Commit Graph
54 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Drew Newberry 1c939a255a feat(sandbox): enable port forwarding and setup openclaw (!33) 2026-02-19 16:03:23 -08:00
John Myers f1439727b9 feat(sandbox): L7 protocol-aware inspection with TLS termination (!29)
## Summary

Implements L7 (application-layer) protocol-aware policy enforcement for the sandbox proxy, enabling per-request allow/deny decisions based on HTTP method and path — not just host:port.

### Phase 1: HTTP/REST L7 Inspection (plaintext)
- New `l7/` module with provider trait, REST parser, and relay loop
- Parses HTTP/1.1 requests inside CONNECT tunnels, evaluates method+path against OPA/Rego policy
- Supports `access` presets (`full`, `read-only`, `read-write`) and explicit `rules` with glob path matching
- `enforcement` modes: `enforce` (deny with 403 JSON) vs `audit` (log only, forward traffic)
- Structured logging for every L7 decision (`L7_REQUEST` with protocol, action, target, decision)

### Phase 2: MITM TLS Termination for HTTPS
- Ephemeral CA generated at sandbox startup (`rcgen`)
- Per-hostname leaf certificate cache (256 cap) for dynamic cert presentation
- Client-side TLS termination (sandbox trusts ephemeral CA via `SSL_CERT_FILE`, `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, etc.)
- Upstream TLS connection with `webpki-roots` verification
- Endpoints with `tls: terminate` get full L7 inspection; others remain passthrough

### Additional
- Benign TLS/connection errors (close_notify, handshake EOF, reset) downgraded from WARN to DEBUG
- Generic `AsyncRead + AsyncWrite` bounds throughout L7 module (works with both `TcpStream` and `TlsStream`)
- Proto schema extended with `protocol`, `tls`, `enforcement`, `access`, `rules` fields on `NetworkEndpoint`
- CLI `nav sandbox run` wired with `--rego-policy`/`--rego-data` flags and L7 policy display

### E2E Test Coverage
- 7 L4 tests: no-matching-policy deny, wildcard binary, binary-restricted, wrong port, cross-policy isolation, non-CONNECT 405, structured log fields
- 7 L7 TLS tests: full access allow, read-only deny POST, audit mode, explicit path rules, CA trust store injection, deny response JSON format, structured log fields

## Key Files

| Area | Files |
|------|-------|
| L7 core | `l7/mod.rs`, `l7/provider.rs`, `l7/relay.rs`, `l7/rest.rs` |
| TLS termination | `l7/tls.rs` |
| Proxy integration | `proxy.rs`, `lib.rs`, `main.rs` |
| Env/process | `process.rs`, `ssh.rs` |
| OPA policy | `opa.rs`, `dev-sandbox-policy.rego` |
| Proto schema | `proto/sandbox.proto` |
| CLI | `navigator-cli/src/run.rs` |
| E2E tests | `e2e/python/test_sandbox_policy.py` |

## Test plan

- [x] 67 unit tests pass (`cargo test --workspace`)
- [x] `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets` clean
- [x] 16 e2e policy tests pass (`mise run test:e2e:sandbox`)
- [x] Manual smoke test: sandbox with `tls: terminate` on `api.anthropic.com:443`

Closes #25
2026-02-19 09:01:26 -08:00
Drew Newberry 89a6e04c8c feat(providers): inject provider credentials into sandbox child processes at runtime (!26)
## Summary
- Add `GetSandboxProviderEnvironment` gRPC endpoint so the sandbox supervisor can fetch provider credentials at runtime instead of embedding them in the pod spec
- Sandbox supervisor (`navigator-sandbox`) fetches credentials on startup and injects them as environment variables into both entrypoint processes and SSH shell sessions via `Command::env()`
- Remove credential injection from sandbox creation-time pod spec in `navigator-server`
- Update `architecture/providers.md` to document the full runtime credential injection flow, discovery engine details, trait definitions, and end-to-end diagram

## Changes
- **proto**: Add `GetSandboxProviderEnvironment` RPC and request/response messages, add `providers` field to `SandboxSpec`
- **navigator-server**: Implement `GetSandboxProviderEnvironment` handler and `resolve_provider_environment()` with env var key validation and first-wins dedup; remove old creation-time credential injection from `sandbox/mod.rs`
- **navigator-sandbox**: Fetch provider env via gRPC on startup (`grpc_client.rs`), thread `provider_env` HashMap through to `process.rs` (entrypoint) and `ssh.rs` (shell sessions), inject via `cmd.env()`
- **navigator-cli**: Adjust sandbox create flow to set provider names in `SandboxSpec.providers`
- **e2e**: Add `test_sandbox_providers.py` end-to-end tests
- **docs**: Rewrite `architecture/providers.md` with implementation details

## Test Plan
- Unit tests for `resolve_provider_environment` in `grpc.rs`
- Integration tests updated in `provider_commands_integration.rs`, `mtls_integration.rs`, `multiplex_integration.rs`, `multiplex_tls_integration.rs`
- New e2e test suite `test_sandbox_providers.py`
2026-02-17 13:40:10 -08:00
Drew Newberry d2f3ca71d4 feat(sandbox): add callable python exec API and refresh e2e coverage (!19)
Closes #13

## Summary
- add Python sandbox execution APIs for command and callable workflows
- consolidate sandbox policy fixtures and expand e2e test coverage for policy and Python exec paths
- update CI/build config and images for sandbox e2e execution dependencies

## Test Plan
- mise run pre-commit
2026-02-12 23:30:24 -08:00