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codex/mxc-https-test-socket-owner
147
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jorge
|
42e9bcf2b0 |
feat(e2e): support the Vault credential-driver lane on OpenShift (#3312)
Implements https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell/issues/3212 Running e2e:kubernetes with the Vault credential driver failed on OpenShift in two ways: the OpenBao fixture pod was rejected by the restricted-v2 SCC, and provider-creating tests hit HTTP 403 from auth/kubernetes/login because OpenBao's Kubernetes auth was provisioned only inside a single feature-gated test. - Deploy OpenBao with the chart's OpenShift mode (global.openshift=true) when OpenShift is detected, so the pod inherits a namespace-assigned, SCC-compliant security context with no manual SCC grant. Hoist OpenShift detection ahead of the credential-driver fixtures so the flag is set before the fixture is deployed. - Provision the OpenBao KV store, Kubernetes auth method, storage policy, and gateway login role in the harness (deploy_vault_fixture), making a Vault-backed gateway usable by the whole suite instead of only the credential_drivers test. Remove the now-redundant configure_vault_storage helper from the test. - Harden openbao_exec so it tolerates only the idempotent "path is already in use" error on reruns and fails fast with output on any other error, instead of a blanket `|| true` that masked genuine failures (e.g. an unresponsive pod) until a later cryptic write. - Document the OpenShift Vault credential-store SCC and Kubernetes-auth 403 troubleshooting in the debug-openshell-cluster skill. Signed-off-by: Jorge Garcia Oncins <jgarciao@redhat.com> |
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Jesse JaggarsandDrew Newberry
|
02b664bb0d |
refactor(config): normalize and enforce gateway schema v2 (#2814)
* refactor(config): normalize compute driver field names Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * refactor(config): introduce canonical gateway fields Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * refactor(config): enforce gateway schema version 2 Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): preserve compute driver runtime guarantees Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): address schema v2 review regressions Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): complete schema v2 migration safeguards Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(config): expand schema v2 regression coverage Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(config): add schema v2 parity manifest Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): correct parity manifest inventory Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs(config): record schema v2 intentional changes Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs(config): disposition schema v2 parity gaps Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): add dual schema parity harness Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): establish compute lifecycle parity baseline Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): preserve gateway option compatibility Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): record gateway option parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * docs(config): close gateway-wide parity gaps Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(podman): apply configured pids limit Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): validate Podman option parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): add Kubernetes option parity harness Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): record Kubernetes option parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): disposition VM parity lanes Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): add external driver parity lane Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): preserve external driver pull policy Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): attest parity artifacts and launches Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): require clean parity build sources Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): bind parity runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): use isolated supervisor tags Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): qualify parity image tags Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): serve parity supervisor locally Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): isolate parity podman services Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): harden parity evidence provenance Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): pin parity sandbox artifacts Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): attest parity runtime inputs Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): bind parity runtime evidence Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): record compute boundary parity Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(e2e): disposition cross-cutting parity lanes Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(packaging): preflight gateway config upgrades Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): preserve rebase integration guarantees Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(ci): isolate temporary git signing config Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): update remaining schema v2 consumers Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(ci): provide e2fs tools to VM tests Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): align preflight with gateway startup Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(vm): preserve rootfs tar configuration Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * chore(config): adopt duration unit constructors Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(packaging): preflight RPM gateway config Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(config): address driver review findings Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): require fresh semantic parity evidence Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * fix(docker): update tests for renamed sandbox label Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> * test(gateway): preserve selective driver coverage after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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John T. MyersandJohn Myers
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226a83b323 |
fix(supervisor): classify credential placeholders in request bodies (#3246)
* fix(supervisor): classify credential placeholders in request bodies Closes #2904 Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(supervisor): preserve same-provider placeholders in request bodies Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ShijuandDrew Newberry
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8211274bfb |
fix(e2e): follow credential storage identity (#3202)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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John T. Myers
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f4dc6be4b2 |
refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes (#3195)
* refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes Closes #3172 Remove the inference route control plane, inference.local data path, built-in router crate, and SDK surface. Move inference workloads to explicitly imported provider profiles and native endpoints, with migration cleanup and updated tests and documentation. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve alternate upstream isolation Restore the provider policy activation guard so legacy OpenAI and Anthropic providers configured for alternate base URLs do not grant egress to the built-in public vendor endpoints. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Simon Scatton
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48c449d8c8 |
chore(deps): replace ring with AWS-LC (#3243)
* chore(deps): replace ring with AWS-LC Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(lint): address warnings after dependency upgrades Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(tls): limit provider initialization to reqwest clients Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> |
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Gaizka Menendez
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8af79a7f4b |
fix(podman): resolve macOS Podman socket dynamically (#3135)
* docs(podman): document macOS socket path mismatch and dynamic lookup On macOS, Homebrew-installed Podman does not create the default socket path that the Podman driver probes. Document the OPENSHELL_PODMAN_SOCKET override and the podman machine inspect lookup in both the compute drivers reference and the debug-openshell-cluster skill. Fixes #1690 Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * fix(podman): resolve macOS Podman socket dynamically Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * chore: restore debug skill file Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * chore: drop legacy debug skill path Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * fix(podman): trim unrelated e2e changes Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): harden shell array expansion Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> * chore: remove unrelated skill note * ci: retrigger checks Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Gaizka Menendez Hernandez <gmenende@redhat.com> |
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Evie Howard
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6e6b3c8905 |
refactor(cli): remove local Dockerfile image builds (#3214)
Signed-off-by: Evie Howard <evhoward@redhat.com> |
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Philippe Martin
|
118b250f01 |
feat(sandbox): support rootfs tar as --from source for VM driver (#2863)
* feat(sandbox): support rootfs tar as --from source for VM driver Accept flat rootfs tar archives (.tar, .tar.gz, .tgz) via the --from flag for VM-backed gateways. The CLI detects the archive extension, validates that the gateway uses the VM compute driver, and passes the tar path through driver_config. The VM driver copies the tar into its staging area and feeds it into the existing rootfs extraction and ext4 disk creation pipeline, skipping the container image pull/export steps. Closes #2175 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): validate rootfs tar path at the VM driver boundary The rootfs_tar_path field in driver_config was passed from the API caller directly to tokio::fs::copy without validation. An authenticated user bypassing the CLI could supply arbitrary host paths (e.g. /dev/zero for disk exhaustion, or readable host files for data exfiltration). Introduce a trusted staging directory that the VM driver creates on startup and advertises via GetCapabilities. The CLI now copies the tar into the staging directory before creating the sandbox, and the driver validates that the received path is a regular file inside the staging root and within a configurable size limit (default 10 GiB) before any I/O. New VmDriverConfig options: - rootfs_tar_staging_dir: override the staging directory (default: <state_dir>/rootfs-tar-staging) - rootfs_tar_max_bytes: override the size limit (default: 10 GiB) Addresses GATOR-28b5152e-01. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): request-scoped staging, size pre-check, and cleanup for rootfs tar Tighten the rootfs tar staging flow to address the remaining GATOR-01 obligations: - Request-scoped staging: the CLI creates a unique per-request subdirectory (req-<pid>) under the staging root instead of placing files directly in the shared directory. The driver enforces that the tar path is at depth 2 (staging_root/<subdir>/<file>), preventing cross-request path selection. - Size pre-check: the driver advertises rootfs_tar_max_bytes via GetCapabilities. The CLI reads this limit and rejects oversized files before copying, avoiding disk exhaustion in the staging directory. - Cleanup: the driver removes the request staging subdirectory after consuming the tar (on cache hit, copy success, or copy failure), ensuring staged data does not persist beyond the request. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): restore rootfs-tar sandboxes from persisted image identity On restore or restart, the one-shot staged tar archive has already been cleaned up. Reading the persisted image identity from the sandbox state directory and resolving the cached disk path directly avoids re-accessing the deleted staging path. Addresses GATOR-168b9210-01. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(cli): use random staging dirs and enforce byte limit during rootfs tar copy Replace PID-based request staging directories with tempfile-generated random names to prevent collisions and make paths unpredictable. Replace bare tokio::fs::copy with a streaming copy loop that enforces the advertised max_bytes limit during transfer, closing the TOCTOU gap between the pre-copy size check and the actual copy. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): issue rootfs tar staging slots from the gateway A caller could name any host path in `driver_config.vm.rootfs_tar_path`, which the privileged VM driver then read. The CLI-side locality check did not apply to direct API requests. The gateway now owns staging. `BeginRootfsTarStaging` allocates a request-scoped directory under the driver-advertised staging root and returns an opaque single-use token; `CreateSandbox` carries the token, and the gateway substitutes the path it allocated before dispatching to the driver. `template.driver_config.<driver>.rootfs_tar_path` is rejected outright in request validation, so a caller-supplied path never reaches privileged I/O. Tokens are bound to the issuing workspace and subject, consumed once, and expire after 30 minutes. Outstanding slots are capped per caller and overall, so one caller can neither exhaust the staging filesystem nor starve others. An RAII guard reclaims the directory on every failure path after consumption, and an age-gated sweep runs at startup and on each reconcile pass for directories whose driver died before its own cleanup. The token is stripped from the public sandbox before persistence: the stored copy is returned verbatim by GetSandbox, ListSandboxes and WatchSandbox to every member of the workspace. Also fixes two defects this exposed: - The CLI wrote `rootfs_tar_path` at the top level of `driver_config`, but the gateway forwards only `driver_config.<driver_name>`, silently dropping unmatched keys. The archive never reached the VM driver, so the documented `--from ./rootfs.tar` flow did not work at all. Config is now nested under `vm` and deep-merged, so a caller's existing VM settings survive instead of being clobbered by a shallow extend. - Staging previously required `GetGatewayInfo`, which is restricted to `platform_admin`, making the feature unusable for ordinary users on any RBAC-enabled gateway. The new RPC matches CreateSandbox at `sandbox:write` / `workspace_role: user`. `compute_driver.proto` is unchanged; the gateway reads the staging root from the capabilities it already stores. Refs #2175 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): derive rootfs tar cache identity from archive contents The prepared-disk cache key combined the archive's full path with an mtime truncated to seconds, then mapped punctuation to `-`. Distinct paths such as `/tmp/a/b.tar` and `/tmp/a-b.tar` collapsed onto the same key and reused each other's disk, a rewrite within the same second kept stale contents, and a long path could exceed filesystem component limits. Identity is now a SHA-256 of the archive contents. This is also what makes the cache work at all now that the gateway allocates a fresh staging directory per request: a path-derived key would miss on every create. The archive is hashed, the cache checked, and only on a miss copied — so a hit skips writing a multi-gigabyte file. The copy is hashed as it is written and rejected if the digest differs from the first pass, which closes the window where the source changes during staging rather than approximating it with a re-stat. Refs #2175 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): decompress gzip rootfs tar archives during staging `--from` accepts `.tar.gz` and `.tgz`, but the driver staged whatever bytes it was given and the guest image-prep VM extracts the staged file with a plain `tar -xpf`. Compressed sources therefore depended on the guest tar auto-detecting gzip, and the prepared disk was sized from the compressed length, which is far too small for the expanded rootfs. Staging now detects gzip from the archive's magic bytes -- the driver only ever sees a gateway-issued staging path, never the caller's file name -- and writes an uncompressed tar. The digest still covers the source bytes, so the "archive changed while staging" check is unaffected, and expansion is bounded by `rootfs_tar_max_bytes` so a compression bomb cannot fill the host disk. `extract_rootfs_archive_to` sniffs gzip as well, so the host-side extraction path matches. Adds unit coverage for gzip staging, bounded expansion, and gzip extraction, plus an e2e sandbox created from a gzip-compressed export. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@nvidia.com> |
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Jorge
|
519e5eb35f |
feat(e2e): make e2e:kubernetes work transparently on OpenShift (#3183)
* feat(e2e): make e2e:kubernetes work transparently on OpenShift
Running `mise run e2e:kubernetes` on OpenShift required manual namespace
creation, SCC grants, Helm value overrides, and cleanup. A separate
`e2e:openshift` task existed but only checked pod readiness without
running the Rust e2e test suite, and even with the suite wired up the
SSH-relay `sandbox connect` path stalled to the ready timeout because
`kubectl port-forward` cannot carry round-trip-heavy SSH over the
internet.
The harness now auto-detects OpenShift via the `route.openshift.io` API
group and, on OpenShift, both configures the cluster and switches the
gateway transport automatically:
- Drives the gateway through a passthrough OpenShift Route secured with
mandatory mTLS instead of port-forward, so the connect suites
(live_policy_update, port_forward, sync, connect-based
sandbox_lifecycle, settings_management) actually pass. Computes the
Route host from the cluster ingress domain, extracts client mTLS
material from the openshell-client-tls secret, waits for the Route to
serve mTLS, asserts a certless caller is rejected at the TLS
handshake, and registers an mTLS CLI gateway pointing at the Route.
- Applies an SCC-compatible Helm values overlay that removes hardcoded
runAsUser/fsGroup, letting OpenShift assign UIDs from the namespace
range.
- Grants the privileged SCC to openshell-sandbox before Helm install
and removes it during cleanup.
- Grants the anyuid SCC to the PostgreSQL fixture service account in
DB scenarios and removes it during cleanup.
- All oc commands use --context to target the correct cluster.
The OpenShift e2e overlay (ci/values-openshift-e2e.yaml) turns TLS back
on, enables the Route, promotes the cert-verified caller to a dev
principal, and forces `image.pullPolicy`/`supervisor.image.pullPolicy`
to Always so runs against the `latest` upstream image use it instead of
a stale copy cached on the cluster nodes. Every OpenShift branch is
gated on OPENSHIFT_DETECTED, so the vanilla-Kubernetes port-forward path
is unchanged.
The Helm template for podSecurityContext is wrapped with {{- with }} so
null values omit the block instead of rendering invalid YAML.
The separate e2e:openshift task and e2e-openshift.sh script are removed
since e2e:kubernetes now covers OpenShift.
TESTING.md is updated with Kubernetes e2e documentation including
OpenShift auto-detection, dropping the e2e-host-gateway feature on
remote clusters, pinning IMAGE_TAG when the CLI and image versions
differ, task variants, and environment variables.
The debug-openshell-cluster skill gains an OpenShift platform row and
two SCC failure patterns (gateway rejected over hardcoded runAsUser,
sandbox missing the privileged SCC) covering the SCC handling and
podSecurityContext behavior this change introduces.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Garcia Oncins <jgarciao@redhat.com>
* fix(e2e): harden OpenShift SCC cleanup, mTLS gate, and Route timeout
Track the anyuid SCC grant for the PostgreSQL fixture with a dedicated
OPENSHIFT_POSTGRES_SCC_GRANTED flag set before the fixture apply, so a
failed apply no longer leaks the binding; cleanup now revokes it whenever
the grant succeeded, independent of deploy state.
Validate the Route server cert in the certless security gate (curl
--cacert instead of -k) and classify curl's exit code so only a TLS
client-auth rejection (35/56) counts as the expected certless rejection;
an unrelated DNS/timeout/TLS failure now fails loudly instead of masking
a potential mTLS hole.
Raise the OpenShift Route timeout in the e2e overlay. The default HAProxy
Route timeout is 30s, which severed long-lived transfers (large sandbox
upload/download, SSH-relay `sandbox connect`) mid-stream and failed the
sync e2e tests. Set both haproxy.router.openshift.io/timeout and
timeout-tunnel to 300s: a passthrough Route proxies in TCP mode, so
timeout-tunnel governs the established tunnel while timeout covers the
pre-tunnel phase.
Document the OpenShift transport exception, oc prerequisites and SCC
grants, and make the skopeo tag-check example copy-safe in TESTING.md.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Garcia Oncins <jgarciao@redhat.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Jorge Garcia Oncins <jgarciao@redhat.com>
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Evan Lezar
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e4369adcd0 |
chore(deps): replace serde_yml with noyalib (#3031)
* chore(deps): replace serde_yml with noyalib Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * fix(providers): annotate generic YAML test values Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Evan LezarandDrew Newberry
|
1e1a8b5810 |
test(e2e): keep lifecycle sandboxes running (#3128)
* test(e2e): keep lifecycle sandboxes running Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): cover sandbox terminal lifecycle semantics Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): synchronize detached main exit checks Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Philippe Martin
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857af42a16 |
feat(vm): support corporate HTTP forward proxy egress for microVM sandboxes (#3090)
* feat(vm): support corporate HTTP forward proxy egress for microVM sandboxes The corporate forward proxy machinery from #1792 is driver-agnostic and already merged: openshell-supervisor-network implements CONNECT chaining, NO_PROXY matching, credentials, https:// proxies and corporate CA trust, and openshell-sandbox exposes it as six argv-only flags. Podman gained the driver half in #2245/#2512 and Kubernetes in #2633; the VM driver had none of it, so VM sandboxes on proxy-only networks could not reach any destination requiring the proxy even when policy allowed it. The blocking piece was not proxy logic but delivery: the VM guest init script runs as PID 1 and execs a fixed supervisor command line, and libkrun's krun_set_exec receives an empty argv, so there was no channel for driver-owned supervisor arguments. The supervisor's proxy flags deliberately have no environment fallback, and build_guest_environment merges user-supplied environment, so the guest env is not a safe transport either. Add a driver-authored argument file, mirroring the existing init.d manifest: the driver writes /opt/openshell/supervisor-args into the overlay upperdir on every launch and the guest reads it verbatim, one argument per line, appending it to every supervisor exec. It is written even when empty, which is what makes the channel unforgeable -- the upperdir always shadows the read-only image layer, so an image can neither supply its own arguments nor disable the operator's by omitting the file. Because both launch backends exec the same init script, this covers libkrun and QEMU without touching either. A microVM has no bind mounts or container secrets, so the credential and CA bundle are staged into the per-sandbox overlay the way the gateway JWT already is: credential root-only at 0600, CA at 0644, both rewritten every launch so a removed setting clears prior material, and both deleted with the sandbox state directory. This places the credential at rest in the overlay image on the gateway host, which differs from the Podman secret model and is documented as an explicit security consideration. Validation is fail-closed and shared: a new openshell_core::driver_utils::validate_upstream_proxy_settings holds the pairing rules the Podman driver established, and both the gateway and the driver call it so an invalid table names the offending key instead of surfacing as an opaque driver-readiness timeout. Guest egress leaves through gvproxy, so a proxy on the gateway host's loopback is reachable only through host.openshell.internal; the guest to gateway callback is unaffected. Closes #3088 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): bound the proxy CA read and scope the host-loopback recipe Two review findings on the corporate forward proxy support for microVM sandboxes. The driver read the operator's proxy_ca_bundle with an unbounded fs::read and accepted it on a substring match for the PEM BEGIN CERTIFICATE marker. A special file such as /dev/zero therefore grew driver memory without bound on every authorized sandbox create, and a PEM block holding invalid DER passed the host check but contributes no trust anchor in the guest, so every supervisor would fail after boot with an error attributed to the sandbox rather than to the setting. Move the read into openshell-core as read_upstream_proxy_ca_bundle_file: it reuses the credential reader's bounded-read path (non-regular files rejected on fstat, size capped, read bounded even if the file grows), then requires at least one anchor that RootCertStore::add_parsable_certificates accepts. The supervisor's own reader now delegates to it, so host acceptance and guest acceptance are the same function and cannot drift. The published host-loopback recipe was written for libkrun only. gvproxy NATs host.openshell.internal to the gateway host's 127.0.0.1, but GPU sandboxes run on the QEMU/TAP backend where that name resolves to the TAP host address and the driver's own nftables input chain accepts only the gateway port from the guest — no proxy on the gateway host is reachable there at any bind address, so an operator following the generic recipe lost all proxy-required egress while configuration validation succeeded. Scope the recipe to libkrun in every reference and reject a gateway-host proxy URL when a launch plan resolves to QEMU, naming the reason, instead of booting a sandbox whose policy-approved CONNECTs all time out. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(vm): match the QEMU proxy preflight to the selected TAP host The gateway-host proxy guard added for the QEMU/TAP backend classified the wrong set of addresses in both directions. It ran at the top of configure_qemu_launch_plan, before the subnet allocation that settles plan.host_ip, so it could not compare against the address the guest actually reaches the host on. An operator pointing https_proxy at the sandbox's own TAP host address, such as 10.0.128.1, passed the check, and the driver's nftables input chain — which accepts only the gateway port from the guest — then dropped every policy-approved CONNECT, which is exactly the silent timeout the guard exists to prevent. In the other direction it rejected 192.168.127.254 unconditionally. That address is special only to libkrun/gvproxy; on QEMU/TAP it is an ordinary address that may be routable through the guest's masqueraded egress, so the guard refused a working configuration. Run the check after the launch plan's network allocation, on both the freshly-allocated and already-complete paths, and compare IP literals with that sandbox's selected TAP host. Loopback literals, localhost, and the documented host aliases that write_host_gateway_aliases seeds to the TAP host still classify as the gateway host, and the failure names the address. The gvproxy host-loopback constant returns to being a documentation anchor. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> |
||
|
grs
|
74960ebfae |
feat(server): add sandbox templates (#2833)
* feat(server): add sandbox workload templates Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * feat(go-sdk): add sandbox workload template support Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * feat(rust-sdk): add sandbox workload template support Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * feat(python-sdk): add sandbox workload template support Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * feat(typescript-sdk): add sandbox workload template support Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * docs(agents): document sandbox workload templates Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(cli): support default GPU requests in sandbox templates Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(server): cap sandbox templates per workspace Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * docs(architecture): document sandbox workload template boundaries Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * feat(cli+sdk): expose sandbox workload template provenance Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(cli): include sandbox template annotations in output Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * feat(sandbox): add label selectors to template listing Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(e2e): cover sandbox template failure paths Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(server): preserve command and ttl when creating sandbox from template Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(server): add field coverage test for template merge Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(go-sdk): add pagination support to fake client Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(cli): warn on env vars that looks like secrets Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(sdk-ts): propagate sandbox workspace through lifecycle calls Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(docs): update workspace management docs Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(ts-sdk): support command and tty when creating from template Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(go-sdk): support command and tty when creating from template Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(python-sdk): verify command and tty handling when creating from template Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(go-sdk): update docs and ClientInterface Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(server): validate sandbox create specs before I/O Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(go-sdk): guard empty DNS-1123 label validation Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(python-sdk): allow empty template builder mappings Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(cli): align template GPU JSON default output Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> |
||
|
Drew Newberry
|
9ca19e6c80 |
refactor(compute): decouple gateway driver composition (#2823)
* refactor(compute): decouple gateway driver composition Move first-party composition and VM process ownership into openshell-gateway, leaving openshell-server backend-independent. Update packaging and build references with the new crate, simplify the compiled-driver boundary, and keep the driver-free gateway path buildable with bundled Z3 tooling. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(telemetry): bound compute driver categories Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(core): keep runtime transport generic Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): complete server driver decoupling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): preserve driver integrations after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(compute): preserve docker tracing after decoupling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(compute): preserve driver behavior after extraction Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): remove MXC policy side channel Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): separate policy delivery from readiness Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
07df822090 |
feat(providers): make profiles authoritative (#2962)
* feat(providers): make profiles authoritative Closes #1988 Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): move profiles into provider navigation Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): clarify provider attachment lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(tui): scroll provider profile picker Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(providers): honor profile credential semantics Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(providers): prefer exact profile IDs Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(providers): harden authoritative profile adoption Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(oidc): align provider fixtures with profiles Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(providers): preserve authoritative profile lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
a547dc9f4d |
fix(sandbox): reconcile early container exits (#3101)
* fix(sandbox): reconcile early container exits Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(oidc): isolate RBAC checks from lifecycle exits Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Evan Lezar
|
bb70461878 |
test(e2e): run conformance in gateway lanes (#2925)
* test(e2e): isolate VM-specific smoke assertions Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): add portable CLI conformance baseline Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * feat(conformance): add standalone CLI runner Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): run conformance in gateway lanes Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Drew Newberry
|
69a05ebb3b | fix(sandbox): complete successful main processes (#2884) | ||
|
Simon Scatton
|
981606d2f8 |
ci: build release binaries with Nix (#2977)
* ci: build release binaries with Nix Refs #1683 Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: build VM artifacts with Nix Refs #1683 Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: build images from Nix artifacts Refs #1683 Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(nix): prevent host header leakage Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: parallelize artifact builds Refs #1683 Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: build external driver test artifacts Refs #1683 Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(nix): disable mold in musl shells Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: key Rust cache by Nix shell derivation Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: refactor end-to-end workflows Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: split platform binary workflows Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: remove obsolete native build workflows Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: replace disallowed mise action Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: fix refactored e2e lanes Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: check out local result action Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: cache mise installations Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: run docker builds on host runners Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * ci: disable unstable kubernetes e2e lanes Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): scope binary builds to cargo packages Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): address zizmor template injection findings Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): resolve remaining zizmor annotations Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Evan Lezar
|
9f88f8ff9b |
ci: remove rootless podman e2e lane (#2981)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Mrunal Patel
|
18ce13b9b1 |
feat(providers): expose actionable OAuth refresh failures (#2887)
* fix(providers): classify OAuth refresh failures Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * test(providers): add Keycloak refresh e2e lane Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * fix(providers): harden OAuth refresh recovery Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * fix(providers): classify post-mint refresh failures Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * fix(providers): tolerate malformed OAuth subtypes Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> |
||
|
Russell Bryant
|
72b9c4acef |
test(e2e): pin direct podman calls to harness socket on macOS (#2909)
The podman_gateway_start e2e test shells out to `podman` directly (unlike every other Podman e2e test, which routes through the gateway). The harness `e2e/with-podman-gateway.sh` clobbers `XDG_CONFIG_HOME` with an empty dir to isolate CLI/SDK gateway metadata. On macOS the podman client resolves its VM connection config from `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, so a bare `podman ps` falls back to a nonexistent native rootless socket and fails with "unable to connect to Podman socket". On Linux the socket resolves via `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR`, so the test passes there and this is a macOS-only false failure. Target the same API socket the gateway uses by passing `--url unix://$SOCKET` when the harness-exported `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_SOCKET` is set, mirroring the shell's `podman_cmd` helper. When the var is unset (running the test outside the harness), fall back to plain `podman`, so Linux behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Russell Bryant <rbryant@redhat.com> |
||
|
Philippe Martin
|
0a1f246587 |
feat(sandbox,podman): trust corporate CA for https:// proxies and intercepted TLS (#2512)
* feat(sandbox,podman): trust corporate CA for https:// proxies and intercepted TLS The corporate proxy chaining only accepted plain http:// proxy URLs, so operators whose forward proxy terminates TLS with a private corporate CA had no way to reach it, and TLS-intercepting proxies (mitmproxy, squid ssl-bump) that re-sign tunneled server certificates broke every upstream handshake after CONNECT. The supervisor now accepts https:// proxy URLs: it wraps the connection to the proxy in TLS before the CONNECT handshake, verifying the proxy certificate against the built-in Mozilla roots, the system CA bundle, and an optional operator corporate CA bundle. The upstream dial returns a Plain/Tls stream enum consumed generically by the relay paths. The corporate CA is delivered as a driver-supplied command-line argument (--upstream-proxy-ca-bundle), never an environment variable, matching the hardened proxy-config model where a sandbox image cannot influence the operator's egress boundary. It is folded into the sandbox combined trust bundle (write_ca_files) and the L7 upstream verification store (build_upstream_client_config) at startup, so intercepted upstream handshakes succeed and sandbox workloads trust the re-signed certificates. Configuration is fail-closed: a CA bundle set without a proxy, or an unreadable or certificate-free file, is fatal rather than silently weakening the trust boundary. The shared parse_upstream_proxy_url validator accepts https:// (recording the scheme so the driver and supervisor agree), keeping the explicit-port requirement. The Podman driver gains a proxy_ca_bundle operator setting (TOML, --sandbox-proxy-ca-bundle, OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CA_BUNDLE) that bind-mounts the host PEM read-only into the sandbox (a CA certificate is not secret) and points --upstream-proxy-ca-bundle at it, with a create-time readability check. The standalone dev gateway task passes OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CA_BUNDLE through to the generated podman config, so a local gateway can be pointed at a TLS-intercepting proxy without hand-editing the regenerated TOML. Refs #1792 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): reject CA bundles with valid PEM framing but invalid X.509 DER The proxy CA bundle validation counted PEM blocks that base64-decoded successfully, but did not verify the decoded bytes were accepted as trust anchors by RootCertStore. A bundle with syntactically valid PEM framing but invalid DER would pass the startup check while contributing zero usable anchors, causing opaque TLS failures at runtime instead of a fail-closed startup error. Validate decoded certificates through RootCertStore::add_parsable_certificates and reject the bundle unless at least one is accepted. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): allow proxy auth without insecure acknowledgement for https:// proxies For an https:// proxy the Proxy-Authorization credential travels inside the verified TLS session, so the proxy_auth_allow_insecure acknowledgement is unnecessary. Previously both http:// and https:// proxies required it, producing a misleading cleartext-risk diagnostic for a path that is already encrypted. Skip the requirement when the proxy URL uses https://; the acknowledgement is still tolerated if set. Updated in both the supervisor and Podman driver validation paths, with docs and tests. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix: format Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): use truly unsupported scheme in proxy validation test https:// is now a supported proxy scheme after a13c4dce, so the unsupported-scheme test must use a genuinely unsupported scheme. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): sign the https proxy fixture listener cert with a CA The corporate-proxy E2E fixture served a single `openssl req -x509` certificate as its TLS listener identity. OpenSSL marks that certificate `basicConstraints: critical, CA:TRUE`, and rustls refuses a CA certificate presented as an end-entity certificate (CaUsedAsEndEntity). The supervisor's TLS handshake with the proxy therefore failed, the upstream dial errored, and the workload's CONNECT was dropped without a response, so podman_corporate_proxy_trusts_ca_bundle_for_https_proxy failed on the approved destination while policy denial still worked. Generate a corporate CA and a separate listener leaf signed by it, serve the leaf chain, and publish only the CA as the bundle the supervisor trusts. This is what an intercepting proxy actually presents, and it exercises the corporate-CA trust path rather than pinning the listener certificate itself. Refs #1792 Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> |
||
|
grs
|
40d1b48666 |
feat(provider): support for SPIFFE backed token exchange (#1970)
* feat(provider): add ability to request token exchange instead of client credentials as OAuth grant_type Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(proxy): add further tests for token exchange Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(provider): add runnable example for token exchange Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(e2e): cover Podman token exchange grants Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * refactor(oauth): extract duplicated functionality from server and supervisor Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(provider): evict nearest-to-expiry entry from intermediate token cache Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * doc(supervisor): add podman example for token exchange Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(provider): withhold token-exchange subject credentials Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> |
||
|
Drew NewberryandEvan Lezar
|
40f822906c |
feat(compute): add standalone first-party drivers (#2822)
* feat(compute): add standalone first-party drivers Build Docker, Podman, Kubernetes, and VM drivers as external binaries and exercise each through the public compute-driver API. Keep the external E2E setup complete at introduction, including VM image selection, Kubernetes post-renderer isolation, supervisor reuse, and scoped Podman coverage. External Kubernetes endpoints support shared and managed workspace modes. Operator mode remains restricted to the in-process driver because gateway authentication and the driver must share a dynamic namespace allowlist. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): run managed and external drivers independently Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(compute): cover external driver socket contract Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): install bundled Z3 build dependency Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(server): gate in-tree driver tracing Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Drew Newberry
|
dfb06e6a39 |
test(e2e): align detached sandbox assertions (#2856)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
||
|
John T. Myers
|
0300e6dcb2 |
fix(sandbox): order sidecar provider updates by generation (#2849)
Closes #2847 Separate sidecar delivery ordering from opaque provider environment fingerprints and cover live bind/unbind convergence. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Drew Newberry
|
6c34a3c645 |
fix(sandbox): stabilize canonical main process tests (#2854)
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Drew Newberry
|
ef296806f5 |
feat(sandbox): add canonical main process (#2726)
* feat(sandbox): add canonical main process Closes #2710 Persist and supervise one canonical workload per sandbox, attach sandbox connect to its retained session, and make every unexpected main-process exit terminal. Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sandbox): simplify canonical main process contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve legacy VM main compatibility Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve main status across driver updates Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy macOS process lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): gate Linux exit acknowledgement publisher Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): simplify main process plumbing Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): make controlling tty ioctl portable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): initialize canonical process environment Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * perf(supervisor): optimize retained main session Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sandbox): detach main session on ctrl-c Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): use explicit main detach keys Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(dev): atomically stage Docker supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(test): align Docker main environment assertion Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(sdk): expose canonical main process fields Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
||
|
John T. Myers
|
b2ea81822b |
feat(network): enable Docker and Podman policy DNS and transparent TCP (#2723)
* feat(network): enable Docker transparent TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover Docker transparent TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(network): correlate transparent TCP audit events Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(examples): add transparent TCP Redis demo Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(examples): demonstrate blocked TCP connections Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(examples): focus Redis demo audit output Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): close transparent TCP policy bypasses Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reject unsupported TCP policy reloads Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(ci): satisfy Linux transparent TCP lints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(podman): enable transparent TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): permit policy DNS port binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): use qualified transparent TCP hostname Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): preserve exact policy DNS names Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): route policy DNS over TCP Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(dns): serve multiple TCP queries per connection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(network): explain native DNS and TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reconcile runtime reload with upstream Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): harden transparent DNS capture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): preserve resolver behavior for native tcp Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(network): clarify native tcp runtime constraints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): remove unused transparent tcp pin Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): admit redirected transparent tcp Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): restore podman transparent networking Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): permit alpine busybox binaries Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): use portable alpine keepalive Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): build musl networking fixture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): isolate musl DNS probe Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): keep privileged port capability dropped Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve transparent TCP port 53 Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): report synthetic pool pressure by family Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): bind tcp fixtures before readiness Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): grant fixture low-port bind Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Drew Newberry
|
7909fb5d0f |
refactor(compute): unify gateway restart reconciliation (#2743)
* refactor(compute): unify gateway restart reconciliation Remove the Docker-specific gateway shutdown cleanup and reconcile persisted running intent through ComputeDriver::StartSandbox for Docker, Podman, and VM drivers. Explicitly stopped sandboxes remain stopped. Refs #2417 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(compute): stop local sandboxes on shutdown Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): match managed Podman containers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(compute): synchronize lifecycle sweeps Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
||
|
alangou
|
0d708d6d51 |
fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints (#2493)
* fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * refactor(cli): extract allowed-ip option parsing Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): gate endpointless credential bindings Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> |
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|
Mrunal Patel
|
8d67250a5d |
fix(providers): keep refresh credential handles stable (#2780)
* fix(providers): keep refresh credential handles stable Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * fix(providers): protect refresh-owned credentials Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> |
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|
Giuseppe Scrivano
|
d51a653f9c |
feat(driver-podman): add userns config (#2562)
* refactor(driver): extract shared supervisor binary helpers Move supervisor binary extraction, caching, and validation helpers from the Docker driver into openshell-core::driver_utils so both Docker and Podman drivers can reuse them. Moved helpers: extract_first_tar_entry, write_cache_binary_atomic, supervisor_cache_path, temp_extract_container_name, and validate_linux_elf_binary. The shared extract_first_tar_entry gains entry-type and empty-payload checks that the Docker-local version lacked. supervisor_cache_path takes a driver_subdir parameter so each driver caches under its own namespace (docker-supervisor vs podman-supervisor). Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> * feat(driver-podman): add userns config Add a `userns` option to the Podman compute driver that maps to Podman's user namespace modes. The mode string is split on the first colon into the API's `nsmode` and `value` fields so parameterized values like `auto:size=65536` and `keep-id:uid=1000,gid=1000` are forwarded correctly. When the mode is `auto`, the container spec also sets `idmappings.AutoUserNs = true` as required by the API. An allowlist validates the mode at startup: `auto` and `keep-id` accept optional parameters; `host`, `private`, and `nomap` reject them; everything else is an error. Podman image volumes use overlay mounts internally and the kernel does not support idmapped mounts on overlay (`mount_setattr` returns EINVAL). When userns is configured (any mode except `host`), the driver extracts the supervisor binary from the image to a host-side cache and bind-mounts it instead of using an image volume. Configurable via TOML `userns = "auto"`, CLI `--userns`, or environment variable `OPENSHELL_PODMAN_USERNS`. Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> |
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|
Derek Carr
|
59479f492a |
feat(k8s): add namespace-per-workspace support (RFC 0011 Phase 3) (#2656)
* feat(k8s): add namespace-per-workspace support (RFC 0011 Phase 3) Implement three workspace namespace modes for the Kubernetes compute driver: shared (default, preserves current single-namespace behavior), managed (auto-creates/deletes namespaces per workspace), and operator (pre-provisioned namespaces with dynamic discovery via label selector or drop-in allowlist file). Key changes: - WorkspaceMode enum and namespace resolution in driver config - Managed namespace lifecycle with ServiceAccount and OpenShift SCC annotation propagation - Cluster-wide sandbox CR watchers for managed/operator modes - NamespaceValidator (Exact/Prefix/Allowlist) for SA token auth - Workspace-aware credential secret storage - Helm ClusterRole for multi-namespace RBAC - Gateway config, architecture, and reference docs Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): add e2e tests for workspace namespace modes Add end-to-end tests for managed and operator workspace modes introduced in RFC 0011 Phase 3. The managed mode tests verify namespace creation with correct labels, ServiceAccount provisioning, sandbox CR placement, and namespace survival with remaining sandboxes. The operator mode tests verify rejection of unlabeled and nonexistent namespaces. The positive operator path (sandbox in labeled namespace) is known to fail due to an RBAC gap and will be addressed separately. Also fixes Helm 4 compatibility: move SPDX license headers inside conditional guards in 8 chart templates to prevent empty comment-only documents, and fix a trailing whitespace trimmer in clusterrole.yaml that concatenated the license header with apiVersion. Adds cleanup sweep in with-kube-gateway.sh to remove managed and operator namespaces before Helm uninstall, and mise tasks for running each mode independently. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(k8s): add operator namespace label watcher Spawn a background kube::runtime::watcher in the K8s driver that watches namespaces matching the configured label selector and populates the OperatorNamespaceAllowlist at runtime. The driver owns the allowlist and exposes its Arc so the server can share the same set with the SA token authenticator. create_sandbox now gates pod creation on the allowlist in operator mode — workspaces whose namespace is not yet labeled are rejected at resource render time rather than silently proceeding. Workspace lifecycle itself is unaffected; only sandbox (resource) creation is gated. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): harden operator mode and address review findings Close the fail-open gap in operator mode when only operator_namespace_file is configured: the allowlist is now created unconditionally in operator mode (fail-closed from startup). Implement the namespace file watcher using the notify crate, following the TLS hot-reload pattern (parent-directory watch, 1s debounce, ConfigMap symlink-swap safe). The file format is a JSON array of namespace name strings. Additional fixes from the 10-reviewer audit: - Change allowlist rejection from InvalidArgument to FailedPrecondition so callers know the request may succeed later once the namespace is provisioned. - NamespaceValidator::Allowlist now holds the OperatorNamespaceAllowlist newtype instead of a raw Arc<RwLock<BTreeSet>>, eliminating silent denial on RwLock poison. - Verify LABEL_MANAGED_BY and LABEL_GATEWAY_ID ownership before deleting a managed namespace. - Replace fixed 5s sleep in operator e2e test with a 30s poll loop. - Add Helm validation for workspaceMode values. - Fix Helm README type column and description for operator fields. - Add insert/remove methods to OperatorNamespaceAllowlist; label watcher now uses them instead of reaching through shared(). - Reject configs with both operator_namespace_label and operator_namespace_file set. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(k8s): add workspace-level compute driver RPCs and harden RBAC Decouple namespace lifecycle from sandbox lifecycle by adding EnsureWorkspace/DeleteWorkspace RPCs to the ComputeDriver service. Namespace creation now happens before credential storage and namespace deletion happens on workspace delete, fixing credential storage in managed workspace mode. - Add EnsureWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace proto RPCs with implementations across all compute drivers (K8s managed delegates to ensure_namespace/delete_namespace_if_empty; others no-op) - Wire ensure_workspace into provider create/update/refresh paths so the namespace exists before the credential driver writes secrets - Wire delete_workspace into workspace deletion for cleanup - Remove delete_namespace_if_empty from sandbox deletion path - Scope ClusterRole secrets access to non-shared workspace modes - Add TODO for TLS cert hot-reload in sandbox gRPC client - Harden e2e tests with control-plane sandbox resolution assertions - Fix docker image save --platform flag for OCI index manifests Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address re-review findings and add test coverage - Use server-side apply for TLS secret sync (fixes second sandbox creation failure when TLS is enabled) - Scope gateway-ID label selector unconditionally across all workspace modes (fixes operator reads/watches/deletes seeing foreign sandboxes) - Validate operator allowlist in EnsureWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace RPCs (prevents credential writes to namespaces outside the allowlist) - Extend ClusterRole secrets patch+delete to all non-shared modes with credential driver enabled (fixes operator credential storage RBAC) - Validate namespace ownership on 409 conflict in ensure_namespace (prevents adopting unowned namespaces in managed mode) - Replace delete_namespace_if_empty with unconditional delete_namespace letting Kubernetes cascade cleanup (fixes stuck terminating CRs) - Strengthen NetworkPolicy TODO to cover both managed and operator modes - Extract selector and ownership logic into testable free functions - Add unit tests for gateway-ID selectors and namespace ownership - Add Helm ClusterRole RBAC tests for operator credential driver Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * ci(k8s): add workspace managed and operator mode e2e to CI Wire the existing e2e:kubernetes:workspace-managed and e2e:kubernetes:workspace-operator mise tasks into the branch-e2e workflow so they run alongside the other core Kubernetes e2e suites. Both are gated by run_core_e2e and included in the Core E2E result gate. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): add e2e tests for workspace namespace modes Add 7 new e2e tests covering workspace namespace lifecycle, TLS secret copying, ownership conflict detection, DNS-1123 validation, operator namespace preservation, and dynamic label watcher behavior. Fix async sandbox deletion race condition in existing tests by polling sandbox list instead of asserting immediately after delete. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): grant secrets/patch unconditionally and backfill gateway-id labels Address two review findings: 1. RBAC: server-side apply (PATCH) is used for TLS secret sync in multi-namespace modes, but the ClusterRole only granted patch when the kubernetes-secrets credential driver was enabled. Grant patch unconditionally for non-shared modes since TLS sync always needs it; keep delete gated on the credential driver. 2. Upgrade safety: the new gateway-id label selector would orphan legacy Sandbox CRs that predate its introduction. Add a startup backfill in shared mode that patches any managed Sandbox CR missing the gateway-id label before the driver begins serving requests. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address workspace namespace review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address follow-up review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): preserve workspace lookup after rebase Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(helm): allow managed secret creation Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): stop pods in workspace namespace Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(k8s): scope pod deletion check to v1alpha1 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(k8s): address workspace namespace review findings Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
||
|
LR90
|
d0c6dc3fd8 |
feat(kubernetes): support corporate upstream proxy (#2633)
* feat(kubernetes): support corporate upstream proxy Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> * fix(kubernetes): reject proxy_auth_secret_key values Kubernetes cannot create Gateway validation accepted proxy_auth_secret_key values that Kubernetes rejects when creating the Secret (keys longer than 253 bytes, or the reserved "."/".." names), turning an invalid deployment setting into repeated sandbox Pod-provisioning failures instead of a startup error. Reject them in validate_upstream_proxy_config so they fail closed at gateway startup. Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> * docs(skill): add corporate upstream proxy checks to debug-openshell-cluster Add a Kubernetes corporate upstream proxy troubleshooting section covering rendered [openshell.drivers.kubernetes] configuration, credential Secret volume events, supervisor arguments and mounts confined to the network- supervising container, and proxy reachability. Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> --------- Signed-off-by: loveRhythm1990 <qiuweimin@126.com> |
||
|
Seth Jennings
|
0f8fad23c4 |
feat(sandbox): add stop and start operations (#2653)
* feat(sandbox): add suspend and resume operations Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): preserve lifecycle work after cancellation Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): reconcile ambiguous lifecycle outcomes Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): complete suspended session cleanup Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(vm): preserve suspension state on resume failure Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): retry retained lifecycle transitions Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(server): clean sessions after suspend reconciliation Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover deleting suspended sandbox Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve progressing sandbox suspension Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): bound suspend status polling Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): detect legacy sandbox suspension Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(tui): render suspended sandbox phases Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * refactor(sandbox): rename suspend and resume lifecycle Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * perf(server): clean stopped sessions on transition Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(kubernetes): fail fast on rejected stop Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(compute): fence stale restart lifecycle events Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
||
|
Matthew Grossman
|
170961997f |
chore(ci): disable telemetry in internal test runs (#2648)
* chore(ci): disable telemetry in internal test runs Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(ci): remove brittle telemetry wiring test Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * docs: trim CI telemetry guidance Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(e2e): share telemetry default with OpenShift Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
0120535efc |
feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints (#2510)
* feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): verify static credential endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(e2e): use valid endpoint isolation fixtures Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve binding identity across rotations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): enforce bindings across request lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): close credential relay gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): hash selected provider profile scope Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): resolve credentials after request admission Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): align single-route credential denials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): harden endpoint-bound rotation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce identity and authority binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): snapshot provider environment atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): include authority port in query proxy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): close credential revocation gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(proxy): explain authority mismatch diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce binding lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): reject credential config collisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): capture credential scope atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): distinguish origin and absolute targets Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): isolate endpointless profile credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): normalize IPv6 request authorities Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify endpointless profile isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): bind endpointless provider credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): use current GCP placeholder revision Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): explain policy credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover endpointless fail-closed invariant Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(policy): expect ambiguity rejection at creation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): share credential mismatch finding builder Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover malformed binding metadata Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): verify multi-key endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover same-host credential path denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): document serialized refresh contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): consolidate L7 log formatting Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): precompile endpoint binding patterns Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): share identity epoch revisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): require explicit request default ports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate SigV4 credential sources Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve endpoint bindings for credential handles Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(go-sdk): expose network credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
5548405fcb |
feat(credentials): add provider credential storage drivers (#2437)
* feat(credentials): add provider credential storage drivers Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): harden credential update handling Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): harden credential driver security, correctness, and performance Address review findings from the credential storage drivers PR: - Route additional_credentials through the driver on refresh to prevent silent data loss for multi-credential providers (e.g. AWS STS) - Clean up stored credential handles on CAS failure during refresh to prevent orphaned secrets in external backends - Enforce namespace validation in the Kubernetes Secrets driver to prevent cross-namespace credential access when allow_reference_namespace is not enabled - Cache Vault Kubernetes auth tokens with 80% TTL to avoid re-authenticating on every credential operation - Parallelize resolve_credentials in all three drivers using try_join_all for faster sandbox startup - Add existingSecret support for the KEK Secret to fix helm template/GitOps workflows where lookup returns empty and regenerates the key - Document RBAC blast radius for the Kubernetes Secrets credential driver and recommend a dedicated namespace Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): add optimistic concurrency, fix thundering herd, parallelize operations Use resourceVersion optimistic concurrency with retry loop for K8s Secret ownership checks to prevent TOCTOU races. Switch Vault token cache from RwLock to Mutex with double-check pattern to prevent thundering herd on cache miss. Parallelize credential store and delete operations across independent keys using try_join_all. Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): handle partial failures, add delete retry, consolidate cleanup Replace try_join_all with join_all in credential store/delete operations to handle partial failures — successfully-stored handles are cleaned up when another key fails. Add retry loop with conflict detection to db-credstore delete_credential, matching the K8s driver pattern. Consolidate 4 manual cleanup_pre_stored_provider_credentials call sites into a single error handler using an async block. Remove inconsistent .trim() from db-credstore validate_handle_owner. Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): fix retry loop guard and remove unprotected validation Remove attempt-count guard from 409/Aborted match arms in retry loops so the post-loop Status::aborted error is reachable after exhausting retries. Previously, last-attempt conflicts fell through to the catch-all error arm, producing misleading Status::unavailable errors. Remove duplicate validation calls that ran after prepare_provider_credential_update but outside the cleanup-protected async block, which would leak pre-stored handles on failure. Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> * fix(credentials): add workspace/provider UUID to credential backend paths Include workspace and provider ID in credential backend object paths to ensure cross-workspace uniqueness and prevent credential collision (GATOR-1806c9be-01). - Updated credential driver proto to include workspace and provider_id fields - Modified Vault driver to include workspace/provider_id in managed_secret_path - Modified Kubernetes Secrets driver to include workspace/provider_id in credential_owner_id and managed_secret_name - Updated all credential runtime calls to pass workspace/provider_id - Updated tests to use the new signatures This prevents two workspaces sharing the same external credential store from colliding on provider names, which was a critical security issue (CWE-639). * fix(credentials): preserve provider-level expiration for handle-backed credentials Compute effective expiration from both provider and driver values using the earliest non-zero timestamp and skip expired values before insertion (GATOR-1806c9be-02). - Modified resolve_provider_handles to check provider credential_expires_at_ms - Skip expired credentials during resolution instead of returning them - Use effective expiration (min of provider and driver) in resolution results - Fix inference.rs to preserve earliest expiration when merging This ensures handle-backed credentials respect the same expiration semantics as inline credentials. * fix(credentials): stage refresh changes under new handles before validation Stage credential replacements under new immutable handles instead of reusing existing handles to prevent overwriting committed values before validation/CAS (GATOR-1806c9be-03). - Stage credentials with empty existing_handles map to force new handle creation - Validate and CAS before the new values are committed to backend storage - Delete old handles only after successful CAS - On CAS failure, delete only the newly staged handles - This prevents CWE-362/CWE-367 race conditions where failed refreshes could still modify or delete the active credential The fix ensures that a rejected refresh cannot modify the backend object still referenced by the committed provider record. * fix(credentials): add timeouts to credential driver RPCs Apply configured timeouts to both startup capability negotiation and runtime RPCs to prevent indefinite hangs (GATOR-1806c9be-05). - Add DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_DRIVER_RPC_TIMEOUT_SECS constant (30s) - Apply timeout to GetCapabilities during startup connection - Apply timeout to all runtime RPCs (store, delete, resolve) - Use tokio::time::timeout to bound the entire GetCapabilities operation during startup, not just the socket connection - Return contextual deadline errors on timeout This prevents a faulty or overloaded driver from hanging gateway operations indefinitely. * fix(credentials): fix test to use consistent workspace/provider identity The Kubernetes auth Vault resolve test was constructing a managed path with test-workspace/test-provider-id but sending default/prov-123 in the request, causing validation to reject the request (GATOR-18e32351-01). - Update test to use test-workspace and test-provider-id in the request to match the logical_path construction - This ensures the test exercises the intended code path and validates Kubernetes auth resolution properly The test now passes and correctly validates identity enforcement. * fix(credentials): use unique staging ID for refresh to avoid overwrites Stage refresh replacements under genuinely distinct immutable handles using a unique staging ID to prevent overwriting committed values (GATOR-1806c9be-03). - Generate a unique staging ID using UUID for each refresh operation - Use this staging ID when storing credentials instead of the real provider ID - Pass the same staging ID during cleanup on failure to delete only staged objects - This ensures deterministic paths (Vault) and object names (K8s) don't collide with the committed provider's credentials The fix prevents failed refreshes from silently replacing active credentials or breaking providers by deleting still-referenced backend objects. * fix(credentials): wrap credential driver RPCs in local timeouts Add local tokio::time::timeout wrappers around credential driver RPCs to bound non-compliant or stalled UDS peers (GATOR-1806c9be-05). - Wrap StoreCredential, DeleteCredential, and ResolveCredentials in local timeouts - Return contextual deadline_exceeded errors when timeouts occur - Keep existing gRPC timeout metadata for compliant implementations - GetCapabilities during startup was already wrapped in previous commit This ensures a faulty local driver cannot hang gateway operations indefinitely, even if it accepts the connection but never responds to the RPC. * fix(credentials): preserve ownership for staged refreshes Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(credentials): bound startup capability probe Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * test(provider): authenticate credential handler requests Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(ci): grant actions read to credential driver e2e Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Varsha Prasad Narsing <varshaprasad96@gmail.com> |
||
|
Matthew Grossman
|
537805568d |
feat(sandbox): honor OCI image working directories (#2530)
* feat(sandbox): honor Docker OCI working directories Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): honor effective workspace access Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): cover enforced workspace denial Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * docs(docker): explain effective workdir checks Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): validate effective workspace writes Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reserve supervisor control roots Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): centralize control paths Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reserve OCI runtime mount roots Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
905b554c7c |
refactor(network): consolidate proxy egress pipeline (#2373)
* refactor(network): introduce shared egress pipeline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover shared proxy egress paths Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): make destination authorization explicit Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): pin proxy relay policy context Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): lock relay generation contracts Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): establish phase zero compatibility baseline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): detect ambiguous network endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(sandbox): fail closed on invalid policy updates Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): invalidate relays on policy changes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document validation failure posture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover validation and middleware egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): move policy failure mode to gateway toml Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): name proxy contracts by behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): align overlap validation with endpoint selection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): expect hard loopback denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): match declared endpoint denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve path-specific endpoint overrides Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): respect hard-blocked host gateways Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): reconcile proxy refactor with main Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve CONNECT policy generation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): cover runtime endpoint glob semantics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): reject ambiguous policies before persistence Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): explain ambiguity preflight behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): compare body limits within protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): avoid global tracing capture race Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(server): format rebased provider tests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): retain runtime on middleware outage Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): preflight provider composition activation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): distinguish runtime failure transitions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Derek Carr
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9c019a93f5 |
Wire authorization into workspace model (#2445)
* feat(auth): implement RFC 0011 Phase 2 workspace authorization Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address PR review feedback on workspace authorization - Docker e2e: add --health-port and switch readiness probe from `openshell status` to `curl /healthz`, fixing a false-positive readiness check in OIDC mode where the CLI exited 0 without actually contacting the gateway - ListWorkspaces: move membership filtering from post-query N+1 lookups into a SQL EXISTS subquery so pagination applies to the visible set, not the global ordering. Add generic list_with_membership to the persistence layer. - Descriptor validator: reject role/scope fields on unauthenticated and sandbox auth modes, and allow-list workspace_role as user/admin and global_role as platform_admin to catch typos at startup Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(server): use authed request in delete telemetry test The workspace authorization added by the Phase 2 auth changes requires a Principal on every delete request. The delete-telemetry test was still using a bare Request::new, so extract_principal failed before the handler could acquire the delete gate, causing a 5-second timeout flake. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address gator review findings for workspace authorization - Inject unauthenticated-local-dev principal in no-auth gateway mode so handlers that call extract_principal() always find one. - Cap label-selector membership query at MAX_PAGE_SIZE instead of u32::MAX to bound the in-memory read. - Authorize workspace membership before resolving workspace existence in all sandbox RPCs to prevent workspace-name enumeration by non-members. - Remove dead_code allow on AuthorizedWorkspace.workspace now that callers use the normalized name from the authz result. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): close workspace-name oracle and label-selector truncation Swap authorize-before-resolve ordering in 27 handlers across provider.rs, service.rs, policy.rs, and workspace.rs to prevent CWE-203 workspace-name enumeration by non-members. Add combined membership+label SQL query (list_with_membership_and_selector) to both persistence backends so ListWorkspaces with label selectors no longer silently drops results beyond the first page of membership matches. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(auth): add non-member rejection and membership+label persistence tests Add comprehensive test coverage for workspace authorization changes: - Non-member rejection tests across all 44 workspace-scoped handlers (sandbox, provider, service, policy, workspace, inference) verifying PERMISSION_DENIED is returned instead of NOT_FOUND to prevent CWE-203 workspace-name oracle - Persistence test for list_with_membership_and_selector verifying SQL-level membership EXISTS + label filtering, multiple predicates, no-match cases, and pagination Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): format merged import line in sandbox tests Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address gator re-review findings on workspace authorization - Fix TUI unconditionally setting providers_v2_enabled after provider refresh; read the actual gateway setting via GetGatewayConfig at startup instead - Fix SQLite json_extract with dotted label keys (e.g. example.com/env) by quoting the key in the JSON path - Add authed_request wrappers to upstream OCI identity tests that were missing a principal after rebase - Add test proving GetGatewayConfig is accessible without Platform Admin - Add test for dotted/prefixed Kubernetes-style label key filtering Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address second gator re-review findings - Loosen GetGatewayConfig from platform_admin to scope-only so workspace users can discover providers_v2_enabled during sandbox creation with inferred-provider commands; update proto descriptor, descriptor validation, and RFC 0011 access table - Add validate_label_selector to handle_list_workspaces and escape single quotes in SQLite json_extract interpolation (CWE-89 defense-in-depth) - Re-fetch providers_v2_enabled after TUI gateway switch so the new gateway's capability is reflected - Add e2e test for workspace user with inferred-provider command - Add persistence test for adversarial label keys with SQL injection attempts - Add handler test for invalid label selector rejection in ListWorkspaces Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): address third gator review findings - Cap label selector pairs at 64 (CWE-400) to bound SQLite dynamic SQL - Add SCOPE_ONLY_METHODS allowlist for scope-without-role RPCs (CWE-863) - Normalize ID-based data-plane handlers to return NOT_FOUND for unauthorized sandboxes, closing the cross-workspace oracle (CWE-203) - Fix TUI provider profile cache lookup key mismatch for legacy providers with empty profile_workspace - Add whoami to CLI skill reference command tree - Update TUI skill doc with workspace, provider, and settings coverage - Document scope/workspace orthogonality on GetGatewayConfig proto Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): extend CWE-203 normalization to policy.rs sandbox handlers GetSandboxConfig and GetSandboxLogs in policy.rs had the same fetch-before-authorize pattern that leaked cross-workspace sandbox existence. Promote fetch_and_authorize_sandbox to pub(super) and use it from both sandbox.rs and policy.rs handlers. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(auth): update assertions for CWE-203 sandbox ID normalization Cross-workspace sandbox access via ID-based handlers now returns NOT_FOUND instead of PERMISSION_DENIED to prevent existence inference. Update the unit test and OIDC e2e assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(auth): narrow CWE-203 error mapping and correct whoami output formats Only remap PERMISSION_DENIED to NOT_FOUND in fetch_and_authorize_sandbox and RevokeSshSession, letting INTERNAL and UNAUTHENTICATED propagate as-is. Fix whoami --output format values in cli-reference.md to match the actual CLI (table/json/yaml, not text/json). Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(ci): share network namespace with Keycloak in containerized CI In GitHub Actions job containers, Docker port publishing lands on the host, not inside the job container. Detect this environment and attach Keycloak to the job container's network namespace instead, with hardened defaults (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, loopback-only listener). Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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Evan Lezar
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eb380d71a3 |
ci(e2e): probe VM gateway readiness (#2544)
Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Matthew Grossman
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bc14018cad |
feat(sandbox): use policy-first OCI image identity (#2509)
* feat(sandbox): use policy-first OCI image identity Closes #2331 Preserve per-field policy omission, derive Docker and Podman fallbacks from the inspected immutable image, and resolve the final numeric identity before starting agent children. Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve declared process identities Keep explicit policy values and OCI-declared names intact, defer passwd lookup until a primary GID is required, and refresh stale policy examples. Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): reuse resolved OCI identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): allow Linux pre-exec arguments Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): protect resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): prepare workspace for OCI identity Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): own only workspace root Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden partial identity drops Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): scope OCI image e2e to Docker Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): narrow OCI identity fallback scope Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * test(podman): cover OCI identity launch Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): exercise OCI fallback in E2E Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Matthew Grossman <mgrossman@nvidia.com> |
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Philippe Martin
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77e5c32217 |
feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy (#2245)
* feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy - Chain sandbox egress through a corporate HTTP proxy so outbound traffic from within the sandbox respects the host proxy settings - Forward sandbox proxy environment variables to the generated Podman config so the proxy is applied consistently to Podman-managed workloads Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): make corporate proxy routing operator-owned The operator-configured corporate egress proxy was injected under the conventional HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY names as defaults beneath sandbox spec/template environment, so a sandbox creator could redirect egress at an arbitrary proxy or disable proxying with NO_PROXY=*. Route the boundary through reserved, supervisor-only variables (OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY) written in the Podman driver's required-variable tier. Any sandbox-supplied value under a reserved name is stripped before the operator value is applied, so the supervisor never observes a reserved proxy variable the operator did not set. The supervisor now reads only the reserved names and ignores the conventional proxy variables the sandbox controls. Add the reserved proxy variables to the supervisor-only child-environment denylist so the corporate proxy URL and any embedded credentials are not inherited by the sandbox workload, which reaches egress through the local policy proxy and never needs them. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * feat(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy credentials via secret file Proxy credentials were embedded inline in the proxy URL, so they were stored in gateway.toml and exposed in container metadata via 'podman inspect'. Reject inline 'user:pass@' credentials in https_proxy/http_proxy at startup (parsed with the url crate rather than hand-splitting), and add a proxy_auth_file option pointing at a 'user:pass' file. The driver stages that file as a per-sandbox root-only Podman secret, mounts it at a fixed path, and exports only the path in the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_FILE variable, so the credential never appears in config, environment, or container metadata. Reading the file fails closed on a missing, empty, or control-character-bearing value. The supervisor reads the credential from the mounted file and builds the Proxy-Authorization: Basic header, rejecting control characters, and no longer derives credentials from URL userinfo. The auth-file path is added to the child-environment strip list, and the generated gateway.toml is written owner-only (mode 0600). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fail closed on invalid upstream proxy configuration The reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* variables are an operator-owned egress boundary, but the supervisor treated present-but-invalid values as unset: an unsupported or malformed proxy URL was ignored with a warning, an unreadable auth file proceeded without credentials, and a malformed credential silently became unauthenticated. Any of these could quietly downgrade the corporate proxy boundary to direct dialing or unauthenticated proxy access. Make every configured-but-invalid proxy or auth setting fatal to supervisor proxy startup, emit an OCSF ConfigStateChange failure event before refusing, and share URL validation semantics between the Podman driver and the supervisor through a single validator in openshell-core (parse_upstream_proxy_url), so a value accepted at sandbox-create time can never be rejected in-container or vice versa. Inline user:pass@ URL credentials are now fatal in the supervisor too (previously warn-and-strip), matching the driver. Unset or empty variables still mean no proxy; only present-but-invalid values fail. Error paths never include credential content. Addresses the fail-closed review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): finish the fail-closed upstream proxy credential contract The upstream proxy URL already had a single shared validator, but the credential did not: the Podman driver rejected only CR/LF/NUL while the supervisor rejected every control character, so a credential accepted at sandbox-create time (e.g. one containing a tab) could still be rejected in-container. Present-but-whitespace reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* values were also silently treated as unset, quietly downgrading the operator's egress boundary to direct dialing. Add parse_upstream_proxy_credential to openshell-core as the single source of truth for the documented user:pass credential form (non-empty user, no control characters, trimmed) and use it in both the Podman driver's secret staging and the supervisor's Proxy-Authorization header construction. Error variants carry no payload so credential content can never leak into messages. Make a present-but-empty reserved variable fatal to supervisor proxy startup instead of meaning "unset"; only fully unset variables disable the proxy. The driver correspondingly rejects an empty no_proxy at config time so it can never inject a value the supervisor refuses. Addresses the remaining fail-closed credential/config review item on Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> #2245. * fix(sandbox,podman): close remaining fail-open upstream proxy config paths Two configuration paths could still silently run without the proxy boundary the operator believed was in effect. A no_proxy bypass list configured without any https_proxy/http_proxy was accepted by both the driver and the supervisor and simply meant "dial everything directly". Reject it on both sides, exactly like the existing proxy_auth_file-without-proxy rule: an operator who wrote a bypass list assumed proxying was active, so accepting it hides a fail-open state. The gateway.sh dev script guarded proxy settings with [[ -n "${VAR:-}" ]], which conflates unset with explicitly-empty and dropped the latter before the gateway's validation could see it. Use ${VAR+x} instead so a set-but-empty variable is written into gateway.toml and rejected at startup by validate_proxy_config rather than silently discarded. Addresses the remaining fail-open configuration review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject upstream proxy URLs with path, query, or fragment parse_upstream_proxy_url accepted URLs like http://proxy.corp.com:8080/some/path and silently discarded everything after host:port, a lenience inherited from the original supervisor parser. A forward proxy is addressed by host:port only, so extra components indicate a misconfiguration (for example a pasted endpoint URL) and silently truncating them violates the present-but-invalid-is-fatal contract enforced everywhere else in this configuration surface. Reject a path, query, or fragment in the shared validator with a new UnexpectedComponent error. A bare trailing slash remains accepted because the url crate normalizes an absent http path to "/", making the two indistinguishable. Both the Podman driver (gateway startup) and the supervisor (sandbox startup) inherit the rule through the shared parser, keeping their semantics identical by construction. Addresses the proxy URL component review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): remove plain-HTTP upstream proxy support The http_proxy path tunneled plain-HTTP requests through the corporate proxy with CONNECT to port 80 and then sent origin-form requests down the tunnel. Conventional enterprise forward proxies expect plain HTTP as absolute-form requests sent directly over the proxy connection, and commonly refuse CONNECT to port 80, so the setting looked supported but failed against typical deployments. Tunneling also blinds the proxy to the one protocol it could inspect. Narrow the feature to TLS (CONNECT) egress only, which is the conventional and already-correct case: plain-HTTP requests now always dial the destination directly, and only client CONNECT tunnels chain through the corporate proxy. Remove the http_proxy config field, the --sandbox-http-proxy / OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_HTTP_PROXY driver surface, the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTP_PROXY variable, and the UpstreamScheme plumbing. The feature never shipped, so this is a clean removal; a stray http_proxy key in gateway.toml still fails loudly through the config's deny_unknown_fields. Removing the plain-HTTP proxy branch also removes its host-gateway special case; the architecture doc now documents the real host-gateway behavior (add driver-injected host aliases to the reserved NO_PROXY list) instead of an invariant the HTTPS path never implemented. Plain-HTTP forwarding through a corporate proxy can return later as absolute-form forwarding behind its own design review. Addresses the plain-HTTP forwarding review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): escape generated TOML and require explicit proxy URL form Escape backslashes, quotes, and control characters when gateway.sh writes proxy values into gateway.toml, so a hostile or unusual environment value cannot corrupt the config or inject extra keys. Restrict the upstream proxy URL grammar to the documented http://host:port form: a scheme-less value is no longer normalized to http:// and a missing port is no longer silently defaulted to 80. Docs, README, and CLI help now state the explicit-form requirement consistently. Also fix a test-only call of handle_tcp_connection that was missing the upstream_proxy argument added in an earlier commit. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): preserve tunneled bytes read with the CONNECT response The CONNECT handshake reads the corporate proxy's response in chunks, so the read that completes the header block can also contain the first tunneled payload bytes. Those bytes were discarded, silently corrupting the start of the tunnel for server-speaks-first destinations or proxies that coalesce writes. connect_via now returns a PrefixedStream that replays any bytes received past the response terminator before reading from the socket again; writes pass through unchanged. Direct dials wrap the stream with an empty prefix so downstream relay and TLS paths keep a single stream type, and tls_connect_upstream is generalized to any AsyncRead + AsyncWrite stream. Adds regression coverage for a combined response/payload read and for prefix replay ordering. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): gate cleartext proxy Basic auth behind an explicit opt-in Proxy-Authorization: Basic is base64 over the plain-TCP connection to the http:// corporate proxy, so anyone on the network path between the sandbox host and the proxy can recover the credential. Sending it is now an explicit operator decision instead of an implicit side effect of configuring proxy_auth_file. Add a proxy_auth_allow_insecure driver setting (CLI --sandbox-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE), delivered to the supervisor as the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE variable. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: an auth file without the acknowledgement is rejected at gateway startup and at supervisor startup, as is the acknowledgement without an auth file or any value other than 'true'. gateway.sh writes the key only as a TOML boolean; a non-boolean value is emitted as a quoted string so the gateway rejects it at startup instead of risking injection. Documents the exposure prominently in the gateway config reference, the driver README, and the sandbox architecture doc. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): honor port qualifiers and resolved addresses in NO_PROXY Two divergences from the documented NO_PROXY contract: - A port-qualified entry (internal.corp:8443) was silently stripped to its hostname and bypassed the proxy for every port, excluding traffic the operator never listed. Entries now keep the optional :port qualifier (also on IP and CIDR entries) and only apply to that destination port; a trailing qualifier that is not a valid port stays part of the pattern instead of widening the entry. - IP and CIDR entries only matched IP-literal hosts, so a bypass like 10.0.0.0/8 never applied to hostnames resolving into that range. NO_PROXY evaluation now sees the validated resolved addresses: an IP/CIDR entry matching through resolution authorizes a direct dial of only the addresses it contains, so a bypass scoped to an internal range cannot widen into a direct dial of addresses outside it. Hostname-level matches (loopback, wildcard, domain entries, IP-literal hosts) keep authorizing all validated addresses. proxy_for is replaced by decision(host, port, resolved) returning either the proxy endpoint or the permitted direct-dial subset, and dial_upstream restricts the direct connect to that subset. Adds regression coverage for port-scoped bypasses on domain, IP, and CIDR entries, invalid port qualifiers, resolved-address matching, and split-resolution subset dialing. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bind proxied CONNECT tunnels to validated addresses The CONNECT request sent to the corporate proxy carried the destination hostname, so the proxy resolved the name itself and the addresses that had passed SSRF and allowed_ips validation were discarded. Split-horizon DNS or rebinding at the proxy could then reach internal or otherwise unapproved destinations through a tunnel the supervisor logged as validated, and IP-range policy could not be enforced at all on proxied dials. CONNECT now targets a validated resolved address by default: the proxy performs no DNS resolution and the tunnel stays bound to the answer the supervisor checked. The hostname still travels inside the tunnel (TLS SNI, application Host), so destination servers behave normally. In split-horizon networks, operators point the gateway host at the corporate resolver so internal names validate to their internal addresses. For proxies whose ACLs filter on hostnames and reject IP CONNECT targets, a new proxy_connect_by_hostname opt-in (CLI --sandbox-proxy-connect-by-hostname, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME, reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME) restores hostname CONNECT, documented as re-opening proxy-side resolution and making the proxy's ACLs the effective egress control. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: the opt-in without a proxy, or any value other than 'true', is fatal. Adds regression coverage for the IP CONNECT request line (including IPv6 bracketing and hostname non-leakage), the hostname opt-in, and the config pairing rules in driver and supervisor. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject empty port after bracketed IPv6 proxy host http://[fd00::1]: passed the explicit-port check because the bracketed branch only tested for a colon after the bracket, then fell back to port 80 — violating the fail-closed http://host:port contract and potentially sending configured Basic credentials to an unintended service. Require a non-empty suffix after ]:, matching the unbracketed branch, and cover the case in the shared parser tests. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fall back across validated addresses in proxied CONNECT The direct path hands TcpStream::connect the whole validated address list and it falls back across them, but the validated-IP CONNECT path attempted only the first address, so a dual-stack destination could fail through the corporate proxy even when a later validated address was reachable. connect_via_validated tries each validated address in order under one aggregate CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT budget, returning the first success; when every attempt fails the error names the attempt count and carries the last failure. An empty address list is rejected up front. Adds regressions for first-fails/second-succeeds fallback (asserting both CONNECT request lines), the aggregate all-addresses failure message, and the empty-list rejection. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): strip new reserved proxy vars and complete docs/tests Follow-ups from review: - Add OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE and OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME to the supervisor-only strip list so workload child processes never inherit them, matching the documented contract for the other reserved proxy variables, and cover both in the supervisor-only variable test. - Document all five OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_* proxy variables in the mise run gateway help text, marked Podman-only and stating the auth-file/acknowledgement pairing, and complete the gateway-key list in the Podman README. - Add NO_PROXY composition coverage for bracketed IPv6 entries with port qualifiers, bare IPv6 entries, and IPv6 CIDR matching against an IPv6-literal host and against a hostname's resolved addresses, including the port-qualified CIDR form. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): cap each proxied CONNECT attempt within the shared budget A proxy that accepted the first CONNECT request but never responded consumed the entire aggregate handshake timeout, so later validated addresses were never tried and the hang defeated the multi-address fallback. Each attempt is now time-boxed to its fair share of the time remaining before the shared deadline (remaining / attempts_left): a hanging attempt is cut off with enough budget left for every remaining address, while time a fast failure does not use rolls over to later attempts and the total never exceeds CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT. A timed-out attempt is recorded like any other failure, and the aggregate error distinguishes all-attempted from budget-exhausted runs. Adds a first-hangs/second-succeeds regression driven through a test-visible budget parameter so it runs in about a second instead of a real 30s window. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy config on the supervisor argv The proxy settings were injected as reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* container environment variables. The driver only wrote names the operator configured, but container runtimes layer the spec environment over ENV values baked into the sandbox image, so an image could supply NO_PROXY=*, enable hostname CONNECT, or point an unconfigured deployment at an attacker-controlled proxy whenever the operator left a field unset. The settings now travel as supervisor command-line arguments (--upstream-proxy, --upstream-no-proxy, --upstream-proxy-auth-file, --upstream-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, --upstream-proxy-connect-by-hostname) built by the driver from operator config. The driver sets the container entrypoint and command explicitly, so neither sandbox spec/template environment nor image ENV can influence argv, and an omitted flag genuinely means unconfigured — in every supervisor topology, since the supervisor no longer consults its environment for these settings at all. Credentials stay on the root-only secret mount; only the mount path appears on argv. The reserved environment names, their strip-list entries, and the env-based validation surface are removed. UpstreamProxyConfig::from_args replaces from_env, reusing the same shared fail-closed validation and pairing rules keyed by the CLI flag names. Driver tests now assert the argv contract, including that sandbox-supplied environment cannot add, remove, or redirect proxy flags; supervisor tests cover from_args mapping and its pairing rules. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs(sandbox): align proxy comments with the argv transport The argv migration left comments describing the configuration as reserved environment variables ("reserved value", "present-but-empty variable", "reserved upstream proxy variables"). Rephrase them as driver-supplied arguments and operator settings so the documented trust boundary matches the implementation. Comment-only change. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): parse bracketed IPv6 authorities in client CONNECT targets parse_target split the CONNECT authority at the first colon, so an IPv6-literal target like [2001:db8::1]:443 always failed port parsing and IPv6-literal clients could never reach policy evaluation; a regression test even locked in that failure. Parse the RFC 3986 bracketed form and return the host bracket-free, matching what DNS resolution, SSRF validation, NO_PROXY matching, and the upstream CONNECT builder expect. Unclosed brackets, a missing or empty port after the bracket, and non-numeric ports are rejected; unbracketed behavior is unchanged. Replaces the failure-locking test with success coverage for bracketed targets and adds malformed-bracket rejection cases. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover proxy-auth secret cleanup across lifecycle failures The per-sandbox proxy-auth credential secret is staged before the container is created and removed on cleanup, but no test proved the cleanup paths actually issue the secret removal. Add Podman-stub tests that drive create_sandbox to a container-create failure and to a start failure, and delete_sandbox for an out-of-band deletion, asserting each path issues the DELETE for the per-sandbox proxy-auth secret so a credential can never outlive the sandbox that owned it. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs: list corporate proxy keys in the Podman compute-driver overview The Fern Podman driver section enumerated its gateway.toml keys but omitted the corporate egress proxy settings. Add https_proxy, no_proxy, proxy_auth_file, proxy_auth_allow_insecure, and proxy_connect_by_hostname with a pointer to the gateway configuration reference for the full contract. No navigation change: the reference folder already includes the gateway configuration page. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover the SSRF-to-TLS composition across the proxy tunnel Existing tests exercised validated-IP CONNECT and the upstream-TLS helper independently, but not the full boundary. Add an end-to-end regression that stands up a fake corporate proxy tunneling to a fake TLS server and drives the real path: connect_via_validated CONNECTs to the validated address, the proxy splices the tunnel, and tls_connect_upstream verifies the upstream certificate against the original hostname carried in SNI. It asserts the CONNECT authority is the validated IP and never the hostname, that verification succeeds for the matching hostname, and that a mismatched hostname is rejected — proving a rebinding or split-horizon substitution behind the proxy cannot pass certificate verification. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bound proxy-auth reads, reject port 0, fix stale comment Three review findings: - CWE-400: the proxy-auth credential file was read with an unbounded read_to_string on both the driver (sandbox-create) and supervisor (startup) paths, so a huge file or a special file such as /dev/zero could exhaust memory. Add a shared bounded reader in openshell-core that rejects non-regular files, caps the size at 4 KiB, and reads at most that many bytes; the driver runs it via spawn_blocking. Covers oversized, special-file, and missing-path cases on both sides. - Reject an upstream proxy URL with port 0: it passed the explicit-port check and startup validation but is not a connectable TCP port, so every proxied dial would fail later. Add a typed ZeroPort error with shared-validator and Podman-config tests. - Reword a driver-config comment that still described a 'reserved variable' to match the argv transport. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): open proxy-auth file non-blocking to reject FIFOs promptly read_upstream_proxy_credential_file opened the path with a blocking File::open before the regular-file check, so a configured FIFO with no writer would block open() indefinitely — hanging sandbox creation on the driver and supervisor startup. Open with O_NONBLOCK on Unix so the open returns immediately, then reject the non-regular file as before; O_NONBLOCK has no effect on the later read of a regular file. Adds a mkfifo regression asserting the reader returns promptly with a non-regular-file error instead of hanging. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover corporate proxy egress across driver and supervisor The existing corporate-proxy tests construct config structs or call CONNECT helpers directly, so none of them detect a break in the wiring between layers: gateway TOML deserialization, the Podman argv and secret-mount semantics, supervisor CLI parsing, or policy denial before proxy contact. Add a Podman e2e that drives the whole chain against a fake authenticated forward proxy and asserts that an approved TLS request traverses it with a validated-IP CONNECT, a policy-denied destination is refused with 403 without ever reaching the proxy, credentials arrive through the mounted per-sandbox secret, and deleting the sandbox removes that secret. SupportContainer is a new harness fixture. Unlike ContainerHttpServer it probes readiness with a TCP connect rather than an HTTP GET, so it can host a forward proxy and TLS servers, and it exposes container logs and network IP for assertions. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): restart the gateway on the proxy-config panic path The panic cleanup for the temporary corporate proxy configuration restored the gateway TOML but left the gateway process running with the temporary configuration still loaded, which could poison later test binaries in the same run. Nothing restarted it: the only ManagedGateway is the short-lived one inside restart_gateway, and its Drop only calls start, which does not reload config for an already-running gateway. Restore and synchronously stop/start the gateway in Drop, and set restored only after the normal restore and restart both succeed so a failed restart no longer suppresses the fallback. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(supervisor-network): derive the loopback proxy bypass from resolved IPs The automatic bypass treated the host string "localhost" as proof that the destination was loopback and returned every resolved address. A sandbox controls its own /etc/hosts and resolve_socket_addrs consults it before DNS, so a workload could map localhost to any policy-allowed address and dial it directly, escaping the operator proxy and the inspection and audit boundary it exists to provide. Check the resolved addresses instead: the name bypasses only when the resolution is non-empty and every address is loopback. A mixed answer is not partially honored, and an IP literal is still authoritative for itself. A spoofed localhost falls through to the entries below, so an explicit operator NO_PROXY entry is still honored. This matches the trust model detect_trusted_host_gateway already applies to the same hosts file, which validates the mapped address rather than the alias. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(podman): clean up proxy-auth secret when container already deleted The delete_sandbox early-return path cleaned up the token secret but skipped the proxy-auth secret, leaking it on disk. Also update tests for recent API changes (Optional socket_path, workspace field, list-based container lookup). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> |
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Piotr Mlocek
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cbdeb4d537 |
fix(server): prevent unrelated sandbox deletes from blocking deletion events (#2340)
* fix(server): unblock sandbox deletion events Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(server): simplify sandbox settings cleanup Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(server): make delete lock ordering explicit Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(server): bind delete worker to stable sandbox id Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(server): disarm canceled queued deletes Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test: harden sandbox lifecycle cleanup coverage Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
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f169084923 |
fix(supervisor): tailor Landlock rights by inode type (#2380)
Closes #2218 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Derek Carr
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5952a5a23f |
feat(workspace): add workspace resource model with scoping, membershi… (#2243)
* feat(workspace): implement workspace model (Phase 1 of RFC 0011) Implements workspace and membership model providing hard isolation boundaries for multi-player OpenShell deployments. Workspace CRUD with Kubernetes-style Terminating phase for graceful deletion. All resources scoped by workspace via ObjectMeta. Membership RPCs for workspace access control. Persistence migration shifts name uniqueness to (object_type, workspace, name). Provider profiles support platform and workspace scoping. Service routing uses workspace-prefixed DNS labels. Inference routes renamed and workspace-scoped with DeleteInferenceRoute RPC. Python SDK with WorkspaceClient, two-method list pattern (workspace-scoped and for_all_workspaces), and workspace parameter on all methods. CLI workspace flags, TUI workspace cycling. K8s driver filters unmanaged CRs and uses delete preconditions. Podman driver uses immutable container IDs. Label serialization fixed across all put_if call sites. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(cli): delegate sandbox upload command to existing upload function The standalone `sandbox upload` command reimplemented upload logic inline with two bugs: it used `Path::exists()` which follows symlinks (rejecting dangling symlinks), and it ran git-aware filtering on symlink sources. The `run::sandbox_upload()` function already handles both cases correctly via `sandbox_upload_plan()`. Replace the inline logic with a call to the existing function. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): shorten sandbox names and fix test compatibility Shorten the sandbox name in initial_sparse_policy_is_acknowledged_as_loaded from 'e2e-2159-sparse-enrich' (22 chars) to 'e2e-sparse-enrich' (17 chars) to comply with MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN (19 chars). Also capture stderr in create_keep_with_args so future sandbox creation failures include the actual CLI error instead of reporting empty output. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(workspace): add test coverage for workspace CRUD and persistence isolation Add unit tests for workspace create happy path, get round-trip, get not-found, get empty-name rejection, already-exists error, and resolve_workspace not-found. Add persistence test proving cross-workspace name uniqueness (same name in different workspaces produces separate records). Add workspace name max-length boundary tests. Fix e2e harness to include stderr in name-parse-failure error path. Align Python e2e test_workspace_crud with try/finally pattern. Document provider profile catalog workspace scoping gap in RFC 0011. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(examples): update examples for workspace model compatibility Shorten sandbox names in demo scripts to fit the 19-character MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN limit: policy-demo prefix to pd-, multi-agent notepad derives a short SANDBOX_TAG from the run ID, governance interceptor uses gs-PID-RANDOM. Update vscode-remote-sandbox.md SSH host aliases from openshell-{name} to openshell-{name}.{workspace} format. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(sdk): add workspace-scoped client and workspace CRUD Add WorkspaceScopedClient modeled after kube::Api::namespaced — captures workspace once and injects it into every sandbox request. Add workspace CRUD methods (create, get, list, delete) and list_sandboxes_all_workspaces on OpenShellClient. Extend SandboxRef with workspace field and add WorkspaceRef type. Include mock tests for all new operations. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings in workspace test assertions Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(docs): convert indented code blocks to fenced in RFC 0011 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings and apply cargo fmt across workspace Auto-format with cargo fmt and fix clippy warnings exposed by the reformat: unnecessary qualifications, map_unwrap_or, identical match arms, unused variable prefix, dead code annotations, and let-unit-value in e2e harness. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): address workspace scoping issues from review - Add workspace field to settings JSON output (CLI) - Skip Podman containers missing workspace label instead of defaulting to empty string, matching K8s driver behavior - Add resource_version to list_by_scope SELECT in both SQLite and Postgres backends, with regression test - Gate PolicyLocalContext proposal/lookup routes on workspace readiness, returning 503 when workspace is not yet discovered - Block sandbox and provider creation in TUI all-workspaces mode - Clear workspace vectors in TUI reset_sandbox_state Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog workspace-aware Thread workspace through snapshot_catalog so the EffectiveProviderProfileCatalog enforces workspace boundaries on both read and write paths. UserProviderProfileSource now loads platform-scoped profiles (workspace "") plus the target workspace's profiles, preventing cross-workspace duplicate profile ID collisions that previously caused global catalog failures. Update RFC 0011 to reflect catalog scoping is implemented in Phase 1 rather than deferred to future work. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(persistence): include workspace column in atomic policy revision INSERT put_policy_revision_atomic omitted the workspace column from the INSERT into the objects table in both SQLite and Postgres backends, causing atomically-written policy revisions to lose their workspace association. Add workspace field to AtomicPolicyRevisionWrite and thread it through both backend INSERT statements, matching the non-atomic put_policy_revision path which already included it. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proxy): skip ancestor walk when socket owner is the entrypoint collect_ancestor_identities walked the entire process tree above the entrypoint when the connecting process was the entrypoint itself, SHA256-hashing every ancestor binary (IDE, shell, container runtime). On dev machines with large binaries in the ancestor chain this exceeded the 30-second test timeout. When start_pid == stop_pid there are no intermediate ancestors to verify, so return an empty list immediately. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog scope-aware Allow the same profile ID at platform and workspace scopes by introducing layered catalog entries where workspace profiles shadow platform profiles. Add source and scope fields to the ProviderProfile proto and CLI output. Migrate List/Get handlers to the catalog, fixing divergence with runtime profile resolution. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align podman e2e labels with centralized driver constants The podman driver moved its container labels to the centralized openshell.ai/ prefix, but the e2e test harness and cleanup script still referenced the old openshell.sandbox-* keys, causing the local_driver_token_restart test to fail on container lookup. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align python profile isolation test with scope-aware catalog Platform profiles are now visible in workspace listings as fallbacks per the layered catalog design. Update the assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): honor profile_workspace in runtime profile resolution Runtime profile lookups now consult provider.profile_workspace via get_type_profile_for_scope. Providers created with --global-profile (profile_workspace="") resolve to the platform profile even when a workspace profile shadows the same ID. All 6 runtime call sites updated; type-only call sites remain scope-agnostic. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |