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pull-request/2832
115
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 alangou
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0d708d6d51 |
fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints (#2493)
* fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * refactor(cli): extract allowed-ip option parsing Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): gate endpointless credential bindings Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> |
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Mrunal Patel
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8d67250a5d |
fix(providers): keep refresh credential handles stable (#2780)
* fix(providers): keep refresh credential handles stable Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * fix(providers): protect refresh-owned credentials Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> |
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Giuseppe Scrivano
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d51a653f9c |
feat(driver-podman): add userns config (#2562)
* refactor(driver): extract shared supervisor binary helpers Move supervisor binary extraction, caching, and validation helpers from the Docker driver into openshell-core::driver_utils so both Docker and Podman drivers can reuse them. Moved helpers: extract_first_tar_entry, write_cache_binary_atomic, supervisor_cache_path, temp_extract_container_name, and validate_linux_elf_binary. The shared extract_first_tar_entry gains entry-type and empty-payload checks that the Docker-local version lacked. supervisor_cache_path takes a driver_subdir parameter so each driver caches under its own namespace (docker-supervisor vs podman-supervisor). Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> * feat(driver-podman): add userns config Add a `userns` option to the Podman compute driver that maps to Podman's user namespace modes. The mode string is split on the first colon into the API's `nsmode` and `value` fields so parameterized values like `auto:size=65536` and `keep-id:uid=1000,gid=1000` are forwarded correctly. When the mode is `auto`, the container spec also sets `idmappings.AutoUserNs = true` as required by the API. An allowlist validates the mode at startup: `auto` and `keep-id` accept optional parameters; `host`, `private`, and `nomap` reject them; everything else is an error. Podman image volumes use overlay mounts internally and the kernel does not support idmapped mounts on overlay (`mount_setattr` returns EINVAL). When userns is configured (any mode except `host`), the driver extracts the supervisor binary from the image to a host-side cache and bind-mounts it instead of using an image volume. Configurable via TOML `userns = "auto"`, CLI `--userns`, or environment variable `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_USERNS`. Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> |
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Derek Carr
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59479f492a |
feat(k8s): add namespace-per-workspace support (RFC 0011 Phase 3) (#2656)
* feat(k8s): add namespace-per-workspace support (RFC 0011 Phase 3) Implement three workspace namespace modes for the Kubernetes compute driver: shared (default, preserves current single-namespace behavior), managed (auto-creates/deletes namespaces per workspace), and operator (pre-provisioned namespaces with dynamic discovery via label selector or drop-in allowlist file). Key changes: - WorkspaceMode enum and namespace resolution in driver config - Managed namespace lifecycle with ServiceAccount and OpenShift SCC annotation propagation - Cluster-wide sandbox CR watchers for managed/operator modes - NamespaceValidator (Exact/Prefix/Allowlist) for SA token auth - Workspace-aware credential secret storage - Helm ClusterRole for multi-namespace RBAC - Gateway config, architecture, and reference docs Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): add e2e tests for workspace namespace modes Add end-to-end tests for managed and operator workspace modes introduced in RFC 0011 Phase 3. The managed mode tests verify namespace creation with correct labels, ServiceAccount provisioning, sandbox CR placement, and namespace survival with remaining sandboxes. The operator mode tests verify rejection of unlabeled and nonexistent namespaces. The positive operator path (sandbox in labeled namespace) is known to fail due to an RBAC gap and will be addressed separately. Also fixes Helm 4 compatibility: move SPDX license headers inside conditional guards in 8 chart templates to prevent empty comment-only documents, and fix a trailing whitespace trimmer in clusterrole.yaml that concatenated the license header with apiVersion. Adds cleanup sweep in with-kube-gateway.sh to remove managed and operator namespaces before Helm uninstall, and mise tasks for running each mode independently. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(k8s): add operator namespace label watcher Spawn a background kube::runtime::watcher in the K8s driver that watches namespaces matching the configured label selector and populates the OperatorNamespaceAllowlist at runtime. The driver owns the allowlist and exposes its Arc so the server can share the same set with the SA token authenticator. create_sandbox now gates pod creation on the allowlist in operator mode — workspaces whose namespace is not yet labeled are rejected at resource render time rather than silently proceeding. Workspace lifecycle itself is unaffected; only sandbox (resource) creation is gated. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): harden operator mode and address review findings Close the fail-open gap in operator mode when only operator_namespace_file is configured: the allowlist is now created unconditionally in operator mode (fail-closed from startup). Implement the namespace file watcher using the notify crate, following the TLS hot-reload pattern (parent-directory watch, 1s debounce, ConfigMap symlink-swap safe). The file format is a JSON array of namespace name strings. Additional fixes from the 10-reviewer audit: - Change allowlist rejection from InvalidArgument to FailedPrecondition so callers know the request may succeed later once the namespace is provisioned. - NamespaceValidator::Allowlist now holds the OperatorNamespaceAllowlist newtype instead of a raw Arc<RwLock<BTreeSet>>, eliminating silent denial on RwLock poison. - Verify LABEL_MANAGED_BY and LABEL_GATEWAY_ID ownership before deleting a managed namespace. - Replace fixed 5s sleep in operator e2e test with a 30s poll loop. - Add Helm validation for workspaceMode values. - Fix Helm README type column and description for operator fields. - Add insert/remove methods to OperatorNamespaceAllowlist; label watcher now uses them instead of reaching through shared(). - Reject configs with both operator_namespace_label and operator_namespace_file set. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(k8s): add workspace-level compute driver RPCs and harden RBAC Decouple namespace lifecycle from sandbox lifecycle by adding EnsureWorkspace/DeleteWorkspace RPCs to the ComputeDriver service. Namespace creation now happens before credential storage and namespace deletion happens on workspace delete, fixing credential storage in managed workspace mode. - Add EnsureWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace proto RPCs with implementations across all compute drivers (K8s managed delegates to ensure_namespace/delete_namespace_if_empty; others no-op) - Wire ensure_workspace into provider create/update/refresh paths so the namespace exists before the credential driver writes secrets - Wire delete_workspace into workspace deletion for cleanup - Remove delete_namespace_if_empty from sandbox deletion path - Scope ClusterRole secrets access to non-shared workspace modes - Add TODO for TLS cert hot-reload in sandbox gRPC client - Harden e2e tests with control-plane sandbox resolution assertions - Fix docker image save --platform flag for OCI index manifests Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address re-review findings and add test coverage - Use server-side apply for TLS secret sync (fixes second sandbox creation failure when TLS is enabled) - Scope gateway-ID label selector unconditionally across all workspace modes (fixes operator reads/watches/deletes seeing foreign sandboxes) - Validate operator allowlist in EnsureWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace RPCs (prevents credential writes to namespaces outside the allowlist) - Extend ClusterRole secrets patch+delete to all non-shared modes with credential driver enabled (fixes operator credential storage RBAC) - Validate namespace ownership on 409 conflict in ensure_namespace (prevents adopting unowned namespaces in managed mode) - Replace delete_namespace_if_empty with unconditional delete_namespace letting Kubernetes cascade cleanup (fixes stuck terminating CRs) - Strengthen NetworkPolicy TODO to cover both managed and operator modes - Extract selector and ownership logic into testable free functions - Add unit tests for gateway-ID selectors and namespace ownership - Add Helm ClusterRole RBAC tests for operator credential driver Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * ci(k8s): add workspace managed and operator mode e2e to CI Wire the existing e2e:kubernetes:workspace-managed and e2e:kubernetes:workspace-operator mise tasks into the branch-e2e workflow so they run alongside the other core Kubernetes e2e suites. Both are gated by run_core_e2e and included in the Core E2E result gate. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): add e2e tests for workspace namespace modes Add 7 new e2e tests covering workspace namespace lifecycle, TLS secret copying, ownership conflict detection, DNS-1123 validation, operator namespace preservation, and dynamic label watcher behavior. Fix async sandbox deletion race condition in existing tests by polling sandbox list instead of asserting immediately after delete. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): grant secrets/patch unconditionally and backfill gateway-id labels Address two review findings: 1. RBAC: server-side apply (PATCH) is used for TLS secret sync in multi-namespace modes, but the ClusterRole only granted patch when the kubernetes-secrets credential driver was enabled. Grant patch unconditionally for non-shared modes since TLS sync always needs it; keep delete gated on the credential driver. 2. Upgrade safety: the new gateway-id label selector would orphan legacy Sandbox CRs that predate its introduction. Add a startup backfill in shared mode that patches any managed Sandbox CR missing the gateway-id label before the driver begins serving requests. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address workspace namespace review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address follow-up review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): preserve workspace lookup after rebase Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(helm): allow managed secret creation Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): stop pods in workspace namespace Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): scope pod deletion check to v1alpha1 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address workspace namespace review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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|
LR90
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d0c6dc3fd8 |
feat(kubernetes): support corporate upstream proxy (#2633)
* feat(kubernetes): support corporate upstream proxy Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> * fix(kubernetes): reject proxy_auth_secret_key values Kubernetes cannot create Gateway validation accepted proxy_auth_secret_key values that Kubernetes rejects when creating the Secret (keys longer than 253 bytes, or the reserved "."/".." names), turning an invalid deployment setting into repeated sandbox Pod-provisioning failures instead of a startup error. Reject them in validate_upstream_proxy_config so they fail closed at gateway startup. Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> * docs(skill): add corporate upstream proxy checks to debug-openshell-cluster Add a Kubernetes corporate upstream proxy troubleshooting section covering rendered [openshell.drivers.kubernetes] configuration, credential Secret volume events, supervisor arguments and mounts confined to the network- supervising container, and proxy reachability. Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> --------- Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> |
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Seth Jennings
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0f8fad23c4 |
feat(sandbox): add stop and start operations (#2653)
* feat(sandbox): add suspend and resume operations Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): preserve lifecycle work after cancellation Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): reconcile ambiguous lifecycle outcomes Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): complete suspended session cleanup Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(vm): preserve suspension state on resume failure Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): retry retained lifecycle transitions Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): clean sessions after suspend reconciliation Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover deleting suspended sandbox Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve progressing sandbox suspension Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): bound suspend status polling Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): detect legacy sandbox suspension Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(tui): render suspended sandbox phases Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * refactor(sandbox): rename suspend and resume lifecycle Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * perf(server): clean stopped sessions on transition Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): fail fast on rejected stop Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(compute): fence stale restart lifecycle events Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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Matthew Grossman
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170961997f |
chore(ci): disable telemetry in internal test runs (#2648)
* chore(ci): disable telemetry in internal test runs Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(ci): remove brittle telemetry wiring test Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * docs: trim CI telemetry guidance Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): share telemetry default with OpenShift Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
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0120535efc |
feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints (#2510)
* feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): verify static credential endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(e2e): use valid endpoint isolation fixtures Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve binding identity across rotations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): enforce bindings across request lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): close credential relay gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): hash selected provider profile scope Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): resolve credentials after request admission Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): align single-route credential denials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): harden endpoint-bound rotation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce identity and authority binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): snapshot provider environment atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): include authority port in query proxy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): close credential revocation gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(proxy): explain authority mismatch diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce binding lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): reject credential config collisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): capture credential scope atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): distinguish origin and absolute targets Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): isolate endpointless profile credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): normalize IPv6 request authorities Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify endpointless profile isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): bind endpointless provider credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): use current GCP placeholder revision Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): explain policy credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover endpointless fail-closed invariant Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(policy): expect ambiguity rejection at creation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): share credential mismatch finding builder Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover malformed binding metadata Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): verify multi-key endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover same-host credential path denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): document serialized refresh contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): consolidate L7 log formatting Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): precompile endpoint binding patterns Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): share identity epoch revisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): require explicit request default ports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate SigV4 credential sources Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve endpoint bindings for credential handles Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(go-sdk): expose network credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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5548405fcb |
feat(credentials): add provider credential storage drivers (#2437)
* feat(credentials): add provider credential storage drivers Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): harden credential update handling Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): harden credential driver security, correctness, and performance Address review findings from the credential storage drivers PR: - Route additional_credentials through the driver on refresh to prevent silent data loss for multi-credential providers (e.g. AWS STS) - Clean up stored credential handles on CAS failure during refresh to prevent orphaned secrets in external backends - Enforce namespace validation in the Kubernetes Secrets driver to prevent cross-namespace credential access when allow_reference_namespace is not enabled - Cache Vault Kubernetes auth tokens with 80% TTL to avoid re-authenticating on every credential operation - Parallelize resolve_credentials in all three drivers using try_join_all for faster sandbox startup - Add existingSecret support for the KEK Secret to fix helm template/GitOps workflows where lookup returns empty and regenerates the key - Document RBAC blast radius for the Kubernetes Secrets credential driver and recommend a dedicated namespace Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): add optimistic concurrency, fix thundering herd, parallelize operations Use resourceVersion optimistic concurrency with retry loop for K8s Secret ownership checks to prevent TOCTOU races. Switch Vault token cache from RwLock to Mutex with double-check pattern to prevent thundering herd on cache miss. Parallelize credential store and delete operations across independent keys using try_join_all. Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): handle partial failures, add delete retry, consolidate cleanup Replace try_join_all with join_all in credential store/delete operations to handle partial failures — successfully-stored handles are cleaned up when another key fails. Add retry loop with conflict detection to db-credstore delete_credential, matching the K8s driver pattern. Consolidate 4 manual cleanup_pre_stored_provider_credentials call sites into a single error handler using an async block. Remove inconsistent .trim() from db-credstore validate_handle_owner. Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): fix retry loop guard and remove unprotected validation Remove attempt-count guard from 409/Aborted match arms in retry loops so the post-loop Status::aborted error is reachable after exhausting retries. Previously, last-attempt conflicts fell through to the catch-all error arm, producing misleading Status::unavailable errors. Remove duplicate validation calls that ran after prepare_provider_credential_update but outside the cleanup-protected async block, which would leak pre-stored handles on failure. Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): add workspace/provider UUID to credential backend paths Include workspace and provider ID in credential backend object paths to ensure cross-workspace uniqueness and prevent credential collision (GATOR-1806c9be-01). - Updated credential driver proto to include workspace and provider_id fields - Modified Vault driver to include workspace/provider_id in managed_secret_path - Modified Kubernetes Secrets driver to include workspace/provider_id in credential_owner_id and managed_secret_name - Updated all credential runtime calls to pass workspace/provider_id - Updated tests to use the new signatures This prevents two workspaces sharing the same external credential store from colliding on provider names, which was a critical security issue (CWE-639). * fix(credentials): preserve provider-level expiration for handle-backed credentials Compute effective expiration from both provider and driver values using the earliest non-zero timestamp and skip expired values before insertion (GATOR-1806c9be-02). - Modified resolve_provider_handles to check provider credential_expires_at_ms - Skip expired credentials during resolution instead of returning them - Use effective expiration (min of provider and driver) in resolution results - Fix inference.rs to preserve earliest expiration when merging This ensures handle-backed credentials respect the same expiration semantics as inline credentials. * fix(credentials): stage refresh changes under new handles before validation Stage credential replacements under new immutable handles instead of reusing existing handles to prevent overwriting committed values before validation/CAS (GATOR-1806c9be-03). - Stage credentials with empty existing_handles map to force new handle creation - Validate and CAS before the new values are committed to backend storage - Delete old handles only after successful CAS - On CAS failure, delete only the newly staged handles - This prevents CWE-362/CWE-367 race conditions where failed refreshes could still modify or delete the active credential The fix ensures that a rejected refresh cannot modify the backend object still referenced by the committed provider record. * fix(credentials): add timeouts to credential driver RPCs Apply configured timeouts to both startup capability negotiation and runtime RPCs to prevent indefinite hangs (GATOR-1806c9be-05). - Add DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_DRIVER_RPC_TIMEOUT_SECS constant (30s) - Apply timeout to GetCapabilities during startup connection - Apply timeout to all runtime RPCs (store, delete, resolve) - Use tokio::time::timeout to bound the entire GetCapabilities operation during startup, not just the socket connection - Return contextual deadline errors on timeout This prevents a faulty or overloaded driver from hanging gateway operations indefinitely. * fix(credentials): fix test to use consistent workspace/provider identity The Kubernetes auth Vault resolve test was constructing a managed path with test-workspace/test-provider-id but sending default/prov-123 in the request, causing validation to reject the request (GATOR-18e32351-01). - Update test to use test-workspace and test-provider-id in the request to match the logical_path construction - This ensures the test exercises the intended code path and validates Kubernetes auth resolution properly The test now passes and correctly validates identity enforcement. * fix(credentials): use unique staging ID for refresh to avoid overwrites Stage refresh replacements under genuinely distinct immutable handles using a unique staging ID to prevent overwriting committed values (GATOR-1806c9be-03). - Generate a unique staging ID using UUID for each refresh operation - Use this staging ID when storing credentials instead of the real provider ID - Pass the same staging ID during cleanup on failure to delete only staged objects - This ensures deterministic paths (Vault) and object names (K8s) don't collide with the committed provider's credentials The fix prevents failed refreshes from silently replacing active credentials or breaking providers by deleting still-referenced backend objects. * fix(credentials): wrap credential driver RPCs in local timeouts Add local tokio::time::timeout wrappers around credential driver RPCs to bound non-compliant or stalled UDS peers (GATOR-1806c9be-05). - Wrap StoreCredential, DeleteCredential, and ResolveCredentials in local timeouts - Return contextual deadline_exceeded errors when timeouts occur - Keep existing gRPC timeout metadata for compliant implementations - GetCapabilities during startup was already wrapped in previous commit This ensures a faulty local driver cannot hang gateway operations indefinitely, even if it accepts the connection but never responds to the RPC. * fix(credentials): preserve ownership for staged refreshes Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(credentials): bound startup capability probe Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * test(provider): authenticate credential handler requests Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(ci): grant actions read to credential driver e2e Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> |
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Matthew Grossman
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537805568d |
feat(sandbox): honor OCI image working directories (#2530)
* feat(sandbox): honor Docker OCI working directories Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): honor effective workspace access Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): cover enforced workspace denial Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * docs(docker): explain effective workdir checks Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): validate effective workspace writes Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reserve supervisor control roots Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): centralize control paths Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reserve OCI runtime mount roots Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
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905b554c7c |
refactor(network): consolidate proxy egress pipeline (#2373)
* refactor(network): introduce shared egress pipeline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover shared proxy egress paths Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): make destination authorization explicit Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): pin proxy relay policy context Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): lock relay generation contracts Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): establish phase zero compatibility baseline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): detect ambiguous network endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(sandbox): fail closed on invalid policy updates Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): invalidate relays on policy changes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document validation failure posture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover validation and middleware egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): move policy failure mode to gateway toml Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): name proxy contracts by behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): align overlap validation with endpoint selection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): expect hard loopback denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): match declared endpoint denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve path-specific endpoint overrides Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): respect hard-blocked host gateways Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): reconcile proxy refactor with main Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve CONNECT policy generation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): cover runtime endpoint glob semantics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): reject ambiguous policies before persistence Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): explain ambiguity preflight behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): compare body limits within protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): avoid global tracing capture race Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(server): format rebased provider tests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): retain runtime on middleware outage Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): preflight provider composition activation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): distinguish runtime failure transitions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Derek Carr
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9c019a93f5 |
Wire authorization into workspace model (#2445)
* feat(auth): implement RFC 0011 Phase 2 workspace authorization Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address PR review feedback on workspace authorization - Docker e2e: add --health-port and switch readiness probe from `openshell status` to `curl /healthz`, fixing a false-positive readiness check in OIDC mode where the CLI exited 0 without actually contacting the gateway - ListWorkspaces: move membership filtering from post-query N+1 lookups into a SQL EXISTS subquery so pagination applies to the visible set, not the global ordering. Add generic list_with_membership to the persistence layer. - Descriptor validator: reject role/scope fields on unauthenticated and sandbox auth modes, and allow-list workspace_role as user/admin and global_role as platform_admin to catch typos at startup Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(server): use authed request in delete telemetry test The workspace authorization added by the Phase 2 auth changes requires a Principal on every delete request. The delete-telemetry test was still using a bare Request::new, so extract_principal failed before the handler could acquire the delete gate, causing a 5-second timeout flake. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address gator review findings for workspace authorization - Inject unauthenticated-local-dev principal in no-auth gateway mode so handlers that call extract_principal() always find one. - Cap label-selector membership query at MAX_PAGE_SIZE instead of u32::MAX to bound the in-memory read. - Authorize workspace membership before resolving workspace existence in all sandbox RPCs to prevent workspace-name enumeration by non-members. - Remove dead_code allow on AuthorizedWorkspace.workspace now that callers use the normalized name from the authz result. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): close workspace-name oracle and label-selector truncation Swap authorize-before-resolve ordering in 27 handlers across provider.rs, service.rs, policy.rs, and workspace.rs to prevent CWE-203 workspace-name enumeration by non-members. Add combined membership+label SQL query (list_with_membership_and_selector) to both persistence backends so ListWorkspaces with label selectors no longer silently drops results beyond the first page of membership matches. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(auth): add non-member rejection and membership+label persistence tests Add comprehensive test coverage for workspace authorization changes: - Non-member rejection tests across all 44 workspace-scoped handlers (sandbox, provider, service, policy, workspace, inference) verifying PERMISSION_DENIED is returned instead of NOT_FOUND to prevent CWE-203 workspace-name oracle - Persistence test for list_with_membership_and_selector verifying SQL-level membership EXISTS + label filtering, multiple predicates, no-match cases, and pagination Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): format merged import line in sandbox tests Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address gator re-review findings on workspace authorization - Fix TUI unconditionally setting providers_v2_enabled after provider refresh; read the actual gateway setting via GetGatewayConfig at startup instead - Fix SQLite json_extract with dotted label keys (e.g. example.com/env) by quoting the key in the JSON path - Add authed_request wrappers to upstream OCI identity tests that were missing a principal after rebase - Add test proving GetGatewayConfig is accessible without Platform Admin - Add test for dotted/prefixed Kubernetes-style label key filtering Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address second gator re-review findings - Loosen GetGatewayConfig from platform_admin to scope-only so workspace users can discover providers_v2_enabled during sandbox creation with inferred-provider commands; update proto descriptor, descriptor validation, and RFC 0011 access table - Add validate_label_selector to handle_list_workspaces and escape single quotes in SQLite json_extract interpolation (CWE-89 defense-in-depth) - Re-fetch providers_v2_enabled after TUI gateway switch so the new gateway's capability is reflected - Add e2e test for workspace user with inferred-provider command - Add persistence test for adversarial label keys with SQL injection attempts - Add handler test for invalid label selector rejection in ListWorkspaces Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address third gator review findings - Cap label selector pairs at 64 (CWE-400) to bound SQLite dynamic SQL - Add SCOPE_ONLY_METHODS allowlist for scope-without-role RPCs (CWE-863) - Normalize ID-based data-plane handlers to return NOT_FOUND for unauthorized sandboxes, closing the cross-workspace oracle (CWE-203) - Fix TUI provider profile cache lookup key mismatch for legacy providers with empty profile_workspace - Add whoami to CLI skill reference command tree - Update TUI skill doc with workspace, provider, and settings coverage - Document scope/workspace orthogonality on GetGatewayConfig proto Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): extend CWE-203 normalization to policy.rs sandbox handlers GetSandboxConfig and GetSandboxLogs in policy.rs had the same fetch-before-authorize pattern that leaked cross-workspace sandbox existence. Promote fetch_and_authorize_sandbox to pub(super) and use it from both sandbox.rs and policy.rs handlers. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(auth): update assertions for CWE-203 sandbox ID normalization Cross-workspace sandbox access via ID-based handlers now returns NOT_FOUND instead of PERMISSION_DENIED to prevent existence inference. Update the unit test and OIDC e2e assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): narrow CWE-203 error mapping and correct whoami output formats Only remap PERMISSION_DENIED to NOT_FOUND in fetch_and_authorize_sandbox and RevokeSshSession, letting INTERNAL and UNAUTHENTICATED propagate as-is. Fix whoami --output format values in cli-reference.md to match the actual CLI (table/json/yaml, not text/json). Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(ci): share network namespace with Keycloak in containerized CI In GitHub Actions job containers, Docker port publishing lands on the host, not inside the job container. Detect this environment and attach Keycloak to the job container's network namespace instead, with hardened defaults (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, loopback-only listener). Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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Evan Lezar
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eb380d71a3 |
ci(e2e): probe VM gateway readiness (#2544)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Matthew Grossman
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bc14018cad |
feat(sandbox): use policy-first OCI image identity (#2509)
* feat(sandbox): use policy-first OCI image identity Closes #2331 Preserve per-field policy omission, derive Docker and Podman fallbacks from the inspected immutable image, and resolve the final numeric identity before starting agent children. Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve declared process identities Keep explicit policy values and OCI-declared names intact, defer passwd lookup until a primary GID is required, and refresh stale policy examples. Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): reuse resolved OCI identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): allow Linux pre-exec arguments Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): protect resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): prepare workspace for OCI identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): own only workspace root Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden partial identity drops Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): scope OCI image e2e to Docker Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): narrow OCI identity fallback scope Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(podman): cover OCI identity launch Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): exercise OCI fallback in E2E Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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Philippe Martin
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77e5c32217 |
feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy (#2245)
* feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy - Chain sandbox egress through a corporate HTTP proxy so outbound traffic from within the sandbox respects the host proxy settings - Forward sandbox proxy environment variables to the generated Podman config so the proxy is applied consistently to Podman-managed workloads Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): make corporate proxy routing operator-owned The operator-configured corporate egress proxy was injected under the conventional HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY names as defaults beneath sandbox spec/template environment, so a sandbox creator could redirect egress at an arbitrary proxy or disable proxying with NO_PROXY=*. Route the boundary through reserved, supervisor-only variables (OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY) written in the Podman driver's required-variable tier. Any sandbox-supplied value under a reserved name is stripped before the operator value is applied, so the supervisor never observes a reserved proxy variable the operator did not set. The supervisor now reads only the reserved names and ignores the conventional proxy variables the sandbox controls. Add the reserved proxy variables to the supervisor-only child-environment denylist so the corporate proxy URL and any embedded credentials are not inherited by the sandbox workload, which reaches egress through the local policy proxy and never needs them. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * feat(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy credentials via secret file Proxy credentials were embedded inline in the proxy URL, so they were stored in gateway.toml and exposed in container metadata via 'podman inspect'. Reject inline 'user:pass@' credentials in https_proxy/http_proxy at startup (parsed with the url crate rather than hand-splitting), and add a proxy_auth_file option pointing at a 'user:pass' file. The driver stages that file as a per-sandbox root-only Podman secret, mounts it at a fixed path, and exports only the path in the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_FILE variable, so the credential never appears in config, environment, or container metadata. Reading the file fails closed on a missing, empty, or control-character-bearing value. The supervisor reads the credential from the mounted file and builds the Proxy-Authorization: Basic header, rejecting control characters, and no longer derives credentials from URL userinfo. The auth-file path is added to the child-environment strip list, and the generated gateway.toml is written owner-only (mode 0600). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fail closed on invalid upstream proxy configuration The reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* variables are an operator-owned egress boundary, but the supervisor treated present-but-invalid values as unset: an unsupported or malformed proxy URL was ignored with a warning, an unreadable auth file proceeded without credentials, and a malformed credential silently became unauthenticated. Any of these could quietly downgrade the corporate proxy boundary to direct dialing or unauthenticated proxy access. Make every configured-but-invalid proxy or auth setting fatal to supervisor proxy startup, emit an OCSF ConfigStateChange failure event before refusing, and share URL validation semantics between the Podman driver and the supervisor through a single validator in openshell-core (parse_upstream_proxy_url), so a value accepted at sandbox-create time can never be rejected in-container or vice versa. Inline user:pass@ URL credentials are now fatal in the supervisor too (previously warn-and-strip), matching the driver. Unset or empty variables still mean no proxy; only present-but-invalid values fail. Error paths never include credential content. Addresses the fail-closed review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): finish the fail-closed upstream proxy credential contract The upstream proxy URL already had a single shared validator, but the credential did not: the Podman driver rejected only CR/LF/NUL while the supervisor rejected every control character, so a credential accepted at sandbox-create time (e.g. one containing a tab) could still be rejected in-container. Present-but-whitespace reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* values were also silently treated as unset, quietly downgrading the operator's egress boundary to direct dialing. Add parse_upstream_proxy_credential to openshell-core as the single source of truth for the documented user:pass credential form (non-empty user, no control characters, trimmed) and use it in both the Podman driver's secret staging and the supervisor's Proxy-Authorization header construction. Error variants carry no payload so credential content can never leak into messages. Make a present-but-empty reserved variable fatal to supervisor proxy startup instead of meaning "unset"; only fully unset variables disable the proxy. The driver correspondingly rejects an empty no_proxy at config time so it can never inject a value the supervisor refuses. Addresses the remaining fail-closed credential/config review item on Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> #2245. * fix(sandbox,podman): close remaining fail-open upstream proxy config paths Two configuration paths could still silently run without the proxy boundary the operator believed was in effect. A no_proxy bypass list configured without any https_proxy/http_proxy was accepted by both the driver and the supervisor and simply meant "dial everything directly". Reject it on both sides, exactly like the existing proxy_auth_file-without-proxy rule: an operator who wrote a bypass list assumed proxying was active, so accepting it hides a fail-open state. The gateway.sh dev script guarded proxy settings with [[ -n "${VAR:-}" ]], which conflates unset with explicitly-empty and dropped the latter before the gateway's validation could see it. Use ${VAR+x} instead so a set-but-empty variable is written into gateway.toml and rejected at startup by validate_proxy_config rather than silently discarded. Addresses the remaining fail-open configuration review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject upstream proxy URLs with path, query, or fragment parse_upstream_proxy_url accepted URLs like http://proxy.corp.com:8080/some/path and silently discarded everything after host:port, a lenience inherited from the original supervisor parser. A forward proxy is addressed by host:port only, so extra components indicate a misconfiguration (for example a pasted endpoint URL) and silently truncating them violates the present-but-invalid-is-fatal contract enforced everywhere else in this configuration surface. Reject a path, query, or fragment in the shared validator with a new UnexpectedComponent error. A bare trailing slash remains accepted because the url crate normalizes an absent http path to "/", making the two indistinguishable. Both the Podman driver (gateway startup) and the supervisor (sandbox startup) inherit the rule through the shared parser, keeping their semantics identical by construction. Addresses the proxy URL component review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): remove plain-HTTP upstream proxy support The http_proxy path tunneled plain-HTTP requests through the corporate proxy with CONNECT to port 80 and then sent origin-form requests down the tunnel. Conventional enterprise forward proxies expect plain HTTP as absolute-form requests sent directly over the proxy connection, and commonly refuse CONNECT to port 80, so the setting looked supported but failed against typical deployments. Tunneling also blinds the proxy to the one protocol it could inspect. Narrow the feature to TLS (CONNECT) egress only, which is the conventional and already-correct case: plain-HTTP requests now always dial the destination directly, and only client CONNECT tunnels chain through the corporate proxy. Remove the http_proxy config field, the --sandbox-http-proxy / OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_HTTP_PROXY driver surface, the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTP_PROXY variable, and the UpstreamScheme plumbing. The feature never shipped, so this is a clean removal; a stray http_proxy key in gateway.toml still fails loudly through the config's deny_unknown_fields. Removing the plain-HTTP proxy branch also removes its host-gateway special case; the architecture doc now documents the real host-gateway behavior (add driver-injected host aliases to the reserved NO_PROXY list) instead of an invariant the HTTPS path never implemented. Plain-HTTP forwarding through a corporate proxy can return later as absolute-form forwarding behind its own design review. Addresses the plain-HTTP forwarding review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): escape generated TOML and require explicit proxy URL form Escape backslashes, quotes, and control characters when gateway.sh writes proxy values into gateway.toml, so a hostile or unusual environment value cannot corrupt the config or inject extra keys. Restrict the upstream proxy URL grammar to the documented http://host:port form: a scheme-less value is no longer normalized to http:// and a missing port is no longer silently defaulted to 80. Docs, README, and CLI help now state the explicit-form requirement consistently. Also fix a test-only call of handle_tcp_connection that was missing the upstream_proxy argument added in an earlier commit. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): preserve tunneled bytes read with the CONNECT response The CONNECT handshake reads the corporate proxy's response in chunks, so the read that completes the header block can also contain the first tunneled payload bytes. Those bytes were discarded, silently corrupting the start of the tunnel for server-speaks-first destinations or proxies that coalesce writes. connect_via now returns a PrefixedStream that replays any bytes received past the response terminator before reading from the socket again; writes pass through unchanged. Direct dials wrap the stream with an empty prefix so downstream relay and TLS paths keep a single stream type, and tls_connect_upstream is generalized to any AsyncRead + AsyncWrite stream. Adds regression coverage for a combined response/payload read and for prefix replay ordering. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): gate cleartext proxy Basic auth behind an explicit opt-in Proxy-Authorization: Basic is base64 over the plain-TCP connection to the http:// corporate proxy, so anyone on the network path between the sandbox host and the proxy can recover the credential. Sending it is now an explicit operator decision instead of an implicit side effect of configuring proxy_auth_file. Add a proxy_auth_allow_insecure driver setting (CLI --sandbox-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE), delivered to the supervisor as the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE variable. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: an auth file without the acknowledgement is rejected at gateway startup and at supervisor startup, as is the acknowledgement without an auth file or any value other than 'true'. gateway.sh writes the key only as a TOML boolean; a non-boolean value is emitted as a quoted string so the gateway rejects it at startup instead of risking injection. Documents the exposure prominently in the gateway config reference, the driver README, and the sandbox architecture doc. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): honor port qualifiers and resolved addresses in NO_PROXY Two divergences from the documented NO_PROXY contract: - A port-qualified entry (internal.corp:8443) was silently stripped to its hostname and bypassed the proxy for every port, excluding traffic the operator never listed. Entries now keep the optional :port qualifier (also on IP and CIDR entries) and only apply to that destination port; a trailing qualifier that is not a valid port stays part of the pattern instead of widening the entry. - IP and CIDR entries only matched IP-literal hosts, so a bypass like 10.0.0.0/8 never applied to hostnames resolving into that range. NO_PROXY evaluation now sees the validated resolved addresses: an IP/CIDR entry matching through resolution authorizes a direct dial of only the addresses it contains, so a bypass scoped to an internal range cannot widen into a direct dial of addresses outside it. Hostname-level matches (loopback, wildcard, domain entries, IP-literal hosts) keep authorizing all validated addresses. proxy_for is replaced by decision(host, port, resolved) returning either the proxy endpoint or the permitted direct-dial subset, and dial_upstream restricts the direct connect to that subset. Adds regression coverage for port-scoped bypasses on domain, IP, and CIDR entries, invalid port qualifiers, resolved-address matching, and split-resolution subset dialing. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bind proxied CONNECT tunnels to validated addresses The CONNECT request sent to the corporate proxy carried the destination hostname, so the proxy resolved the name itself and the addresses that had passed SSRF and allowed_ips validation were discarded. Split-horizon DNS or rebinding at the proxy could then reach internal or otherwise unapproved destinations through a tunnel the supervisor logged as validated, and IP-range policy could not be enforced at all on proxied dials. CONNECT now targets a validated resolved address by default: the proxy performs no DNS resolution and the tunnel stays bound to the answer the supervisor checked. The hostname still travels inside the tunnel (TLS SNI, application Host), so destination servers behave normally. In split-horizon networks, operators point the gateway host at the corporate resolver so internal names validate to their internal addresses. For proxies whose ACLs filter on hostnames and reject IP CONNECT targets, a new proxy_connect_by_hostname opt-in (CLI --sandbox-proxy-connect-by-hostname, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME, reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME) restores hostname CONNECT, documented as re-opening proxy-side resolution and making the proxy's ACLs the effective egress control. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: the opt-in without a proxy, or any value other than 'true', is fatal. Adds regression coverage for the IP CONNECT request line (including IPv6 bracketing and hostname non-leakage), the hostname opt-in, and the config pairing rules in driver and supervisor. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject empty port after bracketed IPv6 proxy host http://[fd00::1]: passed the explicit-port check because the bracketed branch only tested for a colon after the bracket, then fell back to port 80 — violating the fail-closed http://host:port contract and potentially sending configured Basic credentials to an unintended service. Require a non-empty suffix after ]:, matching the unbracketed branch, and cover the case in the shared parser tests. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fall back across validated addresses in proxied CONNECT The direct path hands TcpStream::connect the whole validated address list and it falls back across them, but the validated-IP CONNECT path attempted only the first address, so a dual-stack destination could fail through the corporate proxy even when a later validated address was reachable. connect_via_validated tries each validated address in order under one aggregate CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT budget, returning the first success; when every attempt fails the error names the attempt count and carries the last failure. An empty address list is rejected up front. Adds regressions for first-fails/second-succeeds fallback (asserting both CONNECT request lines), the aggregate all-addresses failure message, and the empty-list rejection. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): strip new reserved proxy vars and complete docs/tests Follow-ups from review: - Add OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE and OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME to the supervisor-only strip list so workload child processes never inherit them, matching the documented contract for the other reserved proxy variables, and cover both in the supervisor-only variable test. - Document all five OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_* proxy variables in the mise run gateway help text, marked Podman-only and stating the auth-file/acknowledgement pairing, and complete the gateway-key list in the Podman README. - Add NO_PROXY composition coverage for bracketed IPv6 entries with port qualifiers, bare IPv6 entries, and IPv6 CIDR matching against an IPv6-literal host and against a hostname's resolved addresses, including the port-qualified CIDR form. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): cap each proxied CONNECT attempt within the shared budget A proxy that accepted the first CONNECT request but never responded consumed the entire aggregate handshake timeout, so later validated addresses were never tried and the hang defeated the multi-address fallback. Each attempt is now time-boxed to its fair share of the time remaining before the shared deadline (remaining / attempts_left): a hanging attempt is cut off with enough budget left for every remaining address, while time a fast failure does not use rolls over to later attempts and the total never exceeds CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT. A timed-out attempt is recorded like any other failure, and the aggregate error distinguishes all-attempted from budget-exhausted runs. Adds a first-hangs/second-succeeds regression driven through a test-visible budget parameter so it runs in about a second instead of a real 30s window. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy config on the supervisor argv The proxy settings were injected as reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* container environment variables. The driver only wrote names the operator configured, but container runtimes layer the spec environment over ENV values baked into the sandbox image, so an image could supply NO_PROXY=*, enable hostname CONNECT, or point an unconfigured deployment at an attacker-controlled proxy whenever the operator left a field unset. The settings now travel as supervisor command-line arguments (--upstream-proxy, --upstream-no-proxy, --upstream-proxy-auth-file, --upstream-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, --upstream-proxy-connect-by-hostname) built by the driver from operator config. The driver sets the container entrypoint and command explicitly, so neither sandbox spec/template environment nor image ENV can influence argv, and an omitted flag genuinely means unconfigured — in every supervisor topology, since the supervisor no longer consults its environment for these settings at all. Credentials stay on the root-only secret mount; only the mount path appears on argv. The reserved environment names, their strip-list entries, and the env-based validation surface are removed. UpstreamProxyConfig::from_args replaces from_env, reusing the same shared fail-closed validation and pairing rules keyed by the CLI flag names. Driver tests now assert the argv contract, including that sandbox-supplied environment cannot add, remove, or redirect proxy flags; supervisor tests cover from_args mapping and its pairing rules. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs(sandbox): align proxy comments with the argv transport The argv migration left comments describing the configuration as reserved environment variables ("reserved value", "present-but-empty variable", "reserved upstream proxy variables"). Rephrase them as driver-supplied arguments and operator settings so the documented trust boundary matches the implementation. Comment-only change. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): parse bracketed IPv6 authorities in client CONNECT targets parse_target split the CONNECT authority at the first colon, so an IPv6-literal target like [2001:db8::1]:443 always failed port parsing and IPv6-literal clients could never reach policy evaluation; a regression test even locked in that failure. Parse the RFC 3986 bracketed form and return the host bracket-free, matching what DNS resolution, SSRF validation, NO_PROXY matching, and the upstream CONNECT builder expect. Unclosed brackets, a missing or empty port after the bracket, and non-numeric ports are rejected; unbracketed behavior is unchanged. Replaces the failure-locking test with success coverage for bracketed targets and adds malformed-bracket rejection cases. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover proxy-auth secret cleanup across lifecycle failures The per-sandbox proxy-auth credential secret is staged before the container is created and removed on cleanup, but no test proved the cleanup paths actually issue the secret removal. Add Podman-stub tests that drive create_sandbox to a container-create failure and to a start failure, and delete_sandbox for an out-of-band deletion, asserting each path issues the DELETE for the per-sandbox proxy-auth secret so a credential can never outlive the sandbox that owned it. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs: list corporate proxy keys in the Podman compute-driver overview The Fern Podman driver section enumerated its gateway.toml keys but omitted the corporate egress proxy settings. Add https_proxy, no_proxy, proxy_auth_file, proxy_auth_allow_insecure, and proxy_connect_by_hostname with a pointer to the gateway configuration reference for the full contract. No navigation change: the reference folder already includes the gateway configuration page. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover the SSRF-to-TLS composition across the proxy tunnel Existing tests exercised validated-IP CONNECT and the upstream-TLS helper independently, but not the full boundary. Add an end-to-end regression that stands up a fake corporate proxy tunneling to a fake TLS server and drives the real path: connect_via_validated CONNECTs to the validated address, the proxy splices the tunnel, and tls_connect_upstream verifies the upstream certificate against the original hostname carried in SNI. It asserts the CONNECT authority is the validated IP and never the hostname, that verification succeeds for the matching hostname, and that a mismatched hostname is rejected — proving a rebinding or split-horizon substitution behind the proxy cannot pass certificate verification. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bound proxy-auth reads, reject port 0, fix stale comment Three review findings: - CWE-400: the proxy-auth credential file was read with an unbounded read_to_string on both the driver (sandbox-create) and supervisor (startup) paths, so a huge file or a special file such as /dev/zero could exhaust memory. Add a shared bounded reader in openshell-core that rejects non-regular files, caps the size at 4 KiB, and reads at most that many bytes; the driver runs it via spawn_blocking. Covers oversized, special-file, and missing-path cases on both sides. - Reject an upstream proxy URL with port 0: it passed the explicit-port check and startup validation but is not a connectable TCP port, so every proxied dial would fail later. Add a typed ZeroPort error with shared-validator and Podman-config tests. - Reword a driver-config comment that still described a 'reserved variable' to match the argv transport. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): open proxy-auth file non-blocking to reject FIFOs promptly read_upstream_proxy_credential_file opened the path with a blocking File::open before the regular-file check, so a configured FIFO with no writer would block open() indefinitely — hanging sandbox creation on the driver and supervisor startup. Open with O_NONBLOCK on Unix so the open returns immediately, then reject the non-regular file as before; O_NONBLOCK has no effect on the later read of a regular file. Adds a mkfifo regression asserting the reader returns promptly with a non-regular-file error instead of hanging. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover corporate proxy egress across driver and supervisor The existing corporate-proxy tests construct config structs or call CONNECT helpers directly, so none of them detect a break in the wiring between layers: gateway TOML deserialization, the Podman argv and secret-mount semantics, supervisor CLI parsing, or policy denial before proxy contact. Add a Podman e2e that drives the whole chain against a fake authenticated forward proxy and asserts that an approved TLS request traverses it with a validated-IP CONNECT, a policy-denied destination is refused with 403 without ever reaching the proxy, credentials arrive through the mounted per-sandbox secret, and deleting the sandbox removes that secret. SupportContainer is a new harness fixture. Unlike ContainerHttpServer it probes readiness with a TCP connect rather than an HTTP GET, so it can host a forward proxy and TLS servers, and it exposes container logs and network IP for assertions. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): restart the gateway on the proxy-config panic path The panic cleanup for the temporary corporate proxy configuration restored the gateway TOML but left the gateway process running with the temporary configuration still loaded, which could poison later test binaries in the same run. Nothing restarted it: the only ManagedGateway is the short-lived one inside restart_gateway, and its Drop only calls start, which does not reload config for an already-running gateway. Restore and synchronously stop/start the gateway in Drop, and set restored only after the normal restore and restart both succeed so a failed restart no longer suppresses the fallback. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(supervisor-network): derive the loopback proxy bypass from resolved IPs The automatic bypass treated the host string "localhost" as proof that the destination was loopback and returned every resolved address. A sandbox controls its own /etc/hosts and resolve_socket_addrs consults it before DNS, so a workload could map localhost to any policy-allowed address and dial it directly, escaping the operator proxy and the inspection and audit boundary it exists to provide. Check the resolved addresses instead: the name bypasses only when the resolution is non-empty and every address is loopback. A mixed answer is not partially honored, and an IP literal is still authoritative for itself. A spoofed localhost falls through to the entries below, so an explicit operator NO_PROXY entry is still honored. This matches the trust model detect_trusted_host_gateway already applies to the same hosts file, which validates the mapped address rather than the alias. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(podman): clean up proxy-auth secret when container already deleted The delete_sandbox early-return path cleaned up the token secret but skipped the proxy-auth secret, leaking it on disk. Also update tests for recent API changes (Optional socket_path, workspace field, list-based container lookup). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> |
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|
Piotr Mlocek
|
cbdeb4d537 |
fix(server): prevent unrelated sandbox deletes from blocking deletion events (#2340)
* fix(server): unblock sandbox deletion events Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(server): simplify sandbox settings cleanup Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(server): make delete lock ordering explicit Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(server): bind delete worker to stable sandbox id Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(server): disarm canceled queued deletes Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test: harden sandbox lifecycle cleanup coverage Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
f169084923 |
fix(supervisor): tailor Landlock rights by inode type (#2380)
Closes #2218 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Derek Carr
|
5952a5a23f |
feat(workspace): add workspace resource model with scoping, membershi… (#2243)
* feat(workspace): implement workspace model (Phase 1 of RFC 0011) Implements workspace and membership model providing hard isolation boundaries for multi-player OpenShell deployments. Workspace CRUD with Kubernetes-style Terminating phase for graceful deletion. All resources scoped by workspace via ObjectMeta. Membership RPCs for workspace access control. Persistence migration shifts name uniqueness to (object_type, workspace, name). Provider profiles support platform and workspace scoping. Service routing uses workspace-prefixed DNS labels. Inference routes renamed and workspace-scoped with DeleteInferenceRoute RPC. Python SDK with WorkspaceClient, two-method list pattern (workspace-scoped and for_all_workspaces), and workspace parameter on all methods. CLI workspace flags, TUI workspace cycling. K8s driver filters unmanaged CRs and uses delete preconditions. Podman driver uses immutable container IDs. Label serialization fixed across all put_if call sites. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(cli): delegate sandbox upload command to existing upload function The standalone `sandbox upload` command reimplemented upload logic inline with two bugs: it used `Path::exists()` which follows symlinks (rejecting dangling symlinks), and it ran git-aware filtering on symlink sources. The `run::sandbox_upload()` function already handles both cases correctly via `sandbox_upload_plan()`. Replace the inline logic with a call to the existing function. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): shorten sandbox names and fix test compatibility Shorten the sandbox name in initial_sparse_policy_is_acknowledged_as_loaded from 'e2e-2159-sparse-enrich' (22 chars) to 'e2e-sparse-enrich' (17 chars) to comply with MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN (19 chars). Also capture stderr in create_keep_with_args so future sandbox creation failures include the actual CLI error instead of reporting empty output. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(workspace): add test coverage for workspace CRUD and persistence isolation Add unit tests for workspace create happy path, get round-trip, get not-found, get empty-name rejection, already-exists error, and resolve_workspace not-found. Add persistence test proving cross-workspace name uniqueness (same name in different workspaces produces separate records). Add workspace name max-length boundary tests. Fix e2e harness to include stderr in name-parse-failure error path. Align Python e2e test_workspace_crud with try/finally pattern. Document provider profile catalog workspace scoping gap in RFC 0011. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(examples): update examples for workspace model compatibility Shorten sandbox names in demo scripts to fit the 19-character MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN limit: policy-demo prefix to pd-, multi-agent notepad derives a short SANDBOX_TAG from the run ID, governance interceptor uses gs-PID-RANDOM. Update vscode-remote-sandbox.md SSH host aliases from openshell-{name} to openshell-{name}.{workspace} format. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(sdk): add workspace-scoped client and workspace CRUD Add WorkspaceScopedClient modeled after kube::Api::namespaced — captures workspace once and injects it into every sandbox request. Add workspace CRUD methods (create, get, list, delete) and list_sandboxes_all_workspaces on OpenShellClient. Extend SandboxRef with workspace field and add WorkspaceRef type. Include mock tests for all new operations. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings in workspace test assertions Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(docs): convert indented code blocks to fenced in RFC 0011 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings and apply cargo fmt across workspace Auto-format with cargo fmt and fix clippy warnings exposed by the reformat: unnecessary qualifications, map_unwrap_or, identical match arms, unused variable prefix, dead code annotations, and let-unit-value in e2e harness. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): address workspace scoping issues from review - Add workspace field to settings JSON output (CLI) - Skip Podman containers missing workspace label instead of defaulting to empty string, matching K8s driver behavior - Add resource_version to list_by_scope SELECT in both SQLite and Postgres backends, with regression test - Gate PolicyLocalContext proposal/lookup routes on workspace readiness, returning 503 when workspace is not yet discovered - Block sandbox and provider creation in TUI all-workspaces mode - Clear workspace vectors in TUI reset_sandbox_state Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog workspace-aware Thread workspace through snapshot_catalog so the EffectiveProviderProfileCatalog enforces workspace boundaries on both read and write paths. UserProviderProfileSource now loads platform-scoped profiles (workspace "") plus the target workspace's profiles, preventing cross-workspace duplicate profile ID collisions that previously caused global catalog failures. Update RFC 0011 to reflect catalog scoping is implemented in Phase 1 rather than deferred to future work. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(persistence): include workspace column in atomic policy revision INSERT put_policy_revision_atomic omitted the workspace column from the INSERT into the objects table in both SQLite and Postgres backends, causing atomically-written policy revisions to lose their workspace association. Add workspace field to AtomicPolicyRevisionWrite and thread it through both backend INSERT statements, matching the non-atomic put_policy_revision path which already included it. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proxy): skip ancestor walk when socket owner is the entrypoint collect_ancestor_identities walked the entire process tree above the entrypoint when the connecting process was the entrypoint itself, SHA256-hashing every ancestor binary (IDE, shell, container runtime). On dev machines with large binaries in the ancestor chain this exceeded the 30-second test timeout. When start_pid == stop_pid there are no intermediate ancestors to verify, so return an empty list immediately. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog scope-aware Allow the same profile ID at platform and workspace scopes by introducing layered catalog entries where workspace profiles shadow platform profiles. Add source and scope fields to the ProviderProfile proto and CLI output. Migrate List/Get handlers to the catalog, fixing divergence with runtime profile resolution. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align podman e2e labels with centralized driver constants The podman driver moved its container labels to the centralized openshell.ai/ prefix, but the e2e test harness and cleanup script still referenced the old openshell.sandbox-* keys, causing the local_driver_token_restart test to fail on container lookup. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align python profile isolation test with scope-aware catalog Platform profiles are now visible in workspace listings as fallbacks per the layered catalog design. Update the assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): honor profile_workspace in runtime profile resolution Runtime profile lookups now consult provider.profile_workspace via get_type_profile_for_scope. Providers created with --global-profile (profile_workspace="") resolve to the platform profile even when a workspace profile shadows the same ID. All 6 runtime call sites updated; type-only call sites remain scope-agnostic. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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Evan Lezar
|
339eae5ad1 |
ci(e2e): reuse prebuilt CLI and gateway artifacts (#2311)
* ci(e2e): reuse prebuilt CLI artifacts Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): reuse prebuilt gateway artifacts Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): reuse prebuilt VM driver artifact Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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|
Mesut Oezdil
|
8cf2673c0b |
docs: bump stated Rust MSRV from 1.88 to 1.90 (#2276)
* docs: bump stated Rust MSRV from 1.88 to 1.90 Cargo.toml sets rust-version = "1.90" (rust-toolchain.toml pins 1.95.0), so building with the previously documented 1.88 fails Cargo's MSRV check. * docs: bump e2e/rust MSRV to 1.90 * fix: align remaining Rust version fields to 1.90 examples/governance-interceptor/Cargo.toml still had rust-version 1.88. Also bump e2e/rust's prost dependency to 0.14 to match the workspace, since it was on 0.13 in an otherwise standalone crate. |
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Drew Newberry
|
5402551797 |
test(e2e): run VM suite in CI (#2305)
* test(e2e): run VM suite in CI Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): configure KVM permissions directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(e2e): flush VM overlay before restart Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: simplify VM test documentation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): include gateway resume in VM run Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
392ad63941 |
fix(driver-vm): run sandbox supervisor as guest pid 1 (#2299)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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|
krishicks
|
97e1051307 |
fix(tasks): format all Rust workspaces (#2268)
Run cargo fmt for both the root workspace and the standalone e2e Rust workspace from the rust format and format-check tasks. Apply rustfmt to the e2e sources so the expanded formatting check passes. Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com> |
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Kyle ZhengandJohn Myers
|
ff9af8e320 |
fix(sandbox): acknowledge initial policy revision; expose SDK labels/selectors (#2170)
* fix(sandbox): acknowledge initial policy revision The supervisor loaded and enforced a sandbox-scoped policy but never told the gateway which revision it loaded. The policy poll loop seeded itself with the initial revision's hash on its first poll, so `policy_changed` was never true for that revision and `ReportPolicyStatus(LOADED)` — which only ran in the hot-reload branch — was never called. The revision stayed `Pending` and `current_policy_version` stayed 0 even though the sandbox was `Ready` and the policy was effective. This was most visible with sparse policies that get baseline-enriched into a new revision during startup. After the OPA engine is constructed, report the exact sandbox revision the supervisor loaded as LOADED, and seed the poll loop from that revision so it is not re-reported. Report FAILED with the original construction error if engine construction or conversion fails. Only sandbox-sourced revisions (version > 0) whose canonical content matches the loaded policy are acknowledged; global and local-file policies are untouched. Delivery uses the shared bounded retry, is non-fatal on transient failure, and a pending initial acknowledgement is delivered before any newer revision so policy history is never reordered. Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * feat(python): expose sandbox labels and selectors The gateway protobuf and CLI already support request-level sandbox labels (`CreateSandboxRequest.name`/`labels`) and selector-based listing (`ListSandboxesRequest.label_selector`), but the public Python SDK dropped them, so Python-created sandboxes could not be found via `openshell sandbox list --selector ...`. Add optional, source-compatible `name`/`labels` to `SandboxClient.create`, `create_session`, and the high-level `Sandbox`, and `label_selector` to `list`/`list_ids`. `SandboxRef` now carries the gateway labels as an immutable mapping (default empty, so `SandboxRef(id, name, status)` still works). Caller-provided label mappings are copied. Attaching the high-level `Sandbox` to an existing sandbox rejects `name`/`labels` since creation metadata cannot change on attach. Template labels remain a separate concept. No protobuf changes are required. Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * fix(python): keep SandboxRef hashable and copy high-level labels Excluding the new immutable `labels` field from SandboxRef equality/hash (`compare=False`) preserves the original (id, name, status) identity and keeps the frozen dataclass hashable — a MappingProxyType field would otherwise make `hash(SandboxRef(...))` raise. Also defensively copy caller-provided labels in the high-level `Sandbox` so later caller mutation cannot change what is sent. Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound initial-policy-ack retries The poll loop retried a pending initial acknowledgement before processing any newer revision, but retried unconditionally forever. A permanently undeliverable ack (e.g. the revision was superseded before it could be reported) would then stall all later policy hot-reloads and provider-env refreshes. Cap the retries; after the bound, give up and resume normal polling so the loop cannot livelock on a stuck acknowledgement. Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): add sparse-policy revision-2 acknowledgement e2e Regression for #2159: create a sandbox with the network-only policy-advisor fixture, which the supervisor enriches with baseline filesystem paths during startup (creating revision 2, superseding revision 1). Assert the effective policy reaches revision 2 and no revision remains Pending once the supervisor acknowledges the load. Adds SandboxGuard::create_keep_with_args to create a kept sandbox with an initial --policy. Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): correct sandbox checks Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * test(cli): serialize mTLS environment access Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): address policy review feedback Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve exact policy acknowledgements Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve local policy overrides Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Kyle Zheng <kyzheng@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Evan Lezar
|
5f9bf9ce52 |
test(e2e): run rootless podman on ubuntu host (#2119)
* test(e2e): run rootless podman on ubuntu host Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): probe rootless capability behavior Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): make capability probe observational Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Evan Lezar
|
a226806026 |
test(e2e): run gpu workloads from manifest (#1709)
* test(e2e): add workload manifest build flow Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): add gpu workload validation tests Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): build gpu workloads before gpu e2e Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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krishicksandddurst
|
7bce1223dc |
feat(policy): add JSON-RPC and MCP L7 policies (#1865)
Add policy schema, proto, provider profile, OPA, and L7 proxy support for `protocol: json-rpc` and `protocol: mcp`. Generic JSON-RPC endpoints match exact method names only, with `method: "*"` as the all-method sentinel; wildcard/glob methods and params matchers are rejected. Parse JSON-RPC request bodies and batches in the forward proxy, deny response-shaped client frames, limit receive-stream GET allowance to MCP endpoints, and redact params in decision logs. Preserve L7 rule params on the proto load path so MCP `tools/call` tool filters behave like YAML-loaded policies. Add MCP conformance coverage, JSON-RPC L7 e2e coverage, and docs for the new protocols and current matcher limitations. Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: ddurst <267424412+ddurst-nvidia@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
Simon Scatton
|
c7879a0a1d |
test(e2e): stop using custom e2e binary builds (#2000)
Remove the production-crate dev-settings feature so e2e tests build the same gateway, CLI, and supervisor binaries that we ship. Move settings coverage from dummy test-only keys to the production ocsf_json_enabled setting. Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> |
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Evan Lezar
|
b6428cb9cd |
fix(build): align container engine selection (#1944)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
f1245a33b2 |
test(e2e): retry transient forward proxy stale policy responses (#1929)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Evan Lezar
|
294c64eed1 |
fix(gpu): prefer single CDI devices for local runtimes (#1675)
Prefer a single CDI-qualified device when Docker or Podman resolves the default GPU request to one GPU. Allow nvidia.com/gpu=all only as a WSL2 all-only compatibility fallback, using Docker daemon info and Podman's /dev/dxg probe to identify that case. Update driver docs, architecture notes, and GPU e2e coverage for the default selection behavior. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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|
Alex Lewontin
|
fb83d1a3c8 |
feat(gateway): add system registry support and source indicators (#1625)
* feat(bootstrap): add system gateway registry for installer defaults Adds a read-only installer-seeded gateway registry that the CLI consults after per-user gateway config. The registry uses the same layout as per-user config with `active_gateway` at the root and `gateways/<name>/metadata.json` beneath it. By default the system config root is `/etc/openshell`, while `OPENSHELL_SYSTEM_GATEWAY_DIR` remains available as an override for packages that need a different location. User-managed gateways continue to shadow installer entries on name collision. Originally-authored-by: Mark Shuttleworth <mark@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Lewontin <alex.lewontin@canonical.com> * feat(cli): show gateway config source in list and term Expose whether a gateway registration comes from user or system config in `openshell gateway list`, the TUI gateway pane, and list JSON output. The CLI also refuses to remove system-managed registrations and the smoke tests cover the new list output. Signed-off-by: Alex Lewontin <alex.lewontin@canonical.com> * fix(bootstrap): preserve user shadowing on invalid metadata Signed-off-by: Alex Lewontin <alex.lewontin@canonical.com> * fix(cli): keep system fallback out of rollback state * docs(gateway): describe system config fallback layout * test(bootstrap): cover system gateway last_sandbox persistence * test(gateway): cover system-only removal rejection * fix(bootstrap): validate gateway names before path joins --------- Signed-off-by: Alex Lewontin <alex.lewontin@canonical.com> |
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|
Evan Lezar
|
1dc59853ff |
feat(gpu): move device selection to driver config (#1815)
* refactor(kubernetes): use shared proto struct helpers Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): extract sandbox template validation * feat(gpu)!: move device selection to driver config BREAKING CHANGE: The openshell sandbox create --gpu-device flag and corresponding API field were removed. Select specific GPUs through driver-specific driver_config fields instead. Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): reject unknown driver config fields Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
|
530aaf1360 |
feat(drivers): support docker and podman config mounts (#1785)
* feat(drivers): support docker and podman config mounts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(drivers): trim mount docs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): cover local driver volume mounts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): satisfy linux clippy lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(drivers): gate bind mounts behind gateway config * docs(sandbox): simplify mount examples * cleanup * test(e2e): stabilize branch checks * fix(drivers): tighten local mount validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Taylor Mutch
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c4ca283c1a | refactor(helm): require external postgres for ha (#1844) | ||
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Russell Bryant
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3a4463e36a |
fix(cli): fall back to regular upload when git filtering excludes all files (#1783)
* fix(cli): fall back to regular upload when git filtering excludes all files When uploading a directory whose contents are entirely excluded by .gitignore, git_sync_files returns an empty file list. The git-aware upload path silently accepted this and printed "Upload complete" without transferring any files. Now both call sites (direct CLI handler and sandbox_upload_plan) check for an empty file list and fall through to the regular, unfiltered upload path instead. Closes #1778 Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <rbryant@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): add regression test for gitignored upload fallback (#1778) Reproduces the reported workflow: download a file from a sandbox into a local git repo where the target directory is gitignored, then re-upload that directory without --no-git-ignore. Before the fix the upload silently succeeded with zero files transferred. Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <rbryant@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): warn on stderr when gitignore fallback triggers Address PR review: print a notice when .gitignore filtering excludes all files and the CLI falls back to unfiltered upload. Add a GitFilteredEmpty variant to SandboxUploadPlan so the caller can distinguish this case and emit a visible warning. Document the default gitignore filtering and fallback behavior in manage-sandboxes. * fix(cli): warn on stderr for direct upload gitignore fallback The SandboxCommands::Upload path in main.rs had the same silent fallback as sandbox_create. Restructure the git_sync_files check to emit the same .gitignore warning before falling back to unfiltered upload. Assert the warning in the E2E regression test. * docs(sandboxes): fix misleading upload fallback guidance Replace inaccurate "explicit file list" advice with actionable alternatives: --no-git-ignore, uploading outside the work tree, or git force-adding the files. * fix(cli): collapse nested ifs to satisfy clippy::collapsible_if * style(cli): apply rustfmt to main.rs --------- Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <rbryant@nvidia.com> |
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Philippe Martin
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eea9751c01 |
feat(cli): support multiple --upload flags on sandbox create (#1635) (#1645)
Closes #1635 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> |
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Taylor Mutch
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e4bcfdfaaa | fix(gateway): allow local sandbox jwt to not expire (#1721) | ||
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Naveen Malik
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f1ed347a40 |
fix(driver-podman): bind gateway to 0.0.0.0 in rootless mode (#1623)
Rootless Podman sandbox containers reach the host through pasta's local connection bypass, which translates L2 frames to L4 host sockets. The dev gateway script binds to 127.0.0.1 by default, which is not routable through pasta. Auto-detect rootless mode and bind to 0.0.0.0 so sandbox containers can connect to the gateway. - Auto-detect rootless Podman in gateway.sh and export OPENSHELL_BIND_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0 when not explicitly set - Add e2e:podman:rootless mise task and CI matrix entry to validate rootless Podman networking end-to-end - CI creates a non-root user inside the privileged container to trigger Podman's rootless code paths (pasta, user namespace isolation) Signed-off-by: Naveen Malik <nmalik@redhat.com> |
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Saurabh Agarwal
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5007042e79 |
feat(helm): add optional PostgreSQL backing store (#1579)
* feat(helm): add optional PostgreSQL backing store with Secret-based credentials - Add postgres.enabled and postgres.deploy values to control database backend (SQLite vs PostgreSQL) and subchart deployment independently. - Introduce db-secret.yaml template for Opaque Secret with assembled postgresql:// connection string injected via OPENSHELL_DB_URL env var. - Add Bitnami PostgreSQL as optional subchart dependency keyed on postgres.deploy to prevent subchart deployment in external mode. - Externalize JWT signing key file mode via sandboxJwt.secretDefaultMode with 0400 default matching upstream. - Add validation guard for postgres.deploy=true without postgres.enabled. - Add helm unit tests covering internal, external, URL-override, special character encoding, and misconfiguration error paths. - Update README with Kubernetes and OpenShift install examples for bundled and external PostgreSQL configurations. - Add helm dependency build to lint and unittest tasks. * fix(helm): add database backend docs to README.md.gotmpl and regenerate The helm-docs CI check failed because the Database backend section was added directly to README.md instead of README.md.gotmpl. Move the content to the template and regenerate so the check passes. * fix(helm): use Secret-based DB credentials and support existingSecret Replace the inline db-url stringData pattern with a proper Secret containing individual fields plus a uri key. When postgres.deploy=true the Bitnami service-binding secret is referenced directly; when deploy=false users can supply postgres.external.existingSecret to bring their own Secret, or let the chart generate one from the external field values. Also restructures the README database section for clarity, adds helm-unittest coverage for the new secret resolution paths, and fixes a markdown lint issue in the root README. * refactor(helm): move OpenShift e2e script to e2e/rust/ and add mise task Move test-openshift-scenarios.sh from deploy/helm/openshell/ci/ to e2e/rust/e2e-openshift.sh, matching the existing e2e script naming convention. Register it as `e2e:openshift` in tasks/test.toml — not wired into the `test` or `e2e` aggregates so it only runs on explicit invocation against a live OpenShift cluster. * feat(e2e): add database backend scenarios to Kubernetes e2e Extend with-kube-gateway.sh with an optional multi-scenario loop gated by OPENSHELL_E2E_KUBE_DB_SCENARIOS=1. When enabled, the script installs the Helm chart three times — SQLite (default), bundled PostgreSQL, and external PostgreSQL with existingSecret — running the full test suite against each backend. When unset, existing single-install behavior is unchanged. Also adds helm dependency build before helm install, fixing CI failures caused by the missing PostgreSQL subchart dependency. * refactor(helm): simplify PostgreSQL config to two orthogonal controls Replace postgres.deploy and postgres.external.* with two simple controls: - postgres.enabled: deploy the bundled Bitnami PostgreSQL subchart - server.externalDbSecret: name of a pre-existing Secret with a uri key Delete db-secret.yaml — the chart no longer generates Secrets from individual credential fields. Users either get the Bitnami service-binding secret (bundled) or bring their own via server.externalDbSecret. Add validation that postgres.serviceBindings.enabled must stay true when using bundled PostgreSQL, preventing a confusing runtime failure. |
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alangou
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2bdc968ed9 |
fix(gateway): make readiness health checks dependency-aware (#1328)
* feat(gateway): add readiness probe metrics and test-only store close Emit Prometheus readiness metrics for database probes (healthy gauge and outcome-labeled latency histogram) with coverage in health HTTP tests. Restrict Store::close behind test support cfg to prevent accidental runtime pool shutdown under live traffic. Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): add simple e2e test with kubernetes to test /readyz Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> |
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Taylor Mutch
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a3b16c18ab | feat(auth): per-sandbox authentication to gateway (#1404) | ||
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Evan Lezar
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cade0bb0ac |
test(e2e): default GPU probe image (#1450)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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John T. Myers
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d255cdd9c9 |
feat(providers): add credential refresh foundation (#1349)
* feat(providers): add credential refresh foundation * feat(providers): mint oauth refresh token credentials * fix(providers): allow delegated refresh bootstrap * fix(providers): guard refresh credential modes * fix(providers): refine refresh lifecycle UX * fix(cli): restore provider test gateway response import * fix(server): clean auth endpoint test qualifications * fix(providers): tighten refresh authorization and collisions * chore(providers): trim bundled v2 profiles * fix(providers): resolve refresh rebase fallout * fix(cli): accept rfc3339 credential expiry * test(providers): update inferred claude provider type * test(providers): avoid removed outlook default profile * test(providers): isolate attach limit fixtures |
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Russell Bryant
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65a3a7c2ec |
test(e2e): close Podman driver test coverage gaps (#1439)
* test(e2e): close Podman driver test coverage gaps Add podman_gateway_resume test following the VM pattern (no container-state assertions since Podman keeps containers running across gateway restarts). Widen websocket_conformance feature gate from e2e-docker to e2e-host-gateway so it runs on both Docker and Podman. Fix e2e-podman.sh to default to the e2e-podman feature so Podman- specific and host-gateway tests are actually included in Podman CI runs. * refactor(e2e): extract shared CLI helpers from gateway_resume tests Move run_cli, wait_for_healthy, sandbox_names, and wait_for_sandbox_exec_contains into a new harness::cli module. All three gateway_resume variants (Docker, Podman, VM) now import these shared helpers instead of defining identical copies. Docker-specific container introspection functions remain local to gateway_resume.rs. |
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Russell Bryant
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3cd238ab1a |
feat(e2e): enable mTLS for Podman compute driver (#1430)
* feat(e2e): enable mTLS for Podman compute driver e2e harness The Podman driver already supported mTLS certificate injection into sandbox containers, but the e2e test harness explicitly blocked HTTPS and ran plaintext-only gateways. Generate ephemeral PKI (CA, server, client certs) with host.containers.internal in the server SANs, wire guest_tls_* paths into the TOML config, replace --disable-tls with --tls-cert/--tls-key/--tls-client-ca, and switch to mTLS gateway registration. The health check remains on the plaintext health port. Closes #1428 * refactor(e2e): extract shared PKI generation into gateway-common.sh The Docker and Podman e2e scripts had near-identical 35-line PKI generation blocks differing only in the host-gateway SAN. Extract into e2e_generate_pki(pki_dir, host_alias) in gateway-common.sh, which also eliminates the cd/cd pattern by using absolute paths throughout. * refactor(e2e): use generate-certs instead of raw openssl for PKI Replace the hand-rolled openssl PKI generation in e2e_generate_pki() with the gateway's built-in generate-certs --output-dir command. This uses the same PKI generation as production deployments (Helm and RPM). The helper now takes the gateway binary path and passes extra SANs via --server-san (host.openshell.internal always, plus the driver's host alias for Podman). The default SAN list already includes host.docker.internal and localhost. Update all cert path references to match the generate-certs output layout (server/tls.{crt,key}, client/tls.{crt,key}) and remove the openssl preflight checks from both gateway scripts. |
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Drew Newberry
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09bd8a9c66 | fix(vm): preserve guest TLS hostname (#1416) | ||
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Drew Newberry
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f819f7dcb5 | fix(vm): restore sandboxes after gateway restart (#1407) | ||
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Drew Newberry
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910d3f09f2 |
feat(vm): boot sandboxes from ext4 root disks (#1263)
* feat(vm): boot sandboxes from ext4 root disks * feat(vm): boot sandboxes with writable overlay disk * fix(sandbox): improve sandbox provisioning behavior * fix(vm): repair sandbox image provisioning * fix(vm): clean up rebase fallout * perf(vm): cache empty overlay images * perf(vm): skip repeated sandbox ownership repair * fix(vm): address lifecycle review issues * fix(vm): repair gateway vm startup * wip |
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Seth Jennings
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c94cddbfb8 |
feat(server): separate HTTPS from mTLS authentication (#1351)
Make --tls-client-ca optional and make client certificates always optional when a CA is configured. This decouples HTTPS encryption from mTLS authentication, allowing mTLS and OIDC bearer tokens to coexist as parallel authentication mechanisms. When --tls-client-ca is provided, client certificates are validated against the CA when presented but never required. Clients may connect with or without a certificate — authentication is handled at the application layer (e.g. OIDC). Two TLS modes are now supported: - HTTPS with optional mTLS (--tls-client-ca provided) - HTTPS-only (--tls-client-ca omitted) The --disable-gateway-auth flag is preserved for backward compatibility but is now a no-op. The allow_unauthenticated field has been removed from TlsConfig. The Helm chart conditionally includes the client-ca volume and env var based on whether clientCaSecretName is configured. |