13.065Z CONFIG:DISCOVERY [INFO] ...
After:  2026-04-01T04:04:13.065Z OCSF CONFIG:DISCOVERY [INFO] ...

* fix(ocsf): clean up shorthand formatting for listen and SSH events

- Fix double space in NET:LISTEN, SSH:LISTEN, and other events where
  action is empty (e.g., 'NET:LISTEN [INFO]  10.200.0.1' -> 'NET:LISTEN [INFO] 10.200.0.1')
- Add listen address to SSH:LISTEN event (was empty)
- Downgrade SSH handshake intermediate steps (reading preface, verifying)
  from OCSF events to debug!() traces. Only the final verdict
  (accepted/denied) is an OCSF event now, reducing noise from 3 events
  to 1 per SSH connection.
- Apply same spacing fix to HTTP shorthand for consistency.

* docs(observability): update examples with OCSF prefix and formatting fixes

Align doc examples with the deployed output:
- Add OCSF level prefix to all shorthand examples in the log file
- Show mixed OCSF + standard tracing in the file format section
- Update listen events (no double space, SSH includes address)
- Show one SSH:OPEN per connection instead of three
- Update grep patterns to use 'OCSF NET:' etc.

* docs(agents): add OCSF logging guidance to AGENTS.md

Add a Sandbox Logging (OCSF) section to AGENTS.md so agents have
in-context guidance for deciding whether new log emissions should use
OCSF structured logging or plain tracing. Covers event class selection,
severity guidelines, builder API usage, dual-emit pattern for security
findings, and the no-secrets rule.

Also adds openshell-ocsf to the Architecture Overview table.

* fix: remove workflow files accidentally included during rebase

These files were already merged to main in separate PRs. They got
pulled into our branch during rebase conflict resolution for the
deleted docs-preview-pr.yml file.

* docs(observability): use sandbox connect instead of raw SSH

Users access sandboxes via 'openshell sandbox connect', not direct SSH.

* fix(docs): correct settings CLI syntax in OCSF JSON export page

The settings CLI requires --key and --value named flags, not positional
arguments. Also fix the per-sandbox form: the sandbox name is a
positional argument, not a --sandbox flag.

* fix(e2e): update log assertions for OCSF shorthand format

The E2E tests asserted on the old tracing::fmt key=value format
(action=allow, l7_decision=audit, FORWARD, L7_REQUEST, always-blocked).
Update to match the new OCSF shorthand (ALLOWED/DENIED, HTTP:, NET:,
engine:ssrf, policy:).

* feat(sandbox): convert WebSocket upgrade log calls to OCSF

PR #718 added two log calls for WebSocket upgrade handling:

- 101 Switching Protocols info → NetworkActivity with Upgrade activity.
  This is a significant state change (L7 enforcement drops to raw relay).

- Unsolicited 101 without client Upgrade header → DetectionFinding with
  High severity. A non-compliant upstream sending 101 without a client
  Upgrade request could be attempting to bypass L7 inspection.
2026-04-07 13:01:13 -07:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
# =============================================================================
# Network Policy Smoke Test
# =============================================================================
#
# End-to-end smoke test for sandbox network policies, TLS auto-termination,
# credential injection, and L4/L7 enforcement. Uses GitHub's API as the target.
#
# Prerequisites:
# - A running OpenShell gateway (`openshell status` shows Healthy)
# - GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN env var set with a valid GitHub token
# - The `openshell` CLI on PATH
#
# Usage:
# GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_xxx ./scripts/smoke-test-network-policy.sh
#
# What it tests:
#
# Phase 1 — L4 allow/deny (credential injection, TLS auto-terminated):
# Creates a sandbox with L4+L7 policy for api.github.com (provider
# attached for authenticated requests).
# - curl api.github.com/zen -> should succeed (authenticated, 200)
# - curl httpbin.org -> should be blocked (implicit deny)
#
# Phase 2 — L7 enforcement (method + path rules):
# Creates a sandbox with read-only L7 enforcement (provider attached).
# - GET /zen -> should succeed (200)
# - POST /user/repos -> should be blocked (403)
#
# Phase 3 — Credential injection:
# Creates a sandbox with provider attached and full L7 access.
# - curl /user (no auth header) -> should return authenticated response
# (proxy auto-injects GITHUB_TOKEN via TLS MITM)
#
# Phase 4 — tls: skip escape hatch:
# Creates a sandbox with tls: skip (provider attached but no MITM).
# - curl /zen -> should get response from upstream (raw tunnel)
# - curl /user -> should get 401 (no credential injection)
#
# After all tests, sandboxes are kept alive for log inspection.
# The script prompts before cleanup.
#
# =============================================================================
#
# Embedded Policy YAMLs
# =============================================================================
#
# POLICY_L4 (allow api.github.com:443 with credential injection, deny everything else):
# network_policies:
# github_api:
# endpoints: [{ host: api.github.com, port: 443, protocol: rest, access: full }]
# binaries: [{ path: /usr/bin/curl }]
#
# POLICY_L7_READONLY (L7 read-only enforcement):
# network_policies:
# github_api:
# endpoints:
# - host: api.github.com
# port: 443
# protocol: rest
# enforcement: enforce
# access: read-only
# binaries: [{ path: /usr/bin/curl }]
#
# POLICY_CRED_INJECT (L7 full access, provider credential injection):
# Same as L7 but with access: full
#
# POLICY_TLS_SKIP (L4 with tls: skip — raw tunnel):
# network_policies:
# github_api:
# endpoints: [{ host: api.github.com, port: 443, tls: skip }]
# binaries: [{ path: /usr/bin/curl }]
#
# =============================================================================
set -uo pipefail
# Note: NOT using set -e so we can capture exit codes without exiting.
RED='\033[0;31m'
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
YELLOW='\033[0;33m'
BOLD='\033[1m'
RESET='\033[0m'
PASS_COUNT=0
FAIL_COUNT=0
pass() { ((PASS_COUNT++)); echo -e " ${GREEN}PASS${RESET} $1"; }
fail() { ((FAIL_COUNT++)); echo -e " ${RED}FAIL${RESET} $1\n $2"; }
header() { echo -e "\n${BOLD}=== $1 ===${RESET}"; }
PROVIDER_NAME="smoke-test-github"
SANDBOXES=()
POLICY_DIR=""
# Resolve token from GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN
TOKEN="${GITHUB_TOKEN:-${GH_TOKEN:-}}"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Preflight
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Preflight"
if [[ -z "$TOKEN" ]]; then
echo -e "${RED}Error: GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN env var is required${RESET}"
exit 1
fi
echo " Token is set"
if ! openshell status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo -e "${RED}Error: No healthy gateway. Run: openshell gateway start${RESET}"
exit 1
fi
echo " Gateway is healthy"
POLICY_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
echo " Policy dir: $POLICY_DIR"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
write_policy() {
local name="$1"
local file="$POLICY_DIR/${name}.yaml"
cat > "$file"
echo "$file"
}
# Create a sandbox with --keep and a sleep, wait for Ready.
create_sandbox() {
local name="$1"
shift
local provider_flag=("$@")
echo " Creating sandbox: $name"
openshell sandbox create --name "$name" --keep "${provider_flag[@]}" \
-- sh -c "echo Ready && sleep 3600" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
local pid=$!
local attempts=0
while [[ $attempts -lt 40 ]]; do
if openshell sandbox list 2>/dev/null | grep -q "$name.*Ready"; then
echo " Sandbox $name is Ready"
SANDBOXES+=("$name")
# Kill the blocking create process (sandbox stays alive with --keep)
kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
# Brief settle time — SSH server inside the sandbox may still be
# binding its port even though the status flipped to Ready.
sleep 3
return 0
fi
sleep 2
((attempts++))
done
echo -e " ${RED}TIMEOUT waiting for $name${RESET}"
kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
return 1
}
# Run a command inside a sandbox via SSH.
sandbox_exec() {
local name="$1"
shift
local ssh_config
ssh_config=$(openshell sandbox ssh-config "$name" 2>/dev/null)
local ssh_host
ssh_host=$(echo "$ssh_config" | grep "^Host " | awk '{print $2}')
local ssh_config_file="$POLICY_DIR/ssh_config_${name}"
echo "$ssh_config" > "$ssh_config_file"
ssh -F "$ssh_config_file" \
-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
-o LogLevel=ERROR \
-o ConnectTimeout=15 \
"$ssh_host" "$@" 2>&1
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Write policies
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
POLICY_L4=$(write_policy l4-allow-deny <<'YAML'
version: 1
filesystem_policy:
include_workdir: true
read_only: [/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /app, /etc, /var/log]
read_write: [/sandbox, /tmp, /dev/null]
landlock:
compatibility: best_effort
process:
run_as_user: sandbox
run_as_group: sandbox
network_policies:
github_api:
name: github-api-l4
endpoints:
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
enforcement: enforce
access: full
binaries:
- { path: /usr/bin/curl }
YAML
)
POLICY_L7_RO=$(write_policy l7-readonly <<'YAML'
version: 1
filesystem_policy:
include_workdir: true
read_only: [/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /app, /etc, /var/log]
read_write: [/sandbox, /tmp, /dev/null]
landlock:
compatibility: best_effort
process:
run_as_user: sandbox
run_as_group: sandbox
network_policies:
github_api:
name: github-api-l7-readonly
endpoints:
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
enforcement: enforce
access: read-only
binaries:
- { path: /usr/bin/curl }
YAML
)
POLICY_CRED=$(write_policy l7-cred-inject <<'YAML'
version: 1
filesystem_policy:
include_workdir: true
read_only: [/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /app, /etc, /var/log]
read_write: [/sandbox, /tmp, /dev/null]
landlock:
compatibility: best_effort
process:
run_as_user: sandbox
run_as_group: sandbox
network_policies:
github_api:
name: github-api-cred-inject
endpoints:
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
enforcement: enforce
access: full
binaries:
- { path: /usr/bin/curl }
YAML
)
POLICY_SKIP=$(write_policy tls-skip <<'YAML'
version: 1
filesystem_policy:
include_workdir: true
read_only: [/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /app, /etc, /var/log]
read_write: [/sandbox, /tmp, /dev/null]
landlock:
compatibility: best_effort
process:
run_as_user: sandbox
run_as_group: sandbox
network_policies:
github_api:
name: github-api-skip
endpoints:
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
tls: skip
binaries:
- { path: /usr/bin/curl }
YAML
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 0: Provider setup
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Phase 0: Provider Setup"
openshell provider delete "$PROVIDER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if openshell provider create \
--name "$PROVIDER_NAME" \
--type github \
--credential "GITHUB_TOKEN=$TOKEN" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pass "Provider '$PROVIDER_NAME' created"
else
fail "Provider creation failed" ""
exit 1
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 1: L4 allow/deny
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Phase 1: L4 Allow/Deny (TLS auto-terminated, credential injection)"
SB1="smoke-l4"
if create_sandbox "$SB1" --provider "$PROVIDER_NAME"; then
echo " Setting L4-only policy..."
openshell policy set "$SB1" --policy "$POLICY_L4" >/dev/null 2>&1
echo " Waiting for policy propagation (15s)..."
sleep 15
# Test 1: L4 allow (authenticated via credential injection)
echo " Running: curl api.github.com/zen"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB1" 'curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" https://api.github.com/zen')
if [[ "$output" == *"200"* ]]; then
pass "L4 allow: curl to api.github.com succeeded (HTTP 200)"
else
fail "L4 allow: expected HTTP 200" "got: $output"
fi
# Test 2: L4 deny (implicit deny for httpbin.org)
echo " Running: curl httpbin.org (should be blocked)"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB1" "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 https://httpbin.org/get" || true)
if [[ "$output" == *"403"* || "$output" == *"000"* || -z "$output" ]]; then
pass "L4 deny: curl to httpbin.org blocked"
else
fail "L4 deny: expected connection failure" "got: $output"
fi
else
fail "L4 sandbox creation failed" ""
fail "L4 deny test skipped" "sandbox not created"
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 2: L7 enforcement
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Phase 2: L7 Enforcement (read-only, TLS auto-terminated)"
SB2="smoke-l7"
if create_sandbox "$SB2" --provider "$PROVIDER_NAME"; then
echo " Setting L7 read-only policy..."
openshell policy set "$SB2" --policy "$POLICY_L7_RO" >/dev/null 2>&1
echo " Waiting for policy propagation (15s)..."
sleep 15
# Test 3: L7 allow (GET, authenticated via credential injection)
echo " Running: GET /zen"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB2" 'curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" https://api.github.com/zen')
if [[ "$output" == *"200"* ]]; then
pass "L7 allow: GET /zen succeeded (read-only allows GET)"
else
fail "L7 allow: expected HTTP 200 for GET" "got: $output"
fi
# Test 4: L7 deny (POST blocked by read-only)
echo " Running: POST /user/repos (should be blocked)"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB2" "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 -X POST https://api.github.com/user/repos -d '{\"name\":\"should-not-create\"}'" || true)
if [[ "$output" == *"403"* ]]; then
pass "L7 deny: POST blocked by read-only enforcement"
else
fail "L7 deny: expected HTTP 403 for POST" "got: $output"
fi
else
fail "L7 sandbox creation failed" ""
fail "L7 deny test skipped" "sandbox not created"
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 3: Credential injection
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Phase 3: Credential Injection (provider attached, TLS auto-terminated)"
SB3="smoke-cred"
if create_sandbox "$SB3" --provider "$PROVIDER_NAME"; then
echo " Setting L7 full policy..."
openshell policy set "$SB3" --policy "$POLICY_CRED" >/dev/null 2>&1
echo " Waiting for policy propagation (15s)..."
sleep 15
# Test 5: Credential injection — curl /user using the placeholder env var.
# The sandbox process sees GITHUB_TOKEN=openshell:resolve:env:GITHUB_TOKEN
# in its environment. When curl sends this as an Authorization header,
# the proxy's SecretResolver rewrites the placeholder to the real token.
echo " Running: curl /user -H 'Authorization: token \$GITHUB_TOKEN'"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB3" 'curl -s --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" https://api.github.com/user' || true)
if [[ "$output" == *"login"* ]]; then
pass "Credential injection: /user returned authenticated response"
elif [[ "$output" == *"401"* || "$output" == *"Unauthorized"* ]]; then
fail "Credential injection: got 401 (placeholder may have leaked)" "$output"
else
fail "Credential injection: unexpected response" "$output"
fi
else
fail "Credential injection sandbox creation failed" ""
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Phase 4: tls: skip escape hatch
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Phase 4: tls: skip (raw tunnel, no MITM)"
SB4="smoke-skip"
if create_sandbox "$SB4" --provider "$PROVIDER_NAME"; then
echo " Setting tls: skip policy..."
openshell policy set "$SB4" --policy "$POLICY_SKIP" >/dev/null 2>&1
echo " Waiting for policy propagation (15s)..."
sleep 15
# Test 6: L4 connection reaches upstream (raw tunnel, no MITM).
# Without credential injection the request is unauthenticated, so
# GitHub may return 200 or 403 (rate-limited). Either proves the
# proxy forwarded the request — a proxy block would return "000"
# or the sandbox-policy 403 body.
echo " Running: curl /zen (should reach upstream via raw tunnel)"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB4" "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 https://api.github.com/zen" || true)
if [[ "$output" == *"200"* || "$output" == *"403"* ]]; then
pass "tls: skip: request reached upstream (raw tunnel, HTTP $output)"
else
fail "tls: skip: expected upstream response (200 or 403)" "got: $output"
fi
# Test 7: Credential injection does NOT work with tls: skip.
# The placeholder leaks verbatim since there's no MITM to rewrite it.
echo " Running: curl /user with \$GITHUB_TOKEN (should fail, placeholder leaks)"
output=$(sandbox_exec "$SB4" 'curl -s --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" https://api.github.com/user' || true)
if [[ "$output" == *"401"* || "$output" == *"Unauthorized"* || "$output" == *"Bad credentials"* ]]; then
pass "tls: skip: /user returned 401 (credential injection bypassed)"
elif [[ "$output" == *"login"* ]]; then
fail "tls: skip: /user was authenticated (MITM should be disabled)" "$output"
else
pass "tls: skip: /user not authenticated (expected)"
fi
else
fail "tls: skip sandbox creation failed" ""
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Results
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
header "Results"
echo -e " ${GREEN}Passed: ${PASS_COUNT}${RESET}"
echo -e " ${RED}Failed: ${FAIL_COUNT}${RESET}"
echo ""
if [[ ${#SANDBOXES[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
echo -e "${BOLD}Sandboxes kept for inspection:${RESET}"
for sb in "${SANDBOXES[@]}"; do
echo " - $sb"
done
echo ""
echo "Inspect logs with:"
echo " openshell logs <name> --source sandbox"
echo ""
read -r -p "Delete all smoke test sandboxes and provider? [y/N] " answer
if [[ "$answer" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
echo ""
for sb in "${SANDBOXES[@]}"; do
openshell sandbox delete "$sb" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo " Deleted $sb" || true
done
openshell provider delete "$PROVIDER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo " Deleted provider $PROVIDER_NAME" || true
else
echo " Sandboxes left running. Clean up manually:"
echo " openshell sandbox delete --all"
echo " openshell provider delete $PROVIDER_NAME"
fi
fi
# Clean up temp files
rm -rf "$POLICY_DIR"
echo ""
if [[ $FAIL_COUNT -gt 0 ]]; then
echo -e "${RED}${BOLD}SMOKE TEST FAILED${RESET}"
exit 1
else
echo -e "${GREEN}${BOLD}SMOKE TEST PASSED${RESET}"
exit 0
fi