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40
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Piotr Mlocekanddivesh
|
604b9f66f6 |
feat(config): deliver gateway configuration over the supervisor session (#4320)
Supervisors poll the gateway for configuration every 10 seconds. This PR adds an opt-in push mode (config_delivery_mode = "push"): supervisors still start by polling, and once their ConnectSupervisor session is accepted, the gateway delivers every later change over it and supervisors apply it and report the result. poll stays the default, and older supervisors and gateways keep polling. --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com> |
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Shiju
|
ffb530671f |
fix(providers): prepare dynamic credentials across HTTP relay paths (#4152)
* fix(providers): bind multi-route grants to admitted endpoints Carry gateway-derived endpoint owners through policy and credential delivery. Select grants only from owners that admit the current request, refresh provider snapshots per request, and reject superseded installations before forwarding. Cover persistent routes, overlapping owners, denial, refresh, cache expiry and recovery with focused tests and a Podman regression. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * refactor(providers): simplify admitted-endpoint grant selection Share admitted endpoints between forwarding and credential authorization. Select grants from the live snapshot without rebuilding a locked map, reuse profile policy construction, and preserve freshness guards when grants are removed. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(providers): preserve trusted owners across policy approval Sanitize authored owner metadata before composing effective policies, preserve derived owners through proposal approval, and normalize advisor endpoint comparisons. Account for gateway-only owner fields in SDK coverage and schema inventory. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * refactor(providers): share dynamic credential key layout and require a snapshot for admission Move the endpoint-bound credential key layout into openshell-core. DynamicCredentialKey encodes the key the gateway builds, and the supervisor reads its endpoint selector, credential identity, and revision-scoped form through the same module instead of parsing tab-separated strings in three places. Revision scoping becomes ProviderCredentialSnapshot::scoped_key. inject_for_admitted_owners now takes the pinned snapshot directly. The L7 admission path never acquires a grant from the live credential map, which production populates only alongside a snapshot. L4 forwarding keeps the selector-only path through inject_if_needed. Both share one acquire-and-rewrite step. Delete two relay tests whose behavior the Rego admission tests already prove. Add a test that grants for different headers are acquired only for admitting owners. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(providers): share credential preparation across HTTP relays Apply endpoint-owned grants after policy and request middleware in REST, GraphQL, JSON-RPC/MCP and inspected plaintext forwarding. Preserve live provider and policy checks through guarded writes, reject missing owner metadata, and reject profiles that cannot inject dynamic HTTP credentials. Cover production stream dispatch, multiple endpoints, failure handling and plaintext ownership with focused regressions. Document upgrade ordering. Closes #3657 Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(providers): validate dynamic credential key encoding Reject control characters at profile import and key construction. Propagate invalid key errors through gateway environment resolution and reject malformed key layouts before token acquisition while preserving supported legacy keys. Consolidate duplicate relay success tests and share forward-proxy setup without removing ownership, canonicalization, refresh or guarded-write assertions. Document token-grant endpoint authority. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
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Yuedong Wu
|
718dba3430 |
fix(policy)!: reject removed tls endpoint values (#3414)
Signed-off-by: Yuedong Wu <dwcn22@outlook.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
d91b1999a0 |
feat(api)!: use sandbox names as canonical RPC references (#3272)
* feat(api)!: use sandbox names as canonical references Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(cli): update forward color fixture for workspace scope Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): use sandbox names for settings lookup Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): use canonical sandbox request fields Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): use canonical sandbox receipt field Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(server): harden sandbox mutation handling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): update rebased sandbox references Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(api)!: standardize canonical entity references Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(api): codify protobuf API conventions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(api): preserve workspace selector semantics Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(api): restore workspace selector parity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(api): preserve descriptive name fields Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(api): update e2e request fixtures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(core): omit workspace selector during bootstrap Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(api): remove proto convention checker Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(api): refresh schema fingerprints after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): use canonical provider receipt field Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Krzysztof Malczuk
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e38d7254e6 |
fix(policy): reject unknown endpoint security modes (#3187)
* fix(policy): reject unknown endpoint security modes Closes #3046 Validate TLS, enforcement, and access values across policy and provider profile ingress, and prevent runtime parsing from falling back to audit for unknown enforcement values. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Malczuk <kmalczuk@redhat.com> * fix(policy)!: use enums for endpoint security modes Replace the public TLS, enforcement, and access strings with protobuf enums and carry the typed values through policy composition, provider profiles, drivers, and runtime conversion. Preserve the documented YAML spellings, reject unknown and invalid numeric enum values consistently, and update generated Go bindings, SDK conversions, tests, and policy documentation. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Malczuk <kmalczuk@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Malczuk <kmalczuk@redhat.com> |
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John T. Myers
|
1d010f4187 |
feat(sandbox): validate configuration before workload activation (#3259)
* feat(sandbox): validate configuration before workload activation Closes #3145 Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): bound startup failures and preserve activation history Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): enforce deadlines on startup RPC attempts Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(sandbox): isolate provider auto-create policy fixture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(sandbox): remove unnecessary fixture string delimiters Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(sandbox): capture startup logs before ephemeral cleanup Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve credential revocation after rebase Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): retain provider revision helper for endpoint reports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): import provider object trait in production Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(supervisor): preserve admission across boundary extraction Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): use existing boundary discovery imports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(sandbox): distinguish workload and supervisor containers Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): reconcile admission schema with timestamp migration Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): reconcile admission with typed deletion schema Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): reconcile admission with mutation request IDs Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(supervisor): adapt local startup fixture to admission state Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(supervisor): deduplicate startup quarantine diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(tui): show configuration blockers in sandbox notes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(sandbox): expire provisioning repair attempts after five minutes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(supervisor): reconcile admission with provider readiness Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(tui): separate configuration summaries from full diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(tui): shorten invalid configuration note Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): refresh schema inventory after rebase Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Shiju
|
9708ba9999 |
feat(providers): report applied sandbox provider changes (#3391)
* feat(providers): report applied sandbox provider changes Record exact provider mutation targets in shared configuration operations. Require authenticated evidence that credentials, effective policy, and the workload launch environment have been installed before reporting readiness. Add bounded CLI and Rust SDK status and wait support, preserving ordinary revision-scoped references for existing processes. Verify new-client rotation and acknowledged detach revocation without external-stable resolver changes. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(providers): align readiness times with protobuf contracts Represent readiness receipts, status, and operation times with Timestamp and report intervals with Duration. Reserve the scalar field tags, update all consumers and generated bindings, and preserve timestamp presence and nanosecond identity through storage and client validation. Qualify both empty-map constructors in the Linux boundary test so its module compiles while retaining the explicit default required by Clippy. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): preserve provider mutation storage uncertainty Recognize the gateway's exact structured storage-uncertainty reason for provider attach, detach, and update. Explain that the change may already be saved and must be reconciled before retrying, without exposing server messages or metadata. Preserve uncertainty ahead of generic retry hints. Exercise saved mutations through the CLI and verify single submission, redaction, missing receipt handling, and untrusted error-detail rejection. Document the recovery guidance for users and the public CLI skill. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): explain denied provider profile lookups Report exact and alias profile lookup denials with fixed permission and workspace guidance. Keep backend details redacted and stop before provider mutations. Cover denied create and update calls through the CLI. Verify the complete provider list independently in the cross-workspace OIDC regression, extracting its JSON object from surrounding startup diagnostics. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
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Derek Carr
|
d68b7069c3 |
refactor(proto)!: use well-known time types (#3113)
* refactor(proto)!: use well-known time types Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve time migration behavior Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve timestamp boundary semantics Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): convert sandbox token expiry to timestamp Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve time compatibility semantics Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve exact endpoint and profile times Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(e2e): use duration for interactive exec timeout Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(sdk-go)!: remove legacy profile duration fields BREAKING CHANGE: Go provider profile callers must use RefreshBefore, MaxLifetime, and CacheTTL with ProfileDuration instead of the whole-second fields. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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VarshaandJohn Myers
|
0803c4aa4c |
refactor(policy)!: remove NetworkBinary harness field (#3222)
* refactor(policy)!: remove NetworkBinary harness field Closes #3054 Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * test(policy): preserve unknown fields during migration Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(policy): preserve advisor provenance during merge Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(policy): remove redundant network binary default Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): record harness schema migration Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Shiju
|
592df3e014 |
feat(policy): preserve exact MCP revision allowlists (#3027)
* feat(mcp): add version-aware wire profile metadata Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * feat(policy): canonicalize MCP version allowlists Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): align MCP policy tests with current main Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): canonicalize supervisor protobuf ingress Materialize defaultable MCP revisions before ambiguity checks, OPA construction, and sidecar delivery. Reject invalid sidecar policies with bounded errors. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
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John T. Myers
|
4d7f402ce2 |
feat(policy): establish direct TCP egress foundation (#2711)
* feat(policy): accept explicit tcp endpoint protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): snapshot authoritative egress decisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document explicit tcp protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): defer transparent TCP release guidance Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(go): regenerate sandbox protobuf bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): complete tcp egress foundation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document explicit tcp contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): fail closed on authorization errors Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): fence delayed exit events before restart Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate network endpoint destinations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(providers): opt in tcp credential fixture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): require dns host for transparent tcp Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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alangou
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0d708d6d51 |
fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints (#2493)
* fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * refactor(cli): extract allowed-ip option parsing Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): gate endpointless credential bindings Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> |
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Piotr Mlocek
|
44bf0df485 |
feat(middleware): inspect WebSocket text messages (#2477)
* feat(middleware): inspect websocket text messages Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address websocket review feedback Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): bound websocket message assembly Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): harden websocket upgrade lifecycle Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): unify in-process and remote transports Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(middleware): support regex websocket redaction Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): bound persistent streaming sessions Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): accept websocket sequence gaps Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): refine websocket introspection contract Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify websocket preflight lifecycle Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify websocket coverage semantics Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): type websocket frame failures Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): return 503 when middleware admission is exhausted Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): align streaming API contract Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify WebSocket event result scope Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): simplify middleware revision history Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(examples): add WebSocket content guard support Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): unify binding payload limits Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): align payload limit terminology Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address websocket review feedback Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): address websocket review findings Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test(network): allow Linux handler setup in preflight regression Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): harden websocket relay finalization Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): inspect compressed websocket messages Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test(network): stabilize compressed websocket regressions Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(go-sdk): regenerate middleware protobuf binding Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify websocket skip lifecycle Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address WebSocket review feedback Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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Piotr Mlocek
|
bdabb54cb3 |
fix(security): authenticate extension services (#2638)
* fix(security): authenticate extension services Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(extension-core): verify gateway JWTs Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(extension-core): keep inbound verification external This should become an extension SDK package. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(security): harden the extension authentication contract Follow-up hardening on the alpha extension authentication mechanism. Claim contract: - Extension tokens carry an explicit `typ` of `openshell-ext+jwt`. They share a signing key with sandbox-to-gateway admission tokens and were otherwise separated by audience alone, so a verifier that neglects to check `aud` could accept a gateway credential. The header is a second, independent discriminator. - Publish OIDC-shaped discovery at `/.well-known/openid-configuration` so a service configured with only the gateway URL can learn the exact expected issuer and the JWKS location. It is shaped, not compliant: `issuer` is the gateway identity, not the serving URL. Audience agreement: - `MiddlewareManifest` and `InterceptorManifest` gain `expected_audience`. The audience is otherwise configured independently on each side of the boundary, where a mismatch surfaces only as an opaque authentication failure on every call. OpenShell now compares the two and fails at startup. An empty field keeps the check off for existing services. Compatibility: - Add `allow_insecure_transport` per registration. Enabling gateway JWT signing previously made any plaintext endpoint a hard startup failure, including the endpoint form used in our own documentation. The opt-out attaches no credential, is refused by the gateway if a supervisor asks for one, and warns at every startup. - Make the transport requirement kind-aware. A middleware endpoint must be reachable from every sandbox supervisor, so only interceptors may use a gateway-local Unix socket. Credential lifecycle: - Replace the process-global slot map with a supervisor-owned `ExtensionCredentialStore` shared explicitly across the gateway connections the supervisor opens, removing test-order coupling. - Rotate only when a credential is missing or has passed four fifths of its lifetime. Configuration polling ran every ten seconds against fifteen-minute credentials, so each poll re-ran gateway effective-policy resolution and re-minted the gateway token. - Bound credential minting per sandbox, since each request resolves the caller's effective policy. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs: record alpha extension authentication in RFC appendices Restore the RFC 0009 and 0010 bodies to their accepted text and move every extension-authentication update into appendices instead. An RFC records a decision at a point in time; superseding detail belongs alongside it rather than rewritten into it. RFC 0009's appendix carries the shared contract: claims, authorization, key distribution, the `allow_insecure_transport` replacement for the body's `allow_insecure`, and residual risks. RFC 0010's records only what differs for interceptors and links to it. The existing protocol-extensions appendix, which parked the phase 2 transport question, now points forward to what was built. Also document the audience handshake, the discovery endpoint, the `typ` requirement, and `jti` replay guidance in the extensibility and gateway configuration pages, and correct the middleware transport guidance: middleware endpoints must be reachable from sandbox supervisors, so Unix sockets are not an option there. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(extension-core): abstract extension server trust Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(core): update middleware manifest example Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(extension-auth): preserve unsigned gateway compatibility Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(extension-auth): reject cross-domain token replay Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
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0120535efc |
feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints (#2510)
* feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): verify static credential endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(e2e): use valid endpoint isolation fixtures Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve binding identity across rotations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): enforce bindings across request lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): close credential relay gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): hash selected provider profile scope Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): resolve credentials after request admission Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): align single-route credential denials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): harden endpoint-bound rotation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce identity and authority binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): snapshot provider environment atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): include authority port in query proxy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): close credential revocation gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(proxy): explain authority mismatch diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce binding lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): reject credential config collisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): capture credential scope atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): distinguish origin and absolute targets Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): isolate endpointless profile credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): normalize IPv6 request authorities Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify endpointless profile isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): bind endpointless provider credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): use current GCP placeholder revision Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): explain policy credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover endpointless fail-closed invariant Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(policy): expect ambiguity rejection at creation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): share credential mismatch finding builder Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover malformed binding metadata Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): verify multi-key endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover same-host credential path denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): document serialized refresh contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): consolidate L7 log formatting Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): precompile endpoint binding patterns Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): share identity epoch revisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): require explicit request default ports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate SigV4 credential sources Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve endpoint bindings for credential handles Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(go-sdk): expose network credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
905b554c7c |
refactor(network): consolidate proxy egress pipeline (#2373)
* refactor(network): introduce shared egress pipeline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover shared proxy egress paths Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): make destination authorization explicit Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): pin proxy relay policy context Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): lock relay generation contracts Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): establish phase zero compatibility baseline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): detect ambiguous network endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(sandbox): fail closed on invalid policy updates Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): invalidate relays on policy changes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document validation failure posture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover validation and middleware egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): move policy failure mode to gateway toml Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): name proxy contracts by behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): align overlap validation with endpoint selection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): expect hard loopback denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): match declared endpoint denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve path-specific endpoint overrides Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): respect hard-blocked host gateways Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): reconcile proxy refactor with main Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve CONNECT policy generation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): cover runtime endpoint glob semantics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): reject ambiguous policies before persistence Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): explain ambiguity preflight behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): compare body limits within protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): avoid global tracing capture race Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(server): format rebased provider tests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): retain runtime on middleware outage Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): preflight provider composition activation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): distinguish runtime failure transitions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Derek Carr
|
5952a5a23f |
feat(workspace): add workspace resource model with scoping, membershi… (#2243)
* feat(workspace): implement workspace model (Phase 1 of RFC 0011) Implements workspace and membership model providing hard isolation boundaries for multi-player OpenShell deployments. Workspace CRUD with Kubernetes-style Terminating phase for graceful deletion. All resources scoped by workspace via ObjectMeta. Membership RPCs for workspace access control. Persistence migration shifts name uniqueness to (object_type, workspace, name). Provider profiles support platform and workspace scoping. Service routing uses workspace-prefixed DNS labels. Inference routes renamed and workspace-scoped with DeleteInferenceRoute RPC. Python SDK with WorkspaceClient, two-method list pattern (workspace-scoped and for_all_workspaces), and workspace parameter on all methods. CLI workspace flags, TUI workspace cycling. K8s driver filters unmanaged CRs and uses delete preconditions. Podman driver uses immutable container IDs. Label serialization fixed across all put_if call sites. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(cli): delegate sandbox upload command to existing upload function The standalone `sandbox upload` command reimplemented upload logic inline with two bugs: it used `Path::exists()` which follows symlinks (rejecting dangling symlinks), and it ran git-aware filtering on symlink sources. The `run::sandbox_upload()` function already handles both cases correctly via `sandbox_upload_plan()`. Replace the inline logic with a call to the existing function. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): shorten sandbox names and fix test compatibility Shorten the sandbox name in initial_sparse_policy_is_acknowledged_as_loaded from 'e2e-2159-sparse-enrich' (22 chars) to 'e2e-sparse-enrich' (17 chars) to comply with MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN (19 chars). Also capture stderr in create_keep_with_args so future sandbox creation failures include the actual CLI error instead of reporting empty output. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(workspace): add test coverage for workspace CRUD and persistence isolation Add unit tests for workspace create happy path, get round-trip, get not-found, get empty-name rejection, already-exists error, and resolve_workspace not-found. Add persistence test proving cross-workspace name uniqueness (same name in different workspaces produces separate records). Add workspace name max-length boundary tests. Fix e2e harness to include stderr in name-parse-failure error path. Align Python e2e test_workspace_crud with try/finally pattern. Document provider profile catalog workspace scoping gap in RFC 0011. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(examples): update examples for workspace model compatibility Shorten sandbox names in demo scripts to fit the 19-character MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN limit: policy-demo prefix to pd-, multi-agent notepad derives a short SANDBOX_TAG from the run ID, governance interceptor uses gs-PID-RANDOM. Update vscode-remote-sandbox.md SSH host aliases from openshell-{name} to openshell-{name}.{workspace} format. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(sdk): add workspace-scoped client and workspace CRUD Add WorkspaceScopedClient modeled after kube::Api::namespaced — captures workspace once and injects it into every sandbox request. Add workspace CRUD methods (create, get, list, delete) and list_sandboxes_all_workspaces on OpenShellClient. Extend SandboxRef with workspace field and add WorkspaceRef type. Include mock tests for all new operations. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings in workspace test assertions Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(docs): convert indented code blocks to fenced in RFC 0011 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings and apply cargo fmt across workspace Auto-format with cargo fmt and fix clippy warnings exposed by the reformat: unnecessary qualifications, map_unwrap_or, identical match arms, unused variable prefix, dead code annotations, and let-unit-value in e2e harness. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): address workspace scoping issues from review - Add workspace field to settings JSON output (CLI) - Skip Podman containers missing workspace label instead of defaulting to empty string, matching K8s driver behavior - Add resource_version to list_by_scope SELECT in both SQLite and Postgres backends, with regression test - Gate PolicyLocalContext proposal/lookup routes on workspace readiness, returning 503 when workspace is not yet discovered - Block sandbox and provider creation in TUI all-workspaces mode - Clear workspace vectors in TUI reset_sandbox_state Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog workspace-aware Thread workspace through snapshot_catalog so the EffectiveProviderProfileCatalog enforces workspace boundaries on both read and write paths. UserProviderProfileSource now loads platform-scoped profiles (workspace "") plus the target workspace's profiles, preventing cross-workspace duplicate profile ID collisions that previously caused global catalog failures. Update RFC 0011 to reflect catalog scoping is implemented in Phase 1 rather than deferred to future work. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(persistence): include workspace column in atomic policy revision INSERT put_policy_revision_atomic omitted the workspace column from the INSERT into the objects table in both SQLite and Postgres backends, causing atomically-written policy revisions to lose their workspace association. Add workspace field to AtomicPolicyRevisionWrite and thread it through both backend INSERT statements, matching the non-atomic put_policy_revision path which already included it. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proxy): skip ancestor walk when socket owner is the entrypoint collect_ancestor_identities walked the entire process tree above the entrypoint when the connecting process was the entrypoint itself, SHA256-hashing every ancestor binary (IDE, shell, container runtime). On dev machines with large binaries in the ancestor chain this exceeded the 30-second test timeout. When start_pid == stop_pid there are no intermediate ancestors to verify, so return an empty list immediately. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog scope-aware Allow the same profile ID at platform and workspace scopes by introducing layered catalog entries where workspace profiles shadow platform profiles. Add source and scope fields to the ProviderProfile proto and CLI output. Migrate List/Get handlers to the catalog, fixing divergence with runtime profile resolution. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align podman e2e labels with centralized driver constants The podman driver moved its container labels to the centralized openshell.ai/ prefix, but the e2e test harness and cleanup script still referenced the old openshell.sandbox-* keys, causing the local_driver_token_restart test to fail on container lookup. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align python profile isolation test with scope-aware catalog Platform profiles are now visible in workspace listings as fallbacks per the layered catalog design. Update the assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): honor profile_workspace in runtime profile resolution Runtime profile lookups now consult provider.profile_workspace via get_type_profile_for_scope. Providers created with --global-profile (profile_workspace="") resolve to the platform profile even when a workspace profile shadows the same ID. All 6 runtime call sites updated; type-only call sites remain scope-agnostic. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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|
Piotr Mlocek
|
d556748771 |
feat(supervisor-middleware): add network egress middleware (#2027)
Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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|
krishicksandddurst
|
7bce1223dc |
feat(policy): add JSON-RPC and MCP L7 policies (#1865)
Add policy schema, proto, provider profile, OPA, and L7 proxy support for `protocol: json-rpc` and `protocol: mcp`. Generic JSON-RPC endpoints match exact method names only, with `method: "*"` as the all-method sentinel; wildcard/glob methods and params matchers are rejected. Parse JSON-RPC request bodies and batches in the forward proxy, deny response-shaped client frames, limit receive-stream GET allowance to MCP endpoints, and redact params in decision logs. Preserve L7 rule params on the proto load path so MCP `tools/call` tool filters behave like YAML-loaded policies. Add MCP conformance coverage, JSON-RPC L7 e2e coverage, and docs for the new protocols and current matcher limitations. Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: ddurst <267424412+ddurst-nvidia@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Jesse JaggarsandRussell Bryant
|
f569a0ade6 |
feat(sandbox): proxy-side AWS SigV4 credential signing for CONNECT tunnels (#1638)
Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Bryant <russell.bryant@gmail.com> |
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|
mjamivandJohn Myers
|
f1fc87e1ad |
fix(sandbox): trust exact declared private endpoints (#1560)
* fix(sandbox): trust exact declared private endpoints * fix(sandbox): preserve advisor endpoint provenance * fix(sandbox): repair advisor provenance lint failures --------- Co-authored-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Aaron Erickson 🦞andJohn Myers
|
9ea94b645d |
fix(sandbox): rewrite messaging credential placeholders (#1286)
* fix(sandbox): rewrite credential placeholders in websocket text frames Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden websocket credential rewrite Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * feat(sandbox): add websocket l7 inspection and compression Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden websocket upgrade validation Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): cover route-selected websocket upgrades Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden websocket negotiation parsing Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): add websocket conformance relay matrix Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): add websocket conformance lane Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): support websocket incremental rules Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * feat(policy): enable websocket credential rewrite updates Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): make websocket rewrite endpoint-local Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * feat(sandbox): support graphql websocket policy Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): allow private IPs for websocket endpoints * feat(sandbox): rewrite REST credential placeholders Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): generalize credential aliases Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): rewrite encoded form credentials Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): close websocket policy and provider alias gaps Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): route websocket probe through host gateway * fix(e2e): stabilize websocket probe handshake * fix(e2e): exercise websocket probe through proxy * ci: remove websocket conformance workflow --------- Signed-off-by: Aaron Erickson <aerickson@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
John T. Myers
|
1d3b741ee3 |
feat(providers): support sandbox provider attach lifecycle (#1242)
* feat(providers): support sandbox provider attach lifecycle Closes #1171 Adds sandbox provider list, attach, and detach API/CLI support while keeping provider policy and credential resolution derived from current sandbox attachments. * fix(providers): refresh sandbox provider credentials Adds provider environment revisions and generation-scoped sandbox credential snapshots so future SSH and exec launches pick up provider attach, detach, and credential updates without mutating already-running processes. Also blocks provider deletion while attached to prevent stale sandbox provider references. * fix(providers): serialize sandbox object mutations * test(providers): cover sandbox provider attach lifecycle * test(providers): accept versioned credential placeholders |
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|
John T. Myers
|
6b21804258 |
feat(policy): add GraphQL L7 inspection (#1083)
Support GraphQL L7 policies |
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|
John T. Myers
|
c960d480fd |
fix(sandbox): canonicalize HTTP request-targets before L7 policy evaluation (#878)
* fix(sandbox): canonicalize HTTP request-targets before L7 policy evaluation
The L7 REST proxy evaluated OPA path rules against the raw request-target
and forwarded the raw header block byte-for-byte to the upstream. The
upstream normalized `..`, `%2e%2e`, and `//` before dispatching, so a
compromised agent inside the sandbox could bypass any path-based allow
rule by prefixing the blocked path with an allowed one (e.g.
`GET /public/../secret` matches `/public/**` at the proxy but the
upstream serves `/secret`). The inference-routing detection had the same
normalization gap via `normalize_inference_path`, which only stripped
scheme+authority and preserved dot-segments verbatim.
- Add `crates/openshell-sandbox/src/l7/path.rs` with
`canonicalize_request_target`. Percent-decodes (with uppercase hex
re-emission), resolves `.` / `..` segments per RFC 3986 5.2.4,
collapses doubled slashes, strips trailing `;params`, rejects
fragments / raw non-ASCII / control bytes / encoded slashes (unless
explicitly enabled per-endpoint), and returns a `rewritten` flag so
callers know when to rewrite the outbound request line.
- Wire the canonicalizer into `rest.rs::parse_http_request`. The
canonical path is the `target` on `L7Request` that OPA sees, and
when the canonical form differs from the raw input the request line
is rebuilt in `raw_header` so the upstream dispatches on the exact
bytes the policy evaluated.
- Canonicalize the forward (plain HTTP proxy) path at
`proxy.rs`'s second L7 evaluation site. A non-canonical request-target
is rejected with 400 Bad Request and an OCSF `NetworkActivity` Fail
event rather than silently passed through.
- Replace the old `normalize_inference_path` body with a call to the
canonicalizer. On canonicalization error the raw path is returned
(so inference detection simply misses and the normal forward path
handles and rejects).
- Document the invariant in `sandbox-policy.rego`: `input.request.path`
is pre-canonicalized so rules must not attempt defensive matching
against `..` or `%2e%2e`.
- Architecture doc (`architecture/sandbox.md`) lists the new module.
- 24 new unit tests cover dot segments, percent-encoded dot segments,
double-slash collapse, encoded-slash reject/opt-in, null/control byte
rejection, legitimate percent-encoded bytes round-tripping, mixed-case
percent normalization, fragment rejection, absolute-form stripping,
empty / length-bounded / non-ASCII handling, and regression payloads
for the specific bypasses above.
Tracks OS-99.
* fix(sandbox): close forward-proxy parser-differential and wire allow_encoded_slash
Addresses two review findings on the L7 path canonicalization change.
1. `handle_forward_proxy` previously evaluated OPA on the canonical path
but wrote the raw path to the upstream via `rewrite_forward_request`,
leaving the parser-differential open for plain-HTTP forward-proxy
traffic even though it was closed for the L7 tunnel path. `path` is
now reassigned to the canonical form inside the L7 block before the
outbound write, so the bytes dispatched to the upstream match what
OPA evaluated. Covered by a new regression test against
`rewrite_forward_request`.
2. `allow_encoded_slash` is now wired through the YAML policy schema,
the proto `NetworkEndpoint` message, the Rego endpoint config, and
the `L7EndpointConfig` → `RestProvider` canonicalization options.
Operators can opt in per-endpoint for upstreams like GitLab that
embed `%2F` in namespaced resource paths; the default remains
strict. The `RestProvider` gains a constructor
`RestProvider::with_options` so `relay_rest` constructs a provider
with per-endpoint options while `relay_passthrough_with_credentials`
retains strict defaults.
Integration tests:
- `parse_http_request_canonicalizes_target_and_rewrites_raw_header`
drives a non-canonical request through the parser and asserts both
`L7Request.target` (what OPA evaluates) and `raw_header` (what the
upstream receives) are canonical.
- `parse_http_request_canonicalization_preserves_query_string`,
`parse_http_request_leaves_canonical_input_byte_for_byte`,
`parse_http_request_rejects_traversal_above_root`,
`parse_http_request_preserves_http_10_version_on_rewrite`.
- `parse_http_request_accepts_encoded_slash_when_endpoint_opts_in` /
`_rejects_encoded_slash_by_default` verify the
`allow_encoded_slash` gate.
- `test_rewrite_forward_request_uses_canonical_path_on_the_wire`
asserts the fix to the forward-proxy flow.
- `parse_l7_config_allow_encoded_slash_{defaults_false,opt_in}` verify
the YAML/Rego wiring.
|
||
|
John T. Myers
|
28e1ff7b40 |
feat(policy): add deny rules to network policy schema (#822)
* feat(policy): add deny rules to network policy schema Closes #565 Add L7 deny rules that block specific requests even when allowed by access presets or explicit allow rules. Deny rules mirror the full capability set of allow rules (method, path, query params, SQL command) and take precedence -- if a request matches any deny rule, it is blocked regardless of allow rules. This enables the "allow everything except these specific operations" pattern without enumerating every allowed endpoint. For example, granting read-write access to GitHub while blocking PR approvals, branch protection changes, and ruleset modifications. * fix(policy): deny query matching fails closed, mirror allow-side validation Addresses PR review findings P1 and P3: P1: Deny-side query matching now uses fail-closed semantics. If ANY value for a query key matches the deny matcher, the deny fires. The previous implementation reused allow-side "all values must match" logic which allowed ?force=true&force=false to bypass a deny on force=true. P3: Deny-side query validation now mirrors the full allow-side checks: empty any lists, non-string matcher values, glob+any mutual exclusion, glob type checks, and glob syntax warnings are all validated. |
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|
Drew Newberry
|
60035c6a61 | refactor(server): extract kubernetes compute driver (#817) | ||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
e8950e624c |
feat(sandbox): add L7 query parameter matchers (#617)
* feat(sandbox): add L7 query parameter matchers Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): decode + as space in query params and validate glob syntax Three improvements from PR #617 review: 1. Decode + as space in query string values per the application/x-www-form-urlencoded convention. This matches Python's urllib.parse, JavaScript's URLSearchParams, Go's url.ParseQuery, and most HTTP frameworks. Literal + should be sent as %2B. 2. Add glob pattern syntax validation (warnings) for query matchers. Checks for unclosed brackets and braces in glob/any patterns. These are warnings (not errors) because OPA's glob.match is forgiving, but they surface likely typos during policy loading. 3. Add missing test cases: empty query values, keys without values, unicode after percent-decoding, empty query strings, and literal + via %2B encoding. * fix(sandbox): add missing query_params field in forward proxy L7 request info * style(sandbox): fix formatting in proxy L7 query param parsing --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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John T. Myers
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a831a8921b |
feat(settings): gateway-to-sandbox runtime settings channel (#474)
* feat(gateway/sandbox): add global and sandbox runtime settings flow |
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John T. Myersandjohntmyers
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241e95dc39 |
feat(policy): support host wildcards and multi-port endpoints (#366)
* feat(policy): support host wildcards and multi-port endpoints Add glob-style host wildcards to endpoints[].host using OPA's glob.match with "." as delimiter — *.example.com matches a single DNS label, **.example.com matches across labels. Validation rejects bare * and requires *. prefix; warns on broad patterns like *.com. Add repeated uint32 ports field to NetworkEndpoint for multi-port support. Backwards compatible: existing port scalar is normalized to ports array. Both the proto-to-JSON and YAML-to-JSON conversion paths emit a ports array; Rego always references endpoint.ports[_]. Fix OpaEngine::reload() to route through the full preprocessing pipeline instead of bypassing L7 validation and port normalization. Closes #359 * fix(policy): reject configs with both port and ports set --------- Co-authored-by: johntmyers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Drew Newberry
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fbd93a4632 | refactor: rename navigator- crate prefix to openshell- (#277) | ||
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Piotr Mlocek
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31d7ca53ff |
refactor(inference): simplify routing — introduce inference.local, remove implicit catch-all (#146)
Remove multi-route CRUD system and replace with single managed cluster route (inference.local). Key changes: - Remove inference route CRUD RPCs and CLI commands - Remove InspectForInference OPA action; policy is binary allow/deny - Introduce AuthHeader enum and InferenceProviderProfile in navigator-core - Router is now provider-agnostic: auth style carried on ResolvedRoute - Replace InferenceRouteSpec with ClusterInferenceConfig (2 fields vs 8) - Rename proto: routing_hint->name, SandboxResolvedRoute->ResolvedRoute, GetSandboxInferenceBundle->GetInferenceBundle, drop sandbox_id param - Rename RouteConfig.route -> RouteConfig.name; use inference.local - Add 'nemoclaw cluster inference update' for partial config changes - Delete stale navigator.inference.v1.rs checked-in proto file - Update architecture docs, agent skills, and CLI reference Closes #133 |
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Alexander Watson
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1d7909cb38 |
chore: add open-source compliance files and SPDX headers (#71)
Add Apache 2.0 licensing, SPDX copyright headers on all source files, DCO enforcement, third-party notices, and CI enforcement. - LICENSE: Apache License 2.0 full text - DCO: Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1 - SPDX headers on all 176 source files (.rs, .py, .proto, .rego, .sh, .toml, .yaml, Dockerfiles) - scripts/update_license_headers.py: header management with --check mode - scripts/generate_third_party_notices.py: dependency license aggregation - THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES: generated listing of all Rust and Python deps - build/license.toml: mise tasks for license:check and license:update - CI: license-headers job in checks.yml, DCO check workflow - CONTRIBUTING.md: DCO sign-off requirement and license header docs - Cargo.toml: license changed to Apache-2.0, repository URL updated - pyproject.toml: license field added Closes #58 |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
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ff52643237 |
feat(sandbox): allow egress to private IP space via allowed_ips policy field (#60)
* feat(sandbox): allow egress to private IP space via allowed_ips policy field Add an allowed_ips field to NetworkEndpoint that accepts CIDR notation and exact IPs, enabling sandboxes to reach private IP space under policy control while maintaining SSRF protections for loopback and link-local addresses. Three modes are supported: - Default (no allowed_ips): all private IPs blocked (existing behavior) - Host + allowlist: domain must resolve to an IP in allowed_ips - Hostless allowlist (no host): any domain allowed if resolved IP matches Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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John Myers
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757217f4bd |
feat(sandbox): support live policy updates, history, and policy-aware logs (!55)
Closes #78 ## What You Can Do ### Live policy updates Update a running sandbox's network policy without recreating it: ```bash nav sandbox policy set <sandbox> --policy new-policy.yaml --wait --timeout 60 ``` The sandbox hot-reloads the policy within 30s (configurable). On failure, the previous policy stays active (last-known-good). Idempotent — submitting the same policy twice returns the existing version: ``` ✓ Policy version 3 submitted (hash: a1b2c3d4e5f6) $ nav sandbox policy set test --policy same.yaml · Policy unchanged (version 3, hash: a1b2c3d4e5f6) ``` ### Policy history & inspection ```bash nav sandbox policy list <sandbox> # version history with status nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> # current policy metadata nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> --full # print full policy as YAML nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> --rev 2 --full # specific revision as YAML ``` ### Sandbox logs Stream logs from both the gateway and sandbox supervisor in one view: ```bash nav sandbox logs <sandbox> # one-shot, last 2000 lines nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --tail # live streaming nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --source sandbox # supervisor logs only nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --source gateway # gateway logs only nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --level warn # warnings and errors only nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --since 5m # last 5 minutes nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --tail --source sandbox --level info ``` Each log line is tagged with its source and includes structured fields: ``` [1772055394.673] [sandbox] [INFO ] [navigator_sandbox::proxy] CONNECT action=allow dst_host=api.anthropic.com dst_port=443 policy=claude_code [1772055061.005] [gateway] [INFO ] [navigator_server::grpc] GetSandboxPolicy served from policy history ``` --- ## Implementation ### Proto changes - 7 new RPCs: `UpdateSandboxPolicy`, `GetSandboxPolicyStatus`, `ListSandboxPolicies`, `ReportPolicyStatus`, `GetSandboxLogs`, `PushSandboxLogs` (client-streaming) - `SandboxLogLine`: added `source` (gateway/sandbox), `fields` (structured key-value map) - `WatchSandboxRequest`: added `log_since_ms`, `log_sources`, `log_min_level` - `GetSandboxLogsRequest`: added `sources`, `min_level` - `PolicyStatus` enum, `SandboxPolicyRevision` message - `Sandbox.current_policy_version` field ### Server - **Policy persistence**: New `sandbox_policies` table (SQLite + Postgres) with per-sandbox monotonic versions, status tracking, and policy hash - **UpdateSandboxPolicy**: Validates static field immutability (filesystem/landlock/process), network mode consistency (Block↔Proxy), deterministic hash comparison for idempotent updates - **Lazy backfill**: First `GetSandboxPolicy` call creates version 1 from `spec.policy` for existing sandboxes - **Log broker**: `TracingLogBus::publish_external()` injects sandbox-pushed logs into the same broadcast channel + tail buffer (2000 lines). Server forces `source="sandbox"` and `sandbox_id` on all pushed logs - **Source/level filtering**: Applied server-side in both `GetSandboxLogs` and `WatchSandbox` streams - **Version supersession**: When a new version is loaded, all older pending+loaded versions are marked superseded ### Sandbox - **`OpaEngine::reload_from_proto()`**: Full `from_proto()` pipeline (L7 validation, access preset expansion) with atomic engine swap. On failure, previous engine untouched (LKG) - **Policy poll loop**: Background task polls every 30s (configurable via `NAVIGATOR_POLICY_POLL_INTERVAL_SECS`), reports status via `ReportPolicyStatus` RPC - **`LogPushLayer`**: Tracing layer captures events at INFO+ (configurable via `NAVIGATOR_LOG_PUSH_LEVEL`), sends structured fields via `PushSandboxLogs` client-streaming RPC. Background task batches 50 lines / flushes every 500ms. Best-effort (drops on full channel, never blocks) - **`CachedNavigatorClient`**: Persistent mTLS channel for both policy polling and log push ### Database migration - `002_create_sandbox_policies.sql` (SQLite + Postgres) ## Tests - **Unit**: 8 policy persistence tests (put/get/list/status/supersede/isolation) - **Integration**: 4 test files updated with new RPC stubs - **E2E**: `test_live_policy_update_and_logs` — full lifecycle: create → set same (unchanged) → push new → wait for load → verify connectivity → push same (unchanged) → verify history → fetch logs ## Documentation - `architecture/sandbox.md`: Log streaming architecture, LogPushLayer, push task, server broker, source tagging, structured fields, CLI filtering, failure modes - `architecture/security-policy.md`: Live update semantics, deterministic hashing, CLI filter flags, policy inspection - `architecture/plans/issue-78-sandbox-log-streaming.md`: Design plan for log streaming ## Security - Trust boundary documented: shared mTLS cert model (per-sandbox auth tracked in #80) - Server forces `source="sandbox"` and `sandbox_id` on pushed logs (can't impersonate gateway or other sandboxes) - Per-batch line cap (100) prevents flooding |
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Piotr Mlocek
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34fd3cbf64 |
feat(inference): inference interception and routing (!38)
Closes #67 ## Summary Implements transparent inference interception and routing for sandboxed AI agents. The sandbox proxy intercepts outbound AI SDK calls (OpenAI, Anthropic) and reroutes them through the gateway to policy-controlled backends — enabling organizations to redirect inference traffic to local or self-hosted models without modifying agent code. **Decision model** — a tri-state OPA evaluation for every CONNECT request: 1. Binary + endpoint explicitly allowed in `network_policies` → **allow** (pass through) 2. Not explicitly allowed + `inference.allowed_routes` configured → **inspect for inference** (TLS intercept, detect API patterns, route through gateway) 3. Otherwise → **deny** No endpoint declarations or binary lists needed for inference routing. Just configure `inference.allowed_routes`. ## Key Changes ### Sandbox (interception) - **OPA policy**: New `network_action` Rego rule with three outcomes (`allow`, `inspect_for_inference`, `deny`). New `NetworkAction` enum replaces `PolicyDecision.allowed` bool for the proxy's main decision path. - **Proxy**: New `InspectForInference` path — TLS-terminates client, parses HTTP, detects inference API patterns (`POST /v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/v1/messages`), strips auth headers, forwards via gRPC. - **New module**: `l7/inference.rs` — `InferenceApiPattern`, `detect_inference_pattern()`, HTTP request/response parsing. - **gRPC client**: New `proxy_inference()` for sandbox→gateway forwarding. - **Sandbox init**: Creates OPA engine when inference is configured, even without `network_policies`. ### Gateway (dispatch) - **InferenceService**: `ProxyInference` RPC loads sandbox policy, resolves allowed routes, dispatches to router. Full CRUD for inference routes. - **Proto**: `InferenceRoute`, `InferenceRouteSpec`, `ProxyInferenceRequest/Response`, Inference gRPC service. ### Router (backend proxying) - **New crate**: `navigator-router` with `Router`, `proxy_with_candidates()`, protocol-based route selection, backend HTTP proxying with auth header rewriting. - **Mock support** for testing (`mock://` scheme). ### CLI - `nav inference create/update/delete/list` commands for route management. ### Python SDK - Updated protobuf bindings. Removed old `inference.py` client (replaced by transparent interception). ### Documentation - New `architecture/inference-routing.md` — end-to-end system documentation. - Updated `architecture/sandbox.md` — proxy, OPA, and source index sections. - Updated `architecture/README.md` — new subsystem overview and diagram. ## Addendum: Chunked Transfer Compatibility This branch now also fixes intercepted SDK requests that send chunked request bodies: - `inspect_for_inference` now accepts `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and decodes chunked request bodies before forwarding to the gateway - Removed the prior `411 Length Required` response for chunked intercepted requests - Added request/response header sanitization for framing and hop-by-hop headers (`content-length`, `transfer-encoding`, `connection`, etc.) to keep forwarded requests and returned responses valid - Added unit tests for chunked parsing and header sanitization Note: this improves compatibility for streaming-style SDK request patterns; true token-by-token passthrough response streaming is still a separate follow-up. ## Minimal Policy for Inference Routing ```yaml inference: allowed_routes: - local ``` Any outgoing connection from a binary not explicitly allowed in `network_policies` will be intercepted and checked for inference API patterns. ## Test Plan - [x] `cargo test --workspace` — all tests pass - [x] `mise run pre-commit` — all checks pass - [x] E2E: OpenAI chat completions routed through gateway - [x] E2E: Anthropic messages routed through gateway - [x] E2E: Python OpenAI SDK from sandbox (`examples/inference/inference.py`) - [x] E2E test: `e2e/python/test_inference_routing.py` |
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John Myers
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f1439727b9 |
feat(sandbox): L7 protocol-aware inspection with TLS termination (!29)
## Summary Implements L7 (application-layer) protocol-aware policy enforcement for the sandbox proxy, enabling per-request allow/deny decisions based on HTTP method and path — not just host:port. ### Phase 1: HTTP/REST L7 Inspection (plaintext) - New `l7/` module with provider trait, REST parser, and relay loop - Parses HTTP/1.1 requests inside CONNECT tunnels, evaluates method+path against OPA/Rego policy - Supports `access` presets (`full`, `read-only`, `read-write`) and explicit `rules` with glob path matching - `enforcement` modes: `enforce` (deny with 403 JSON) vs `audit` (log only, forward traffic) - Structured logging for every L7 decision (`L7_REQUEST` with protocol, action, target, decision) ### Phase 2: MITM TLS Termination for HTTPS - Ephemeral CA generated at sandbox startup (`rcgen`) - Per-hostname leaf certificate cache (256 cap) for dynamic cert presentation - Client-side TLS termination (sandbox trusts ephemeral CA via `SSL_CERT_FILE`, `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, etc.) - Upstream TLS connection with `webpki-roots` verification - Endpoints with `tls: terminate` get full L7 inspection; others remain passthrough ### Additional - Benign TLS/connection errors (close_notify, handshake EOF, reset) downgraded from WARN to DEBUG - Generic `AsyncRead + AsyncWrite` bounds throughout L7 module (works with both `TcpStream` and `TlsStream`) - Proto schema extended with `protocol`, `tls`, `enforcement`, `access`, `rules` fields on `NetworkEndpoint` - CLI `nav sandbox run` wired with `--rego-policy`/`--rego-data` flags and L7 policy display ### E2E Test Coverage - 7 L4 tests: no-matching-policy deny, wildcard binary, binary-restricted, wrong port, cross-policy isolation, non-CONNECT 405, structured log fields - 7 L7 TLS tests: full access allow, read-only deny POST, audit mode, explicit path rules, CA trust store injection, deny response JSON format, structured log fields ## Key Files | Area | Files | |------|-------| | L7 core | `l7/mod.rs`, `l7/provider.rs`, `l7/relay.rs`, `l7/rest.rs` | | TLS termination | `l7/tls.rs` | | Proxy integration | `proxy.rs`, `lib.rs`, `main.rs` | | Env/process | `process.rs`, `ssh.rs` | | OPA policy | `opa.rs`, `dev-sandbox-policy.rego` | | Proto schema | `proto/sandbox.proto` | | CLI | `navigator-cli/src/run.rs` | | E2E tests | `e2e/python/test_sandbox_policy.py` | ## Test plan - [x] 67 unit tests pass (`cargo test --workspace`) - [x] `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` clean - [x] 16 e2e policy tests pass (`mise run test:e2e:sandbox`) - [x] Manual smoke test: sandbox with `tls: terminate` on `api.anthropic.com:443` Closes #25 |
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Piotr Mlocek
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c094769a43 |
feat(server): add an inference router (!13)
Closes #3 |
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John Myers
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87b2446501 | feat(sandbox): OPA policy engine with process-identity binding | ||
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Drew Newberry
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d5d3c71e9c | feat(sandboxes): initial kube sandbox impl |