* feat(auth): add OIDC/Keycloak authentication with RBAC
Add OAuth2/OIDC authentication to the gateway server with role-based
access control, CLI login flows, and full deployment plumbing.
Server: JWT validation against configurable OIDC issuer (oidc.rs),
JWKS key caching with TTL and rotation handling, method classification
(unauthenticated/sandbox-secret/dual-auth/bearer), identity extraction
with provider-agnostic Identity type, and RBAC enforcement via
AuthzPolicy with configurable admin/user roles and auth-only mode.
CLI: browser-based Authorization Code + PKCE flow, Client Credentials
flow for CI/automation, token storage with refresh, gateway add/login/
logout commands, OIDC bearer token injection over mTLS transport,
discovery endpoint for auto-configuration.
Security: sandbox-secret scope restriction on UpdateConfig (policy
sync only), anti-spoofing header stripping, dual-auth fallthrough
from sandbox-secret to Bearer token.
Deployment: OIDC config wired through DeployOptions, Docker env vars,
Helm values/templates, HelmChart manifest, cluster-entrypoint.sh, and
bootstrap scripts. Keycloak dev server script with pre-configured
realm (test users, roles, PKCE client, CI client).
Tested with Keycloak. The roles claim path and role names are
configurable to support other OIDC providers.
* feat(auth): add OAuth2 scope-based fine-grained permissions
Add opt-in scope enforcement on top of existing OIDC role-based access
control. When --oidc-scopes-claim is set, the server extracts scopes
from the JWT and checks them per-method against an exhaustive scope map.
Scopes: sandbox:read, sandbox:write, provider:read, provider:write,
config:read, config:write, inference:read, inference:write, and
openshell:all (wildcard). Methods not in the scope map require
openshell:all. Scopes layer on top of roles and cannot escalate
privilege. Auth-only mode (empty role names) still enforces scopes
when enabled.
Server: scopes_claim in OidcConfig, scope extraction from JWT
(space-delimited and JSON array formats), standard OIDC scope
filtering, scope check in AuthzPolicy after role check.
CLI: --oidc-scopes on gateway add/start stored in metadata and
consumed by gateway login, --oidc-scopes-claim on gateway start
forwarded to server, scopes parameter in browser and client
credentials OAuth2 flows with openid deduplication.
Deployment: oidc_scopes_claim wired through DeployOptions, docker.rs,
Helm, bootstrap scripts, and cluster entrypoint.
Keycloak: realm config updated with built-in OIDC scopes and 9
OpenShell client scopes as optional on openshell-cli and openshell:all
as default on openshell-ci.
* fix(auth): address branch review findings
Add GetInferenceBundle to sandbox-secret methods so sandbox inference
route refresh works under OIDC. Make GetSandboxConfig dual-auth so CLI
users can read sandbox settings with Bearer tokens.
Preserve OIDC gateway metadata on restart — a bare gateway start
without --oidc-* flags no longer erases the stored OIDC registration.
Document CI client ID requirement (openshell-ci vs openshell-cli) in
the testing guide. Add security note about auth-only mode blast radius
for GitHub Actions.
* fix(auth): complete review findings for OIDC auth boundary
Move OpenShell/GetSandboxConfig from sandbox-secret-only to dual-auth
so CLI users can read sandbox settings with Bearer tokens while sandbox
supervisors continue using the shared secret.
Add sandbox secret interceptor to the inference bundle fetch path so
GetInferenceBundle works under OIDC-enabled gateways. Extract shared
interceptor constructor to avoid duplication.
Add GetSandboxConfig to the config:read scope map so scope enforcement
applies consistently when scopes are enabled.
Refactor OIDC metadata preservation into apply_oidc_gateway_metadata()
with explicit resume semantics — only preserve existing OIDC metadata
on real resume paths, not on fresh deployments.
Update architecture docs and testing guide to reflect the corrected
method classifications and add new test coverage for interceptor
injection, scope requirements, metadata preservation, and dual-auth
classification.
* refactor(auth): use oauth2 crate for CLI OIDC flows
Replace hand-written PKCE generation, authorization URL construction,
token exchange, client credentials, and token refresh with the oauth2
crate's typed API.
Eliminates sha2, hex, and getrandom dependencies from the CLI. The
custom urlencoded() helper and manual form POST logic are replaced by
BasicClient methods with proper type-state safety.
Discovery and the callback server remain custom since the oauth2 crate
does not provide OIDC discovery or a localhost redirect listener.
* refactor(auth): move server auth modules into auth/ directory
Group oidc.rs, authz.rs, identity.rs, and the auth HTTP endpoints
under src/auth/ module directory. No behavioral changes.
auth/mod.rs — module root, re-exports HTTP router
auth/oidc.rs — JWT validation, JWKS caching, method classification
auth/authz.rs — role and scope authorization policy
auth/identity.rs — provider-agnostic Identity type
auth/http.rs — /auth/connect and /auth/oidc-config endpoints
* fix(auth): use RequestBody auth type for client credentials flow
The oauth2 crate defaults to BasicAuth (HTTP Basic header) but Keycloak
and most OIDC providers expect client_secret_post (credentials in the
request body). Set AuthType::RequestBody explicitly to match the
pre-refactor behavior.
Also re-export Identity, IdentityProvider, and JwksCache from the auth
module so ServerState's public API remains nameable by external consumers.
* fix(auth): forward OPENSHELL_OIDC_SCOPES through cluster bootstrap
Pass --oidc-scopes to gateway start so the metadata includes requested
scopes after cluster bootstrap. Without this, users had to manually
edit metadata.json to set scopes for gateway login.
Usage: OPENSHELL_OIDC_SCOPES="openshell:all" mise run cluster
* test(auth): add OIDC e2e tests for RBAC, scopes, and client credentials
Add 10 end-to-end tests covering OIDC authentication against a live
K3s cluster with Keycloak:
RBAC (5 tests): admin can create providers, user cannot, user can list
sandboxes, unauthenticated requests rejected, health probe works
without auth.
Scopes (4 tests): sandbox-scoped token can list sandboxes but not
providers, openshell:all grants full access, no-scopes token denied.
Client credentials (1 test): CI token via client_credentials grant.
Tests are opt-in via OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC=1 and OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC_SCOPES=1
env vars. They derive the Keycloak URL from gateway metadata to match
the server's configured issuer.
Run with:
OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC=1 OPENSHELL_E2E_OIDC_SCOPES=1 \
PYTHONPATH=python uv run pytest e2e/python/oidc/ -v
* fix(docs): fix markdown lint errors in OIDC architecture docs
Add blank lines before lists and fenced code blocks to satisfy
markdownlint MD031 and MD032 rules.
* ci(docker): use prebuilt Rust binaries by default
Flip Docker image builds to consume staged native Rust artifacts, remove in-Docker Rust build stages, and publish per-arch images with a manifest merge.
Add local staging support for prebuilt gateway and sandbox binaries so development image builds continue to work without CI artifacts.
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
* ci(docker): address prebuilt build review feedback
* ci(rust): allow existing vfio complexity
* ci(rust): pin toolchain to 1.95
---------
Signed-off-by: Jonas Toelke <jtoelke@nvidia.com>
the transfer of very large sandbox images to containerd can
timeout depending on the size of the image and the speed of
the local host.
Made-with: Cursor
* fix(sandbox): add GPU device nodes and nvidia-persistenced to landlock baseline
Landlock READ_FILE/WRITE_FILE restricts open(2) on character device files
even when DAC permissions would otherwise allow it. GPU sandboxes need
/dev/nvidiactl, /dev/nvidia-uvm, /dev/nvidia-uvm-tools, /dev/nvidia-modeset,
and per-GPU /dev/nvidiaX nodes in the policy to allow NVML initialization.
Additionally, CDI bind-mounts /run/nvidia-persistenced/socket into the
container. NVML tries to connect to this socket at init time; if the
directory is not in the landlock policy, it receives EACCES (not
ECONNREFUSED), which causes NVML to abort with NVML_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS
even though nvidia-persistenced is optional.
Both classes of paths are auto-added to the baseline when /dev/nvidiactl is
present. Per-GPU device nodes are enumerated at runtime to handle multi-GPU
configurations.
Replace manual Header::set_path() + append() with
builder.append_path_with_name() which emits GNU LongName extensions
for paths exceeding the 100-byte POSIX tar name field limit.
Fixes#705
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
The image push pipeline buffered the entire Docker image tar 3x in
memory (export, tar wrap, Bytes copy), causing OOM kills for images
over ~1-2 GB. Replace the in-memory pipeline with a temp-file +
streaming upload: export to a NamedTempFile, then stream the outer
tar (header, 8 MiB file chunks, footer) directly into
upload_to_container via body_try_stream. Peak memory drops from ~3x
image size to ~8 MiB constant.
Also adds incremental export progress reporting every 100 MiB.
* feat(bootstrap): switch GPU injection to CDI where supported
Use an explicit CDI device request (driver="cdi", device_ids=["nvidia.com/gpu=all"])
when the Docker daemon reports CDI spec directories via GET /info (SystemInfo.CDISpecDirs).
This makes device injection declarative and decouples spec generation from consumption.
When the daemon reports no CDI spec directories, fall back to the legacy NVIDIA device
request (driver="nvidia", count=-1) which relies on the NVIDIA Container Runtime hook.
Failure modes for both paths are equivalent: a missing or stale NVIDIA Container Toolkit
installation will cause container start to fail.
CDI spec generation is out of scope for this change; specs are expected to be
pre-generated out-of-band, for example by the NVIDIA Container Toolkit.
---------
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com>
Co-authored-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com>
* fix(cli): clear stale last-used sandbox on deletion
When a sandbox is deleted, the locally stored last-used record now gets
cleared if it matches the deleted sandbox name. This prevents subsequent
commands from falling back to a sandbox that no longer exists, which
previously caused confusing gRPC errors.
Adds clear_last_sandbox_if_matches() to openshell-bootstrap and calls
it from sandbox_delete() after each successful deletion.
Closes#172
Signed-off-by: Serge Panev <spanev@nvidia.com>
* style: fix rustfmt import ordering and line wrapping
Signed-off-by: Serge Panev <spanev@nvidia.com>
* fix(cli): pass gateway to sandbox_delete in finalize_sandbox_create_session
Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Serge Panev <spanev@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com>
Error messages and recovery hints were showing 'openshell gateway destroy <name>'
as a positional argument, but the CLI defines name as a --name flag. This caused
'unexpected argument' errors when users copied the suggested commands.
Docker Desktop 29.x defaults to private cgroupns which prevents k3s
kubelet from accessing cgroup v2 controllers (cpu, cpuset, memory,
pids, hugetlb). This causes ContainerManager to fail during startup.
Explicitly set cgroupns_mode to host, which is backwards compatible
with all Docker versions and matches what k3s-in-Docker tooling
(k3d) requires.
Closes#273
Verify inference endpoints synchronously on the server during set/update, expose a --no-verify escape hatch in the CLI and Python helper, and return actionable failures when validation does not pass.
PR #281 removed the shared openshell-cluster Docker network in favor of
the default bridge. This restores custom bridge networking but makes each
gateway use its own isolated network named openshell-cluster-{name},
matching the existing container/volume naming convention.
Changes:
- Add network_name() to constants.rs for per-gateway network naming
- Add ensure_network() with retry/backoff and force_remove_network()
parameterized by network name instead of a global constant
- Attach containers to their per-gateway network via network_mode
- Disconnect and remove the network during gateway destroy
- Wire ensure_network() into the deploy flow before ensure_volume()
- Update architecture docs to reflect per-gateway network isolation
Mrunal Patel