In the Rust ecosystem there's largely three ways to do system calls:
- raw libc
- nix
- rustix
Of the three, libc is almost all `unsafe` and really 95% of use
cases should be either nix or rustix. nix is the original one,
but after having looked at the code of both, I think rustix
is just better designed and organized. It's also reached 1.0,
whereas nix is still making semver-breaking changes (in fact
we're behind here in this project).
Now in practice, we have both *transitively* in the depchain
already, and that's true for quite a lot of projects.
But I think rustix is better, so let's add rustix as
a workspace dependency (process feature) and migrate
a few use cases to it - it's especially better than the raw
libc which is suprisingly widespread.
If we agree to do this, then many other calls can be ported.
Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Migrate all sandbox and VM driver network policy enforcement from
iptables to nftables. nftables provides atomic ruleset loading, a
cleaner rule syntax, and is the standard netfilter interface in modern
kernels.
Sandbox bypass enforcement (openshell-sandbox):
- Replace iptables chain of individual rule insertions with a single
atomic nftables ruleset load via nft -f
- New nft_ruleset module with pure functions for ruleset generation
and unit tests
- Combine log and reject rules in one inet family table (handles both
IPv4 and IPv6 in a single ruleset)
- Fall back to reject-only ruleset when kernel lacks nft_log support
- Enable net.netfilter.nf_log_all_netns so log rules work from
non-init network namespaces
- Use temp file for nft ruleset loading instead of stdin for
compatibility with minimal VM guest environments
VM TAP networking (openshell-driver-vm):
- Replace iptables NAT/forwarding rules with nftables equivalents
- New nft_ruleset module for TAP network rule generation with unit
tests
- Atomic table-per-TAP-device lifecycle (create/destroy)
- Host-side rules provide NAT infrastructure and defense-in-depth
isolation (input chain restricts VM to gateway port only, forward
chain blocks unsolicited inbound); primary security enforcement
happens inside the VM guest via the sandbox supervisor's own rules
VM init script:
- Load nft kernel modules at sandbox init
- Enable nf_log_all_netns sysctl for bypass detection logging
OCSF / docs:
- Update firewall rule engine references from iptables to nftables
- Document host firewall interaction model and two-layer enforcement
architecture in VM driver README and compute drivers reference
Closes#1335
Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <rbryant@redhat.com>
Clippy's collapsible_if lint fails `mise run rust:lint` on main because
of the nested `if let Ok(..) { if ping().is_ok() { .. } }` pattern in
`connect_local_container_engine`. Introduced by 44e843ed
("feat(vm): fall back to Podman socket when Docker is unavailable",
#1370). Rewrite both blocks using `&&` let-chains.
* test(e2e): add bypass detection test for sandbox REJECT rules
Validates that direct TCP connections bypassing the HTTP CONNECT proxy
are rejected immediately (ECONNREFUSED) rather than hanging until a
network timeout. This is implementation-agnostic — it tests observable
kernel behavior regardless of whether rules are installed via iptables
or nftables.
* feat(vm): fall back to Podman socket when Docker is unavailable
The VM driver resolves sandbox images from a local container engine
before falling back to registry pulls. Previously it only checked
Docker. Now it tries the Podman socket as a fallback, since Podman
exposes a Docker-compatible API via bollard.
On Linux, enable the Podman API socket with:
systemctl --user start podman.socket
Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <russell.bryant@gmail.com>
* chore(vm): fix formatting
Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <russell.bryant@gmail.com>
* refactor(vm): rename docker-specific identifiers to engine-neutral names
Rename resolve_local_docker_image → resolve_local_container_image,
local_docker_image_platform_mismatch → local_image_platform_mismatch,
and the local docker variable → engine since the function now supports
both Docker and Podman backends.
Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <russell.bryant@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <russell.bryant@gmail.com>
* refactor!(auth): drop SSH handshake secret in favor of mTLS
The OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SECRET / x-sandbox-secret mechanism was
misnamed: it does not authenticate SSH (which flows over the
RelayStream gRPC RPC and is gated by mTLS plus supervisor Unix-socket
permissions). It only gated a small set of sandbox-to-gateway
control-plane RPCs, and production deployments already enforce mTLS
on that channel — so the shared secret was redundant.
Replace the secret check with an mTLS-presence marker. Sandbox-class
methods (ReportPolicyStatus, PushSandboxLogs,
GetSandboxProviderEnvironment, SubmitPolicyAnalysis, GetSandboxConfig,
GetInferenceBundle) accept callers without a Bearer token; the gRPC
mTLS handshake is the trust boundary. Dual-auth methods treat
Bearer-present as full-scope CLI access and Bearer-absent as
sandbox-restricted scope via validate_sandbox_caller_update.
Drops the secret from all drivers (K8s, Podman, VM), the sandbox gRPC
interceptor, the Helm chart (values + pre-install hook + StatefulSet
env), the RPM bootstrap script, the man pages, and the
debug-openshell-cluster skill. Also removes the never-read
ssh_handshake_skew_secs flag and config field.
BREAKING CHANGE: --ssh-handshake-secret / OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SECRET
and --ssh-handshake-skew-secs / OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SKEW_SECS are
removed from the gateway, sandbox, and all driver binaries. The
openshell-ssh-handshake K8s Secret is no longer managed by the chart;
operators may delete the orphan. Deployments using
--disable-gateway-auth must enforce caller authentication at the
fronting proxy, since the gateway no longer validates a per-request
secret on sandbox-class methods.
Refs OS-174.
* docs(auth): scrub residual SSH handshake secret references
Sweep across docs, e2e scripts, the Podman driver README/NETWORKING
notes, the RPM/Helm/setup guides, the gateway man page, and RFC 0003
to remove instructions and examples that still referenced
OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SECRET / --ssh-handshake-secret /
ssh_handshake_skew_secs. The mechanism is gone; nothing should still
suggest setting it. Negative-assertion regression tests are kept so
the env var cannot silently be re-introduced.
* test(drivers): drop SSH handshake secret negative-assertion tests
The supporting code, env vars, CLI flags, and config plumbing are
gone — these tests asserted absence of strings that no longer have
any path to being set. Remove the guards from the Docker, Podman,
Kubernetes, and VM driver test modules.
Consolidate shared constants and helpers into openshell-core to avoid
duplicate definitions scattered across crates. Adds OPENSHELL_SANDBOX
to the sandbox_env module so all drivers and the sandbox supervisor
reference it via a typed constant rather than string literals, matching
the existing pattern for SANDBOX_ID, ENDPOINT, and the other env vars.
* Adding qemu vm driver support with GPU pass-through
Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
* Add GPU rootfs variant, harden VFIO binding, and fix networking and supervisor reliability issues discovered during GPU VM bring-up.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
Drew Newberry