mirror of
https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell.git
synced 2026-10-12 04:39:51 +08:00
John T. Myers
f4dc6be4b2
* refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes Closes #3172 Remove the inference route control plane, inference.local data path, built-in router crate, and SDK surface. Move inference workloads to explicitly imported provider profiles and native endpoints, with migration cleanup and updated tests and documentation. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve alternate upstream isolation Restore the provider policy activation guard so legacy OpenAI and Anthropic providers configured for alternate base URLs do not grant egress to the built-in public vendor endpoints. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
59 lines
4.0 KiB
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59 lines
4.0 KiB
Plaintext
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# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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title: "Overview of NVIDIA OpenShell"
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sidebar-title: "Overview"
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description: "OpenShell is the safe, private runtime for autonomous AI agents. Run agents in sandboxed environments that protect your data, credentials, and infrastructure."
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keywords: "Generative AI, Cybersecurity, AI Agents, Sandboxing, Security, Privacy, Provider Credentials"
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position: 1
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---
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NVIDIA OpenShell is an open-source runtime for executing autonomous AI agents in sandboxed environments with kernel-level isolation. It combines sandbox runtime controls and a declarative YAML policy so teams can run agents without giving them unrestricted access to local files, credentials, and external networks.
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## Why OpenShell Exists
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AI agents are most useful when they can read files, install packages, call APIs, and use credentials. That same access can create material risk. OpenShell is designed for this tradeoff: preserve agent capability while enforcing explicit controls over what the agent can access.
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## Common Risks and Controls
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The table below summarizes common failure modes and how OpenShell mitigates them.
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| Threat | Without controls | With OpenShell |
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|---|---|---|
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| Data exfiltration | Agent uploads source code or internal files to unauthorized endpoints. | Network policies allow only approved destinations; other outbound traffic is denied. |
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| Credential theft | Agent reads local secrets such as SSH keys or cloud credentials. | Filesystem restrictions (Landlock) confine access to declared paths only. |
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| Unauthorized API usage | Agent sends prompts or data to unapproved model providers. | Provider profiles and network policies restrict model traffic to approved endpoints and binaries. |
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| Privilege escalation | Agent attempts `sudo`, setuid paths, or dangerous syscall behavior. | Unprivileged process identity and seccomp restrictions block escalation paths. |
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## Protection Layers at a Glance
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OpenShell applies defense in depth across the following policy domains.
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| Layer | What it protects | When it applies |
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|---|---|---|
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| Filesystem | Prevents reads/writes outside allowed paths. | Locked at sandbox creation. |
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| Network | Blocks unauthorized outbound connections. | Hot-reloadable at runtime. |
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| Process | Blocks privilege escalation and dangerous syscalls. | Locked at sandbox creation. |
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| Provider credentials | Resolves opaque credential placeholders only at profile-authorized endpoints. | Attachments, rotation, and revocation update at runtime; new environment variables require a new process. |
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For details, refer to [Customize Sandbox Policies](/sandboxes/policies) and [Default Policy](/reference/default-policy).
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## Common Use Cases
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OpenShell supports a range of agent deployment patterns.
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| Use Case | Description |
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|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| Secure coding agents | Run Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, or GitHub Copilot CLI with constrained file and network access. |
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| Private enterprise development | Grant selected sandboxes access to self-hosted or private model endpoints while keeping sensitive context under your control. |
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| Compliance and audit | Treat policy YAML as version-controlled security controls that can be reviewed and audited. |
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| Reusable environments | Use community sandbox images or bring your own containerized runtime. |
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## Next Steps
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Explore these topics to go deeper:
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- To understand the runtime architecture, refer to [How OpenShell Works](/about/how-it-works).
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- To install the CLI and create your first sandbox, refer to the [Quickstart](/get-started/quickstart).
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- To learn how OpenShell enforces policy controls across protection layers, refer to [Customize Sandbox Policies](/sandboxes/policies).
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