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pull-request/3839
29
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Drew Newberry
|
c1f2e7189f |
feat(isolation): implement the RFC 0012 sandbox architecture (#2942)
* feat(isolation): add RFC 0012 backend contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(isolation): name the interface crate explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): expose trusted host gateway Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(agents): inventory the MXC driver Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add mediated DNS transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): tighten interface error and digest contracts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): remove unrelated driver inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): define capability-free launch contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): seal confirmed boundary state Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate confirmation for external backend implementations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): clarify mediated DNS identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): unify typed network mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): bind launches to sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): initialize extended sandbox status Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add boundary protocol and Linux primitives Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden signals and separate process status from transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate remote confirmation through public contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate wire state and propagate snapshot failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(isolation): import owned agent specification explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): describe mediated DNS channel Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): bound mediation attach without nested retries Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add transport-neutral session authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): separate sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime boundary controls Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add terminal boundary operation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): split supervisor and sandbox runtimes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden boundary isolation and lifecycle ownership Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reject private root redirects and adopt typed errors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve accept thread ownership on musl Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): isolate credential probes from filtered threads Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): return retained exec exit status to independent waiters Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound network mediation and preserve socket authorization Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound control admission and retire stale mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): select migrated drivers per stack layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): implement loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): authenticate the Sandbox Protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): consume dedicated backend crate Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): align topology session fixture Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): align projected bootstrap bundle Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): validate refreshed credentials before rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): fail closed across supervisor disconnects Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): repair rebased sandbox CI Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * build(runtime): publish separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(config): configure the sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate sandbox binary linkage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): use backend and runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): use a scratch runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): refresh schema and dependency policy Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bind reconnects to supervisor process Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: align runtime split operational guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(security): document Kubernetes runtime RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): enforce runtime lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): identify sandbox start generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(server): restore sandbox launch sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): support authenticated runtime replacement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): bind sandbox session successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): retry pending sandbox successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(vm): run the supervisor outside the guest workload Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): use unified build toolchain Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): own guest network bootstrap Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): expose guest init version Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): select native supervisor artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): guard guest init Linux symbols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): scope Linux test imports Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): avoid guest interface casts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): reconcile admitted sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): share resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): surface host supervisor failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): include guest logs on supervisor exit Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate and clean runtime generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): keep shared paths in the base layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): isolate workloads behind the host supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve host gateway alias resolution Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): use separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): restore startup validation after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): narrow supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): close companion isolation gaps Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): align mediated network expectations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): exercise mediated network paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): attach supervisor to managed network Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): defer supervisor recovery until gateway is ready Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve workloads during session rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): remove unrelated configuration RFC changes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): add proxy-pod isolation topology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): use stable sandbox service authority Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): adapt proxy pods to current runtime APIs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): describe the single runtime placement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): simplify sandbox orchestration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): validate deployment prerequisites Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): update Trivy Helm profile inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(kubernetes): update Trivy scan inventory count Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): reuse preloaded runtime images in e2e Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): type and clean runtime resources Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): make sandbox restarts recoverable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve supervisor egress Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): adopt isolated sandbox and supervisor containers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): stage bootstrap archives at named volume destinations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provision supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): address isolation review findings Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): inspect Debian supervisor provenance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): use libpod-compatible tmpfs options Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind verified sandbox runtime binary Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provide external driver data directory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): start sandbox before joining user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): separate supervisor user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * perf(isolation): add TCP and DNS benchmark harnesses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): align benchmark timing and supported protocols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): report TCP benchmark metrics accurately Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): cancel failed worker startup Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): build matching local supervisor image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make local sandbox smoke test runnable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): wire local sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): narrow sandbox service RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate split runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime session handling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): add standalone network proxy role Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): remove implementation companion notes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): standardize runtime release name Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): pin renamed runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): persist sandbox runtime identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(runtime): restore branch validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): reconcile main after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(network): close unframed HTTP 1.0 responses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(isolation): preserve upstream OCSF updates Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(security): close credential and TLS replay paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): make sandbox refresh retries idempotent Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
0120535efc |
feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints (#2510)
* feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): verify static credential endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(e2e): use valid endpoint isolation fixtures Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve binding identity across rotations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): enforce bindings across request lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): close credential relay gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): hash selected provider profile scope Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): resolve credentials after request admission Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): align single-route credential denials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): harden endpoint-bound rotation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce identity and authority binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): snapshot provider environment atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): include authority port in query proxy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): close credential revocation gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(proxy): explain authority mismatch diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce binding lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): reject credential config collisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): capture credential scope atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): distinguish origin and absolute targets Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): isolate endpointless profile credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): normalize IPv6 request authorities Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify endpointless profile isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): bind endpointless provider credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): use current GCP placeholder revision Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): explain policy credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover endpointless fail-closed invariant Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(policy): expect ambiguity rejection at creation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): share credential mismatch finding builder Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover malformed binding metadata Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): verify multi-key endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover same-host credential path denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): document serialized refresh contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): consolidate L7 log formatting Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): precompile endpoint binding patterns Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): share identity epoch revisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): require explicit request default ports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate SigV4 credential sources Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve endpoint bindings for credential handles Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(go-sdk): expose network credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
905b554c7c |
refactor(network): consolidate proxy egress pipeline (#2373)
* refactor(network): introduce shared egress pipeline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover shared proxy egress paths Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): make destination authorization explicit Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): pin proxy relay policy context Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): lock relay generation contracts Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): establish phase zero compatibility baseline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): detect ambiguous network endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(sandbox): fail closed on invalid policy updates Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): invalidate relays on policy changes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document validation failure posture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover validation and middleware egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): move policy failure mode to gateway toml Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): name proxy contracts by behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): align overlap validation with endpoint selection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): expect hard loopback denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): match declared endpoint denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve path-specific endpoint overrides Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): respect hard-blocked host gateways Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): reconcile proxy refactor with main Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve CONNECT policy generation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): cover runtime endpoint glob semantics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): reject ambiguous policies before persistence Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): explain ambiguity preflight behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): compare body limits within protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): avoid global tracing capture race Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(server): format rebased provider tests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): retain runtime on middleware outage Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): preflight provider composition activation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): distinguish runtime failure transitions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
530aaf1360 |
feat(drivers): support docker and podman config mounts (#1785)
* feat(drivers): support docker and podman config mounts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(drivers): trim mount docs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): cover local driver volume mounts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): satisfy linux clippy lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(drivers): gate bind mounts behind gateway config * docs(sandbox): simplify mount examples * cleanup * test(e2e): stabilize branch checks * fix(drivers): tighten local mount validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
a255ad9142 | fix(e2e): stabilize wildcard host DNS test (#1144) | ||
|
John T. Myers
|
2ca553a4a0 |
fix(sandbox): validate always-blocked IPs at load time, enrich denial logs, and filter un-fixable proposals (#814) (#815)
Policies with allowed_ips entries targeting loopback, link-local, or unspecified ranges now fail at connection time instead of being silently blocked at runtime. The shorthand log format for DENIED events includes a [reason:...] suffix so operators can distinguish 'allowlist miss' from 'structurally un-allowable'. The mechanistic mapper skips proposals for always-blocked destinations, preventing the infinite TUI notification loop. The gateway validates proposed rules on approval as defense-in-depth. - Extract shared IP helpers (is_always_blocked_ip, is_always_blocked_net, is_internal_ip) to openshell_core::net - Reject always-blocked entries in parse_allowed_ips with hard error - Skip implicit allowed_ips synthesis for always-blocked literal IP hosts - Add status_detail to HttpActivityBuilder for denial reason propagation - Enrich NET and HTTP shorthand with [reason:...] for DENIED events - Add engine: tag to HTTP shorthand (consistency with NET shorthand) - Filter always-blocked proposals in mechanistic mapper generate_proposals - Add validate_rule_not_always_blocked server-side defense-in-depth - Update architecture docs, published docs, and E2E test assertions |
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John T. Myers
|
b7779bdefa |
feat(sandbox): integrate OCSF structured logging for sandbox events (#720)
* feat(sandbox): integrate OCSF structured logging for all sandbox events WIP: Replace ad-hoc tracing calls with OCSF event builders across all sandbox subsystems (network, SSH, process, filesystem, config, lifecycle). - Register ocsf_logging_enabled setting (defaults false) - Replace stdout/file fmt layers with OcsfShorthandLayer - Add conditional OcsfJsonlLayer for /var/log/openshell-ocsf.log - Update LogPushLayer to extract OCSF shorthand for gRPC push - Migrate ~106 log sites to OCSF builders (NetworkActivity, HttpActivity, SshActivity, ProcessActivity, DetectionFinding, ConfigStateChange, AppLifecycle) - Add openshell-ocsf to all Docker build contexts * fix(scripts): attach provider to all smoke test phases to avoid rate limits GitHub's unauthenticated API rate limit (60/hour) causes flaky 403s for Phases 1, 2, and 4. Fix by attaching the provider to all sandboxes and upgrading the Phase 1 policy to L7 so credential injection works. Phase 4 (tls:skip) cannot inject credentials by design, so relax the assertion to accept either 200 or 403 from upstream -- both prove the proxy forwarded the request. * fix(ocsf): remove timestamp from shorthand format to avoid double-timestamp The display layer (gateway logs, TUI, sandbox logs CLI) already prepends a timestamp. Having one in the shorthand output too produces redundant double-timestamps like: 15:49:11 sandbox INFO 15:49:11.649 I NET:OPEN ALLOWED ... Now the shorthand is just the severity + structured content: 15:49:11 sandbox INFO I NET:OPEN ALLOWED ... * refactor(ocsf): replace single-char severity with bracketed labels Replace cryptic single-character severity codes (I/L/M/H/C/F) with readable bracketed labels: [LOW], [MED], [HIGH], [CRIT], [FATAL]. Informational severity (the happy-path default) is omitted entirely to keep normal log output clean and avoid redundancy with the tracing-level INFO that the display layer already provides. Before: sandbox INFO I NET:OPEN ALLOWED ... After: sandbox INFO NET:OPEN ALLOWED ... Before: sandbox INFO M NET:OPEN DENIED ... After: sandbox INFO [MED] NET:OPEN DENIED ... * feat(sandbox): use OCSF level label for structured events in log push Set the level field to 'OCSF' instead of 'INFO' for OCSF events in the gRPC log push. This visually distinguishes structured OCSF events from plain tracing output in the TUI and CLI sandbox logs: sandbox OCSF NET:OPEN [INFO] ALLOWED python3(42) -> api.example.com:443 sandbox OCSF NET:OPEN [MED] DENIED python3(42) -> blocked.com:443 sandbox INFO Fetching sandbox policy via gRPC * fix(sandbox): convert new Landlock path-skip warning to OCSF PR #677 added a warn!() for inaccessible Landlock paths in best-effort mode. Convert to ConfigStateChangeBuilder with degraded state so it flows through the OCSF shorthand format consistently. * fix(sandbox): use rolling appender for OCSF JSONL file Match the main openshell.log rotation mechanics (daily, 3 files max) instead of a single unbounded append-only file. Prevents disk exhaustion when ocsf_logging_enabled is left on in long-running sandboxes. * fix(sandbox): address reviewer warnings for OCSF integration W1: Remove redundant 'OCSF' prefix from shorthand file layer — the class name (NET:OPEN, HTTP:GET) already identifies structured events and the LogPushLayer separately sets the level field. W2: Log a debug message when OCSF_CTX.set() is called a second time instead of silently discarding via let _. W3: Document the boundary between OCSF-migrated events and intentionally plain tracing calls (DEBUG/TRACE, transient, internal plumbing). W4: Migrate remaining iptables LOG rule failure warnings in netns.rs (IPv4 TCP/UDP, IPv6 TCP/UDP) to ConfigStateChangeBuilder for consistency with the IPv4 bypass rule failure already migrated. W5: Migrate malformed inference request warn to NetworkActivity with ActivityId::Refuse and SeverityId::Medium. W6: Use Medium severity for L7 deny decisions (both CONNECT tunnel and FORWARD proxy paths) to match the CONNECT deny severity pattern. Allows and audits remain Informational. * refactor(sandbox): rename ocsf_logging_enabled to ocsf_json_enabled The shorthand logs are already OCSF-structured events. The setting specifically controls the JSONL file export, so the name should reflect that: ocsf_json_enabled. * fix(ocsf): add timestamps to shorthand file layer output The OcsfShorthandLayer writes directly to the log file with no outer display layer to supply timestamps. Add a UTC timestamp prefix to every line so the file output matches what tracing::fmt used to provide. Before: CONFIG:VALIDATED [INFO] Validated 'sandbox' user exists in image After: 2026-04-01T15:49:11.649Z CONFIG:VALIDATED [INFO] Validated ... * fix(docker): touch openshell-ocsf source to invalidate cargo cache The supervisor-workspace stage touches sandbox and core sources to force recompilation over the rust-deps dummy stubs, but openshell-ocsf was missing. This caused the Docker cargo cache to use stale ocsf objects from the deps stage, preventing changes to the ocsf crate (like the timestamp fix) from appearing in the final binary. Also adds a shorthand layer test verifying timestamp output, and drafts the observability docs section. * fix(ocsf): add OCSF level prefix to file layer shorthand output Without a level prefix, OCSF events in the log file have no visual anchor at the position where standard tracing lines show INFO/WARN. This makes scanning the file harder since the eye has nothing consistent to lock onto after the timestamp. Before: 2026-04-01T04:04:13.065Z CONFIG:DISCOVERY [INFO] ... After: 2026-04-01T04:04:13.065Z OCSF CONFIG:DISCOVERY [INFO] ... * fix(ocsf): clean up shorthand formatting for listen and SSH events - Fix double space in NET:LISTEN, SSH:LISTEN, and other events where action is empty (e.g., 'NET:LISTEN [INFO] 10.200.0.1' -> 'NET:LISTEN [INFO] 10.200.0.1') - Add listen address to SSH:LISTEN event (was empty) - Downgrade SSH handshake intermediate steps (reading preface, verifying) from OCSF events to debug!() traces. Only the final verdict (accepted/denied) is an OCSF event now, reducing noise from 3 events to 1 per SSH connection. - Apply same spacing fix to HTTP shorthand for consistency. * docs(observability): update examples with OCSF prefix and formatting fixes Align doc examples with the deployed output: - Add OCSF level prefix to all shorthand examples in the log file - Show mixed OCSF + standard tracing in the file format section - Update listen events (no double space, SSH includes address) - Show one SSH:OPEN per connection instead of three - Update grep patterns to use 'OCSF NET:' etc. * docs(agents): add OCSF logging guidance to AGENTS.md Add a Sandbox Logging (OCSF) section to AGENTS.md so agents have in-context guidance for deciding whether new log emissions should use OCSF structured logging or plain tracing. Covers event class selection, severity guidelines, builder API usage, dual-emit pattern for security findings, and the no-secrets rule. Also adds openshell-ocsf to the Architecture Overview table. * fix: remove workflow files accidentally included during rebase These files were already merged to main in separate PRs. They got pulled into our branch during rebase conflict resolution for the deleted docs-preview-pr.yml file. * docs(observability): use sandbox connect instead of raw SSH Users access sandboxes via 'openshell sandbox connect', not direct SSH. * fix(docs): correct settings CLI syntax in OCSF JSON export page The settings CLI requires --key and --value named flags, not positional arguments. Also fix the per-sandbox form: the sandbox name is a positional argument, not a --sandbox flag. * fix(e2e): update log assertions for OCSF shorthand format The E2E tests asserted on the old tracing::fmt key=value format (action=allow, l7_decision=audit, FORWARD, L7_REQUEST, always-blocked). Update to match the new OCSF shorthand (ALLOWED/DENIED, HTTP:, NET:, engine:ssrf, policy:). * feat(sandbox): convert WebSocket upgrade log calls to OCSF PR #718 added two log calls for WebSocket upgrade handling: - 101 Switching Protocols info → NetworkActivity with Upgrade activity. This is a significant state change (L7 enforcement drops to raw relay). - Unsolicited 101 without client Upgrade header → DetectionFinding with High severity. A non-compliant upstream sending 101 without a client Upgrade request could be attempting to bypass L7 inspection. |
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|
John T. Myers
|
77e55ea989 |
test(e2e): replace flaky Python live policy update tests with Rust (#742)
Remove test_live_policy_update_and_logs and test_live_policy_update_from_empty_network_policies from the Python e2e suite. Both used a manual 90s poll loop against GetSandboxPolicyStatus that flaked in CI with 'Policy v2 was not loaded within 90s'. Add e2e/rust/tests/live_policy_update.rs with two replacement tests that exercise the same policy lifecycle (version bumping, hash idempotency, policy list history) through the CLI using the built-in --wait flag for reliable synchronization. |
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|
Piotr Mlocek
|
1c659c1c12 |
fix(sandbox/bootstrap): GPU Landlock baseline paths and CDI spec missing diagnosis (#710)
* fix(sandbox): add GPU device nodes and nvidia-persistenced to landlock baseline Landlock READ_FILE/WRITE_FILE restricts open(2) on character device files even when DAC permissions would otherwise allow it. GPU sandboxes need /dev/nvidiactl, /dev/nvidia-uvm, /dev/nvidia-uvm-tools, /dev/nvidia-modeset, and per-GPU /dev/nvidiaX nodes in the policy to allow NVML initialization. Additionally, CDI bind-mounts /run/nvidia-persistenced/socket into the container. NVML tries to connect to this socket at init time; if the directory is not in the landlock policy, it receives EACCES (not ECONNREFUSED), which causes NVML to abort with NVML_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS even though nvidia-persistenced is optional. Both classes of paths are auto-added to the baseline when /dev/nvidiactl is present. Per-GPU device nodes are enumerated at runtime to handle multi-GPU configurations. |
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|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
e8950e624c |
feat(sandbox): add L7 query parameter matchers (#617)
* feat(sandbox): add L7 query parameter matchers Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): decode + as space in query params and validate glob syntax Three improvements from PR #617 review: 1. Decode + as space in query string values per the application/x-www-form-urlencoded convention. This matches Python's urllib.parse, JavaScript's URLSearchParams, Go's url.ParseQuery, and most HTTP frameworks. Literal + should be sent as %2B. 2. Add glob pattern syntax validation (warnings) for query matchers. Checks for unclosed brackets and braces in glob/any patterns. These are warnings (not errors) because OPA's glob.match is forgiving, but they surface likely typos during policy loading. 3. Add missing test cases: empty query values, keys without values, unicode after percent-decoding, empty query strings, and literal + via %2B encoding. * fix(sandbox): add missing query_params field in forward proxy L7 request info * style(sandbox): fix formatting in proxy L7 query param parsing --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
John T. Myers
|
256f7fc884 |
fix(sandbox,server): fix chunk merge duplicates and OPA variable collision with overlapping policies (#571)
* fix(sandbox,server): fix chunk merge duplicates and OPA variable collision with overlapping policies
Two related bugs triggered when a draft rule approval creates a second
policy entry for the same host:port:
1. merge_chunk_into_policy looked up existing rules by chunk.rule_name
(auto-generated as allow_{host}_{port}), which never matched the
user's original rule name. Now scans all network_policies entries
for a host:port endpoint match before falling back to insertion,
and merges allowed_ips into the existing endpoint.
2. The Rego allow_request rule and _matching_endpoint_configs
comprehension used 'some ep; ep := policy.endpoints[_]' which
caused regorus to error with 'duplicated definition of local
variable ep' when multiple policies covered the same host:port.
Refactored to isolate endpoint iteration inside helper functions
(_policy_allows_l7, _policy_endpoint_configs) so variables are
scoped per-policy evaluation.
Refs: #567
* test(e2e): add overlapping policy tests and update FWD-2 for implicit allowed_ips
- Update FWD-2 (test_forward_proxy_denied_without_allowed_ips ->
test_forward_proxy_allows_private_ip_host_without_allowed_ips):
literal IP host no longer requires explicit allowed_ips, expects 200.
- Add OVL-1: overlapping L4 policies for same host:port must not crash
OPA and should allow forward proxy connections.
- Add OVL-2: overlapping L7 policies for same host:port must not crash
OPA and should allow CONNECT tunnel establishment.
Refs: #567
* style: apply cargo fmt formatting
* test(e2e): update SSRF-3 and SSRF-6 for implicit allowed_ips behavior
SSRF-6: Private IP with literal IP host now gets implicit allowed_ips
from PR #570, so CONNECT returns 200 instead of 403.
SSRF-3: Loopback is still blocked but via the always-blocked path
(implicit allowed_ips is synthesized, then resolve_and_check_allowed_ips
catches it). Log message says 'always-blocked' instead of 'internal
address'.
* fix(e2e): use negative assertion for SSRF-6 when nothing listens on target port
When the SSRF check passes but nothing listens on the target port,
recv() returns empty bytes. Use 'assert 403 not in' (matching SSRF-4
pattern) instead of 'assert 200 in'.
* fix(e2e): update provider tests for redacted credential values
PR #569 changed credential redaction from clearing the map to
replacing values with 'REDACTED'. Update e2e assertions to expect
credential keys with REDACTED values instead of an empty map.
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John T. Myers
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bbcaed2ea7 | refactor(proto): rename UpdateSettings to UpdateConfig for consistency with read path (#515) | ||
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John T. Myers
|
a831a8921b |
feat(settings): gateway-to-sandbox runtime settings channel (#474)
* feat(gateway/sandbox): add global and sandbox runtime settings flow |
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Piotr Mlocek
|
c0cdd665b6 | fix(gateway): allow first live network policy update (#493) | ||
|
Drew Newberry
|
de9dcaa44b | fix(e2e): update log-reading helpers for rolling file appender (#480) (#481) | ||
|
John T. Myersandjohntmyers
|
241e95dc39 |
feat(policy): support host wildcards and multi-port endpoints (#366)
* feat(policy): support host wildcards and multi-port endpoints Add glob-style host wildcards to endpoints[].host using OPA's glob.match with "." as delimiter — *.example.com matches a single DNS label, **.example.com matches across labels. Validation rejects bare * and requires *. prefix; warns on broad patterns like *.com. Add repeated uint32 ports field to NetworkEndpoint for multi-port support. Backwards compatible: existing port scalar is normalized to ports array. Both the proto-to-JSON and YAML-to-JSON conversion paths emit a ports array; Rego always references endpoint.ports[_]. Fix OpaEngine::reload() to route through the full preprocessing pipeline instead of bypassing L7 validation and port normalization. Closes #359 * fix(policy): reject configs with both port and ports set --------- Co-authored-by: johntmyers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
fbd93a4632 | refactor: rename navigator- crate prefix to openshell- (#277) | ||
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Drew Newberry
|
7b0a243304 | ci: remove sandbox docker build from publish and e2e workflows (#275) | ||
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Drew Newberry
|
756950140c | refactor(python): rename navigator module to openshell and migrate config to gateway paths (#220) | ||
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
b8d873f68f |
feat(proxy): support plain HTTP forward proxy for private IP endpoints (#158)
* feat(proxy): support plain HTTP forward proxy for private IP endpoints Add forward proxy mode to the sandbox proxy so that standard HTTP libraries (httpx, requests, etc.) work with HTTP_PROXY for plain HTTP calls to private IP endpoints. Previously, non-CONNECT methods were unconditionally rejected with 403. The forward proxy path requires all three conditions to be met: - OPA policy explicitly allows the destination - The matched endpoint has allowed_ips configured - All resolved IPs are RFC 1918 private This ensures plain HTTP never reaches the public internet while enabling seamless access to internal services without custom CONNECT tunnel code. Implementation: - parse_proxy_uri(): parses absolute-form URIs into components - rewrite_forward_request(): rewrites to origin-form, strips hop-by-hop headers, adds Via and Connection: close - handle_forward_proxy(): full handler with OPA eval, SSRF checks, private-IP gate, upstream connect, and bidirectional relay - Updated dispatch in handle_tcp_connection to route non-CONNECT methods Includes 14 unit tests and 6 E2E tests (FWD-1 through FWD-6). CONNECT path remains completely untouched. Closes #155 * fix(proxy): remove InspectForInference match arm removed by #146 The inference routing simplification in #146 reduced NetworkAction to Allow/Deny, removing InspectForInference. Drop the dead match arm from handle_forward_proxy. * fix(sandbox): restore BestEffort as default Landlock compatibility The Landlock V2 upgrade in #151 changed the default from BestEffort to HardRequirement. This causes all proxy-mode sandboxes to crash with Permission denied when the policy omits the landlock field, because the child process gets locked to only /etc/navigator-tls and /sandbox. Restore BestEffort as the default so policies without an explicit landlock field degrade gracefully. Fixes #161 * fix(sandbox): inject baseline filesystem paths for proxy-mode sandboxes Proxy-mode sandboxes need baseline filesystem paths (/usr, /lib, /etc, /app, /var/log read-only; /sandbox, /tmp read-write) for the child process to function under Landlock. Without these, the child can't exec binaries, resolve DNS, or load shared libraries. The supervisor now enriches the policy with these baseline paths at startup, covering both standalone (file) and gateway (gRPC) modes. For gateway mode, the enriched policy is synced back so users see the effective policy via 'nemoclaw sandbox get'. The gateway validation is relaxed to allow additive filesystem changes (new paths can be added, existing paths cannot be removed) to support the supervisor's enrichment sync-back. Includes 2 E2E tests: BFS-1 (missing filesystem_policy) and BFS-2 (incomplete filesystem_policy). Fixes #161 * fix(e2e): update assertion for relaxed filesystem validation message --------- Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
af8fe4d1d5 |
refactor(policy): consolidate duplicated YAML struct hierarchies (#97)
* refactor(policy): consolidate duplicated YAML struct hierarchies into navigator-policy
Closes #96
Merge the Deserialize-only input structs and Serialize-only output structs
into a single set of types in navigator-policy that derive both Serialize
and Deserialize. This eliminates the duplicate PolicyYaml hierarchy in
navigator-cli and fixes three round-trip issues:
- filesystem_policy vs filesystem field name mismatch
- allowed_ips silently dropped on proto-to-YAML conversion
- network policy name field silently dropped on proto-to-YAML conversion
Also adds api_patterns support to the inference YAML schema and switches
network_policies from HashMap to BTreeMap for deterministic output ordering.
* fix(e2e): update non-CONNECT test assertion from 405 to 403
Align test_l4_non_connect_method_rejected with the proxy behavior
change in
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|
Alexander Watson
|
1d7909cb38 |
chore: add open-source compliance files and SPDX headers (#71)
Add Apache 2.0 licensing, SPDX copyright headers on all source files, DCO enforcement, third-party notices, and CI enforcement. - LICENSE: Apache License 2.0 full text - DCO: Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1 - SPDX headers on all 176 source files (.rs, .py, .proto, .rego, .sh, .toml, .yaml, Dockerfiles) - scripts/update_license_headers.py: header management with --check mode - scripts/generate_third_party_notices.py: dependency license aggregation - THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES: generated listing of all Rust and Python deps - build/license.toml: mise tasks for license:check and license:update - CI: license-headers job in checks.yml, DCO check workflow - CONTRIBUTING.md: DCO sign-off requirement and license header docs - Cargo.toml: license changed to Apache-2.0, repository URL updated - pyproject.toml: license field added Closes #58 |
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|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
ff52643237 |
feat(sandbox): allow egress to private IP space via allowed_ips policy field (#60)
* feat(sandbox): allow egress to private IP space via allowed_ips policy field Add an allowed_ips field to NetworkEndpoint that accepts CIDR notation and exact IPs, enabling sandboxes to reach private IP space under policy control while maintaining SSRF protections for loopback and link-local addresses. Three modes are supported: - Default (no allowed_ips): all private IPs blocked (existing behavior) - Host + allowlist: domain must resolve to an IP in allowed_ips - Hostless allowlist (no host): any domain allowed if resolved IP matches Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
John Myers
|
757217f4bd |
feat(sandbox): support live policy updates, history, and policy-aware logs (!55)
Closes #78 ## What You Can Do ### Live policy updates Update a running sandbox's network policy without recreating it: ```bash nav sandbox policy set <sandbox> --policy new-policy.yaml --wait --timeout 60 ``` The sandbox hot-reloads the policy within 30s (configurable). On failure, the previous policy stays active (last-known-good). Idempotent — submitting the same policy twice returns the existing version: ``` ✓ Policy version 3 submitted (hash: a1b2c3d4e5f6) $ nav sandbox policy set test --policy same.yaml · Policy unchanged (version 3, hash: a1b2c3d4e5f6) ``` ### Policy history & inspection ```bash nav sandbox policy list <sandbox> # version history with status nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> # current policy metadata nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> --full # print full policy as YAML nav sandbox policy get <sandbox> --rev 2 --full # specific revision as YAML ``` ### Sandbox logs Stream logs from both the gateway and sandbox supervisor in one view: ```bash nav sandbox logs <sandbox> # one-shot, last 2000 lines nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --tail # live streaming nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --source sandbox # supervisor logs only nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --source gateway # gateway logs only nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --level warn # warnings and errors only nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --since 5m # last 5 minutes nav sandbox logs <sandbox> --tail --source sandbox --level info ``` Each log line is tagged with its source and includes structured fields: ``` [1772055394.673] [sandbox] [INFO ] [navigator_sandbox::proxy] CONNECT action=allow dst_host=api.anthropic.com dst_port=443 policy=claude_code [1772055061.005] [gateway] [INFO ] [navigator_server::grpc] GetSandboxPolicy served from policy history ``` --- ## Implementation ### Proto changes - 7 new RPCs: `UpdateSandboxPolicy`, `GetSandboxPolicyStatus`, `ListSandboxPolicies`, `ReportPolicyStatus`, `GetSandboxLogs`, `PushSandboxLogs` (client-streaming) - `SandboxLogLine`: added `source` (gateway/sandbox), `fields` (structured key-value map) - `WatchSandboxRequest`: added `log_since_ms`, `log_sources`, `log_min_level` - `GetSandboxLogsRequest`: added `sources`, `min_level` - `PolicyStatus` enum, `SandboxPolicyRevision` message - `Sandbox.current_policy_version` field ### Server - **Policy persistence**: New `sandbox_policies` table (SQLite + Postgres) with per-sandbox monotonic versions, status tracking, and policy hash - **UpdateSandboxPolicy**: Validates static field immutability (filesystem/landlock/process), network mode consistency (Block↔Proxy), deterministic hash comparison for idempotent updates - **Lazy backfill**: First `GetSandboxPolicy` call creates version 1 from `spec.policy` for existing sandboxes - **Log broker**: `TracingLogBus::publish_external()` injects sandbox-pushed logs into the same broadcast channel + tail buffer (2000 lines). Server forces `source="sandbox"` and `sandbox_id` on all pushed logs - **Source/level filtering**: Applied server-side in both `GetSandboxLogs` and `WatchSandbox` streams - **Version supersession**: When a new version is loaded, all older pending+loaded versions are marked superseded ### Sandbox - **`OpaEngine::reload_from_proto()`**: Full `from_proto()` pipeline (L7 validation, access preset expansion) with atomic engine swap. On failure, previous engine untouched (LKG) - **Policy poll loop**: Background task polls every 30s (configurable via `NAVIGATOR_POLICY_POLL_INTERVAL_SECS`), reports status via `ReportPolicyStatus` RPC - **`LogPushLayer`**: Tracing layer captures events at INFO+ (configurable via `NAVIGATOR_LOG_PUSH_LEVEL`), sends structured fields via `PushSandboxLogs` client-streaming RPC. Background task batches 50 lines / flushes every 500ms. Best-effort (drops on full channel, never blocks) - **`CachedNavigatorClient`**: Persistent mTLS channel for both policy polling and log push ### Database migration - `002_create_sandbox_policies.sql` (SQLite + Postgres) ## Tests - **Unit**: 8 policy persistence tests (put/get/list/status/supersede/isolation) - **Integration**: 4 test files updated with new RPC stubs - **E2E**: `test_live_policy_update_and_logs` — full lifecycle: create → set same (unchanged) → push new → wait for load → verify connectivity → push same (unchanged) → verify history → fetch logs ## Documentation - `architecture/sandbox.md`: Log streaming architecture, LogPushLayer, push task, server broker, source tagging, structured fields, CLI filtering, failure modes - `architecture/security-policy.md`: Live update semantics, deterministic hashing, CLI filter flags, policy inspection - `architecture/plans/issue-78-sandbox-log-streaming.md`: Design plan for log streaming ## Security - Trust boundary documented: shared mTLS cert model (per-sandbox auth tracked in #80) - Server forces `source="sandbox"` and `sandbox_id` on pushed logs (can't impersonate gateway or other sandboxes) - Per-batch line cap (100) prevents flooding |
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|
Piotr Mlocek
|
34fd3cbf64 |
feat(inference): inference interception and routing (!38)
Closes #67 ## Summary Implements transparent inference interception and routing for sandboxed AI agents. The sandbox proxy intercepts outbound AI SDK calls (OpenAI, Anthropic) and reroutes them through the gateway to policy-controlled backends — enabling organizations to redirect inference traffic to local or self-hosted models without modifying agent code. **Decision model** — a tri-state OPA evaluation for every CONNECT request: 1. Binary + endpoint explicitly allowed in `network_policies` → **allow** (pass through) 2. Not explicitly allowed + `inference.allowed_routes` configured → **inspect for inference** (TLS intercept, detect API patterns, route through gateway) 3. Otherwise → **deny** No endpoint declarations or binary lists needed for inference routing. Just configure `inference.allowed_routes`. ## Key Changes ### Sandbox (interception) - **OPA policy**: New `network_action` Rego rule with three outcomes (`allow`, `inspect_for_inference`, `deny`). New `NetworkAction` enum replaces `PolicyDecision.allowed` bool for the proxy's main decision path. - **Proxy**: New `InspectForInference` path — TLS-terminates client, parses HTTP, detects inference API patterns (`POST /v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/v1/messages`), strips auth headers, forwards via gRPC. - **New module**: `l7/inference.rs` — `InferenceApiPattern`, `detect_inference_pattern()`, HTTP request/response parsing. - **gRPC client**: New `proxy_inference()` for sandbox→gateway forwarding. - **Sandbox init**: Creates OPA engine when inference is configured, even without `network_policies`. ### Gateway (dispatch) - **InferenceService**: `ProxyInference` RPC loads sandbox policy, resolves allowed routes, dispatches to router. Full CRUD for inference routes. - **Proto**: `InferenceRoute`, `InferenceRouteSpec`, `ProxyInferenceRequest/Response`, Inference gRPC service. ### Router (backend proxying) - **New crate**: `navigator-router` with `Router`, `proxy_with_candidates()`, protocol-based route selection, backend HTTP proxying with auth header rewriting. - **Mock support** for testing (`mock://` scheme). ### CLI - `nav inference create/update/delete/list` commands for route management. ### Python SDK - Updated protobuf bindings. Removed old `inference.py` client (replaced by transparent interception). ### Documentation - New `architecture/inference-routing.md` — end-to-end system documentation. - Updated `architecture/sandbox.md` — proxy, OPA, and source index sections. - Updated `architecture/README.md` — new subsystem overview and diagram. ## Addendum: Chunked Transfer Compatibility This branch now also fixes intercepted SDK requests that send chunked request bodies: - `inspect_for_inference` now accepts `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and decodes chunked request bodies before forwarding to the gateway - Removed the prior `411 Length Required` response for chunked intercepted requests - Added request/response header sanitization for framing and hop-by-hop headers (`content-length`, `transfer-encoding`, `connection`, etc.) to keep forwarded requests and returned responses valid - Added unit tests for chunked parsing and header sanitization Note: this improves compatibility for streaming-style SDK request patterns; true token-by-token passthrough response streaming is still a separate follow-up. ## Minimal Policy for Inference Routing ```yaml inference: allowed_routes: - local ``` Any outgoing connection from a binary not explicitly allowed in `network_policies` will be intercepted and checked for inference API patterns. ## Test Plan - [x] `cargo test --workspace` — all tests pass - [x] `mise run pre-commit` — all checks pass - [x] E2E: OpenAI chat completions routed through gateway - [x] E2E: Anthropic messages routed through gateway - [x] E2E: Python OpenAI SDK from sandbox (`examples/inference/inference.py`) - [x] E2E test: `e2e/python/test_inference_routing.py` |
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Drew Newberry
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6dc97171ed |
feat(sandbox): add image build/push and fix cluster deploy (!34)
Closes #44 ## Summary - Add `nav sandbox image push --dockerfile <path>` command to build and push custom container images into the cluster - Fix sandbox Docker build failure caused by OpenClaw installer TTY access - Fix sandbox proxy crash when network namespace is unavailable (fall back to loopback) - Add e2e test for the full custom image build and sandbox creation flow - Rename and rewrite BYOC architecture doc to reflect current state ## Changes ### `navigator-bootstrap` - New `build` module (`src/build.rs`) with `build_and_push_image()` public API - Builds via bollard `Docker::build_image()`, streams output to caller - `.dockerignore` support with glob matching, 8 unit tests ### `navigator-cli` - Added `SandboxImageCommands::Push` subcommand with `--dockerfile`, `--tag`, `--context`, `--build-arg` flags - Added `test:e2e:custom-image` mise task ### `navigator-sandbox` - Proxy now falls back to `127.0.0.1:3128` when no network namespace or explicit bind address is available, instead of erroring out ### Docker / Infra - Sandbox Dockerfile: replaced OpenClaw native installer (`curl | bash`) with `npm install -g openclaw` to avoid `/dev/tty` failures in Docker build ### Documentation - Renamed `architecture/sandbox-byoc.md` to `sandbox-custom-containers.md` - Rewrote doc to describe current behavior (CLI usage, push pipeline, supervisor behavior, design decisions) instead of listing implementation changes ### Tests - Added `e2e/bash/test_sandbox_custom_image.sh` covering image push + sandbox create with custom image |
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John Myers
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82e6b81324 |
fix(security): reject CONNECT to internal IPs (SSRF defense-in-depth) (!37)
> **🔧 security-fix-agent** Closes #62 ## Security Fix ### Summary The CONNECT proxy accepted hostnames from clients and connected to whatever IP they resolved to, with no validation against internal address ranges. While the OPA policy is default-deny, a misconfigured or overly permissive policy could allow SSRF to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), localhost, or RFC1918 services. This fix adds DNS resolution before connecting and rejects any host that resolves to an internal IP. ### Severity Assessment - **Impact:** Medium — if exploited, could reach cloud metadata (IAM creds), cluster-internal services, or host-local services - **Exploitability:** Very low — requires OPA policy misconfiguration or DNS rebinding attack - **Affected components:** `crates/navigator-sandbox/src/proxy.rs` — `handle_tcp_connection` ### Changes Made - `crates/navigator-sandbox/src/proxy.rs`: Added `is_internal_ip()` helper that checks IPv4 loopback/private/link-local, IPv6 loopback/link-local, and IPv4-mapped IPv6. Added `resolve_and_reject_internal()` that resolves DNS and rejects internal IPs. Inserted check between OPA allow and `TcpStream::connect`, with control plane endpoints exempt. - `architecture/security-policy.md`: Added SSRF Protection section with blocked ranges table and flow diagram - `architecture/sandbox.md`: Updated proxy connection flow diagram and added SSRF protection subsection - `architecture/README.md`: Added internal IP rejection step to proxy description ### Tests Added - **Unit:** 17 tests in `proxy::tests` — covers IPv4 loopback/private/link-local, IPv6 loopback/link-local, IPv4-mapped IPv6, public IPs, DNS resolution of localhost/127.0.0.1/169.254.169.254, and DNS failure handling - **Integration/E2E:** N/A — the proxy runs inside a Linux network namespace; unit tests for IP checking and DNS resolution cover the security boundary ### Documentation Updated - `architecture/security-policy.md`: New SSRF Protection section with blocked IP ranges and Mermaid flowchart - `architecture/sandbox.md`: Updated proxy flow diagram and added SSRF protection subsection - `architecture/README.md`: Added step 4 to proxy description ### Verification All 85 sandbox tests pass including 17 new proxy SSRF tests. Pre-commit (fmt, clippy, full test suite) passes clean with zero warnings. |
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John Myers
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f1439727b9 |
feat(sandbox): L7 protocol-aware inspection with TLS termination (!29)
## Summary Implements L7 (application-layer) protocol-aware policy enforcement for the sandbox proxy, enabling per-request allow/deny decisions based on HTTP method and path — not just host:port. ### Phase 1: HTTP/REST L7 Inspection (plaintext) - New `l7/` module with provider trait, REST parser, and relay loop - Parses HTTP/1.1 requests inside CONNECT tunnels, evaluates method+path against OPA/Rego policy - Supports `access` presets (`full`, `read-only`, `read-write`) and explicit `rules` with glob path matching - `enforcement` modes: `enforce` (deny with 403 JSON) vs `audit` (log only, forward traffic) - Structured logging for every L7 decision (`L7_REQUEST` with protocol, action, target, decision) ### Phase 2: MITM TLS Termination for HTTPS - Ephemeral CA generated at sandbox startup (`rcgen`) - Per-hostname leaf certificate cache (256 cap) for dynamic cert presentation - Client-side TLS termination (sandbox trusts ephemeral CA via `SSL_CERT_FILE`, `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, etc.) - Upstream TLS connection with `webpki-roots` verification - Endpoints with `tls: terminate` get full L7 inspection; others remain passthrough ### Additional - Benign TLS/connection errors (close_notify, handshake EOF, reset) downgraded from WARN to DEBUG - Generic `AsyncRead + AsyncWrite` bounds throughout L7 module (works with both `TcpStream` and `TlsStream`) - Proto schema extended with `protocol`, `tls`, `enforcement`, `access`, `rules` fields on `NetworkEndpoint` - CLI `nav sandbox run` wired with `--rego-policy`/`--rego-data` flags and L7 policy display ### E2E Test Coverage - 7 L4 tests: no-matching-policy deny, wildcard binary, binary-restricted, wrong port, cross-policy isolation, non-CONNECT 405, structured log fields - 7 L7 TLS tests: full access allow, read-only deny POST, audit mode, explicit path rules, CA trust store injection, deny response JSON format, structured log fields ## Key Files | Area | Files | |------|-------| | L7 core | `l7/mod.rs`, `l7/provider.rs`, `l7/relay.rs`, `l7/rest.rs` | | TLS termination | `l7/tls.rs` | | Proxy integration | `proxy.rs`, `lib.rs`, `main.rs` | | Env/process | `process.rs`, `ssh.rs` | | OPA policy | `opa.rs`, `dev-sandbox-policy.rego` | | Proto schema | `proto/sandbox.proto` | | CLI | `navigator-cli/src/run.rs` | | E2E tests | `e2e/python/test_sandbox_policy.py` | ## Test plan - [x] 67 unit tests pass (`cargo test --workspace`) - [x] `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` clean - [x] 16 e2e policy tests pass (`mise run test:e2e:sandbox`) - [x] Manual smoke test: sandbox with `tls: terminate` on `api.anthropic.com:443` Closes #25 |
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Drew Newberry
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d2f3ca71d4 |
feat(sandbox): add callable python exec API and refresh e2e coverage (!19)
Closes #13 ## Summary - add Python sandbox execution APIs for command and callable workflows - consolidate sandbox policy fixtures and expand e2e test coverage for policy and Python exec paths - update CI/build config and images for sandbox e2e execution dependencies ## Test Plan - mise run pre-commit |