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vm-runtime
67
Commits
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2493d415c2 |
feat(extensions)!: normalize protocol negotiation (#3352)
* feat(extensions)!: normalize protocol negotiation Closes #3057 Introduce a shared extension handshake, enforce protocol and capability compatibility across extension families, and expose immutable negotiated snapshots through gateway info and the Go SDK. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(credentials): fail fast on negotiation errors Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(extensions): validate gateway handshake metadata Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(go-sdk): re-export extension kind constants Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(extensions): fail fast on credential handshake rejection Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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dee4f98dda |
chore(vm): refresh runtime defaults and hardening (#3446)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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17ce738bfb |
fix(ci)!: remove gateway callback listener dependency (#3365)
* fix(ci): repair post-merge release canary Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(packaging): bootstrap canary runtime prerequisites Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(canary): collect macOS VM diagnostics Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(canary): pin libkrun-compatible macOS runner Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(canary): limit macOS smoke test to package startup Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute)!: remove gateway callback listeners Run Docker supervisors on host networking so they use the operator-configured primary gateway endpoint. Remove the unused compute-driver callback listener negotiation and listener-scoped routing machinery. BREAKING CHANGE: The ComputeDriver API no longer exposes GetGatewayListenerRequirements or GatewayListenerRequirement. External drivers must regenerate bindings and connect supervisors to the configured primary gateway endpoint. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use sandbox runtime image in launcher Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(podman): exercise production endpoint selection Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): route supervisors to reachable gateways Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): align Podman endpoint fixtures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve host aliases for supervisors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): align sandbox host gateway pin Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): address Docker fixtures by bridge IP Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): serialize sandbox lifecycle cases Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): host Docker TCP fixture with gateway Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): use loopback for host-network supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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0fd3385726 |
fix(container): use distroless Debian 13 for supervisor (#3393)
* fix(container): use distroless Debian 13 for supervisor Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(docker): preserve supervisor bootstrap ownership Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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c1f2e7189f |
feat(isolation): implement the RFC 0012 sandbox architecture (#2942)
* feat(isolation): add RFC 0012 backend contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(isolation): name the interface crate explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): expose trusted host gateway Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(agents): inventory the MXC driver Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add mediated DNS transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): tighten interface error and digest contracts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): remove unrelated driver inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): define capability-free launch contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): seal confirmed boundary state Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate confirmation for external backend implementations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): clarify mediated DNS identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): unify typed network mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): bind launches to sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): initialize extended sandbox status Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add boundary protocol and Linux primitives Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden signals and separate process status from transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate remote confirmation through public contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate wire state and propagate snapshot failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(isolation): import owned agent specification explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): describe mediated DNS channel Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): bound mediation attach without nested retries Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add transport-neutral session authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): separate sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime boundary controls Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add terminal boundary operation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): split supervisor and sandbox runtimes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden boundary isolation and lifecycle ownership Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reject private root redirects and adopt typed errors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve accept thread ownership on musl Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): isolate credential probes from filtered threads Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): return retained exec exit status to independent waiters Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound network mediation and preserve socket authorization Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound control admission and retire stale mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): select migrated drivers per stack layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): implement loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): authenticate the Sandbox Protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): consume dedicated backend crate Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): align topology session fixture Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): align projected bootstrap bundle Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): validate refreshed credentials before rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): fail closed across supervisor disconnects Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): repair rebased sandbox CI Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * build(runtime): publish separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(config): configure the sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate sandbox binary linkage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): use backend and runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): use a scratch runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): refresh schema and dependency policy Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bind reconnects to supervisor process Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: align runtime split operational guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(security): document Kubernetes runtime RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): enforce runtime lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): identify sandbox start generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(server): restore sandbox launch sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): support authenticated runtime replacement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): bind sandbox session successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): retry pending sandbox successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(vm): run the supervisor outside the guest workload Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): use unified build toolchain Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): own guest network bootstrap Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): expose guest init version Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): select native supervisor artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): guard guest init Linux symbols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): scope Linux test imports Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): avoid guest interface casts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): reconcile admitted sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): share resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): surface host supervisor failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): include guest logs on supervisor exit Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate and clean runtime generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): keep shared paths in the base layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): isolate workloads behind the host supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve host gateway alias resolution Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): use separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): restore startup validation after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): narrow supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): close companion isolation gaps Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): align mediated network expectations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): exercise mediated network paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): attach supervisor to managed network Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): defer supervisor recovery until gateway is ready Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve workloads during session rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): remove unrelated configuration RFC changes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): add proxy-pod isolation topology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): use stable sandbox service authority Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): adapt proxy pods to current runtime APIs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): describe the single runtime placement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): simplify sandbox orchestration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): validate deployment prerequisites Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): update Trivy Helm profile inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(kubernetes): update Trivy scan inventory count Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): reuse preloaded runtime images in e2e Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): type and clean runtime resources Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): make sandbox restarts recoverable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve supervisor egress Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): adopt isolated sandbox and supervisor containers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): stage bootstrap archives at named volume destinations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provision supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): address isolation review findings Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): inspect Debian supervisor provenance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): use libpod-compatible tmpfs options Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind verified sandbox runtime binary Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provide external driver data directory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): start sandbox before joining user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): separate supervisor user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * perf(isolation): add TCP and DNS benchmark harnesses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): align benchmark timing and supported protocols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): report TCP benchmark metrics accurately Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): cancel failed worker startup Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): build matching local supervisor image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make local sandbox smoke test runnable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): wire local sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): narrow sandbox service RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate split runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime session handling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): add standalone network proxy role Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): remove implementation companion notes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): standardize runtime release name Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): pin renamed runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): persist sandbox runtime identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(runtime): restore branch validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): reconcile main after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(network): close unframed HTTP 1.0 responses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(isolation): preserve upstream OCSF updates Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(security): close credential and TLS replay paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): make sandbox refresh retries idempotent Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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02b664bb0d |
refactor(config): normalize and enforce gateway schema v2 (#2814)
* refactor(config): normalize compute driver field names Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * refactor(config): introduce canonical gateway fields Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * refactor(config): enforce gateway schema version 2 Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): preserve compute driver runtime guarantees Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): address schema v2 review regressions Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): complete schema v2 migration safeguards Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(config): expand schema v2 regression coverage Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(config): add schema v2 parity manifest Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): correct parity manifest inventory Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs(config): record schema v2 intentional changes Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs(config): disposition schema v2 parity gaps Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): add dual schema parity harness Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): establish compute lifecycle parity baseline Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): preserve gateway option compatibility Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): record gateway option parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs(config): close gateway-wide parity gaps Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(podman): apply configured pids limit Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): validate Podman option parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): add Kubernetes option parity harness Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): record Kubernetes option parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): disposition VM parity lanes Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): add external driver parity lane Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): preserve external driver pull policy Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): attest parity artifacts and launches Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): require clean parity build sources Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): bind parity runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): use isolated supervisor tags Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): qualify parity image tags Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): serve parity supervisor locally Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): isolate parity podman services Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): harden parity evidence provenance Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): pin parity sandbox artifacts Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): attest parity runtime inputs Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): bind parity runtime evidence Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): record compute boundary parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): disposition cross-cutting parity lanes Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(packaging): preflight gateway config upgrades Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): preserve rebase integration guarantees Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(ci): isolate temporary git signing config Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): update remaining schema v2 consumers Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(ci): provide e2fs tools to VM tests Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): align preflight with gateway startup Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(vm): preserve rootfs tar configuration Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * chore(config): adopt duration unit constructors Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(packaging): preflight RPM gateway config Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): address driver review findings Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): require fresh semantic parity evidence Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(docker): update tests for renamed sandbox label Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(gateway): preserve selective driver coverage after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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38f2aef930 |
feat(gateway): support selective compute driver builds (#3118)
* feat(gateway): support selective compute driver builds Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(gateway): support selective Windows MXC builds Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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f4dc6be4b2 |
refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes (#3195)
* refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes Closes #3172 Remove the inference route control plane, inference.local data path, built-in router crate, and SDK surface. Move inference workloads to explicitly imported provider profiles and native endpoints, with migration cleanup and updated tests and documentation. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve alternate upstream isolation Restore the provider policy activation guard so legacy OpenAI and Anthropic providers configured for alternate base URLs do not grant egress to the built-in public vendor endpoints. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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8af79a7f4b |
fix(podman): resolve macOS Podman socket dynamically (#3135)
* docs(podman): document macOS socket path mismatch and dynamic lookup On macOS, Homebrew-installed Podman does not create the default socket path that the Podman driver probes. Document the OPENSHELL_PODMAN_SOCKET override and the podman machine inspect lookup in both the compute drivers reference and the debug-openshell-cluster skill. Fixes #1690 Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * fix(podman): resolve macOS Podman socket dynamically Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * chore: restore debug skill file Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * chore: drop legacy debug skill path Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * fix(podman): trim unrelated e2e changes Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): harden shell array expansion Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * chore: remove unrelated skill note * ci: retrigger checks Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> |
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6e6b3c8905 |
refactor(cli): remove local Dockerfile image builds (#3214)
Signed-off-by: Evie Howard <evhoward@redhat.com> |
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1510e2c5a7 |
feat(compute): advertise resource capabilities (#3010)
* refactor(driver-docker): group runtime GPU capabilities Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): advertise resource capabilities Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(compute): describe resource capabilities Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(server): satisfy resource capability clippy lint Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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857af42a16 |
feat(vm): support corporate HTTP forward proxy egress for microVM sandboxes (#3090)
* feat(vm): support corporate HTTP forward proxy egress for microVM sandboxes The corporate forward proxy machinery from #1792 is driver-agnostic and already merged: openshell-supervisor-network implements CONNECT chaining, NO_PROXY matching, credentials, https:// proxies and corporate CA trust, and openshell-sandbox exposes it as six argv-only flags. Podman gained the driver half in #2245/#2512 and Kubernetes in #2633; the VM driver had none of it, so VM sandboxes on proxy-only networks could not reach any destination requiring the proxy even when policy allowed it. The blocking piece was not proxy logic but delivery: the VM guest init script runs as PID 1 and execs a fixed supervisor command line, and libkrun's krun_set_exec receives an empty argv, so there was no channel for driver-owned supervisor arguments. The supervisor's proxy flags deliberately have no environment fallback, and build_guest_environment merges user-supplied environment, so the guest env is not a safe transport either. Add a driver-authored argument file, mirroring the existing init.d manifest: the driver writes /opt/openshell/supervisor-args into the overlay upperdir on every launch and the guest reads it verbatim, one argument per line, appending it to every supervisor exec. It is written even when empty, which is what makes the channel unforgeable -- the upperdir always shadows the read-only image layer, so an image can neither supply its own arguments nor disable the operator's by omitting the file. Because both launch backends exec the same init script, this covers libkrun and QEMU without touching either. A microVM has no bind mounts or container secrets, so the credential and CA bundle are staged into the per-sandbox overlay the way the gateway JWT already is: credential root-only at 0600, CA at 0644, both rewritten every launch so a removed setting clears prior material, and both deleted with the sandbox state directory. This places the credential at rest in the overlay image on the gateway host, which differs from the Podman secret model and is documented as an explicit security consideration. Validation is fail-closed and shared: a new openshell_core::driver_utils::validate_upstream_proxy_settings holds the pairing rules the Podman driver established, and both the gateway and the driver call it so an invalid table names the offending key instead of surfacing as an opaque driver-readiness timeout. Guest egress leaves through gvproxy, so a proxy on the gateway host's loopback is reachable only through host.openshell.internal; the guest to gateway callback is unaffected. Closes #3088 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): bound the proxy CA read and scope the host-loopback recipe Two review findings on the corporate forward proxy support for microVM sandboxes. The driver read the operator's proxy_ca_bundle with an unbounded fs::read and accepted it on a substring match for the PEM BEGIN CERTIFICATE marker. A special file such as /dev/zero therefore grew driver memory without bound on every authorized sandbox create, and a PEM block holding invalid DER passed the host check but contributes no trust anchor in the guest, so every supervisor would fail after boot with an error attributed to the sandbox rather than to the setting. Move the read into openshell-core as read_upstream_proxy_ca_bundle_file: it reuses the credential reader's bounded-read path (non-regular files rejected on fstat, size capped, read bounded even if the file grows), then requires at least one anchor that RootCertStore::add_parsable_certificates accepts. The supervisor's own reader now delegates to it, so host acceptance and guest acceptance are the same function and cannot drift. The published host-loopback recipe was written for libkrun only. gvproxy NATs host.openshell.internal to the gateway host's 127.0.0.1, but GPU sandboxes run on the QEMU/TAP backend where that name resolves to the TAP host address and the driver's own nftables input chain accepts only the gateway port from the guest — no proxy on the gateway host is reachable there at any bind address, so an operator following the generic recipe lost all proxy-required egress while configuration validation succeeded. Scope the recipe to libkrun in every reference and reject a gateway-host proxy URL when a launch plan resolves to QEMU, naming the reason, instead of booting a sandbox whose policy-approved CONNECTs all time out. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): match the QEMU proxy preflight to the selected TAP host The gateway-host proxy guard added for the QEMU/TAP backend classified the wrong set of addresses in both directions. It ran at the top of configure_qemu_launch_plan, before the subnet allocation that settles plan.host_ip, so it could not compare against the address the guest actually reaches the host on. An operator pointing https_proxy at the sandbox's own TAP host address, such as 10.0.128.1, passed the check, and the driver's nftables input chain — which accepts only the gateway port from the guest — then dropped every policy-approved CONNECT, which is exactly the silent timeout the guard exists to prevent. In the other direction it rejected 192.168.127.254 unconditionally. That address is special only to libkrun/gvproxy; on QEMU/TAP it is an ordinary address that may be routable through the guest's masqueraded egress, so the guard refused a working configuration. Run the check after the launch plan's network allocation, on both the freshly-allocated and already-complete paths, and compare IP literals with that sandbox's selected TAP host. Loopback literals, localhost, and the documented host aliases that write_host_gateway_aliases seeds to the TAP host still classify as the gateway host, and the failure names the address. The gvproxy host-loopback constant returns to being a documentation anchor. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> |
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9ca19e6c80 |
refactor(compute): decouple gateway driver composition (#2823)
* refactor(compute): decouple gateway driver composition Move first-party composition and VM process ownership into openshell-gateway, leaving openshell-server backend-independent. Update packaging and build references with the new crate, simplify the compiled-driver boundary, and keep the driver-free gateway path buildable with bundled Z3 tooling. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(telemetry): bound compute driver categories Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(core): keep runtime transport generic Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): complete server driver decoupling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): preserve driver integrations after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(compute): preserve docker tracing after decoupling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(compute): preserve driver behavior after extraction Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): remove MXC policy side channel Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): separate policy delivery from readiness Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> |
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5c541e1e0e |
fix(kubernetes): prevent stop-start relay race (#3064)
Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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9b6d904e88 |
feat(compute): delegate sandbox authentication to drivers (#2968)
* feat(compute): delegate sandbox authentication to drivers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(kubernetes): align sandbox identity annotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * test(auth): restore sandbox bootstrap coverage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(kubernetes): satisfy ownership test lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> |
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69a05ebb3b | fix(sandbox): complete successful main processes (#2884) | ||
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4e992093f8 |
fix(docker): trace standalone driver over OTLP (#2923)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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ef296806f5 |
feat(sandbox): add canonical main process (#2726)
* feat(sandbox): add canonical main process Closes #2710 Persist and supervise one canonical workload per sandbox, attach sandbox connect to its retained session, and make every unexpected main-process exit terminal. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sandbox): simplify canonical main process contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve legacy VM main compatibility Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve main status across driver updates Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy macOS process lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): gate Linux exit acknowledgement publisher Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): simplify main process plumbing Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): make controlling tty ioctl portable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): initialize canonical process environment Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * perf(supervisor): optimize retained main session Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sandbox): detach main session on ctrl-c Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): use explicit main detach keys Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(dev): atomically stage Docker supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(test): align Docker main environment assertion Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sdk): expose canonical main process fields Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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4c5fce6e59 |
refactor(compute): support external driver parity (#2744)
* refactor(compute): negotiate external driver behavior Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(compute): revert external driver documentation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): negotiate gateway-managed lifecycle Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): remove driver feature negotiation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): let drivers declare gateway lifecycle Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): clarify lifecycle ownership Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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7909fb5d0f |
refactor(compute): unify gateway restart reconciliation (#2743)
* refactor(compute): unify gateway restart reconciliation Remove the Docker-specific gateway shutdown cleanup and reconcile persisted running intent through ComputeDriver::StartSandbox for Docker, Podman, and VM drivers. Explicitly stopped sandboxes remain stopped. Refs #2417 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): stop local sandboxes on shutdown Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): match managed Podman containers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): synchronize lifecycle sweeps Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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998db04780 |
feat(policy): allow non-root sandbox identities (#2785)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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59479f492a |
feat(k8s): add namespace-per-workspace support (RFC 0011 Phase 3) (#2656)
* feat(k8s): add namespace-per-workspace support (RFC 0011 Phase 3) Implement three workspace namespace modes for the Kubernetes compute driver: shared (default, preserves current single-namespace behavior), managed (auto-creates/deletes namespaces per workspace), and operator (pre-provisioned namespaces with dynamic discovery via label selector or drop-in allowlist file). Key changes: - WorkspaceMode enum and namespace resolution in driver config - Managed namespace lifecycle with ServiceAccount and OpenShift SCC annotation propagation - Cluster-wide sandbox CR watchers for managed/operator modes - NamespaceValidator (Exact/Prefix/Allowlist) for SA token auth - Workspace-aware credential secret storage - Helm ClusterRole for multi-namespace RBAC - Gateway config, architecture, and reference docs Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): add e2e tests for workspace namespace modes Add end-to-end tests for managed and operator workspace modes introduced in RFC 0011 Phase 3. The managed mode tests verify namespace creation with correct labels, ServiceAccount provisioning, sandbox CR placement, and namespace survival with remaining sandboxes. The operator mode tests verify rejection of unlabeled and nonexistent namespaces. The positive operator path (sandbox in labeled namespace) is known to fail due to an RBAC gap and will be addressed separately. Also fixes Helm 4 compatibility: move SPDX license headers inside conditional guards in 8 chart templates to prevent empty comment-only documents, and fix a trailing whitespace trimmer in clusterrole.yaml that concatenated the license header with apiVersion. Adds cleanup sweep in with-kube-gateway.sh to remove managed and operator namespaces before Helm uninstall, and mise tasks for running each mode independently. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(k8s): add operator namespace label watcher Spawn a background kube::runtime::watcher in the K8s driver that watches namespaces matching the configured label selector and populates the OperatorNamespaceAllowlist at runtime. The driver owns the allowlist and exposes its Arc so the server can share the same set with the SA token authenticator. create_sandbox now gates pod creation on the allowlist in operator mode — workspaces whose namespace is not yet labeled are rejected at resource render time rather than silently proceeding. Workspace lifecycle itself is unaffected; only sandbox (resource) creation is gated. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): harden operator mode and address review findings Close the fail-open gap in operator mode when only operator_namespace_file is configured: the allowlist is now created unconditionally in operator mode (fail-closed from startup). Implement the namespace file watcher using the notify crate, following the TLS hot-reload pattern (parent-directory watch, 1s debounce, ConfigMap symlink-swap safe). The file format is a JSON array of namespace name strings. Additional fixes from the 10-reviewer audit: - Change allowlist rejection from InvalidArgument to FailedPrecondition so callers know the request may succeed later once the namespace is provisioned. - NamespaceValidator::Allowlist now holds the OperatorNamespaceAllowlist newtype instead of a raw Arc<RwLock<BTreeSet>>, eliminating silent denial on RwLock poison. - Verify LABEL_MANAGED_BY and LABEL_GATEWAY_ID ownership before deleting a managed namespace. - Replace fixed 5s sleep in operator e2e test with a 30s poll loop. - Add Helm validation for workspaceMode values. - Fix Helm README type column and description for operator fields. - Add insert/remove methods to OperatorNamespaceAllowlist; label watcher now uses them instead of reaching through shared(). - Reject configs with both operator_namespace_label and operator_namespace_file set. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(k8s): add workspace-level compute driver RPCs and harden RBAC Decouple namespace lifecycle from sandbox lifecycle by adding EnsureWorkspace/DeleteWorkspace RPCs to the ComputeDriver service. Namespace creation now happens before credential storage and namespace deletion happens on workspace delete, fixing credential storage in managed workspace mode. - Add EnsureWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace proto RPCs with implementations across all compute drivers (K8s managed delegates to ensure_namespace/delete_namespace_if_empty; others no-op) - Wire ensure_workspace into provider create/update/refresh paths so the namespace exists before the credential driver writes secrets - Wire delete_workspace into workspace deletion for cleanup - Remove delete_namespace_if_empty from sandbox deletion path - Scope ClusterRole secrets access to non-shared workspace modes - Add TODO for TLS cert hot-reload in sandbox gRPC client - Harden e2e tests with control-plane sandbox resolution assertions - Fix docker image save --platform flag for OCI index manifests Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address re-review findings and add test coverage - Use server-side apply for TLS secret sync (fixes second sandbox creation failure when TLS is enabled) - Scope gateway-ID label selector unconditionally across all workspace modes (fixes operator reads/watches/deletes seeing foreign sandboxes) - Validate operator allowlist in EnsureWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace RPCs (prevents credential writes to namespaces outside the allowlist) - Extend ClusterRole secrets patch+delete to all non-shared modes with credential driver enabled (fixes operator credential storage RBAC) - Validate namespace ownership on 409 conflict in ensure_namespace (prevents adopting unowned namespaces in managed mode) - Replace delete_namespace_if_empty with unconditional delete_namespace letting Kubernetes cascade cleanup (fixes stuck terminating CRs) - Strengthen NetworkPolicy TODO to cover both managed and operator modes - Extract selector and ownership logic into testable free functions - Add unit tests for gateway-ID selectors and namespace ownership - Add Helm ClusterRole RBAC tests for operator credential driver Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * ci(k8s): add workspace managed and operator mode e2e to CI Wire the existing e2e:kubernetes:workspace-managed and e2e:kubernetes:workspace-operator mise tasks into the branch-e2e workflow so they run alongside the other core Kubernetes e2e suites. Both are gated by run_core_e2e and included in the Core E2E result gate. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): add e2e tests for workspace namespace modes Add 7 new e2e tests covering workspace namespace lifecycle, TLS secret copying, ownership conflict detection, DNS-1123 validation, operator namespace preservation, and dynamic label watcher behavior. Fix async sandbox deletion race condition in existing tests by polling sandbox list instead of asserting immediately after delete. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): grant secrets/patch unconditionally and backfill gateway-id labels Address two review findings: 1. RBAC: server-side apply (PATCH) is used for TLS secret sync in multi-namespace modes, but the ClusterRole only granted patch when the kubernetes-secrets credential driver was enabled. Grant patch unconditionally for non-shared modes since TLS sync always needs it; keep delete gated on the credential driver. 2. Upgrade safety: the new gateway-id label selector would orphan legacy Sandbox CRs that predate its introduction. Add a startup backfill in shared mode that patches any managed Sandbox CR missing the gateway-id label before the driver begins serving requests. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address workspace namespace review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address follow-up review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): preserve workspace lookup after rebase Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(helm): allow managed secret creation Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): stop pods in workspace namespace Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): scope pod deletion check to v1alpha1 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address workspace namespace review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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f12f3ef8d5 |
fix(macos): restore Homebrew sandbox callbacks (#2739)
* fix(macos): restore Docker gateway callbacks Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(gateway): reuse reachable primary callback listener Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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d0c6dc3fd8 |
feat(kubernetes): support corporate upstream proxy (#2633)
* feat(kubernetes): support corporate upstream proxy Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> * fix(kubernetes): reject proxy_auth_secret_key values Kubernetes cannot create Gateway validation accepted proxy_auth_secret_key values that Kubernetes rejects when creating the Secret (keys longer than 253 bytes, or the reserved "."/".." names), turning an invalid deployment setting into repeated sandbox Pod-provisioning failures instead of a startup error. Reject them in validate_upstream_proxy_config so they fail closed at gateway startup. Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> * docs(skill): add corporate upstream proxy checks to debug-openshell-cluster Add a Kubernetes corporate upstream proxy troubleshooting section covering rendered [openshell.drivers.kubernetes] configuration, credential Secret volume events, supervisor arguments and mounts confined to the network- supervising container, and proxy reachability. Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> --------- Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> |
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0f8fad23c4 |
feat(sandbox): add stop and start operations (#2653)
* feat(sandbox): add suspend and resume operations Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): preserve lifecycle work after cancellation Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): reconcile ambiguous lifecycle outcomes Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): complete suspended session cleanup Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(vm): preserve suspension state on resume failure Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): retry retained lifecycle transitions Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): clean sessions after suspend reconciliation Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover deleting suspended sandbox Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve progressing sandbox suspension Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): bound suspend status polling Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): detect legacy sandbox suspension Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(tui): render suspended sandbox phases Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * refactor(sandbox): rename suspend and resume lifecycle Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * perf(server): clean stopped sessions on transition Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): fail fast on rejected stop Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(compute): fence stale restart lifecycle events Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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4cb77a900e |
fix(e2e): separate Podman Machine loopback listeners (#2622)
* fix(e2e): separate Podman Machine loopback listeners Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): remove shallow harness checks Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(e2e): trim Podman listener workaround Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): bypass proxies for Podman health probe Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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537805568d |
feat(sandbox): honor OCI image working directories (#2530)
* feat(sandbox): honor Docker OCI working directories Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): honor effective workspace access Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): cover enforced workspace denial Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * docs(docker): explain effective workdir checks Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): validate effective workspace writes Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reserve supervisor control roots Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): centralize control paths Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reserve OCI runtime mount roots Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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d220d89468 |
feat(compute): negotiate gateway callback listeners (#2492)
* feat(compute): query gateway listener requirements Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): add Podman listener requirements Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(docker): use default gateway bind address Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(gateway): avoid wildcard primary listener Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): validate callback listener discovery Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(server): support split dual-stack listeners Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): support legacy rootless listener discovery Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): accept loopback plaintext rejection Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(agent): add callback listener diagnostics Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(server): restrict compute callback listeners Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): validate local callback port Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(server): clarify callback listener contract Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): require pasta for local callbacks Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(gateway): document RPM listener default Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(server): keep listener provenance diagnostic-only Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): preserve callback listener isolation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): remove Podman callback relay Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(packaging): preserve Podman callback loopback Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): run VM smoke on nested-virt runner Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): gate VM smoke on usable KVM Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): probe KVM through VM driver Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): tolerate hosted KVM denial Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(server): close traced futures before assertions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * revert: remove tracing test stabilization Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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bc14018cad |
feat(sandbox): use policy-first OCI image identity (#2509)
* feat(sandbox): use policy-first OCI image identity Closes #2331 Preserve per-field policy omission, derive Docker and Podman fallbacks from the inspected immutable image, and resolve the final numeric identity before starting agent children. Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve declared process identities Keep explicit policy values and OCI-declared names intact, defer passwd lookup until a primary GID is required, and refresh stale policy examples. Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): reuse resolved OCI identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): allow Linux pre-exec arguments Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): protect resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): prepare workspace for OCI identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): own only workspace root Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden partial identity drops Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): scope OCI image e2e to Docker Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): narrow OCI identity fallback scope Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(podman): cover OCI identity launch Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): exercise OCI fallback in E2E Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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7955c8309b |
feat(k8s): support configuring workspace PVC storageClassName (#2463)
The Kubernetes driver's default workspace PVC never set storageClassName, so on clusters with no default StorageClass the PVC stayed Pending and sandbox creation failed. Add a workspace_storage_class option to KubernetesComputeConfig, wired through SandboxPodParams into the generated volumeClaimTemplates. When non-empty it sets storageClassName; empty preserves the current behavior of relying on the cluster default StorageClass. Expose it via the OPENSHELL_K8S_WORKSPACE_STORAGE_CLASS env var on both the standalone driver and the embedded gateway runtime defaults, and via the server.workspaceStorageClass Helm value. Closes #2442 Signed-off-by: lr90 <qiuweimin@matrixorigin.cn> |
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f00ad23a26 |
fix(podman): tolerate shutdown transport closes (#2498)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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77e5c32217 |
feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy (#2245)
* feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy - Chain sandbox egress through a corporate HTTP proxy so outbound traffic from within the sandbox respects the host proxy settings - Forward sandbox proxy environment variables to the generated Podman config so the proxy is applied consistently to Podman-managed workloads Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): make corporate proxy routing operator-owned The operator-configured corporate egress proxy was injected under the conventional HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY names as defaults beneath sandbox spec/template environment, so a sandbox creator could redirect egress at an arbitrary proxy or disable proxying with NO_PROXY=*. Route the boundary through reserved, supervisor-only variables (OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY) written in the Podman driver's required-variable tier. Any sandbox-supplied value under a reserved name is stripped before the operator value is applied, so the supervisor never observes a reserved proxy variable the operator did not set. The supervisor now reads only the reserved names and ignores the conventional proxy variables the sandbox controls. Add the reserved proxy variables to the supervisor-only child-environment denylist so the corporate proxy URL and any embedded credentials are not inherited by the sandbox workload, which reaches egress through the local policy proxy and never needs them. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * feat(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy credentials via secret file Proxy credentials were embedded inline in the proxy URL, so they were stored in gateway.toml and exposed in container metadata via 'podman inspect'. Reject inline 'user:pass@' credentials in https_proxy/http_proxy at startup (parsed with the url crate rather than hand-splitting), and add a proxy_auth_file option pointing at a 'user:pass' file. The driver stages that file as a per-sandbox root-only Podman secret, mounts it at a fixed path, and exports only the path in the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_FILE variable, so the credential never appears in config, environment, or container metadata. Reading the file fails closed on a missing, empty, or control-character-bearing value. The supervisor reads the credential from the mounted file and builds the Proxy-Authorization: Basic header, rejecting control characters, and no longer derives credentials from URL userinfo. The auth-file path is added to the child-environment strip list, and the generated gateway.toml is written owner-only (mode 0600). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fail closed on invalid upstream proxy configuration The reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* variables are an operator-owned egress boundary, but the supervisor treated present-but-invalid values as unset: an unsupported or malformed proxy URL was ignored with a warning, an unreadable auth file proceeded without credentials, and a malformed credential silently became unauthenticated. Any of these could quietly downgrade the corporate proxy boundary to direct dialing or unauthenticated proxy access. Make every configured-but-invalid proxy or auth setting fatal to supervisor proxy startup, emit an OCSF ConfigStateChange failure event before refusing, and share URL validation semantics between the Podman driver and the supervisor through a single validator in openshell-core (parse_upstream_proxy_url), so a value accepted at sandbox-create time can never be rejected in-container or vice versa. Inline user:pass@ URL credentials are now fatal in the supervisor too (previously warn-and-strip), matching the driver. Unset or empty variables still mean no proxy; only present-but-invalid values fail. Error paths never include credential content. Addresses the fail-closed review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): finish the fail-closed upstream proxy credential contract The upstream proxy URL already had a single shared validator, but the credential did not: the Podman driver rejected only CR/LF/NUL while the supervisor rejected every control character, so a credential accepted at sandbox-create time (e.g. one containing a tab) could still be rejected in-container. Present-but-whitespace reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* values were also silently treated as unset, quietly downgrading the operator's egress boundary to direct dialing. Add parse_upstream_proxy_credential to openshell-core as the single source of truth for the documented user:pass credential form (non-empty user, no control characters, trimmed) and use it in both the Podman driver's secret staging and the supervisor's Proxy-Authorization header construction. Error variants carry no payload so credential content can never leak into messages. Make a present-but-empty reserved variable fatal to supervisor proxy startup instead of meaning "unset"; only fully unset variables disable the proxy. The driver correspondingly rejects an empty no_proxy at config time so it can never inject a value the supervisor refuses. Addresses the remaining fail-closed credential/config review item on Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> #2245. * fix(sandbox,podman): close remaining fail-open upstream proxy config paths Two configuration paths could still silently run without the proxy boundary the operator believed was in effect. A no_proxy bypass list configured without any https_proxy/http_proxy was accepted by both the driver and the supervisor and simply meant "dial everything directly". Reject it on both sides, exactly like the existing proxy_auth_file-without-proxy rule: an operator who wrote a bypass list assumed proxying was active, so accepting it hides a fail-open state. The gateway.sh dev script guarded proxy settings with [[ -n "${VAR:-}" ]], which conflates unset with explicitly-empty and dropped the latter before the gateway's validation could see it. Use ${VAR+x} instead so a set-but-empty variable is written into gateway.toml and rejected at startup by validate_proxy_config rather than silently discarded. Addresses the remaining fail-open configuration review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject upstream proxy URLs with path, query, or fragment parse_upstream_proxy_url accepted URLs like http://proxy.corp.com:8080/some/path and silently discarded everything after host:port, a lenience inherited from the original supervisor parser. A forward proxy is addressed by host:port only, so extra components indicate a misconfiguration (for example a pasted endpoint URL) and silently truncating them violates the present-but-invalid-is-fatal contract enforced everywhere else in this configuration surface. Reject a path, query, or fragment in the shared validator with a new UnexpectedComponent error. A bare trailing slash remains accepted because the url crate normalizes an absent http path to "/", making the two indistinguishable. Both the Podman driver (gateway startup) and the supervisor (sandbox startup) inherit the rule through the shared parser, keeping their semantics identical by construction. Addresses the proxy URL component review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): remove plain-HTTP upstream proxy support The http_proxy path tunneled plain-HTTP requests through the corporate proxy with CONNECT to port 80 and then sent origin-form requests down the tunnel. Conventional enterprise forward proxies expect plain HTTP as absolute-form requests sent directly over the proxy connection, and commonly refuse CONNECT to port 80, so the setting looked supported but failed against typical deployments. Tunneling also blinds the proxy to the one protocol it could inspect. Narrow the feature to TLS (CONNECT) egress only, which is the conventional and already-correct case: plain-HTTP requests now always dial the destination directly, and only client CONNECT tunnels chain through the corporate proxy. Remove the http_proxy config field, the --sandbox-http-proxy / OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_HTTP_PROXY driver surface, the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTP_PROXY variable, and the UpstreamScheme plumbing. The feature never shipped, so this is a clean removal; a stray http_proxy key in gateway.toml still fails loudly through the config's deny_unknown_fields. Removing the plain-HTTP proxy branch also removes its host-gateway special case; the architecture doc now documents the real host-gateway behavior (add driver-injected host aliases to the reserved NO_PROXY list) instead of an invariant the HTTPS path never implemented. Plain-HTTP forwarding through a corporate proxy can return later as absolute-form forwarding behind its own design review. Addresses the plain-HTTP forwarding review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): escape generated TOML and require explicit proxy URL form Escape backslashes, quotes, and control characters when gateway.sh writes proxy values into gateway.toml, so a hostile or unusual environment value cannot corrupt the config or inject extra keys. Restrict the upstream proxy URL grammar to the documented http://host:port form: a scheme-less value is no longer normalized to http:// and a missing port is no longer silently defaulted to 80. Docs, README, and CLI help now state the explicit-form requirement consistently. Also fix a test-only call of handle_tcp_connection that was missing the upstream_proxy argument added in an earlier commit. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): preserve tunneled bytes read with the CONNECT response The CONNECT handshake reads the corporate proxy's response in chunks, so the read that completes the header block can also contain the first tunneled payload bytes. Those bytes were discarded, silently corrupting the start of the tunnel for server-speaks-first destinations or proxies that coalesce writes. connect_via now returns a PrefixedStream that replays any bytes received past the response terminator before reading from the socket again; writes pass through unchanged. Direct dials wrap the stream with an empty prefix so downstream relay and TLS paths keep a single stream type, and tls_connect_upstream is generalized to any AsyncRead + AsyncWrite stream. Adds regression coverage for a combined response/payload read and for prefix replay ordering. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): gate cleartext proxy Basic auth behind an explicit opt-in Proxy-Authorization: Basic is base64 over the plain-TCP connection to the http:// corporate proxy, so anyone on the network path between the sandbox host and the proxy can recover the credential. Sending it is now an explicit operator decision instead of an implicit side effect of configuring proxy_auth_file. Add a proxy_auth_allow_insecure driver setting (CLI --sandbox-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE), delivered to the supervisor as the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE variable. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: an auth file without the acknowledgement is rejected at gateway startup and at supervisor startup, as is the acknowledgement without an auth file or any value other than 'true'. gateway.sh writes the key only as a TOML boolean; a non-boolean value is emitted as a quoted string so the gateway rejects it at startup instead of risking injection. Documents the exposure prominently in the gateway config reference, the driver README, and the sandbox architecture doc. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): honor port qualifiers and resolved addresses in NO_PROXY Two divergences from the documented NO_PROXY contract: - A port-qualified entry (internal.corp:8443) was silently stripped to its hostname and bypassed the proxy for every port, excluding traffic the operator never listed. Entries now keep the optional :port qualifier (also on IP and CIDR entries) and only apply to that destination port; a trailing qualifier that is not a valid port stays part of the pattern instead of widening the entry. - IP and CIDR entries only matched IP-literal hosts, so a bypass like 10.0.0.0/8 never applied to hostnames resolving into that range. NO_PROXY evaluation now sees the validated resolved addresses: an IP/CIDR entry matching through resolution authorizes a direct dial of only the addresses it contains, so a bypass scoped to an internal range cannot widen into a direct dial of addresses outside it. Hostname-level matches (loopback, wildcard, domain entries, IP-literal hosts) keep authorizing all validated addresses. proxy_for is replaced by decision(host, port, resolved) returning either the proxy endpoint or the permitted direct-dial subset, and dial_upstream restricts the direct connect to that subset. Adds regression coverage for port-scoped bypasses on domain, IP, and CIDR entries, invalid port qualifiers, resolved-address matching, and split-resolution subset dialing. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bind proxied CONNECT tunnels to validated addresses The CONNECT request sent to the corporate proxy carried the destination hostname, so the proxy resolved the name itself and the addresses that had passed SSRF and allowed_ips validation were discarded. Split-horizon DNS or rebinding at the proxy could then reach internal or otherwise unapproved destinations through a tunnel the supervisor logged as validated, and IP-range policy could not be enforced at all on proxied dials. CONNECT now targets a validated resolved address by default: the proxy performs no DNS resolution and the tunnel stays bound to the answer the supervisor checked. The hostname still travels inside the tunnel (TLS SNI, application Host), so destination servers behave normally. In split-horizon networks, operators point the gateway host at the corporate resolver so internal names validate to their internal addresses. For proxies whose ACLs filter on hostnames and reject IP CONNECT targets, a new proxy_connect_by_hostname opt-in (CLI --sandbox-proxy-connect-by-hostname, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME, reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME) restores hostname CONNECT, documented as re-opening proxy-side resolution and making the proxy's ACLs the effective egress control. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: the opt-in without a proxy, or any value other than 'true', is fatal. Adds regression coverage for the IP CONNECT request line (including IPv6 bracketing and hostname non-leakage), the hostname opt-in, and the config pairing rules in driver and supervisor. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject empty port after bracketed IPv6 proxy host http://[fd00::1]: passed the explicit-port check because the bracketed branch only tested for a colon after the bracket, then fell back to port 80 — violating the fail-closed http://host:port contract and potentially sending configured Basic credentials to an unintended service. Require a non-empty suffix after ]:, matching the unbracketed branch, and cover the case in the shared parser tests. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fall back across validated addresses in proxied CONNECT The direct path hands TcpStream::connect the whole validated address list and it falls back across them, but the validated-IP CONNECT path attempted only the first address, so a dual-stack destination could fail through the corporate proxy even when a later validated address was reachable. connect_via_validated tries each validated address in order under one aggregate CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT budget, returning the first success; when every attempt fails the error names the attempt count and carries the last failure. An empty address list is rejected up front. Adds regressions for first-fails/second-succeeds fallback (asserting both CONNECT request lines), the aggregate all-addresses failure message, and the empty-list rejection. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): strip new reserved proxy vars and complete docs/tests Follow-ups from review: - Add OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE and OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME to the supervisor-only strip list so workload child processes never inherit them, matching the documented contract for the other reserved proxy variables, and cover both in the supervisor-only variable test. - Document all five OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_* proxy variables in the mise run gateway help text, marked Podman-only and stating the auth-file/acknowledgement pairing, and complete the gateway-key list in the Podman README. - Add NO_PROXY composition coverage for bracketed IPv6 entries with port qualifiers, bare IPv6 entries, and IPv6 CIDR matching against an IPv6-literal host and against a hostname's resolved addresses, including the port-qualified CIDR form. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): cap each proxied CONNECT attempt within the shared budget A proxy that accepted the first CONNECT request but never responded consumed the entire aggregate handshake timeout, so later validated addresses were never tried and the hang defeated the multi-address fallback. Each attempt is now time-boxed to its fair share of the time remaining before the shared deadline (remaining / attempts_left): a hanging attempt is cut off with enough budget left for every remaining address, while time a fast failure does not use rolls over to later attempts and the total never exceeds CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT. A timed-out attempt is recorded like any other failure, and the aggregate error distinguishes all-attempted from budget-exhausted runs. Adds a first-hangs/second-succeeds regression driven through a test-visible budget parameter so it runs in about a second instead of a real 30s window. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy config on the supervisor argv The proxy settings were injected as reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* container environment variables. The driver only wrote names the operator configured, but container runtimes layer the spec environment over ENV values baked into the sandbox image, so an image could supply NO_PROXY=*, enable hostname CONNECT, or point an unconfigured deployment at an attacker-controlled proxy whenever the operator left a field unset. The settings now travel as supervisor command-line arguments (--upstream-proxy, --upstream-no-proxy, --upstream-proxy-auth-file, --upstream-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, --upstream-proxy-connect-by-hostname) built by the driver from operator config. The driver sets the container entrypoint and command explicitly, so neither sandbox spec/template environment nor image ENV can influence argv, and an omitted flag genuinely means unconfigured — in every supervisor topology, since the supervisor no longer consults its environment for these settings at all. Credentials stay on the root-only secret mount; only the mount path appears on argv. The reserved environment names, their strip-list entries, and the env-based validation surface are removed. UpstreamProxyConfig::from_args replaces from_env, reusing the same shared fail-closed validation and pairing rules keyed by the CLI flag names. Driver tests now assert the argv contract, including that sandbox-supplied environment cannot add, remove, or redirect proxy flags; supervisor tests cover from_args mapping and its pairing rules. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs(sandbox): align proxy comments with the argv transport The argv migration left comments describing the configuration as reserved environment variables ("reserved value", "present-but-empty variable", "reserved upstream proxy variables"). Rephrase them as driver-supplied arguments and operator settings so the documented trust boundary matches the implementation. Comment-only change. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): parse bracketed IPv6 authorities in client CONNECT targets parse_target split the CONNECT authority at the first colon, so an IPv6-literal target like [2001:db8::1]:443 always failed port parsing and IPv6-literal clients could never reach policy evaluation; a regression test even locked in that failure. Parse the RFC 3986 bracketed form and return the host bracket-free, matching what DNS resolution, SSRF validation, NO_PROXY matching, and the upstream CONNECT builder expect. Unclosed brackets, a missing or empty port after the bracket, and non-numeric ports are rejected; unbracketed behavior is unchanged. Replaces the failure-locking test with success coverage for bracketed targets and adds malformed-bracket rejection cases. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover proxy-auth secret cleanup across lifecycle failures The per-sandbox proxy-auth credential secret is staged before the container is created and removed on cleanup, but no test proved the cleanup paths actually issue the secret removal. Add Podman-stub tests that drive create_sandbox to a container-create failure and to a start failure, and delete_sandbox for an out-of-band deletion, asserting each path issues the DELETE for the per-sandbox proxy-auth secret so a credential can never outlive the sandbox that owned it. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs: list corporate proxy keys in the Podman compute-driver overview The Fern Podman driver section enumerated its gateway.toml keys but omitted the corporate egress proxy settings. Add https_proxy, no_proxy, proxy_auth_file, proxy_auth_allow_insecure, and proxy_connect_by_hostname with a pointer to the gateway configuration reference for the full contract. No navigation change: the reference folder already includes the gateway configuration page. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover the SSRF-to-TLS composition across the proxy tunnel Existing tests exercised validated-IP CONNECT and the upstream-TLS helper independently, but not the full boundary. Add an end-to-end regression that stands up a fake corporate proxy tunneling to a fake TLS server and drives the real path: connect_via_validated CONNECTs to the validated address, the proxy splices the tunnel, and tls_connect_upstream verifies the upstream certificate against the original hostname carried in SNI. It asserts the CONNECT authority is the validated IP and never the hostname, that verification succeeds for the matching hostname, and that a mismatched hostname is rejected — proving a rebinding or split-horizon substitution behind the proxy cannot pass certificate verification. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bound proxy-auth reads, reject port 0, fix stale comment Three review findings: - CWE-400: the proxy-auth credential file was read with an unbounded read_to_string on both the driver (sandbox-create) and supervisor (startup) paths, so a huge file or a special file such as /dev/zero could exhaust memory. Add a shared bounded reader in openshell-core that rejects non-regular files, caps the size at 4 KiB, and reads at most that many bytes; the driver runs it via spawn_blocking. Covers oversized, special-file, and missing-path cases on both sides. - Reject an upstream proxy URL with port 0: it passed the explicit-port check and startup validation but is not a connectable TCP port, so every proxied dial would fail later. Add a typed ZeroPort error with shared-validator and Podman-config tests. - Reword a driver-config comment that still described a 'reserved variable' to match the argv transport. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): open proxy-auth file non-blocking to reject FIFOs promptly read_upstream_proxy_credential_file opened the path with a blocking File::open before the regular-file check, so a configured FIFO with no writer would block open() indefinitely — hanging sandbox creation on the driver and supervisor startup. Open with O_NONBLOCK on Unix so the open returns immediately, then reject the non-regular file as before; O_NONBLOCK has no effect on the later read of a regular file. Adds a mkfifo regression asserting the reader returns promptly with a non-regular-file error instead of hanging. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover corporate proxy egress across driver and supervisor The existing corporate-proxy tests construct config structs or call CONNECT helpers directly, so none of them detect a break in the wiring between layers: gateway TOML deserialization, the Podman argv and secret-mount semantics, supervisor CLI parsing, or policy denial before proxy contact. Add a Podman e2e that drives the whole chain against a fake authenticated forward proxy and asserts that an approved TLS request traverses it with a validated-IP CONNECT, a policy-denied destination is refused with 403 without ever reaching the proxy, credentials arrive through the mounted per-sandbox secret, and deleting the sandbox removes that secret. SupportContainer is a new harness fixture. Unlike ContainerHttpServer it probes readiness with a TCP connect rather than an HTTP GET, so it can host a forward proxy and TLS servers, and it exposes container logs and network IP for assertions. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): restart the gateway on the proxy-config panic path The panic cleanup for the temporary corporate proxy configuration restored the gateway TOML but left the gateway process running with the temporary configuration still loaded, which could poison later test binaries in the same run. Nothing restarted it: the only ManagedGateway is the short-lived one inside restart_gateway, and its Drop only calls start, which does not reload config for an already-running gateway. Restore and synchronously stop/start the gateway in Drop, and set restored only after the normal restore and restart both succeed so a failed restart no longer suppresses the fallback. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(supervisor-network): derive the loopback proxy bypass from resolved IPs The automatic bypass treated the host string "localhost" as proof that the destination was loopback and returned every resolved address. A sandbox controls its own /etc/hosts and resolve_socket_addrs consults it before DNS, so a workload could map localhost to any policy-allowed address and dial it directly, escaping the operator proxy and the inspection and audit boundary it exists to provide. Check the resolved addresses instead: the name bypasses only when the resolution is non-empty and every address is loopback. A mixed answer is not partially honored, and an IP literal is still authoritative for itself. A spoofed localhost falls through to the entries below, so an explicit operator NO_PROXY entry is still honored. This matches the trust model detect_trusted_host_gateway already applies to the same hosts file, which validates the mapped address rather than the alias. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(podman): clean up proxy-auth secret when container already deleted The delete_sandbox early-return path cleaned up the token secret but skipped the proxy-auth secret, leaking it on disk. Also update tests for recent API changes (Optional socket_path, workspace field, list-based container lookup). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> |
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744a65d52e |
fix(driver-podman): avoid panic when HOME is unset on macOS (#2327)
* fix(driver-podman): resolve Podman socket via auto-detection Align Podman socket selection with the existing Docker model: explicit config wins, otherwise probe openshell-core for a responsive socket. This also fixes the original HOME-unset panic, since resolution no longer hardcodes a per-OS default path. - add detect_podman_socket() in openshell-core, mirroring detect_docker_socket - PodmanComputeConfig.socket_path is now Option<PathBuf>, no default - remove default_socket_path() (podman driver) and podman_socket_path() (vm driver), both replaced by the shared detector - update server env override and CLI for the new Option type - add tests: responsive-candidate detection in openshell-core, and config-error (not panic) when no socket is configured or reachable * fix(driver-podman): address review feedback on socket resolution Extract socket resolution into resolve_socket_path, taking the detector as a parameter so tests do not depend on real env vars or the host's actual Podman state. Replace the flaky env-mutating test with three deterministic cases: explicit wins, detected is used when absent, and neither source errors. Fix the socket_path doc comment to describe it from a config user's point of view, matching DockerComputeConfig's docstring. Drop a comment that only made sense next to the Docker driver code. Update the Podman README and gateway docs: they described a fixed per-OS default path that no longer exists, replace with the actual probe-then-fail behavior. * docs(driver-podman): simplify socket default description Previous wording was self-contradictory (says auto-detect on unset, then lists the same var as a probed candidate) and omitted the Linux /run/user/uid/podman/podman.sock candidate. |
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cf4deccd37 |
fix(gateway): probe Docker socket during driver auto-detection (#2303)
Previously, Docker was auto-detected when the CLI was installed or a candidate Unix socket existed. Neither check verified that the Docker API was responsive. A similar check was done when auto-detecting Podman in the past, but was replaced in |
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614c8c164d |
feat(kubernetes): support PVC subPath driver config (#2034)
* feat(kubernetes): support PVC subPath driver config Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com> * test(kubernetes): cover writable PVC driver config Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): address PVC subPath review feedback Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): address PVC config review follow-up Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): address PVC review follow-ups --------- Signed-off-by: mjamiv <michael.commack@gmail.com> |
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8eacb4779f |
feat(kubernetes): add sidecar supervisor topology (#2076)
* feat(kubernetes): add sidecar supervisor topology Add the Kubernetes sidecar supervisor topology, its Helm/Skaffold configuration, topology documentation, and sidecar e2e matrix coverage. Skip root-only sandbox identity rewriting when process enforcement is network-only so the low-permission sidecar process container can start successfully. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar process id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar process id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): avoid similar proxy id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * docs(kubernetes): clarify sidecar topology limits Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): keep sidecar process leaf capless Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): refresh sidecar provider env snapshots Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * test(supervisor): align hot-swap identity regression Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): stage sidecar mtls files before proxy chown Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): simplify sidecar supervisor topology Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * chore(helm): reuse sidecar skaffold values Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar iptables helper names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(e2e): harden kube gateway wrapper setup Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid nft batch rollback on OCP Run nftables setup as individual commands so optional conntrack and log expressions can fail without rolling back required table, chain, and reject rules. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve process identity in sidecar topology Render sidecar pods with a shared process namespace, keep binary-aware network policy enabled, and move Kubernetes sidecar settings under the nested sidecar config table. Also apply unprivileged Landlock/seccomp setup in NetworkOnly supervisor mode so sidecar topology keeps sandbox child hardening without privileged process setup. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): replace sidecar snapshots with control socket Coordinate sidecar policy and provider bootstrap over a local Unix socket so the process leaf no longer reads policy/provider snapshot files. Report entrypoint startup through the control channel and keep gateway credentials confined to the network sidecar. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * feat(kubernetes): support relaxed sidecar network identity Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy sidecar clippy lint Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): standardize topology naming Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy linux clippy timeout import Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): support kata sidecar on ipv4 pods Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): satisfy linux clippy for sidecar fallback Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * chore(kubernetes): remove stale supervisor topology references Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): enable sidecar binary policy inspection Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): harden sidecar control boundary Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): couple sidecar supervisor lifecycles Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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bebf440b25 |
fix(helm): propagate supervisor image overrides (#2216)
Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> |
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6252aa17c8 |
rfc-0006: add driver config passthrough proposal (#1589)
* docs(rfc): add driver config passthrough proposal Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): link driver config proposal PR Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): clarify driver config scope Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): clarify driver-local config schemas Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): clarify driver config extension path * docs(rfc): update driver config baseline * docs(drivers): document bind-mount selinux_label and whitespace rules --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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6461677c32 |
feat(policy): accept numeric UIDs for sandbox process identity (#1973)
* feat(policy): accept numeric UIDs in sandbox process identity validation Allow run_as_user and run_as_group to be either the literal 'sandbox' or a numeric UID/GID within [1000, 2_000_000_000]. This removes the hard dependency on a baked-in 'sandbox' user in container images, enabling compute drivers to inject resolved UIDs at sandbox creation. Phase 1 of #1959. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * feat(supervisor): accept numeric UIDs for process identity dropping Allow run_as_user and run_as_group to be numeric UIDs/GIDs, removing the hard dependency on a baked-in 'sandbox' user in container images. Changes: - validate_sandbox_user(): accepts numeric UIDs without passwd lookup (logs OCSF event); keeps passwd check for "sandbox" name; rejects non-numeric non-sandbox strings that fail passwd lookup - prepare_filesystem(): passes numeric UIDs/GIDs directly to chown() instead of requiring a passwd entry - drop_privileges(): resolves numeric UIDs/GIDs directly via UID::from_raw / Gid::from_raw; skips initgroups when target uid matches current euid; uses guard conditions before setgid/setuid calls - session_user_and_home(): falls back to ("{uid}", "/sandbox") for numeric UIDs, avoiding a passwd lookup that will fail Re-exports MIN_SANDBOX_UID and MAX_SANDBOX_UID from openshell-policy so callers have consistent range constants. Phase 2 of #1959. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * feat(driver-kubernetes): resolve sandbox UID/GID from config or OpenShift SCC annotations Phase 3 of the numeric-UID plan: allow operators to specify explicit sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid in Kubernetes driver config, auto-detect from OpenShift SCC namespace annotations, and propagate resolved values to supervisor container env vars and PVC init container securityContext. Changes: - Add sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid fields to KubernetesComputeConfig - Add SANDBOX_UID/SANDBOX_GID env var constants to openshell-core - Implement resolve_sandbox_identity() to fetch namespace annotations and auto-detect OpenShift SCC UID ranges (sa.scc.uid-range) - Pass resolved UID/GID through SandboxPodParams to pod spec builder - Inject SANDBOX_UID/SANDBOX_GID env vars into supervisor container - Update PVC init container securityContext with resolved UID/GID instead of hard-coded root - Add comprehensive unit tests for resolution logic and annotation parsing (resolve_sandbox_uid, resolve_sandbox_gid, OpenShift SCC annotation parsing) Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * feat(driver-vm): add configurable sandbox UID/GID and update docs/examples Phase 4 of the numeric-UID plan: replace hardcoded SANDBOX_UID (10001) in VM rootfs preparation with configurable sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid fields. Changes: - Add sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid to VmDriverConfig with serde derives - Pass resolved UID/GID through prepare_sandbox_rootfs_from_image_root to ensure_sandbox_guest_user which writes /etc/passwd/group/gshadow - Update BYOC Dockerfile: remove groupadd/useradd, document runtime UID injection and the ability to skip baked-in sandbox user - Update gateway-config.mdx: document sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid for both Kubernetes (with OpenShift SCC autodetection) and VM drivers - Update sandbox-compute-drivers.mdx: add Sandbox User Identity section explaining numeric UID support across all compute drivers - Update rootfs tests to use non-default UIDs, verify config passthrough Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * code review changes * fix(supervisor): harden tests for restricted CI container environments Guard tests against CI-specific constraints: root without CAP_SETPCAP, UIDs with no /etc/passwd entry, and restricted /proc access. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjennings@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjennings@nvidia.com> |
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43bb030266 |
feat(docker,podman): add SELinux label support for bind mounts (#2092)
* feat(docker,podman): add SELinux label support for bind mounts The Docker Engine structured Mount API does not support SELinux relabelling (:z / :Z). Move user-supplied bind mounts from the structured `mounts` field to the legacy string-format `binds` field, which does support these options. Add a shared `SelinuxLabel` enum (shared/private) to openshell-core so both Docker and Podman drivers accept an optional `selinux_label` field on bind mount configs. For Docker, labels are appended to the bind string; for Podman, they are pushed to the mount options vec. Signed-off-by: Florian Bergmann <fbergman@redhat.com> * fix(docker): reject missing bind source paths on legacy binds Moving user bind mounts from the structured Mount API to the legacy Binds field changed Docker's behavior for missing source directories: the legacy path silently creates them as empty root-owned dirs instead of erroring. Add an explicit Path::exists() check to preserve the fail-fast behavior operators expect. Signed-off-by: Florian Bergmann <fbergman@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Florian Bergmann <fbergman@redhat.com> |
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ba21bb32a2 |
feat(kubernetes): support agent-sandbox v1beta1 (#2009)
* feat(kubernetes): support agent-sandbox v1beta1 Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * ci(kubernetes): test agent-sandbox api versions Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): retry agent-sandbox raw 404s Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): harden agent-sandbox api setup Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): cache agent-sandbox api version Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * docs(kubernetes): document agent-sandbox upgrade behavior Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): collapse agent-sandbox api selection Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> |
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75a317ea45 |
feat(server): support out-of-tree compute drivers via --compute-driver-socket (#1703)
* feat(server): support remote compute driver endpoints Add named remote compute driver endpoint support to the gateway. Remote drivers are selected by a non-reserved compute driver name and either a CLI/env socket endpoint or [openshell.drivers.<name>].socket_path. The VM driver now enters ComputeRuntime through the same acquired remote endpoint path, while Docker, Podman, and Kubernetes retain their in-process drivers. Require --drivers/OPENSHELL_DRIVERS when pairing an ad-hoc socket endpoint so the socket does not imply a magic driver name, and keep reserved in-tree names unavailable for unmanaged socket endpoints. Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: st-gr <38470677+st-gr@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(server): cover remote compute driver UDS lifecycle Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: st-gr <38470677+st-gr@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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2c545893ed |
feat(cli): add GPU count requests (#1812)
* feat(gpu)!: add resource requirements BREAKING CHANGE: SandboxSpec.gpu and DriverSandboxSpec.gpu were replaced with resource_requirements.gpu, changing protobuf field 9 from a bool to a message for both public and driver APIs. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(gpu): pass requirements through sandbox create Pass the coupled GPU requirement object through the CLI sandbox_create boundary instead of splitting presence and count into separate arguments. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(gpu): pass requirements to timeout message Pass ResourceRequirements into the provisioning timeout message helper so GPU hints are derived from the same nested request object used to create the sandbox. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(gpu): pass driver requirements through helpers Thread Option<GpuResourceRequirements> through driver validation and rendering helpers instead of splitting GPU presence and count into separate arguments. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(gpu): validate exact device requests Require exact driver GPU device lists to be tied to a GPU request, allow a single exact device to use the default countless request, and require explicit matching counts for multi-device lists. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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58a3777d07 |
fix(drivers): filter bind-backed named volumes (#1861)
* fix(podman): filter bind-backed named volumes Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(drivers): detect recursive bind-backed volumes Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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1dc59853ff |
feat(gpu): move device selection to driver config (#1815)
* refactor(kubernetes): use shared proto struct helpers Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): extract sandbox template validation * feat(gpu)!: move device selection to driver config BREAKING CHANGE: The openshell sandbox create --gpu-device flag and corresponding API field were removed. Select specific GPUs through driver-specific driver_config fields instead. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): reject unknown driver config fields Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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530aaf1360 |
feat(drivers): support docker and podman config mounts (#1785)
* feat(drivers): support docker and podman config mounts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(drivers): trim mount docs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): cover local driver volume mounts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): satisfy linux clippy lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(drivers): gate bind mounts behind gateway config * docs(sandbox): simplify mount examples * cleanup * test(e2e): stabilize branch checks * fix(drivers): tighten local mount validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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c3964a6513 |
feat(kubernetes): support driver config passthrough (#1744)
* test(docker): default sandbox template fixtures Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(cli): add driver config json plumbing Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): tolerate invalid driver config Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): prototype driver config specifics Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * docs(kubernetes): note driver-local config schema boundary Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): support runtime class driver config Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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e26a1b1ffc |
fix(kubernetes): configure sandbox apparmor profile (#1767)
Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> |
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d9908222f2 | feat(kubernetes): support sandbox image pull secrets (#1671) | ||
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0f73d117a5 |
fix(podman): avoid host-gateway on macOS machines (#1637)
Closes #1307 Default the Podman host gateway alias override to gvproxy's host-loopback IP on macOS while preserving host-gateway resolution on Linux. Wire the setting through Podman config, gateway TOML inheritance, and the standalone driver, and document the platform behavior. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> |