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pull-request/3521
16
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Drew Newberry
|
12cec59bf4 |
fix(sandbox): accept local connections natively on loopback-confined sockets (#4150)
* fix(sandbox): accept local connections natively on loopback-confined sockets On kernels without SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV (RHEL 9 / RHCOS 5.14), the broker cannot safely write an accepted peer address into workload memory, so accept/accept4 with a peer-address buffer failed with EOPNOTSUPP. Static binaries and Go servers, which issue the raw syscall, could not accept connections at all. Move local acceptance into the kernel and replace per-accept inspection with standing kernel confinement: - Bind every broker-created TCP/UDP socket to the loopback device before injection and verify the binding. Accepted sockets inherit it, so they can neither receive routed ingress nor emit routed egress. - Stop notifying accept/accept4 and remove the accept workers, the SIGUSR2 accept-interrupt monitor, and the 64-accept ceiling. - Continue getpeername natively for every descriptor except relayed connections. - Deny interface-selection socket options and MSG_FASTOPEN sends from scalar syscall arguments, so confinement does not depend on the capability state of the user namespace that owns the network namespace and covers unregistered descriptors. - Drop loopback-interface ingress on the non-loopback TCP control listener before it listens, so a workload cannot reach it by reconnecting a natively accepted socket. - Mark descriptors above stdio close-on-exec in every workload pre_exec path. - Require an active confinement probe at qualification and carry it as required authenticated audit evidence. Document OpenShift 4.19 as the minimum release: RHCOS kernels for 4.16 through 4.18 are built without Landlock. Closes #4058 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): close review gaps in native local accept confinement - Reject a TCP boundary control listener on a loopback address, including IPv4-mapped loopback. Production drivers bind the unspecified address; a loopback listener would be reachable from workload sockets the broker does not track. - Extend the confinement probe to IPv6 and prove that an accepted socket keeps its loopback binding after an AF_UNSPEC disconnect. - Pin the accepted-peer contract with tests: a loopback-bound listener admits only clients in the sandbox network namespace, and workload sockets cannot bind a non-loopback source address. - Correct the support matrix: accepted connections are bounded by per-process descriptor limits, the runtime PID limit, and the sandbox memory limit, not by a broker limit. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): replace unsafe socket calls with socket2 and rustix Socket confinement now uses socket2 for device binding and the ingress filter, and rustix for interface lookup and AF_UNSPEC disconnect, so the module contains no unsafe code. The control-listener filter is no longer locked: no safe API exposes SO_LOCK_FILTER, and the listener descriptor never leaves the trusted sandbox process, which marks every descriptor above stdio close-on-exec before running workload code. Tests added for native accept use rustix and socket2 instead of raw libc calls. rustix issues accept4 and getpeername as raw syscalls, so the direct-syscall test keeps its meaning. The close-on-exec sweep test runs in a re-executed test process instead of a forked child. The close_range(CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC) syscall in the pre_exec hook remains the only unsafe added by this branch; neither rustix nor nix wraps it. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): allowlist workload socket families The workload seccomp filter denied only AF_PACKET, AF_BLUETOOTH, and AF_VSOCK, and the broker continued socket() for every non-INET family. Several protocol families, including AF_RXRPC, AF_SMC, and AF_KCM, carry traffic over kernel-owned sockets that the broker never creates and that are not bound to loopback. Allow only AF_UNIX, AF_NETLINK (still limited to NETLINK_ROUTE), and the brokered AF_INET/AF_INET6 families, and restrict socketpair(2) to AF_UNIX. Both decisions use the scalar domain argument. The broker independently refuses non-INET families other than AF_UNIX and AF_NETLINK with EAFNOSUPPORT. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy read-only mode After native local accept, only two broker paths still wrote into workload memory: getpeername on relayed connections and the per-message lengths of a first sendmmsg to the DNS relay. Legacy mode existed only to refuse those writes on kernels without WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV, and the getpeername refusal broke CPython TLS on RHEL 9. The broker now never writes workload memory: - getpeername is no longer mediated and reports the kernel peer on every kernel; relayed connections report the loopback relay address. - A first send to the DNS relay pins the broker's socket copy to the relay and continues the syscall, so the kernel performs the send and writes any per-message results. Remove the listener mode, the task-memory write path and probe, and the task_memory_write, cancellation, and task_memory_writes_disabled audit evidence fields. WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV is still used when available and is reported for diagnostics, but no mediation decision depends on it. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): drop WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV and make handlers restart-safe The broker no longer writes workload memory, so killable notification waits only reduced how often a signal restarts a notified syscall. RHEL 9 kernels never had them, so the handlers must tolerate restarts anyway. Install the listener without the flag on every kernel instead of special-casing newer ones. Handlers now check that the notification is still live immediately before each side effect (bind, connect of the retained socket, listen, and the first DNS send), and answer a restarted operation the broker already completed as the kernel would: a repeated TCP connect returns EISCONN, repeating the same UDP association succeeds, a repeat of a completed bind succeeds, and a failed relay reports its errno. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): finish teardown only when every workload descendant has exited Teardown waited only for registered process groups to disappear. A root is unregistered once reaped, so a descendant that ignored SIGTERM could outlive it while termination reported success and never sent SIGKILL, violating the bounded-termination requirement. The sandbox now becomes a child subreaper when it is not PID 1, so orphaned descendants stay in its tree and are reaped. Termination waits until no live descendant remains, and every scanned process is signalled through a pidfd after confirming its start time, so a reused PID is never signalled. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): keep a frozen workload from resuming itself Freezing stops every workload process with SIGSTOP. tgkill and rt_tgsigqueueinfo were not mediated, and mediated kill, rt_sigqueueinfo, and tkill passed SIGCONT through, so a workload process that was not yet stopped could resume the others while the supervisor recovered. Mediate tgkill and rt_tgsigqueueinfo like tkill: refuse targets in the sandbox thread group, report a thread outside the named group as missing, and continue otherwise. The boundary marks the broker frozen before stopping the workload and clears it after resuming; while frozen, workload requests to send SIGCONT fail with EPERM. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): send mediated DNS datagrams from the broker socket The native UDP send path re-ran the workload's own sendmsg, so per-message ancillary data such as IP_PKTINFO rode along; only the loopback destination contained a routing override. The broker now reads the datagram and sends it from its retained, relay-connected socket, which it builds without ancillary data, so a per-message override cannot redirect the packet. It writes nothing back into workload memory. A send carrying control data is refused with EOPNOTSUPP rather than silently stripped. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): keep sandbox control variables out of the workload environment The canonical process inherits the sandbox environment so the image's own ENV reaches the workload, then removed only a denylist of credential variables. Other variables in the reserved OPENSHELL_ namespace, such as the serialized user environment and the log level, still reached the workload. Remove every inherited OPENSHELL_ variable before applying the declared environment, and restore OPENSHELL_SANDBOX=1. The image's ordinary ENV and declared variables are unaffected; declared variables cannot use the reserved namespace. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): keep /proc read-only for GPU workloads GPU mode granted read-write access to all of /proc so CUDA's cuInit could write thread names to /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm. Keep /proc read-only. Open mediation now serves a writable open of the caller's own thread comm file: the broker opens it and injects the descriptor, with no syscall continued. The kernel accepts a comm write only from the target's own thread group, so a substituted path or reused thread ID cannot rename another process's thread. Any other /proc write is left to Landlock, which denies it. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): keep the broker socket for connected UDP DNS sockets Sending DNS datagrams from the broker's socket required the broker to keep its copy, but the connect paths to the relay and to loopback still released it. glibc connects the resolver socket and then sends A and AAAA together with sendmmsg, which is mediated, so resolution failed. Release the copy on those connect paths only for TCP. Add a regression test for connect followed by sendmmsg that fails fast rather than hanging. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): keep slow loopback connects from stalling mediation The loopback connect path held the registry lock while polling a TCP connect for up to five seconds on the single notification dispatcher. A workload connecting to a busy local listener stalled every other mediated syscall, including opens and signals. Connect a duplicate of the retained socket without holding the lock. A nonblocking socket gets the native EINPROGRESS and the kernel completes the handshake on the shared socket; a blocking socket waits on a bounded worker thread. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): contain network broker handler panics A panic in a notification handler unwound the single broker thread while the health flag still read healthy, so every later blocked workload syscall hung until the sandbox was killed. Run each dispatch under catch_unwind: a panicking handler fails only that syscall with EIO and the broker keeps mediating. If the broker thread ever exits, mark it unhealthy so dependent operations fail closed instead of blocking. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reject ancillary data on DNS sends instead of broker-sending Sending mediated DNS datagrams from the broker's own socket required keeping a broker handle for each DNS socket's whole life, which regressed real name resolution through reclaim and resource accounting that the mock-based unit tests did not exercise. Revert to continuing the kernel send, but refuse a send that carries ancillary control data (msg_controllen != 0) at read time, so a per-message routing override such as IP_PKTINFO cannot ride a mediated DNS send. A loopback destination contains an override that races the check. Full broker-side UDP mediation is left to a separate change with deployment e2e. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): address review findings across the hardening changes Fixes: - The blocking local-connect worker no longer toggles O_NONBLOCK on the open file it shares with the workload; it waits with a plain connect. - tgkill and rt_tgsigqueueinfo are notified only when they send SIGCONT, so ordinary thread signals such as Go preemption stay in the kernel. The frozen flag is re-read immediately before delivery. - A shell redirect to the caller's own thread comm file works again; O_CREAT and O_TRUNC are no-ops there and O_EXCL returns EEXIST. - The teardown scan is a linear walk and fails closed when /proc cannot be read. Simplifications: - Remove tests that need infrastructure outside the repo or prove nothing: the topology harness tests, the static-server benchmark, the direct-syscall accept test, the comm rename test without Landlock, a serde-default test, and the test-only panic hook in setsockopt. - Drop the unused Failed connect outcome, the redundant read-back after binding to loopback, redundant OPENSHELL_SANDBOX settings, and stale or duplicated comments; reuse the reserved environment prefix constant. - Tighten the support matrix and OpenShift wording. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): wait for input when piped exec stdin is nonblocking Processes that inherit the same stdin share one open file description, so any of them can make it nonblocking for all. `sandbox exec` then read no input yet, got EAGAIN, and failed with "Resource temporarily unavailable (os error 11)". Parallel e2e tests inherit the runner's stdin, which made credential_gating fail intermittently. The stdin reader now blocks in poll() until input or end of file arrives instead of treating EAGAIN as fatal, and it leaves the shared descriptor's flags alone. The e2e exec helper also stops inheriting the runner's stdin, since its commands take no input. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): fix macOS lint and older-glibc test linking Import HashSet only in the Linux-only process scan, and call gettid through the raw syscall in a test, since the libc wrapper needs glibc 2.30 or newer. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(sandbox): clarify socket peer address reporting Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Ignas Baranauskas
|
3592a482c5 |
fix(kubernetes): wait for OpenShift SCC annotations (#4054)
Signed-off-by: Ignas Baranauskas <ibaranau@redhat.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
9244868056 |
docs: refresh architecture and agent guides (#3705)
* docs: refresh architecture and agent guides Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: describe updated security architecture neutrally Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: highlight new isolation primitives Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(sandboxes): clarify how to disconnect Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: align architecture and guides with current navigation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(extensibility): streamline extension authentication guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
52cb8ecee7 |
fix(kubernetes): remove NetworkPolicy acknowledgement (#3677)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
a649aa42fc |
docs: add 0.1.0 upgrade guide outline (#3540)
* docs: add 0.1.0 upgrade guide outline Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: add upgrade change provenance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: update 0.1.0 upgrade guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: move upgrade navigation below security Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: remove release notes page Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: announce OpenShell 0.1.0 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: reorganize guides and require user-owned images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: reorganize navigation around core concepts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: simplify navigation and tutorial catalog Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: refine 0.1.0 release highlights Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: align navigation and 0.1.0 guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Akram Ben Aissi
|
293fab75d4 |
fix(sandbox): support kernels < 5.19 via seccomp WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV fallback (#3420)
* fix(sandbox): fall back to plain seccomp listener when WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV is unavailable SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV was added in Linux 5.19. On older kernels (for example RHEL 9.x / 5.14 nodes such as RHCOS on OpenShift) the flag is rejected with EINVAL, which made the capability-free sandbox fail to start during the notification probe with "notification launcher disappeared". Install the notification listener with WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV when the kernel supports it and fall back to a plain NEW_LISTENER on EINVAL. The fallback listener records wait_killable_recv = false: its notification receive is uninterruptible, but the sandbox is otherwise fully functional. Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): address review — legacy read-only listener mode + cancellation invariant Follow-up to the PR review (GATOR-de00bfcc-01 / mrunalp): make the < 5.19 fallback cancellation-safe instead of racing broker writes. - Record an explicit ListenerMode (Killable vs LegacyReadOnly); add writes_disabled()/mode() and emit the selected mode in qualification output (seccomp_listener_mode). - Centralize task-memory output writes behind NotificationListener:: write_task_output; in LegacyReadOnly mode getpeername, accept/accept4 with a non-null address, and sendmmsg length write-backs fail closed with EOPNOTSUPP. accept with a null address, socket/connect/bind/listen/sendto/sendmsg keep working (copied inputs, scalar responses, atomic ADDFD_SEND). - Enforce the launch invariant `cancellation || task_memory_writes_disabled` in SandboxConfirmEvidence::validate() rather than dropping cancellation unconditionally; add task_memory_writes_disabled to SeccompEvidence. - Add per-path fail-closed tests (write_task_output, write_socket_addr, a real plain listener installed on a modern kernel) and confirmation-invariant tests. - Correct the flag-semantics comments and document both modes plus the reduced legacy syscall compatibility in architecture/sandbox.md. Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * docs: document legacy read-only sandbox mode on kernels before 5.19 Kernels without SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV (< 5.19, e.g. RHEL 9.x / RHCOS 5.14) run the sandbox in a legacy read-only cancellation mode where the broker fails closed with EOPNOTSUPP on the mediated operations that write results back into workload memory (getpeername, accept/accept4 with a non-null address, sendmmsg length write-backs). Document this observable behavior and its syscall limitations in the public Fern docs: the support-matrix kernel requirements and the OpenShift runtime guidance. Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * style(sandbox): satisfy rustfmt and clippy doc_markdown Match the pinned rustfmt (Rust 1.95.0) line-wrapping for the write_task_output call, and backtick `legacy_read_only` in the qualification-report doc comment so clippy::doc_markdown (-D warnings) passes. Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): migrate task_memory_writes_disabled into backend protocol Add the `task_memory_writes_disabled` field to `SeccompEvidence` in the backend protocol contract and relax the validation from requiring `cancellation` to accepting `cancellation || task_memory_writes_disabled`. This completes the rebase migration missed by the isolation-interface refactor: the sandbox reports this field but the backend struct lacked it, and the validator rejected every pre-5.19 legacy listener. Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Akram <akram.benaissi@gmail.com> |
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Drew Newberry
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c1f2e7189f |
feat(isolation): implement the RFC 0012 sandbox architecture (#2942)
* feat(isolation): add RFC 0012 backend contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(isolation): name the interface crate explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): expose trusted host gateway Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(agents): inventory the MXC driver Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add mediated DNS transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): tighten interface error and digest contracts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): remove unrelated driver inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): define capability-free launch contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): seal confirmed boundary state Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate confirmation for external backend implementations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): clarify mediated DNS identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): unify typed network mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): bind launches to sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): initialize extended sandbox status Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add boundary protocol and Linux primitives Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden signals and separate process status from transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate remote confirmation through public contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate wire state and propagate snapshot failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(isolation): import owned agent specification explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): describe mediated DNS channel Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): bound mediation attach without nested retries Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add transport-neutral session authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): separate sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime boundary controls Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add terminal boundary operation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): split supervisor and sandbox runtimes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden boundary isolation and lifecycle ownership Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reject private root redirects and adopt typed errors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve accept thread ownership on musl Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): isolate credential probes from filtered threads Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): return retained exec exit status to independent waiters Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound network mediation and preserve socket authorization Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound control admission and retire stale mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): select migrated drivers per stack layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): implement loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): authenticate the Sandbox Protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): consume dedicated backend crate Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): align topology session fixture Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): align projected bootstrap bundle Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): validate refreshed credentials before rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): fail closed across supervisor disconnects Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): repair rebased sandbox CI Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * build(runtime): publish separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(config): configure the sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate sandbox binary linkage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): use backend and runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): use a scratch runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): refresh schema and dependency policy Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bind reconnects to supervisor process Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: align runtime split operational guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(security): document Kubernetes runtime RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): enforce runtime lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): identify sandbox start generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(server): restore sandbox launch sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): support authenticated runtime replacement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): bind sandbox session successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): retry pending sandbox successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(vm): run the supervisor outside the guest workload Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): use unified build toolchain Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): own guest network bootstrap Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): expose guest init version Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): select native supervisor artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): guard guest init Linux symbols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): scope Linux test imports Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): avoid guest interface casts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): reconcile admitted sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): share resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): surface host supervisor failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): include guest logs on supervisor exit Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate and clean runtime generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): keep shared paths in the base layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): isolate workloads behind the host supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve host gateway alias resolution Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): use separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): restore startup validation after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): narrow supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): close companion isolation gaps Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): align mediated network expectations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): exercise mediated network paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): attach supervisor to managed network Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): defer supervisor recovery until gateway is ready Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve workloads during session rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): remove unrelated configuration RFC changes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): add proxy-pod isolation topology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): use stable sandbox service authority Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): adapt proxy pods to current runtime APIs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): describe the single runtime placement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): simplify sandbox orchestration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): validate deployment prerequisites Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): update Trivy Helm profile inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(kubernetes): update Trivy scan inventory count Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): reuse preloaded runtime images in e2e Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): type and clean runtime resources Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): make sandbox restarts recoverable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve supervisor egress Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): adopt isolated sandbox and supervisor containers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): stage bootstrap archives at named volume destinations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provision supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): address isolation review findings Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): inspect Debian supervisor provenance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): use libpod-compatible tmpfs options Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind verified sandbox runtime binary Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provide external driver data directory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): start sandbox before joining user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): separate supervisor user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * perf(isolation): add TCP and DNS benchmark harnesses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): align benchmark timing and supported protocols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): report TCP benchmark metrics accurately Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): cancel failed worker startup Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): build matching local supervisor image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make local sandbox smoke test runnable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): wire local sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): narrow sandbox service RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate split runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime session handling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): add standalone network proxy role Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): remove implementation companion notes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): standardize runtime release name Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): pin renamed runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): persist sandbox runtime identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(runtime): restore branch validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): reconcile main after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(network): close unframed HTTP 1.0 responses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(isolation): preserve upstream OCSF updates Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(security): close credential and TLS replay paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): make sandbox refresh retries idempotent Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Brandon Squizzato
|
cc780d4e17 |
feat(helm): add BackendTLSPolicy support (#2728)
* feat(helm): add optional BackendTLSPolicy for e2e TLS Add grpcRoute.backendTLSPolicy values to optionally create a BackendTLSPolicy resource that enables end-to-end TLS between the Gateway proxy and the OpenShell gateway pod. The Gateway proxy terminates client-facing TLS and re-encrypts when connecting to the backend, validating the pod's certificate against a user-supplied CA ConfigMap. This removes the requirement to set server.disableTls=true when using HTTPS at the Gateway listener. Supported on OpenShift 4.22+ and other platforms with BackendTLSPolicy support in the Gateway API implementation. Update OpenShift and ingress documentation with e2e TLS instructions. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * feat(helm,server): auto-create backend CA ConfigMap in certgen hook Extend the generate-certs command with --backend-ca-configmap-name and --backend-ca-source-secret flags. When BackendTLSPolicy is enabled, the certgen pre-install hook creates the CA ConfigMap automatically: - pkiInitJob mode (default): uses the CA from the generated PKI bundle. Fully automatic on first install. - cert-manager mode: reads ca.crt from the server TLS Secret. On first install the Secret does not exist yet (cert-manager reconciles after templates are applied), so the ConfigMap is created on the first helm upgrade. Logs a warning on the initial skip. The caCertificateConfigMapName value now defaults to <fullname>-backend-ca when empty, so users only need to set backendTLSPolicy.enabled=true. Update certgen RBAC to include configmaps get/create when the feature is enabled. Add CLI arg parsing tests for the new flags. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * refactor(helm): add server.tls.enableMtls flag for mTLS control Replace automatic mTLS disabling based on BackendTLSPolicy with an explicit server.tls.enableMtls flag that defaults to true. The user is now responsible for setting this to false when using BackendTLSPolicy, as ingress proxies cannot present client certificates to backends. Updated: - values.yaml: Added server.tls.enableMtls (default true) - gateway-config.yaml: Check enableMtls instead of backendTLSPolicy - _gateway-workload.tpl: Check enableMtls for client CA mount - Tests: Updated to use enableMtls flag - Docs: Added enableMtls=false to BackendTLSPolicy examples - README: Document new flag and BackendTLSPolicy requirement Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * docs(helm): clarify cert-manager backend CA ConfigMap workflow Update documentation to explain the two-step install process required when using cert-manager with BackendTLSPolicy: 1. helm install - cert-manager issues the server certificate, but the certgen hook can't create the backend CA ConfigMap yet (cert-manager reconciles after templates are applied) 2. helm upgrade - certgen hook reads the CA from the cert-manager-issued certificate and creates the ConfigMap Previously, the docs said "created on first upgrade" without explaining why or that the feature won't work until then. The updated docs now: - Explain the timing issue (cert-manager reconciles after chart install) - Provide clear steps for the cert-manager workflow - Note that pkiInitJob (default) creates it immediately on install - Clarify that users must wait for the Certificate to be Ready before running the second upgrade Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * fix(docs): remove incorrect external hostname requirement for BackendTLSPolicy BackendTLSPolicy validates the backend certificate against the service FQDN (e.g., openshell.openshell.svc.cluster.local), not the external hostname. The external hostname only needs to be on the Gateway listener certificate for client-facing TLS. The default certManager.serverDnsNames already includes all required service FQDN variants, so no configuration is needed for BackendTLSPolicy to work. Fixed incorrect documentation that claimed: - "The server certificate SAN list must include the external hostname" - Users need to "configure certManager.serverDnsNames with the external hostname" Removed the unnecessary pkiInitJob.serverDnsNames override from the example and clarified that: - Gateway listener certificate needs the external hostname (for clients) - Backend certificate needs the service FQDN (for Gateway proxy) - The service FQDN is already in the defaults Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * docs: clarify ACME with LetsEncrypt reference Change all references from "ACME issuer" to "LetsEncrypt/ACME issuer" to help users understand that LetsEncrypt is the most common ACME provider and what ACME means in practice. Updated: - docs/kubernetes/managing-certificates.mdx - docs/kubernetes/openshift.mdx - deploy/helm/openshell/values.yaml - deploy/helm/openshell/README.md - deploy/helm/openshell/ci/values-openshift-route-cert-manager.yaml Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * docs(openshift): restructure end-to-end TLS options and clarify Gateway hostname Reorganize the OpenShift production deployment documentation: 1. Changed main section from "Production Deployments" to "Options for end-to-end TLS" for better clarity 2. Renamed subsections for consistency and clarity: - "End-to-end TLS using Gateway API and BackendTLSPolicy (OpenShift 4.22+)" - "End-to-end TLS using pass-through Route (all OpenShift versions)" 3. Clarified that the Gateway hostname is typically a wildcard: "typically a wildcard like *.openshell-ingress-gw.example.com" 4. Removed the recommendation to copy the cluster's wildcard certificate from openshift-ingress namespace, as this is not a recommended security best practice These changes make it clearer that users have two end-to-end TLS options and help them understand the typical naming pattern for Gateway hostnames. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * feat(helm): eliminate two-stage install for BackendTLSPolicy with cert-manager When using BackendTLSPolicy with cert-manager, the certgen hook now polls for up to 90 seconds waiting for cert-manager to issue the TLS certificate before creating the backend CA ConfigMap. This eliminates the need for a second `helm upgrade` in most cases. The hook polls every 2 seconds with progress logging every 10 seconds. If cert-manager takes longer than 90 seconds, the hook times out gracefully and logs a warning, preserving the fallback to manual ConfigMap creation or a second upgrade. The Job's activeDeadlineSeconds is 120s, so the 90s timeout leaves 30s margin for ConfigMap creation and hook completion. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * feat(helm): add configurable timeout for certgen hook Add `pkiInitJob.timeoutSeconds` Helm value (default 120) to control how long the certgen hook Job can run. When using cert-manager with BackendTLSPolicy, the hook polls for (timeoutSeconds - 30) seconds to leave margin for ConfigMap creation and cleanup. This allows users to increase the timeout for environments where cert-manager takes longer than 90 seconds to issue certificates, without requiring code changes. Example usage: ```yaml pkiInitJob: timeoutSeconds: 180 # Hook polls for 150 seconds ``` Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * docs(helm): document configurable certgen timeout Update documentation to mention the pkiInitJob.timeoutSeconds value and how it affects the cert-manager polling behavior when using BackendTLSPolicy. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * feat(helm): add configurable failure behavior for certgen timeout Add `pkiInitJob.failOnTimeout` Helm value (default false) to control whether the certgen hook fails or succeeds when cert-manager does not issue a certificate within the polling timeout. When false (default), the hook succeeds with a warning and users can run `helm upgrade` after cert-manager issues the certificate to create the backend CA ConfigMap. This provides backwards-compatible behavior. When true, the hook fails immediately if the timeout is reached, providing clear feedback that BackendTLSPolicy is non-functional. This is useful for strict validation requirements where incomplete installs should fail fast. Example usage: ```yaml pkiInitJob: timeoutSeconds: 180 failOnTimeout: true # Fail install if cert-manager takes >150s ``` Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * feat(helm): change failOnTimeout default to true and add troubleshooting docs Change `pkiInitJob.failOnTimeout` default from false to true to provide immediate feedback when cert-manager does not issue certificates within the polling timeout. This prevents silent failures where BackendTLSPolicy is non-functional but the install appears to succeed. Add comprehensive troubleshooting section to docs/kubernetes/ingress.mdx documenting the specific error "TLS error: Secret is not supplied by SDS" that occurs when the backend CA ConfigMap is missing, with step-by-step resolution instructions. Updated comments in values.yaml to clearly document the default behavior and explain when administrators might see connectivity errors if they override the default to failOnTimeout=false. BREAKING CHANGE: pkiInitJob.failOnTimeout now defaults to true. Helm installs will fail if cert-manager takes longer than (timeoutSeconds - 30) seconds to issue certificates. To restore the old behavior of allowing installs to succeed with a warning, set `pkiInitJob.failOnTimeout=false`. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * fix(helm): make cert-manager resources pre-install hooks to fix ordering Make Certificate and Issuer resources run as pre-install/pre-upgrade hooks with weight -30, before the certgen hook (weight -20). This fixes the chicken-and-egg problem where the certgen hook was waiting for Secrets created by Certificates that hadn't been created yet. **Hook ordering:** 1. Certificate and Issuer resources created (weight -30) 2. cert-manager issues certificates and creates Secrets 3. certgen hook runs (weight -20), finds Secrets, creates ConfigMap 4. Main resources (StatefulSet, Service, etc.) created Previously, the certgen pre-install hook would run before any resources were created, poll for a non-existent Secret, timeout, and fail. The Certificate resources would never get created because Helm waits for all pre-install hooks to succeed before creating main resources. This fix allows single-stage installs to work reliably as long as cert-manager can issue certificates within the polling timeout. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * feat(helm): add validation to prevent enableMtls with BackendTLSPolicy Add Helm chart validation that fails the install if both server.tls.enableMtls=true and grpcRoute.backendTLSPolicy.enabled=true are set, since this is an invalid configuration. BackendTLSPolicy requires mTLS to be disabled because the Gateway proxy cannot present client certificates to the backend. This validation provides immediate, clear feedback at install time rather than allowing the misconfiguration to be discovered through runtime errors. Example error message: ``` Error: grpcRoute.backendTLSPolicy requires mTLS to be disabled because the Gateway proxy cannot present client certificates to the backend; set server.tls.enableMtls=false ``` Also updated documentation to mention this validation check. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * docs(helm): clarify pkiInitJob.timeoutSeconds polling behavior Improve documentation to clearly explain that pkiInitJob.timeoutSeconds controls the Job deadline, but the actual polling timeout is (timeoutSeconds - 30) to reserve 30 seconds for ConfigMap creation and cleanup. Added concrete example: "timeoutSeconds=180 allows 150 seconds of polling" to make the relationship explicit and avoid confusion where users might expect the hook to poll for the full timeout value. Updated both values.yaml inline comments and ingress.mdx documentation for consistency. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * docs(openshift): remove outdated two-stage install instructions Update OpenShift documentation to reflect that single-stage installs now work with cert-manager and BackendTLSPolicy. The Certificate resources run as pre-install hooks (weight -30) before certgen (weight -20), allowing the hook to poll for and find the issued certificates. Removed the outdated two-step process: 1. helm install (cert-manager issues cert, hook logs warning) 2. helm upgrade (hook creates ConfigMap) Replaced with current single-stage behavior: - Certificate resources created as pre-install hooks - certgen hook polls for up to 90 seconds (configurable) - Single helm install succeeds in most cases - Fails fast by default if timeout reached This brings openshift.mdx in line with the already-updated ingress.mdx documentation. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> * fix(helm): make pkiInitJob.timeoutSeconds the actual polling duration The timeout value now represents the actual polling time that users experience when waiting for cert-manager to issue certificates. The Job activeDeadlineSeconds is set to (timeoutSeconds + 30) to allow buffer time for ConfigMap creation and cleanup. Previously, the hook polled for (timeoutSeconds - 30) seconds, which was confusing when users set timeoutSeconds=180 and only got 150 seconds of actual polling. Updated documentation in values.yaml, ingress.mdx, and openshift.mdx to reflect the clearer behavior. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@nvidia.com> * docs(helm): update values.yaml and README with correct polling duration Updated the caCertificateConfigMapName description to reflect that the hook polls for exactly pkiInitJob.timeoutSeconds seconds, not (timeoutSeconds - 30) seconds. Regenerated README.md with helm-docs. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@nvidia.com> * docs(kubernetes): add OIDC configuration to helm install and CLI examples Updated all helm install and openshell gateway add examples in ingress.mdx and openshift.mdx to include OIDC issuer and audience configuration. Examples now use concrete placeholder values: - OIDC issuer: https://keycloak.example.com/realms/openshell - OIDC audience: openshell-cli - Hostname: gateway.example.com - ClusterIssuer: letsencrypt-prod This makes it clearer how to configure OIDC authentication, which is required when using BackendTLSPolicy or HTTPS termination since the Gateway proxy cannot present client certificates to the backend. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@nvidia.com> * docs(kubernetes): explicitly list OIDC client ID in gateway add examples Added --oidc-client-id openshell-cli to all openshell gateway add commands in ingress.mdx and openshift.mdx, making the default client ID explicit in the examples even though it's the CLI default. This improves clarity and helps users understand the complete OIDC configuration needed for gateway registration. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@nvidia.com> * fix(helm): address PR review feedback for BackendTLSPolicy - Read backend CA from the authoritative server Secret instead of the in-memory PKI bundle so enabling BackendTLSPolicy on an existing release uses the CA that actually signed the server certificate. - Reconcile the backend CA ConfigMap on every hook run (compare and update) instead of skipping when it already exists, so CA rotations propagate automatically. - Remove hook annotations from cert-manager Issuer/Certificate resources so they remain regular release objects managed by Helm lifecycle. Split the cert-manager backend CA ConfigMap creation into a separate post-install/post-upgrade hook Job that polls after cert-manager Certificate resources are applied. - Update architecture/gateway.md, docs/reference/gateway-config.mdx, debug-openshell-cluster skill, and helm-dev-environment skill with BackendTLSPolicy, backend CA ConfigMap, enableMtls, and timeout documentation. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * fix(docs): resolve markdown lint errors in helm README and kubernetes docs Escape inline HTML angle brackets in README.md template placeholders, remove trailing spaces, and add blank lines around fenced code blocks in numbered lists. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * Update docs * fix(helm): escape inline HTML in values.yaml descriptions and sync mise lockfile Wrap `<fullname>` and `<namespace>` template placeholders in backticks so markdownlint does not flag them as inline HTML (MD033). Regenerate mise.lock to match current mise.toml after rebase onto main. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * Run 'mise lock' * fix: align mise.lock with CI mise version output The lockfile was regenerated locally with mise 2026.8.10 which resolves uv Linux artifacts to gnu variants and adds provenance_verified fields, but CI uses v2026.4.25 which produces musl variants without those fields. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> * fix(docs): correct cert-manager hook ordering and clientCaSecretName comment Update ingress.mdx and openshift.mdx to describe Certificate resources as regular release objects with a post-install/post-upgrade Job, matching the current implementation and architecture/gateway.md. Fix values.yaml clientCaSecretName comment to state that "" disables client certificate verification, matching the helper and access-control docs. Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizzato@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Brandon Squizzato <bsquizza@nvidia.com> |
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|
Jesse Jaggars
|
c4b500a7de |
feat(helm): cert-manager external issuer + OpenShift passthrough Route (#2468)
* fix(core): trust public root CAs alongside the sandbox mTLS CA The supervisor gRPC client only trusted the CA configured via OPENSHELL_TLS_CA, since tonic ClientTlsConfig starts with an empty root store unless with_native_roots()/with_webpki_roots() is also enabled. Deployments where the gateway server certificate is issued by a public CA (e.g. cert-manager against an ACME issuer) caused every supervisor connection to fail the TLS handshake with "UnknownCA", since the sandbox mTLS CA and the server cert issuer were no longer the same. Enable both native and webpki roots in addition to the configured CA. tonic root store is a union of all configured sources, so this does not weaken verification for existing self-signed deployments. webpki-roots (compiled in) is enabled alongside native-roots since the supervisor binary may run in minimal sandbox images without a populated system CA bundle. Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * feat(helm): support external cert-manager issuers and OpenShift Route passthrough Add certManager.serverIssuerRef/clientIssuerRef so the gateway and mTLS client certificates can be issued by a real Issuer/ClusterIssuer (e.g. ACME) instead of only the chart built-in self-signed CA. Add openshiftRoute template for exposing the gateway via a TLS passthrough Route so the gateway keeps terminating its own TLS/mTLS. The server Certificate excludes internal-only SANs (cluster-local, localhost, loopback) when an external issuer is configured, since ACME issuers reject those per CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements. A template-time fail guard catches the misconfiguration at helm install time rather than asynchronously at cert-manager issuance time. Includes Helm unittest coverage for both issuerRef overrides and Route rendering, plus a CI values overlay for lint coverage. Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs: document cert-manager external issuer and OpenShift Route Update managing-certificates.mdx with the serverIssuerRef workflow and install-time validation behavior. Add a production section to the OpenShift guide covering passthrough Route with a real certificate. Regenerate Helm README for new certManager and openshiftRoute values. Sync debug-openshell-cluster skill with new troubleshooting steps for ACME issuance failures and supervisor UnknownCA from mismatched CAs. Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(helm,core): address PR review feedback on cert-manager external issuer Addresses all five blocking review items from #2468: 1. Remove .with_native_roots() from supervisor gRPC client -- the supervisor runs inside the user-selected sandbox image, so the image CA bundle is not operator-controlled. Keep .with_webpki_roots() (compiled-in, not user-controlled) alongside the configured CA. 2. Fail at render time when serverIssuerRef.name is set but clientCaFromServerTlsSecret is still true. Add negative Helm test. 3. Remove clientIssuerRef -- changing only clientIssuerRef breaks both directions because trust bundles are not modeled separately. Change serverIssuerRef.kind default from ClusterIssuer to Issuer. 4. Add server.oidc.issuer and server.oidc.audience to the documented OpenShift production Helm command. Add Access Control prerequisite. 5. Fail at render time when openshiftRoute.enabled and disableTls are both true. Add negative Helm test. Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(drivers): strip GATEWAY_TLS_SERVER_NAME from Docker and Podman env Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(helm,drivers): guard default clientCaSecretName and add env-strip tests Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * feat(tls): SNI-based dual certificate for internal and external server TLS Split the gateway server certificate into two: an internal cert issued by the chart's own CA (for supervisor connections via cluster-local SANs) and an external cert issued by an operator-configured Issuer such as ACME/Let's Encrypt (for CLI and Route access via public SANs). The gateway uses SNI-based certificate selection: connections whose SNI hostname matches external_server_names receive the external cert; all others (including those with no SNI) receive the internal cert. Security improvement: remove .with_webpki_roots() from the supervisor gRPC client so supervisors trust only the chart CA, closing a MITM vector via publicly-trusted certificates in user-supplied container images. Key changes: - Add DualCertResolver with SNI-based cert selection and full test coverage - Add external_cert_path, external_key_path, external_server_names to TlsConfig - Validate partial external cert config (error on cert-without-key or vice versa) - Validate empty external_server_names when external cert is configured - Split cert-manager templates into internal + external Certificate resources - Add Helm guards for misconfigured external issuer (empty serverDnsNames, internal-only SANs with external issuer, conflicting clientCaFromServerTlsSecret) - Update gateway-config.mdx, managing-certificates.mdx, openshift.mdx docs - Update debug-openshell-cluster skill for dual-cert troubleshooting Signed-off-by: Pi Agent <agent@openshell.local> * fix(drivers): strip GATEWAY_TLS_SERVER_NAME in VM driver and correct comments Add the same GATEWAY_TLS_SERVER_NAME environment stripping to the VM compute driver that Docker, Podman, and Kubernetes drivers already perform. Without this, a sandbox user on the VM driver could override the TLS server name the supervisor verifies. Fix stale comments in Docker and Podman drivers that referenced 'with WebPKI roots trusted' — WebPKI roots are explicitly not trusted after the tls-webpki-roots removal. Use tls-ring instead of bare channel for tonic in openshell-core so the TLS API (ClientTlsConfig, Endpoint::tls_config) is available without pulling in any root certificate store. Signed-off-by: Pi Agent <agent@openshell.local> * fix(tls,helm): wildcard SNI matching and Route host validation Add RFC 6125 single-level wildcard matching to DualCertResolver so external_server_names entries like *.example.com correctly match SNI hostnames like gw.example.com. Previously only exact matches worked, silently falling back to the internal cert for wildcard configurations. Add a Helm fail guard in route.yaml that rejects openshiftRoute.host values not listed in certManager.serverDnsNames when an external issuer is configured — catches cert/route hostname mismatches at install time instead of at TLS connect time. Quote the host field in route.yaml for robustness. Signed-off-by: Pi Agent <agent@openshell.local> * fix(helm): address blocking review items — client-CA guard, wildcard Route, serverIssuerRef gate 1. Remove the obsolete guard rejecting serverIssuerRef + clientCaFromServerTlsSecret=true. The internal server certificate is always signed by the chart CA (the same CA that signs the client cert), so clientCaFromServerTlsSecret=true is correct — its filtered ca.crt is exactly the right trust anchor. The old workaround (mounting openshell-ca-tls directly) unnecessarily exposed the CA private key to the gateway container. Remove the client-CA overrides from docs, CI overlay, and production examples. 2. Route host validation now supports wildcard certificates per RFC 6125: single-level wildcards like *.example.com match gateway.example.com but not deep.sub.example.com. Require an explicit openshiftRoute.host when an external issuer is configured — without one, OpenShift generates a hostname absent from serverDnsNames. 3. Reject serverIssuerRef.name when certManager.enabled is false — the external certificate, its Secret mount, and the gateway TLS config all require cert-manager to be enabled. Validated on ROSA (dev.dyee.p3) with branch-built images: - Fresh install with letsencrypt-prod ClusterIssuer - SNI dual-cert: external hostname served Let's Encrypt cert - Supervisor mTLS via internal cert path: ConnectSupervisor accepted - Client CA volume: filtered ca.crt from internal server secret (no key) - CLI connected via Route + OIDC Helm tests: 81 pass across 7 suites. Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pi Agent <agent@openshell.local> |
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Taylor MutchandSeth Jennings
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8eacb4779f |
feat(kubernetes): add sidecar supervisor topology (#2076)
* feat(kubernetes): add sidecar supervisor topology Add the Kubernetes sidecar supervisor topology, its Helm/Skaffold configuration, topology documentation, and sidecar e2e matrix coverage. Skip root-only sandbox identity rewriting when process enforcement is network-only so the low-permission sidecar process container can start successfully. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar process id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar process id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): avoid similar proxy id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * docs(kubernetes): clarify sidecar topology limits Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): keep sidecar process leaf capless Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): refresh sidecar provider env snapshots Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * test(supervisor): align hot-swap identity regression Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): stage sidecar mtls files before proxy chown Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): simplify sidecar supervisor topology Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * chore(helm): reuse sidecar skaffold values Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar iptables helper names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(e2e): harden kube gateway wrapper setup Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid nft batch rollback on OCP Run nftables setup as individual commands so optional conntrack and log expressions can fail without rolling back required table, chain, and reject rules. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve process identity in sidecar topology Render sidecar pods with a shared process namespace, keep binary-aware network policy enabled, and move Kubernetes sidecar settings under the nested sidecar config table. Also apply unprivileged Landlock/seccomp setup in NetworkOnly supervisor mode so sidecar topology keeps sandbox child hardening without privileged process setup. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): replace sidecar snapshots with control socket Coordinate sidecar policy and provider bootstrap over a local Unix socket so the process leaf no longer reads policy/provider snapshot files. Report entrypoint startup through the control channel and keep gateway credentials confined to the network sidecar. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * feat(kubernetes): support relaxed sidecar network identity Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy sidecar clippy lint Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): standardize topology naming Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy linux clippy timeout import Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): support kata sidecar on ipv4 pods Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): satisfy linux clippy for sidecar fallback Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * chore(kubernetes): remove stale supervisor topology references Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): enable sidecar binary policy inspection Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): harden sidecar control boundary Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): couple sidecar supervisor lifecycles Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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Christian Zaccaria
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8c0ecac8cf |
docs(openshift): simplify install steps and add Helm README entries for OpenShift overrides (#2125)
Signed-off-by: ChristianZaccaria <christian.zaccaria.cz@gmail.com> |
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Taylor Mutch
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7dab612feb |
feat(helm): support Deployment kind in HA gateway workloads (#1867)
* feat(helm): support Deployment kind in HA gateway workloads Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(helm): handle null workload values Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> |
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Taylor Mutch
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5f58cb018f |
fix(helm): create sandbox JWT secret when cert-manager is enabled (#1700)
* fix(helm): create sandbox JWT secret under cert-manager The cert-manager install path (certManager.enabled=true, pkiInitJob.enabled=false) left the gateway StatefulSet unable to start because nothing created the openshell-jwt-keys Secret: cert-manager owns TLS Secrets but does not mint the sandbox JWT signing key, and the certgen hook only rendered when pkiInitJob.enabled was true. Separate JWT signing-key provisioning from TLS PKI provisioning: - certgen: add a --jwt-only mode that creates only the Opaque JWT signing Secret, for use when another controller owns TLS Secrets. - certgen.yaml: render the hook when pkiInitJob.enabled OR certManager.enabled is true. cert-manager takes precedence and runs the hook with --jwt-only even if pkiInitJob.enabled remains true. Remove the mutual-exclusion failure between the two values. - _helpers.tpl: add openshell.sandboxJwtSecretName, shared by the hook and the StatefulSet mount. - Update values, README, docs, architecture, and the debug-openshell-cluster skill to reflect the new precedence; the documented cert-manager install no longer needs pkiInitJob.enabled=false. Closes #1691 * fix(helm): honor cert-manager precedence for client CA volume The client CA volume logic treated pkiInitJob.enabled as proof that built-in PKI owns the client CA. With cert-manager precedence now allowing certManager.enabled=true alongside the default pkiInitJob.enabled=true, that assumption mounts the server TLS cert secret as the client CA and ignores certManager.clientCaFromServerTlsSecret=false, which can break mTLS or trust the wrong CA. Gate the pkiInitJob.enabled term with (not certManager.enabled) in all three client CA conditions (volume mount, volume definition, and secret selection) so cert-manager owns TLS when enabled. Add a Helm test suite covering built-in PKI, cert-manager shared CA, the regression config (cert-manager + clientCaFromServerTlsSecret=false + default pkiInitJob), and the no-client-CA case. |
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Taylor Mutch
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a3b16c18ab | feat(auth): per-sandbox authentication to gateway (#1404) | ||
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Miyoung Choi
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8322e4fd00 |
docs: style fixes (#1341)
* docs: style fixes * docs: drop observability section overview page and rename a section title * docs: title updates |
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Taylor Mutch
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d8f614fa31 |
docs(kubernetes): add initial reference docs (#1243)
* docs(kubernetes): add initial reference docs Add a Kubernetes reference section under docs/reference/kubernetes/ covering gateway setup, OIDC and reverse-proxy authentication, cert-manager PKI, and Gateway API external access. Update installation.mdx to link to the new setup page and nest the new folder under the Reference section in index.yml. * docs(kubernetes): promote Kubernetes to top-level nav and retitle pages Move docs/reference/kubernetes/ to docs/kubernetes/ so the section appears as a top-level nav entry rather than nested under Reference. Retitle the pages to broader, action-oriented names (Managing Certificates, Ingress, Access Control) and rename the files to match. Update cross-references in setup.mdx and the installation page. * docs(nav): revert Reference to folder mode The Reference section was switched to explicit section/contents to host the nested Kubernetes subsection. With Kubernetes promoted to a top-level folder, restore folder-mode auto-detection. Side effect: sandbox-compute-drivers is picked up again, which was silently absent from the explicit list. * docs(kubernetes): add OpenShift install page Mirror the OpenShift install instructions from PR #1240 into the Kubernetes docs section. Documents the SCC binding for sandbox pods and the chart overrides required by OpenShift's Security Context Constraints (disabled PKI init Job, plaintext TLS, cleared fsGroup and runAsUser). |