* fix(cli): backpressure sandbox uploads
Stream archive uploads over a bounded SSH subsystem whose credit follows extraction stdin progress. Preserve the existing input budget and tar destination semantics, validate completion, and clean up cancelled transfers. Add protocol, lifecycle, and large-upload regression coverage without changing russh.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(cli): preserve upload cancellation and errors
Keep cancellation active through upload setup and retry delays, and
terminate cancelled SSH probes. Preserve protocol failures through output
completion and report captured diagnostics on early extraction failure.
Remove redundant upload validation and extend the affected regressions.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* refactor(cli): carry upload credit over SSH streams
Replace the framed upload protocol with SSH's own streams. The client
sends one JSON plan line, the raw archive and EOF. The supervisor's
stdout carries only cumulative totals of bytes written to extraction
stdin, extraction output goes to stderr, and the exit status reports
the result. Extraction starts inline through the ordinary exec path.
This removes the frame codec, SHA-256 digests, the CLI sha2 dependency
and the supervisor upload state machine while keeping the 1 MiB credit
window, the 4 MiB input guard, cancellation and error reporting. A
failed archive now stops SSH before closing stdin, so EOF never marks a
truncated archive complete.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(cli): isolate upload SSH connections and pin credit cadence
- Apply the forward multiplexing overrides to the upload ssh command, so
a user ControlMaster cannot carry an upload over another session's
master connection.
- Kill ssh before closing its stdin when a transfer fails locally, and
include ssh stderr in transport errors.
- Share ACK_INTERVAL_BYTES from core. Assert at compile time that CLI
chunks fit the credit left after an ack and that the window stays
below the supervisor's pending-input guard.
- Log the real reason when the supervisor rejects an upload.
- Test that a single-packet upload reports its final total.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(cli): assert upload ssh opens the subsystem without a TTY
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): share OCI image checks across Docker and Podman
Add an oci-image feature testsuite that runs against installed artifacts.
It covers custom WORKDIR placement, image content and ownership, workspace
writes from the main process and exec, file transfer including
directory-merge upload, OCI user identity, the managed /sandbox fallback,
and rejection of an unwritable WORKDIR.
CI runs the suite on the Docker rootful, Podman rootful, and Podman
rootless tmachine guests.
Replace the Docker-only custom_image e2e with the shared suite.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): require WorkspaceValidationFailed and cover image USER fallback
The unwritable WORKDIR scenario now requires the WorkspaceValidationFailed
reason, so unrelated provisioning failures cannot pass it. The numeric
USER scenario supplies a policy without a process section, so the image
USER is the only source of the sandbox identity.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(podman): leave shared OCI identity checks to the oci-image suite
The oci-image feature suite covers the sandbox identity seen by the main
process and sandbox exec on Docker and Podman. The Podman e2e keeps the
checks only it can make: the pinned image ID and the isolated
workload/supervisor container pair.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): accept existing workspace rejection diagnostics
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): fix cleanup ordering and restore coverage parity
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): remove migrated legacy workspace helpers and checks
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* fix(drivers): report rejected OCI working directories as WorkspaceValidationFailed
The supervisor exits with the reserved status when the sandbox rejects the
image working directory. Docker maps that exit during readiness and
monitoring and records it before removing the supervisor container, and
Podman maps the supervisor companion's exit instead of the workload's.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): require WorkspaceValidationFailed for unwritable WORKDIR
Unrelated provisioning failures can no longer pass the rejection scenario.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* fix(oci): keep exit 78 reserved and report fixed workspace diagnostics
The supervisor no longer passes on a workload's own exit status 78, so
drivers cannot misreport it as a workspace rejection after a runtime
restart. The rejection is recognized once at agent start and carried as a
typed error. Docker reports the same fixed condition message as Podman and
logs the supervisor output instead, and its monitor removes the supervisor
container when a stop overlaps diagnostics collection. The OCI image suite
registers images for cleanup only after they build.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* refactor(oci): simplify workspace failure handling and OCI image tests
Report a recorded Docker workspace rejection once, where supervisor
readiness fails, and match its fixed message exactly. Read the Podman
supervisor exit status once per inspection. Choose the supervisor exit
status in one function and derive the workspace error type.
The OCI image suite shares step helpers, checks that a custom workspace
does not also create /sandbox, and its playbook waits for a connected
gateway and collects failure diagnostics through the shared role.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): replace podman_oci_identity with shared and driver suite checks
The oci-image feature suite now checks, on Docker and Podman, that the
image user has no capabilities, has no_new_privs set, and cannot read
the sandbox control credentials, and that a custom WORKDIR is not a
mount. The checks that need container inspection (pinned image ID,
network=none, supervisor user and capabilities) move to a small test in
the Podman driver suite. Remove the legacy podman_oci_identity e2e test.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): keep podman_oci_identity for Podman-only isolation checks
Restore the Podman e2e test removed in the previous commit and drop
only the checks the shared oci-image suite now runs on Docker and
Podman: workload capabilities, no_new_privs, credential readability,
and the workspace and /sandbox mount checks. The pinned image ID and
the workload/supervisor isolation checks stay, as does the Podman
driver suite unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* refactor(oci): simplify workspace failure reporting and OCI image suite
Carry the Docker control supervisor's failure reason in a typed error
instead of matching status text, build the fixed workspace message where
the wait result is classified, and drop the fake Docker server test.
Inline image cleanup ordering in the suite, read the container engine
once, share sandbox naming, and stop granting a literal /sandbox in the
image identity policy. Add e2e:oci-image mise tasks and use them from the
ARM64 Docker workflow and TESTING.md.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): move shared container checks into the OCI image suite
Inspect the containers the driver created through the gateway's engine in
the shared suite: the workload runs the inspected image ID as the OCI
identity without a network or supervisor credential mounts, and the
supervisor is a separate non-root container. Keep only the Podman-specific
supervisor identity and capability checks in podman_oci_identity.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): check the workspace rejection reason from sandbox JSON
Read the WorkspaceValidationFailed condition reason from sandbox get
--output json instead of matching CLI output, and restore the Docker
driver's original workspace failure helpers.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(oci): capture fixture image identity before sandbox creation
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* feat(providers): support stable credential placeholders
Add credentials[].stable_placeholder so a running client keeps using an externally rotated static credential through the reference it already holds. Squashed replay of the earlier four commits onto upstream main 71c3cd957; re-derives the frozen schema fingerprints and adapts the provider environment revision test to the added capability argument.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(e2e): apply stable-placeholder supervisor image override
Use ManagedGateway's per-process supervisor image override so the fixture
CA reaches the supervisor when runtime image environment variables take
precedence over gateway TOML. Restore the wrapper's original image after
each test, following the provider-readiness fixture.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(server): update public RPC schema fingerprint after merging main
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(providers): bind multi-route grants to admitted endpoints
Carry gateway-derived endpoint owners through policy and credential delivery. Select grants only from owners that admit the current request, refresh provider snapshots per request, and reject superseded installations before forwarding.
Cover persistent routes, overlapping owners, denial, refresh, cache expiry and recovery with focused tests and a Podman regression.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* refactor(providers): simplify admitted-endpoint grant selection
Share admitted endpoints between forwarding and credential authorization. Select grants from the live snapshot without rebuilding a locked map, reuse profile policy construction, and preserve freshness guards when grants are removed.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(providers): preserve trusted owners across policy approval
Sanitize authored owner metadata before composing effective policies, preserve derived owners through proposal approval, and normalize advisor endpoint comparisons. Account for gateway-only owner fields in SDK coverage and schema inventory.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* refactor(providers): share dynamic credential key layout and require a snapshot for admission
Move the endpoint-bound credential key layout into openshell-core. DynamicCredentialKey encodes the key the gateway builds, and the supervisor reads its endpoint selector, credential identity, and revision-scoped form through the same module instead of parsing tab-separated strings in three places. Revision scoping becomes ProviderCredentialSnapshot::scoped_key.
inject_for_admitted_owners now takes the pinned snapshot directly. The L7 admission path never acquires a grant from the live credential map, which production populates only alongside a snapshot. L4 forwarding keeps the selector-only path through inject_if_needed. Both share one acquire-and-rewrite step.
Delete two relay tests whose behavior the Rego admission tests already prove. Add a test that grants for different headers are acquired only for admitting owners.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(providers): share credential preparation across HTTP relays
Apply endpoint-owned grants after policy and request middleware in REST,
GraphQL, JSON-RPC/MCP and inspected plaintext forwarding. Preserve live
provider and policy checks through guarded writes, reject missing owner
metadata, and reject profiles that cannot inject dynamic HTTP credentials.
Cover production stream dispatch, multiple endpoints, failure handling and
plaintext ownership with focused regressions. Document upgrade ordering.
Closes#3657
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(providers): validate dynamic credential key encoding
Reject control characters at profile import and key construction. Propagate
invalid key errors through gateway environment resolution and reject malformed
key layouts before token acquisition while preserving supported legacy keys.
Consolidate duplicate relay success tests and share forward-proxy setup without
removing ownership, canonicalization, refresh or guarded-write assertions.
Document token-grant endpoint authority.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(supervisor): report rejected OCI working directories as WorkspaceValidationFailed
The RFC 0012 split dropped the supervisor exit status that drivers map to
the WorkspaceValidationFailed condition. An image WORKDIR the sandbox
identity cannot use then surfaced as ControlSupervisorStartFailed on
Docker and as a signal kill on Podman.
The supervisor now exits with the reserved status when the sandbox rejects
the image working directory. Docker maps that supervisor exit during
readiness and monitoring, and Podman maps the supervisor companion's exit
instead of the workload's.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* feat(podman): honor OCI image working directories
Podman sandboxes now use a custom OCI image WORKDIR as the workspace and
as the working directory for agent commands, matching Docker. Empty, /,
and /sandbox values keep the managed /sandbox workspace volume.
A custom workspace stays in the image's container filesystem: no
workspace volume, no archive upload, and no root setup step. Resolve the
image ID, user, environment, and working directory from one pinned
inspection, validate the workdir with the shared OCI rules, and reject
Podman control-path overlaps and image volumes or driver mounts that
cover it. The runtime starts from / and passes the resolved path to agent
commands with --workdir.
Add podman_oci_identity to the Podman CI test list.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* fix(drivers): preserve custom workspace failures across supervisor cleanup
Check the Podman custom workspace rather than the absent managed volume in the OCI identity E2E. Classify Bollard wait errors by exit code and record Docker workspace failures before removing the supervisor so readiness retains the specific failure reason.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* fix(docker): use sandbox ID for recorded startup failures
Keep the workload container ID for Docker inspection and use the sandbox ID to retrieve the monitor failure. Test with distinct identifiers so the lookup cannot accidentally pass with a container ID.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* refactor(podman): keep WORKDIR change focused on workspace behavior
Remove the new cross-driver workspace failure classification path and its monitor/readiness workaround. Preserve Podman WORKDIR resolution, mount safety, and workspace rejection without requiring a distinct condition reason.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* refactor(podman): simplify inspected image metadata and test fixtures
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* code review
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* fix(ssh): persist sandbox host identities
Store each sandbox's Ed25519 host key in the gateway credential store and
deliver it only to the supervisor. Preserve identity across restarts,
delete owned credentials with the sandbox, and expose the public SHA256
fingerprint through sandbox and SSH-session APIs and client SDKs.
Cover credential ownership, cancellation, deletion retries, client
compatibility, and pinned SSH connections through lifecycle transitions.
Closes#3835
Signed-off-by: Mike Nguyen <miken@nvidia.com>
* fix(compute): clean up failed sandbox SSH identity creation
Signed-off-by: Mike Nguyen <miken@nvidia.com>
* test(ssh): wait for sandbox deletion before name reuse
Signed-off-by: Mike Nguyen <miken@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Mike Nguyen <miken@nvidia.com>
* feat(providers): compose dynamic credential grants per request
Select the most-specific grant independently for each protected header,
preserving each credential's issuer, audience and cache identity. Resolve
all selected grants before rewriting the request, replace agent-supplied
header copies, and fail closed on collisions or acquisition failures.
Allow distinct-header compositions in gateway validation and redact raw
issuer errors. Cover independent cache entries, atomic TLS relay failure,
header replacement and concurrent request isolation; document the profile
contract.
Fixes#3320
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(providers): correct dynamic grant CI checks
Use if-let for a grant result whose error payload is deliberately ignored,
and name the empty query map type in the regression fixture. Preserve grant
acquisition, failure redaction and request atomicity. Update the token-exchange
failure test to require the sanitized error instead of raw issuer text.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(podman): create managed workspace volumes owned by the workload identity
Podman now creates the managed /sandbox volume with uid/gid options for the
resolved workload identity, so the workload starts directly as that
identity. This fixes rootful sandboxes whose image USER or policy
run_as_user could not write to a root-owned /sandbox, and removes the
root-then-drop workspace chown start path.
Resource admission accepts the managed workspace volume when its options
match the workload container's final identity, or are empty for volumes
created by older gateways. The channel volume still requires empty options.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
* test(podman): cover managed volume reuse and workspace access
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* refactor(podman): clarify managed volume creation and validation
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(podman): verify workspace access across user namespaces
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* fix(vm): enforce the configured workload identity
Reject conflicting policy users and groups before VM image preparation
and before guest attach or process startup changes state. Validate
supervisor policy updates against the protected VM workload identity.
Preserve the gateway CA transport and capability-free sandbox launcher.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(sandbox): clarify VM identity rejection fixtures
Name invalid user and group fixtures distinctly and move the final
workload identity into its group mismatch test.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(supervisor): align VM identity startup with current APIs
Pass the optional rejection-log key for VM identity failures and keep
generic startup-write regressions free of VM identity constraints.
Repair the call sites after the branch rebase so the identity and cleanup
proposals compile against the current startup helpers.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(vm): restore inactive sandbox workload identity
Recover the persisted overlay owner before publishing stopped and terminal
sandboxes. Keep resources manageable when identity metadata is invalid.
Clarify fixed MicroVM ownership in policy-generation guidance.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(vm): flush identity fixture before restart
Persist the canonical identity file before readiness and report the observed
exec, canonical and file-owner identities before comparing them.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
Start driver cleanup after terminal finalization and retain disconnect fallback. Add detached success and failure e2e coverage across supervisor-based drivers.
Closes#3938
Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(podman): move podman_preflight into driver-podman integration tests
podman_preflight verifies that openshell-driver-podman fails fast when
its Podman socket is unreachable. It only needs the standalone driver
binary, not a gateway, so it never fit the gateway-backed e2e-podman
harness it lived under and never ran anywhere in CI.
Move it into crates/openshell-driver-podman/tests/ as a plain Cargo
integration test. It now runs via the existing required workspace test
job with no special mise task, workflow step, or coverage exception.
Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com>
* test(podman): make preflight diagnostics portable
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* fix(e2e): stop sandbox leaks from async Drop cleanup
Closes#2922
SandboxGuard::Drop spawned a detached thread to delete the sandbox.
The thread got killed with the test process before the delete
finished. Switch to a blocking command in Drop, like ManagedCleanup
already does. Also wrap two tests' manual cleanup in RAII guards so
a panic does not leak a sandbox.
Signed-off-by: Eric Curtin <eric.curtin@docker.com>
* test(e2e): arm sandbox guards before create
Address review: install guards with explicit names first.
Signed-off-by: Eric Curtin <eric.curtin@docker.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Eric Curtin <eric.curtin@docker.com>
* fix(sandbox-backend): sort boundary request objects before hashing
Sort boundary request objects recursively before hashing so serde_json's
preserve_order feature cannot change digest identity. Cover canonical
bytes, envelope round trips, and rejection of modified provider values
and operations.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* feat(mcp): upgrade tower-mcp-types to 0.22.2
Upgrade tower-mcp-types from 0.12.0 to an exact-pinned 0.22.2 and use its
inspection APIs to validate MCP requests against the selected revision.
Carry inspection metadata into policy evaluation and validate requests
after header rewriting, before forwarding.
Add explicit support for the sessionless 2026-07-28 revision while keeping
2025-11-25 as the default. Validate per-request metadata and standard HTTP
header mirrors, and support discovery, tools, and subscription requests.
Delegate batch availability and parameter schemas to Tower. Share typed
request names between policy and HTTP checks, retain the local batch
resource cap, and centralize MCP policy version parsing and ordering.
Keep supported MCP revisions and shared allowlist parsing in the canonical
policy schema; core re-exports those types. Tower owns wire-profile
semantics, and every supported policy revision must map to the matching
inspector profile.
Reject duplicate JSON keys, invalid known-method parameters, unavailable
methods, and unsupported batches. Keep exact extension allow rules and
deny precedence. Document request inspection boundaries and add unit,
forwarding, and sandbox coverage.
Refs #2174.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(mcp): prove authorization at the forwarding boundary
Cover March batch denial in both member orders, valid and malformed
controls, and audit behavior across both relay entry paths. Exercise real
middleware tool rewrites with matching metadata and assert the exact
upstream representation or zero forwarded bytes.
Verify legacy bodyless SSE GET remains usable while GET tool bodies and
unsupported DELETE cleanup are rejected. Clarify request-selected profile
and middleware mutation comments without changing production behavior.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(mcp): exercise permitted profiles through the sandbox proxy
Cover March and June singleton policies and select November and July
separately under one endpoint allowlist. Capture upstream tool receipts
to distinguish proxy policy denial from an upstream rejection.
Extend middleware rewrite coverage to June and multi-version policies,
and preserve the sessionless discovery and subscription checks through
the shared fixture helpers.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(kubernetes): box the admission check future
Keep the admission test future below Clippy's size limit when the
workspace dependency features are unified.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(mcp): reuse the forwarding fixture identity cache
Share the binary identity cache across protocol-profile cases, matching
the proxy lifecycle and avoiding repeated hashes of the test executable.
Keep procfs authorization and all forwarding assertions intact.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* test(podman): run driver-podman userns suite against rootful Podman too
The driver-specific-integration job only ran the driver-podman testsuite
(default/auto/keep-id/private userns reference checks) against
fedora-podman-rootless, leaving rootful behavior for this scenario
unverified even though the compute driver auto-detects and explicitly
supports rootful Podman.
The default-userns-baseline and userns-profile playbooks hard-asserted a
rootless tmachine gateway user, so pointing them at a rootful environment
would have failed that assertion immediately rather than exercising
anything. They now detect rootful vs. rootless via the existing
tmachine_container_runtime role and branch the reference-capture user
accordingly, while keeping the captured reference file itself owned by
tmachine, since the archived test binary that reads it back always runs
unprivileged as tmachine regardless of daemon mode.
Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com>
* test(podman): add real-daemon coverage for resource limits and daemon failure
Neither the Podman driver's resource-limit enforcement nor its behavior
when the Podman daemon is unreachable had any test coverage against a
real daemon; both were only exercised through unit tests against a
mocked Podman client.
podman_resource_limits.rs creates a sandbox with --cpu/--memory flags and
reads /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max and cpu.max from inside the sandbox
itself, verifying the limit is actually enforced rather than just echoed
back by the template API. Expected values are cross-checked against the
driver's own parse_cpu_to_microseconds/parse_memory_to_bytes and against
a real local `podman run --cpus/--memory` container.
podman_preflight.rs spawns the standalone openshell-driver-podman binary
against a guaranteed-nonexistent Podman socket and asserts it exits
non-zero within its bounded retry window with an actionable error naming
the socket path, rather than hanging or failing silently.
Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com>
* test(podman): make rootful userns and cgroup checks pass
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* test(podman): match lifecycle containers by isolation role label
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* test(podman): accept non-expiring bootstrap tokens
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* fix(podman): restore host gateway alias mediation
Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com>
* fix(podman-e2e-tests): enable broader test podman e2e coverage
Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com>
* fix(tests): make test more reliable
Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com>
* fix(podman): fix macos linting error
Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com>
* fix(driver-kubernetes-secrets)!: store provider credentials in one namespace
The Kubernetes Secrets credential driver now stores every credential in its
configured namespace in all workspace modes and rejects handles that reference
any other namespace before contacting the Kubernetes API. The gateway reaches
credential Secrets through the Role in that namespace; this allows removing the
Secret rules from the ClusterRole.
- Remove the workspace_mode, gateway_id, and allow_reference_namespace driver
settings and stop rendering them from Helm. Configurations that set them fail
at startup. Existing credential state is not migrated.
- Add server.credentialDrivers.kubernetesSecrets.createNamespace to provision a
dedicated credential namespace. The namespace is kept on uninstall, adopted
by a reinstall of the same release, and left untouched when something else owns
it.
- Update the gateway config reference, Kubernetes setup docs, 0.1.0
upgrade guide, compute-runtime architecture, and cluster debugging skill.
Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com>
* fix(helm): reduce gateway Secret permissions
Remove the gateway's Secret list permission in every workspace mode and
grant source Secret reads through a Role in the sandbox namespace.
Bootstrap Secret cleanup deletes Secrets by exact name instead of listing
them.
- Grant get on the copied client TLS and image-pull Secrets through a Role in
the sandbox namespace. The ClusterRole keeps get and patch on those names
for the ownership check and server-side apply into workspace namespaces.
- Delete sandbox and supervisor bootstrap Secrets by exact name, derived from
the runtime generation recorded on the Sandbox and, on restart, the target
generation, tolerating 404. The generation annotation is cleared only after
cleanup succeeds, and each bootstrap Secret has a Pod owner reference, so
garbage collection removes any generation the driver does not name.
- Drop Secret list from the ClusterRole and the shared-mode sandbox Role.
- Extend the managed e2e RBAC checks to Secret list.
- Update the Kubernetes setup and sandbox runtime docs, compute-runtime
architecture, and cluster debugging skill.
Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com>
* fix(driver-kubernetes): stage workspace Secrets per runtime generation
Every Secret the Kubernetes driver writes into a workspace namespace is
now scoped to one sandbox runtime generation, immutable, and created
with create only, so the gateway never reads, patches, or adopts an
existing Secret there. This removes the gateway's cluster-wide get and
patch on the copied client TLS and image-pull Secret names.
- In managed mode, create an immutable copy of each configured
image-pull Secret per generation, named os-pull-<id>-<generation>-<n>
and owned by the generation's workload and supervisor Pods. Pods and
the restarted Sandbox template reference those names, and generation
cleanup deletes them by name. A Secret already holding a generation
name fails the create.
- Outside shared mode, stage the gateway client TLS material into the
supervisor bootstrap Secret instead of copying the client TLS Secret
into the workspace namespace.
- Remove the fixed-name TLS and image-pull copies, the target ownership
read, and the ClusterRole get and patch rule on the copied names.
Source reads stay in the sandbox-namespace Role.
- Update the managed e2e to expect generation image-pull Secrets and
client TLS material in the supervisor bootstrap Secret, and to check
that the gateway cannot read the copied names in workspace namespaces.
- Update the gateway config and compute driver references, Kubernetes
setup and sandbox runtime docs, compute-runtime architecture, driver
README, and cluster debugging skill.
Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com>
* fix(helm)!: grant operator-mode Secret permissions through the workspace chart
The operator-mode gateway ClusterRole grants no Secret permissions.
The openshell-workspace chart Role, installed in each operator-managed
namespace, grants the gateway create and delete on Secrets for sandbox
runtime generations. Operator-managed namespaces require the workspace
chart.
- Fail the chart tests on any ClusterRole rule that includes Secrets in
operator and shared modes.
- Install the workspace chart when the operator e2e provisions a
namespace, and assert that the gateway has no Secret permissions in a
namespace without it.
- Update the Kubernetes setup docs, 0.1.0 upgrade guide, compute-runtime
architecture, and cluster debugging skill.
Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com>
* fix(security): pin supplied executable identity chains
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
* docs(security): document executable identity chain pinning
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
* fix(binary-identity): compile Linux ancestry hashing
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
* test(binary-identity): avoid cross-label ancestry fixture
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
* test(e2e): choose distinct denied TCP port
Fix flaky test due to sequential port assignment on MacOS
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
* fix(identity): bound executable evidence cache
Reject identity chains atomically when the supervisor cache reaches its hard limit, and preserve existing pins without eviction. Classify malformed or conflicting evidence separately from policy denials at the staged TCP boundary.
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jimeyer@nvidia.com>
The credential driver e2e has not passed end to end, and the disabled
kubernetes-credential-drivers CI lane hid three problems.
The test broke when the JSON format of provider list changed.
Continuation-token pagination (#3249) changed
provider list --output json from a bare array of providers to an object
with next_page_token and a providers array. The test still parsed the
output as an array, so it failed before checking either storage
backend. Read the providers array from the new object instead.
Its sandbox name was about 58 characters, but sandbox names are
DNS-routable and limited to 19, so sandbox creation was rejected. Build
a short unique name instead.
The sandbox guard deletes its sandbox from a detached thread on drop, so
the test deleted the provider while the sandbox still existed. The
gateway rejects deleting a provider that is attached to a sandbox, the
test ignored that error, and the credential Secret remained. Delete the
sandbox explicitly before returning from the sandbox check.
Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com>
* feat(kubernetes): support corporate proxy CA bundle
The Kubernetes driver had no way to supply a CA bundle for the corporate
egress proxy, so an `https://` proxy with a private CA, or a TLS-intercepting
proxy, could not be used. Podman and VM already expose `proxy_ca_bundle`.
Add `proxy_ca_bundle` to `[openshell.drivers.kubernetes]` as a path the
gateway Pod reads. The gateway stages the PEM into the existing
per-generation supervisor bootstrap Secret and passes
`--upstream-proxy-ca-bundle` on the supervisor argv. That Secret is already
immutable, owner-referenced and garbage-collected, and its volume mounts
every key at /.openshell/supervisor with no items filter, so this needs no
new object kind, volume, mount, or RBAC verb, and works in shared, managed
and operator workspace modes.
The bundle is deliberately read from the gateway's filesystem rather than
referenced as an object in the sandbox namespace. It becomes a trust anchor
for every upstream the sandbox reaches, so it must stay in the gateway's
trust domain; the immutable staging Secret also keeps the anchor from
changing underneath a running sandbox.
Bound the staged bundle at 256 KiB. The shared reader's limit is exactly the
apiserver's own Secret limit and the bootstrap Secret carries four other
keys, so a bundle between the two would pass gateway startup and then fail
every sandbox create with an opaque `data: Too long`.
Delegate the URL, no_proxy, connect_by_hostname and ca_bundle rules to the
shared validate_upstream_proxy_settings, keeping the Secret-specific
credential block local: this driver accepts an explicit
`proxy_auth_allow_insecure = false` without credentials, which the shared
rules reject. This also fixes the acknowledgement being demanded for an
`https://` proxy, where the credential travels inside the verified TLS
session. Add auth_setting_label so the inline-credential diagnostic names
the Secret keys instead of proxy_auth_file, which this driver rejects as an
unknown key.
Document that the bundle should carry only the CA that signs the proxy's
certificate, or that an intercepting proxy re-signs upstream certificates
with. Public roots already reach the sandbox through the supervisor image and
its TLS stack, and the bundle is concatenated with that system store into a
single boundary control frame, so a full merged trust bundle spends the frame
budget on duplicated roots. The frame, not the apiserver Secret limit, is the
tighter of the two ceilings in practice; raising the staging bound requires
checking it.
Closes#3443
Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com>
* fix(helm): quote proxy CA ConfigMap references
Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com>
* feat(sandbox): default to official Alpine sandbox image
default_sandbox_image() now returns docker.io/library/alpine:3.22, a generic
version-qualified official image, so a fresh install no longer depends on the
community sandbox image catalog. All compute drivers (docker, podman,
kubernetes, vm) inherit this fallback.
Part of #3116.
Signed-off-by: Akram
Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com>
* feat(deploy): default deployment configs to the official Alpine sandbox image
Update the shared gateway default_image, Helm chart values, the standalone
Kubernetes manifest, and the dev gateway task scripts to use
docker.io/library/alpine:3.22 instead of the community base image, consistent
with default_sandbox_image(). GPU e2e image-build base is left unchanged (CUDA
needs a glibc base).
Part of #3116.
Signed-off-by: Akram
Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com>
* feat(driver): default to numeric non-root identity for USER-less images
With the default sandbox image now Alpine, images that declare no OCI USER
must start instead of being rejected. When the image declares no USER and
the policy requests none, the Podman and Docker drivers now supply a numeric
non-root identity (DEFAULT_SANDBOX_UID/GID = 1000) instead of rejecting,
matching the numeric-identity behavior of the Kubernetes and VM drivers. The
supervisor's resolved-identity path runs the sandbox as a synthesized
non-root account without the account existing in the image. Images that
declare a USER keep the OCI resolution path unchanged.
Part of #3116.
Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* test(conformance): use Alpine workload image
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* refactor(policy): drop community image /app path from default policy
The restrictive default policy granted read-only access to /app, a directory
that only existed in the community base image. A generic Alpine default has no
/app, so remove it. Landlock best-effort already ignores absent paths; this
just stops advertising a community-specific layout in the default.
Part of #3116.
Signed-off-by: Akram
Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com>
* docs(config): document Alpine default images
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* fix(podman): report early sandbox termination
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* fix(podman): initialize rootless workspace ownership
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
* fix(sandbox): qualify NVIDIA Ubuntu default
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* fix(podman): initialize rootful default workspace
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* feat(sftp): add native sandbox adapter
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* fix(sftp): gate runtime helper support to Linux
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* fix(sftp): support standard OpenSSH file operations
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* fix(sftp): harden rename and special file handling
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* refactor(runtime): remove community image dependencies
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* test(e2e): build provider readiness tool fixture
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* fix(e2e): use a dedicated Noble fixture for Docker tests
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Akram
Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* feat(kubernetes): support HA gateway rebalancing
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
* perf(server): cache peer connections, tokens, and owner lookups
Every forwarded relay rebuilt its setup from scratch: an owner lookup, a
blocking read of the peer token, a TLS connect to the owning replica, and
a TokenReview plus Pod GET on the receiving side. Sandbox service routing
does this per HTTP request, so the apiserver calls scaled with traffic.
Cache all of it on ServerState:
- peer channels pooled per endpoint, so relays multiplex over one
connection instead of redialing
- peer tokens keyed by SHA-256, expiring at min(ttl, token exp) so a hit
cannot accept an expired token
- owner records for 3s against a 45s ownership TTL, still freshness
checked before use
Entries are evicted when a relay fails. Also raise HTTP/2
max_concurrent_streams to 1024, since pooling funnels every relay between
two replicas onto one connection and hyper's default of 200 sits below
the 256 pending-relay budget.
Signed-off-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com>
* perf(server): pool upstream connections for sandbox services
Each HTTP request to a sandbox service opened its own supervisor relay,
paying a new TCP connection and HTTP/1 handshake every time. Worse, it
counted against the 32 in-flight relay cap, so a service handling more
than 32 concurrent requests failed outright.
Pool idle upstreams per endpoint and port, up to 8 each for 15s. Reuse is
safe because the pool only returns a connection hyper reports as ready,
and HTTP/1 cannot start a request until the previous body has drained.
Upgrades are never pooled since they take the connection over, and a
failed send evicts that endpoint. Pruning is bounded per key, with the
full sweep limited to once per 30s.
Signed-off-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com>
* fix(server): address HA gateway review findings (#3449)
- Let a gateway own supervisor sessions without a peer endpoint. Requiring
one whenever the store is PostgreSQL broke every single-instance
PostgreSQL deployment, because no sandbox supervisor could connect.
A cross-replica request to an owner that advertises no endpoint now fails
immediately naming the cause, instead of retrying until the wait timeout.
- Close a supervisor session on heartbeat only when another replica owns it,
or after renewals fail for the ownership TTL. A database error no longer
drops every session heartbeating during an outage.
- Clamp owner record ages at zero so a skewed or corrupt stored timestamp
cannot produce a negative age.
- Bound the cross-object advisory lock with a lock timeout, so a stuck holder
fails instead of blocking every mutation in the fleet.
- Refuse to start when a peer endpoint is configured on a multi-replica
backend but peer authentication is unavailable, and warn when a
multi-replica backend has no peer endpoint at all.
- Reject a plaintext peer endpoint when the gateway serves TLS.
- Skip the sandbox watch poller on single-replica backends, where the local
update bus already sees every write.
- Rate-limit the peer owner cache sweep so an insert no longer scans the
whole map under the lock.
- Retry GET and HEAD on a pooled upstream the sandbox closed, instead of
returning 502, and drop an emptied endpoint from the pool right away.
- Document the gateway peer environment variables and the post-rollout
ownership skew operators should expect.
Signed-off-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com>
* fix(server): harden HA supervisor ownership
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: divesh <dgude@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Divesh Chowdary <47188680+FrostGod@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(vm): unpack registry images correctly and validate prepared disks
The registry image-prep path expected `umoci raw unpack` to produce a
bundle-style rootfs/ subdirectory, but it extracts the image filesystem
directly into the target. Every registry prep therefore failed after a
successful unpack. Guest init exit codes do not survive the libkrun
boundary, so the failure looked like success and the broken disk was
cached, making every later sandbox for that image fail with "prepared
image disk missing /image-rootfs".
VM E2E started hitting this after the bootstrap image moved to
nvcr.io/nvidia/base/ubuntu:24.04: `--from base` no longer matches the
bootstrap image, so it now goes through registry prep.
- Accept umoci's direct extraction layout in the guest prep script.
- Build the image rootfs under a partial directory and rename it to
/image-rootfs only after every prep step succeeds.
- Check the prepared disk for /image-rootfs before caching it. On
failure, leave the cache untouched and report the prep console tail.
- Size the prep disk to hold the payload and the unpacked rootfs at the
same time. The community base image needs 1.40 GB + 3.32 GB, which
did not fit in the old payload*3 + 512 MiB.
Fixes#2358
Co-authored-by: s2cube <26961336+s2cube@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Emilien Macchi <emacchi@redhat.com>
* test(e2e): run tool-dependent VM tests from the community base image
The host_gateway_alias and vm_corporate_proxy workloads run curl and
python3. The VM driver now defaults to nvcr.io/nvidia/base/ubuntu:24.04,
which ships neither, so these tests fail in VM E2E with "command not
found". Request the community base image explicitly with `--from base`.
Docker, Podman, and Kubernetes E2E already default to that image, so
their behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Emilien Macchi <emacchi@redhat.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Emilien Macchi <emacchi@redhat.com>
Co-authored-by: s2cube <26961336+s2cube@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(cli): promote profile commands to top level
Add profile discovery and management commands with shared handlers for
the existing provider entry points. List a flat catalog across scopes
and follow continuation tokens through full and short pages.
Describe metadata, credentials, endpoints, TLS inspection, and MCP access
settings while preserving complete JSON/YAML definitions. Cover parser
equivalence, scope forwarding, pagination, and inspection settings with
focused unit and compiled-CLI integration tests.
Update docs, public skills, examples, and E2E command invocations.
Refs #2588
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
* fix(cli): remove redundant workspace selector qualification
Use the imported WorkspaceSelector in the provider integration helper so
the target passes Clippy with warnings denied.
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com>
John T. Myers