Files
Derek Carr 5952a5a23f feat(workspace): add workspace resource model with scoping, membershi… (#2243)
* feat(workspace): implement workspace model (Phase 1 of RFC 0011)

Implements workspace and membership model providing hard isolation
boundaries for multi-player OpenShell deployments.

Workspace CRUD with Kubernetes-style Terminating phase for graceful
deletion. All resources scoped by workspace via ObjectMeta. Membership
RPCs for workspace access control. Persistence migration shifts name
uniqueness to (object_type, workspace, name). Provider profiles support
platform and workspace scoping. Service routing uses workspace-prefixed
DNS labels. Inference routes renamed and workspace-scoped with
DeleteInferenceRoute RPC. Python SDK with WorkspaceClient, two-method
list pattern (workspace-scoped and for_all_workspaces), and workspace
parameter on all methods. CLI workspace flags, TUI workspace cycling.
K8s driver filters unmanaged CRs and uses delete preconditions. Podman
driver uses immutable container IDs. Label serialization fixed across
all put_if call sites.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(cli): delegate sandbox upload command to existing upload function

The standalone `sandbox upload` command reimplemented upload logic
inline with two bugs: it used `Path::exists()` which follows symlinks
(rejecting dangling symlinks), and it ran git-aware filtering on
symlink sources. The `run::sandbox_upload()` function already handles
both cases correctly via `sandbox_upload_plan()`. Replace the inline
logic with a call to the existing function.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(e2e): shorten sandbox names and fix test compatibility

Shorten the sandbox name in initial_sparse_policy_is_acknowledged_as_loaded
from 'e2e-2159-sparse-enrich' (22 chars) to 'e2e-sparse-enrich' (17 chars)
to comply with MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN (19 chars).

Also capture stderr in create_keep_with_args so future sandbox creation
failures include the actual CLI error instead of reporting empty output.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* test(workspace): add test coverage for workspace CRUD and persistence isolation

Add unit tests for workspace create happy path, get round-trip, get
not-found, get empty-name rejection, already-exists error, and
resolve_workspace not-found. Add persistence test proving cross-workspace
name uniqueness (same name in different workspaces produces separate
records). Add workspace name max-length boundary tests. Fix e2e harness
to include stderr in name-parse-failure error path. Align Python e2e
test_workspace_crud with try/finally pattern. Document provider profile
catalog workspace scoping gap in RFC 0011.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(examples): update examples for workspace model compatibility

Shorten sandbox names in demo scripts to fit the 19-character
MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN limit: policy-demo prefix to pd-, multi-agent
notepad derives a short SANDBOX_TAG from the run ID, governance
interceptor uses gs-PID-RANDOM. Update vscode-remote-sandbox.md SSH
host aliases from openshell-{name} to openshell-{name}.{workspace}
format.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* feat(sdk): add workspace-scoped client and workspace CRUD

Add WorkspaceScopedClient modeled after kube::Api::namespaced — captures
workspace once and injects it into every sandbox request. Add workspace
CRUD methods (create, get, list, delete) and list_sandboxes_all_workspaces
on OpenShellClient. Extend SandboxRef with workspace field and add
WorkspaceRef type. Include mock tests for all new operations.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings in workspace test assertions

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(docs): convert indented code blocks to fenced in RFC 0011

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings and apply cargo fmt across workspace

Auto-format with cargo fmt and fix clippy warnings exposed by the
reformat: unnecessary qualifications, map_unwrap_or, identical match
arms, unused variable prefix, dead code annotations, and let-unit-value
in e2e harness.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(workspace): address workspace scoping issues from review

- Add workspace field to settings JSON output (CLI)
- Skip Podman containers missing workspace label instead of defaulting
  to empty string, matching K8s driver behavior
- Add resource_version to list_by_scope SELECT in both SQLite and
  Postgres backends, with regression test
- Gate PolicyLocalContext proposal/lookup routes on workspace readiness,
  returning 503 when workspace is not yet discovered
- Block sandbox and provider creation in TUI all-workspaces mode
- Clear workspace vectors in TUI reset_sandbox_state

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog workspace-aware

Thread workspace through snapshot_catalog so the
EffectiveProviderProfileCatalog enforces workspace boundaries on both
read and write paths. UserProviderProfileSource now loads platform-scoped
profiles (workspace "") plus the target workspace's profiles, preventing
cross-workspace duplicate profile ID collisions that previously caused
global catalog failures.

Update RFC 0011 to reflect catalog scoping is implemented in Phase 1
rather than deferred to future work.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(persistence): include workspace column in atomic policy revision INSERT

put_policy_revision_atomic omitted the workspace column from the INSERT
into the objects table in both SQLite and Postgres backends, causing
atomically-written policy revisions to lose their workspace association.
Add workspace field to AtomicPolicyRevisionWrite and thread it through
both backend INSERT statements, matching the non-atomic put_policy_revision
path which already included it.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(proxy): skip ancestor walk when socket owner is the entrypoint

collect_ancestor_identities walked the entire process tree above the
entrypoint when the connecting process was the entrypoint itself,
SHA256-hashing every ancestor binary (IDE, shell, container runtime).
On dev machines with large binaries in the ancestor chain this exceeded
the 30-second test timeout. When start_pid == stop_pid there are no
intermediate ancestors to verify, so return an empty list immediately.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog scope-aware

Allow the same profile ID at platform and workspace scopes by
introducing layered catalog entries where workspace profiles shadow
platform profiles. Add source and scope fields to the ProviderProfile
proto and CLI output. Migrate List/Get handlers to the catalog,
fixing divergence with runtime profile resolution.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(e2e): align podman e2e labels with centralized driver constants

The podman driver moved its container labels to the centralized
openshell.ai/ prefix, but the e2e test harness and cleanup script
still referenced the old openshell.sandbox-* keys, causing the
local_driver_token_restart test to fail on container lookup.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(e2e): align python profile isolation test with scope-aware catalog

Platform profiles are now visible in workspace listings as fallbacks
per the layered catalog design. Update the assertion to match.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

* fix(workspace): honor profile_workspace in runtime profile resolution

Runtime profile lookups now consult provider.profile_workspace via
get_type_profile_for_scope. Providers created with --global-profile
(profile_workspace="") resolve to the platform profile even when a
workspace profile shadows the same ID. All 6 runtime call sites
updated; type-only call sites remain scope-agnostic.

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>
2026-07-21 00:59:18 +00:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
EXAMPLE_DIR="$ROOT/examples/governance-interceptor"
RUN_TEST_SUITE=0
usage() {
cat <<EOF
usage: $0 [--test-suite|--test]
Without flags, starts a local gateway with the governance interceptor attached
and keeps it running for interactive use.
Options:
--test-suite, --test Run the governance smoke test suite, then stop.
-h, --help Show this help.
EOF
}
while [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--test-suite | --test)
RUN_TEST_SUITE=1
shift
;;
-h | --help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "unknown argument: $1" >&2
usage >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
done
TMPDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
LOG_DIR="$TMPDIR/logs"
JWT_DIR="$TMPDIR/jwt"
GATEWAY_CONFIG="$TMPDIR/gateway.toml"
POLICY_FILE="$TMPDIR/policy.yaml"
PROFILE_DIR="$TMPDIR/profiles"
SETUP_LOG="$LOG_DIR/setup.log"
GATEWAY_LOG="$LOG_DIR/gateway.log"
INTERCEPTOR_LOG="$LOG_DIR/interceptor.log"
if [[ "$RUN_TEST_SUITE" -eq 1 ]]; then
RUN_ID="governance-smoke-$$-$RANDOM"
else
RUN_ID="governance-interactive-$$-$RANDOM"
fi
# Sandbox names are capped at 19 characters. Use a short prefix with
# the PID for uniqueness; the full RUN_ID is kept for log directory naming.
SANDBOX_NAME="gs-$$-$RANDOM"
mkdir -p "$LOG_DIR" "$PROFILE_DIR"
cp "$EXAMPLE_DIR"/profiles/*.yaml "$PROFILE_DIR"/
cleanup() {
local status=$?
trap - EXIT
if [[ -n "${INTERCEPTOR_PID:-}" ]]; then
kill "$INTERCEPTOR_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$INTERCEPTOR_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if [[ -n "${GATEWAY_PID:-}" ]]; then
kill "$GATEWAY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$GATEWAY_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if [[ "$status" -eq 0 ]]; then
rm -rf "$TMPDIR"
else
echo "logs retained in $LOG_DIR" >&2
fi
exit "$status"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
port_is_free() {
local port="$1"
if command -v lsof >/dev/null 2>&1; then
! lsof -nP -iTCP:"$port" -sTCP:LISTEN >/dev/null 2>&1
return
fi
if command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
! nc -z 127.0.0.1 "$port" >/dev/null 2>&1
return
fi
return 0
}
choose_port_block() {
local count="$1"
local start offset ok
for _ in {1..200}; do
start=$((20000 + RANDOM % 20000))
ok=1
for ((offset = 0; offset < count; offset++)); do
if ! port_is_free "$((start + offset))"; then
ok=0
break
fi
done
if [[ "$ok" == "1" ]]; then
printf '%s\n' "$start"
return
fi
done
echo "failed to find free local ports for governance interceptor launcher" >&2
exit 1
}
PORT_BASE="$(choose_port_block 3)"
INTERCEPTOR_ADDR="127.0.0.1:$PORT_BASE"
GATEWAY_PORT="$((PORT_BASE + 1))"
HEALTH_PORT="$((PORT_BASE + 2))"
GATEWAY_ADDR="127.0.0.1:$GATEWAY_PORT"
HEALTH_ADDR="127.0.0.1:$HEALTH_PORT"
GATEWAY_ENDPOINT="http://$GATEWAY_ADDR"
dump_log_file() {
local label="$1"
local path="$2"
printf '\n--- %s: %s ---\n' "$label" "$path" >&2
if [[ -f "$path" ]]; then
cat "$path" >&2
else
printf '(missing)\n' >&2
fi
}
dump_logs() {
dump_log_file "setup log" "$SETUP_LOG"
dump_log_file "gateway log" "$GATEWAY_LOG"
dump_log_file "interceptor log" "$INTERCEPTOR_LOG"
}
pass() {
printf 'PASS %s\n' "$1"
}
fail() {
printf 'FAIL %s\n' "$1" >&2
dump_logs
exit 1
}
log_command() {
local label="$1"
shift
{
printf '\n== %s ==\n' "$label"
printf '+'
printf ' %q' "$@"
printf '\n'
} >>"$SETUP_LOG"
}
run_setup_step() {
local label="$1"
shift
printf 'INFO %s\n' "$label"
log_command "$label" "$@"
if ! "$@" >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>&1; then
fail "$label"
fi
}
run_step() {
local label="$1"
shift
log_command "$label" "$@"
if "$@" >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>&1; then
pass "$label"
else
fail "$label"
fi
}
expect_failure() {
local label="$1"
shift
log_command "$label" "$@"
if "$@" >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>&1; then
fail "$label"
else
pass "$label"
fi
}
expect_output_contains() {
local label="$1"
local needle="$2"
shift 2
local output_file="$LOG_DIR/${label//[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_}.out"
log_command "$label" "$@"
if "$@" >"$output_file" 2>>"$SETUP_LOG" && grep -Fq -- "$needle" "$output_file"; then
pass "$label"
else
cat "$output_file" >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>/dev/null || true
fail "$label"
fi
}
expect_output_not_contains() {
local label="$1"
local needle="$2"
shift 2
local output_file="$LOG_DIR/${label//[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_}.out"
log_command "$label" "$@"
if "$@" >"$output_file" 2>>"$SETUP_LOG" && ! grep -Fq -- "$needle" "$output_file"; then
pass "$label"
else
cat "$output_file" >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>/dev/null || true
fail "$label"
fi
}
expect_log_contains() {
local label="$1"
local needle="$2"
local path="$3"
if grep -Fq -- "$needle" "$path"; then
pass "$label"
else
fail "$label"
fi
}
wait_for_output_contains() {
local label="$1"
local needle="$2"
shift 2
local output_file="$LOG_DIR/${label//[^A-Za-z0-9_]/_}.out"
log_command "$label" "$@"
for _ in {1..60}; do
if "$@" >"$output_file" 2>>"$SETUP_LOG" && grep -Fq -- "$needle" "$output_file"; then
pass "$label"
return
fi
sleep 1
done
cat "$output_file" >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>/dev/null || true
fail "$label"
}
policy_hash_for_sandbox() {
local sandbox_name="$1"
"${CLI[@]}" policy get "$sandbox_name" --full -o json \
| awk -F'"' '/"hash":/ { print $4; exit }'
}
policy_signature_for_sandbox() {
local sandbox_name="$1"
"${CLI[@]}" sandbox get "$sandbox_name" \
| awk -F': ' '/openshell.nvidia.com\/policy-signature:/ { print $2; exit }'
}
profile_signature_for_profile() {
local profile_id="$1"
"${CLI[@]}" provider profile export "$profile_id" -o json \
| awk -F'"' '/"openshell.nvidia.com\/profile-signature":/ { print $4; exit }'
}
wait_for_profile() {
local profile_id="$1"
local label="loading $profile_id provider profile"
{
printf '\n== %s ==\n' "$label"
printf '+ wait for provider profile %q\n' "$profile_id"
} >>"$SETUP_LOG"
for _ in {1..60}; do
if "${CLI[@]}" provider profile export "$profile_id" -o yaml >>"$SETUP_LOG" 2>&1; then
printf 'INFO %s\n' "$label"
return
fi
sleep 1
done
fail "$label"
}
generate_gateway_jwt_bundle() {
if ! command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "openssl is required to generate local smoke-test gateway JWT keys" >&2
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p "$JWT_DIR"
openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out "$JWT_DIR/signing.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
openssl pkey -in "$JWT_DIR/signing.pem" -pubout -out "$JWT_DIR/public.pem" >/dev/null 2>&1
printf '%s\n' "$RUN_ID" >"$JWT_DIR/kid"
}
write_gateway_config() {
cat >"$GATEWAY_CONFIG" <<EOF
[openshell]
version = 1
[openshell.gateway]
provider_profile_sources = [
{ type = "interceptor", name = "provider-governance" },
]
[openshell.gateway.auth]
allow_unauthenticated_users = true
[openshell.gateway.gateway_jwt]
signing_key_path = "$JWT_DIR/signing.pem"
public_key_path = "$JWT_DIR/public.pem"
kid_path = "$JWT_DIR/kid"
gateway_id = "$RUN_ID"
ttl_secs = 0
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors]]
name = "provider-governance"
grpc_endpoint = "http://$INTERCEPTOR_ADDR"
order = 10
failure_policy = "fail_closed"
binding_policy = "allowlist"
timeout = "500ms"
max_response_bytes = 1048576
max_patches = 32
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/CreateSandbox"
phases = ["modify_operation", "validate"]
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/CreateProvider"
phases = ["validate"]
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/UpdateConfig"
phases = ["validate"]
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/SubmitPolicyAnalysis"
phases = ["validate"]
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/ImportProviderProfiles"
phases = ["validate"]
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/UpdateProviderProfiles"
phases = ["validate"]
[[openshell.gateway.interceptors.bindings]]
rpc = "openshell.v1.OpenShell/DeleteProviderProfile"
phases = ["validate"]
EOF
}
start_interceptor() {
printf 'INFO starting governance interceptor\n'
"$EXAMPLE_DIR/target/debug/governance-interceptor" \
--listen "$INTERCEPTOR_ADDR" \
--policy "$POLICY_FILE" \
--profiles "$PROFILE_DIR" \
--gateway-endpoint "$GATEWAY_ENDPOINT" \
--policy-watch-interval-ms 250 >"$INTERCEPTOR_LOG" 2>&1 &
INTERCEPTOR_PID=$!
}
start_gateway() {
printf 'INFO starting gateway\n'
env -u OPENSHELL_DRIVERS "$ROOT/target/debug/openshell-gateway" \
--config "$GATEWAY_CONFIG" \
--bind-address 127.0.0.1 \
--port "$GATEWAY_PORT" \
--health-port "$HEALTH_PORT" \
--metrics-port 0 \
--log-level info \
--disable-tls \
--db-url "sqlite://$TMPDIR/gateway.db" >"$GATEWAY_LOG" 2>&1 &
GATEWAY_PID=$!
}
wait_for_gateway() {
local label="gateway starts with interceptor"
for _ in {1..60}; do
if ! kill -0 "$GATEWAY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
fail "$label"
fi
if curl -fsS "http://$HEALTH_ADDR/healthz" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf 'INFO %s\n' "$label"
return
fi
sleep 1
done
fail "$label"
}
configure_gateway() {
CLI=(
env
-u OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_POLICY
"$ROOT/target/debug/openshell"
--gateway-endpoint "$GATEWAY_ENDPOINT"
)
run_setup_step "enabling provider profile policy composition" "${CLI[@]}" settings set --global --key providers_v2_enabled --value true --yes
wait_for_profile "github"
wait_for_profile "slack"
}
run_suite() {
expect_output_contains "lists github profile" "github" "${CLI[@]}" provider list-profiles
expect_output_contains "lists slack profile" "slack" "${CLI[@]}" provider list-profiles
expect_output_not_contains "hides codex profile" "codex" "${CLI[@]}" provider list-profiles
expect_output_not_contains "hides google cloud profile" "google-cloud" "${CLI[@]}" provider list-profiles
expect_output_contains "github profile has governance profile signature" "openshell.nvidia.com/profile-signature" "${CLI[@]}" provider profile export github -o json
expect_output_contains "github profile has governance profile hash" "openshell.nvidia.com/profile-hash" "${CLI[@]}" provider profile export github -o json
cat >"$TMPDIR/disallowed-profile.yaml" <<'EOF'
id: custom-slack
display_name: Custom Slack
description: Profile outside the managed github/slack set used to verify interceptor import denial
category: messaging
credentials: []
endpoints: []
binaries: []
EOF
expect_failure "denies provider profile delete" "${CLI[@]}" provider profile delete slack
expect_failure "denies disallowed provider profile import" "${CLI[@]}" provider profile import -f "$TMPDIR/disallowed-profile.yaml"
run_step "allows github provider create" "${CLI[@]}" provider create --name github --type github --credential GITHUB_TOKEN=dummy
run_step "allows slack provider create" "${CLI[@]}" provider create --name slack --type slack --credential SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=dummy
expect_failure "denies disallowed provider create" "${CLI[@]}" provider create --name bitbucket --type bitbucket --credential BITBUCKET_TOKEN=dummy
expect_failure "denies automatic proposal approval" "${CLI[@]}" settings set --global --key proposal_approval_mode --value auto --yes
run_step "creates sandbox with selected github provider" "${CLI[@]}" sandbox create --name "$SANDBOX_NAME" --provider github --no-auto-providers --keep --no-tty -- /bin/sh -lc true
expect_log_contains "gateway logs interceptor log annotations" "log_annotations" "$GATEWAY_LOG"
expect_log_contains "gateway logs governance correlation id" "governance:create-sandbox:$SANDBOX_NAME" "$GATEWAY_LOG"
expect_output_contains "sandbox has github provider" "github" "${CLI[@]}" sandbox provider list "$SANDBOX_NAME"
expect_output_not_contains "sandbox does not auto-add slack provider" "slack" "${CLI[@]}" sandbox provider list "$SANDBOX_NAME"
expect_output_contains "effective policy has github provider layer" "_provider_github" "${CLI[@]}" policy get "$SANDBOX_NAME" --full -o json
expect_output_not_contains "effective policy omits unselected slack layer" "_provider_slack" "${CLI[@]}" policy get "$SANDBOX_NAME" --full -o json
local sandbox_id
sandbox_id="$("${CLI[@]}" sandbox get "$SANDBOX_NAME" | awk '/Id:/ && !found { print $2; found=1 }')"
if [[ -z "$sandbox_id" ]]; then
fail "reads governed sandbox id"
fi
pass "reads governed sandbox id"
run_step \
"denies authenticated governance bypasses without changing policy" \
"$EXAMPLE_DIR/target/debug/governance-smoke-client" \
"$GATEWAY_ENDPOINT" "$SANDBOX_NAME" "$sandbox_id" \
"$JWT_DIR/signing.pem" "$RUN_ID" "$RUN_ID"
local initial_policy_signature
initial_policy_signature="$(policy_signature_for_sandbox "$SANDBOX_NAME")"
if [[ -z "$initial_policy_signature" ]]; then
fail "reads initial governance policy signature"
fi
pass "reads initial governance policy signature"
local initial_github_profile_signature
initial_github_profile_signature="$(profile_signature_for_profile github)"
if [[ -z "$initial_github_profile_signature" ]]; then
fail "reads initial governance profile signature"
fi
pass "reads initial governance profile signature"
cat >"$POLICY_FILE" <<'EOF'
version: 1
filesystem_policy:
include_workdir: true
read_only: [/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /app, /etc, /var/log]
read_write: [/sandbox, /tmp, /dev/null]
landlock:
compatibility: best_effort
process:
run_as_user: sandbox
run_as_group: sandbox
network_policies:
example_api:
name: example-api
endpoints:
- host: example.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
enforcement: enforce
access: read-only
EOF
wait_for_output_contains "gateway sees policy.yaml reload" "example_api" "${CLI[@]}" policy get "$SANDBOX_NAME" --full -o json
local policy_reload_hash
policy_reload_hash="$(policy_hash_for_sandbox "$SANDBOX_NAME")"
if [[ -z "$policy_reload_hash" ]]; then
fail "reads reloaded policy.yaml hash"
fi
wait_for_output_contains "running sandbox logs policy.yaml reload" "$policy_reload_hash" "${CLI[@]}" logs "$SANDBOX_NAME" --source sandbox --since 90s
local reloaded_policy_signature=""
{
printf '\n== policy.yaml reload updates sandbox policy signature ==\n'
printf '+ wait for sandbox annotation %q to change\n' "openshell.nvidia.com/policy-signature"
} >>"$SETUP_LOG"
for _ in {1..60}; do
reloaded_policy_signature="$(policy_signature_for_sandbox "$SANDBOX_NAME")"
if [[ -n "$reloaded_policy_signature" && "$reloaded_policy_signature" != "$initial_policy_signature" ]]; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
if [[ -z "$reloaded_policy_signature" || "$reloaded_policy_signature" == "$initial_policy_signature" ]]; then
fail "policy.yaml reload updates sandbox policy signature"
fi
pass "policy.yaml reload updates sandbox policy signature"
cat >"$PROFILE_DIR/github.yaml" <<'EOF'
display_name: GitHub
description: GitHub API and Git operations
category: source_control
credentials:
- name: api_token
description: GitHub token
env_vars: [GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN]
required: true
auth_style: bearer
header_name: authorization
discovery:
credentials: [api_token]
endpoints:
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
access: read-only
enforcement: enforce
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
path: /graphql
protocol: graphql
access: read-only
enforcement: enforce
- host: github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
access: read-only
enforcement: enforce
- host: profile-reload.example
port: 443
protocol: rest
access: read-only
enforcement: enforce
binaries: [/usr/bin/gh, /usr/local/bin/gh, /usr/bin/git, /usr/local/bin/git]
EOF
wait_for_output_contains "gateway sees github profile reload" "profile-reload.example" "${CLI[@]}" provider profile export github -o yaml
wait_for_output_contains "effective policy has reloaded github profile" "profile-reload.example" "${CLI[@]}" policy get "$SANDBOX_NAME" --full -o json
local reloaded_github_profile_signature=""
{
printf '\n== github profile reload updates profile signature ==\n'
printf '+ wait for provider profile annotation %q to change\n' "openshell.nvidia.com/profile-signature"
} >>"$SETUP_LOG"
for _ in {1..60}; do
reloaded_github_profile_signature="$(profile_signature_for_profile github)"
if [[ -n "$reloaded_github_profile_signature" && "$reloaded_github_profile_signature" != "$initial_github_profile_signature" ]]; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
if [[ -z "$reloaded_github_profile_signature" || "$reloaded_github_profile_signature" == "$initial_github_profile_signature" ]]; then
fail "github profile reload updates profile signature"
fi
pass "github profile reload updates profile signature"
local profile_reload_hash
profile_reload_hash="$(policy_hash_for_sandbox "$SANDBOX_NAME")"
if [[ -z "$profile_reload_hash" ]]; then
fail "reads reloaded profile policy hash"
fi
wait_for_output_contains "running sandbox logs github profile reload" "$profile_reload_hash" "${CLI[@]}" logs "$SANDBOX_NAME" --source sandbox --since 90s
expect_failure "denies policy replacement" "${CLI[@]}" policy set "$SANDBOX_NAME" --policy "$EXAMPLE_DIR/policy.yaml"
run_step "deletes governed sandbox" "${CLI[@]}" sandbox delete "$SANDBOX_NAME"
}
print_ready() {
cat <<EOF
READY governance interceptor gateway
Gateway endpoint: $GATEWAY_ENDPOINT
Gateway health check: http://$HEALTH_ADDR/healthz
Gateway config: $GATEWAY_CONFIG
Profile dir: $PROFILE_DIR
Setup log: $SETUP_LOG
Gateway log: $GATEWAY_LOG
Interceptor log: $INTERCEPTOR_LOG
Example CLI:
env -u OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_POLICY "$ROOT/target/debug/openshell" --gateway-endpoint "$GATEWAY_ENDPOINT" sandbox list
Press Ctrl-C to stop the gateway and interceptor.
EOF
}
wait_until_stopped() {
while true; do
if ! kill -0 "$GATEWAY_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
fail "gateway process exited"
fi
if ! kill -0 "$INTERCEPTOR_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
fail "governance interceptor process exited"
fi
sleep 1
done
}
cd "$ROOT"
run_setup_step "building gateway" cargo build --quiet -p openshell-server --bin openshell-gateway
run_setup_step "building governance interceptor" cargo build --quiet --manifest-path "$EXAMPLE_DIR/Cargo.toml"
run_setup_step "building CLI" cargo build --quiet -p openshell-cli --bin openshell
generate_gateway_jwt_bundle
cp "$EXAMPLE_DIR/policy.yaml" "$POLICY_FILE"
write_gateway_config
start_interceptor
start_gateway
wait_for_gateway
configure_gateway
if [[ "$RUN_TEST_SUITE" -eq 1 ]]; then
run_suite
echo "ALL PASS governance interceptor smoke"
else
print_ready
wait_until_stopped
fi