Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Seth Jennings 6461677c32 feat(policy): accept numeric UIDs for sandbox process identity (#1973)
* feat(policy): accept numeric UIDs in sandbox process identity validation

Allow run_as_user and run_as_group to be either the literal 'sandbox'
or a numeric UID/GID within [1000, 2_000_000_000]. This removes the
hard dependency on a baked-in 'sandbox' user in container images,
enabling compute drivers to inject resolved UIDs at sandbox creation.

Phase 1 of #1959.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>

* feat(supervisor): accept numeric UIDs for process identity dropping

Allow run_as_user and run_as_group to be numeric UIDs/GIDs, removing
the hard dependency on a baked-in 'sandbox' user in container images.

Changes:
- validate_sandbox_user(): accepts numeric UIDs without passwd lookup
  (logs OCSF event); keeps passwd check for "sandbox" name; rejects
  non-numeric non-sandbox strings that fail passwd lookup
- prepare_filesystem(): passes numeric UIDs/GIDs directly to chown()
  instead of requiring a passwd entry
- drop_privileges(): resolves numeric UIDs/GIDs directly via UID::from_raw
  / Gid::from_raw; skips initgroups when target uid matches current euid;
  uses guard conditions before setgid/setuid calls
- session_user_and_home(): falls back to ("{uid}", "/sandbox") for
  numeric UIDs, avoiding a passwd lookup that will fail

Re-exports MIN_SANDBOX_UID and MAX_SANDBOX_UID from openshell-policy
so callers have consistent range constants.

Phase 2 of #1959.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>

* feat(driver-kubernetes): resolve sandbox UID/GID from config or OpenShift SCC annotations

Phase 3 of the numeric-UID plan: allow operators to specify explicit
sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid in Kubernetes driver config, auto-detect from
OpenShift SCC namespace annotations, and propagate resolved values to
supervisor container env vars and PVC init container securityContext.

Changes:
- Add sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid fields to KubernetesComputeConfig
- Add SANDBOX_UID/SANDBOX_GID env var constants to openshell-core
- Implement resolve_sandbox_identity() to fetch namespace annotations
  and auto-detect OpenShift SCC UID ranges (sa.scc.uid-range)
- Pass resolved UID/GID through SandboxPodParams to pod spec builder
- Inject SANDBOX_UID/SANDBOX_GID env vars into supervisor container
- Update PVC init container securityContext with resolved UID/GID
  instead of hard-coded root
- Add comprehensive unit tests for resolution logic and annotation
  parsing (resolve_sandbox_uid, resolve_sandbox_gid, OpenShift SCC
  annotation parsing)

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>

* feat(driver-vm): add configurable sandbox UID/GID and update docs/examples

Phase 4 of the numeric-UID plan: replace hardcoded SANDBOX_UID (10001)
in VM rootfs preparation with configurable sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid fields.

Changes:
- Add sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid to VmDriverConfig with serde derives
- Pass resolved UID/GID through prepare_sandbox_rootfs_from_image_root
  to ensure_sandbox_guest_user which writes /etc/passwd/group/gshadow
- Update BYOC Dockerfile: remove groupadd/useradd, document runtime UID
  injection and the ability to skip baked-in sandbox user
- Update gateway-config.mdx: document sandbox_uid/sandbox_gid for both
  Kubernetes (with OpenShift SCC autodetection) and VM drivers
- Update sandbox-compute-drivers.mdx: add Sandbox User Identity section
  explaining numeric UID support across all compute drivers
- Update rootfs tests to use non-default UIDs, verify config passthrough

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>

* code review changes

* fix(supervisor): harden tests for restricted CI container environments

Guard tests against CI-specific constraints: root without CAP_SETPCAP,
UIDs with no /etc/passwd entry, and restricted /proc access.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjennings@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjennings@nvidia.com>
2026-07-02 13:31:06 -07:00
Patrick Riel 1f5e1234e9 feat(vm): add vm life cycle extensions (#1583) 2026-06-08 11:45:35 -07:00
Colin Walters e7f965a988 refactor(sandbox,driver-vm): Start moving to rustix (esp over libc unsafe) (#1505)
In the Rust ecosystem there's largely three ways to do system calls:

- raw libc
- nix
- rustix

Of the three, libc is almost all `unsafe` and really 95% of use
cases should be either nix or rustix. nix is the original one,
but after having looked at the code of both, I think rustix
is just better designed and organized. It's also reached 1.0,
whereas nix is still making semver-breaking changes (in fact
we're behind here in this project).

Now in practice, we have both *transitively* in the depchain
already, and that's true for quite a lot of projects.

But I think rustix is better, so let's add rustix as
a workspace dependency (process feature) and migrate
a few use cases to it - it's especially better than the raw
libc which is suprisingly widespread.

If we agree to do this, then many other calls can be ported.

Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
2026-05-21 15:20:21 -05:00
Drew Newberry 910d3f09f2 feat(vm): boot sandboxes from ext4 root disks (#1263)
* feat(vm): boot sandboxes from ext4 root disks

* feat(vm): boot sandboxes with writable overlay disk

* fix(sandbox): improve sandbox provisioning behavior

* fix(vm): repair sandbox image provisioning

* fix(vm): clean up rebase fallout

* perf(vm): cache empty overlay images

* perf(vm): skip repeated sandbox ownership repair

* fix(vm): address lifecycle review issues

* fix(vm): repair gateway vm startup

* wip
2026-05-15 13:23:10 -07:00
Taylor Mutch 7a0c444445 refactor!(auth): drop SSH handshake secret (#1274)
* refactor!(auth): drop SSH handshake secret in favor of mTLS

The OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SECRET / x-sandbox-secret mechanism was
misnamed: it does not authenticate SSH (which flows over the
RelayStream gRPC RPC and is gated by mTLS plus supervisor Unix-socket
permissions). It only gated a small set of sandbox-to-gateway
control-plane RPCs, and production deployments already enforce mTLS
on that channel — so the shared secret was redundant.

Replace the secret check with an mTLS-presence marker. Sandbox-class
methods (ReportPolicyStatus, PushSandboxLogs,
GetSandboxProviderEnvironment, SubmitPolicyAnalysis, GetSandboxConfig,
GetInferenceBundle) accept callers without a Bearer token; the gRPC
mTLS handshake is the trust boundary. Dual-auth methods treat
Bearer-present as full-scope CLI access and Bearer-absent as
sandbox-restricted scope via validate_sandbox_caller_update.

Drops the secret from all drivers (K8s, Podman, VM), the sandbox gRPC
interceptor, the Helm chart (values + pre-install hook + StatefulSet
env), the RPM bootstrap script, the man pages, and the
debug-openshell-cluster skill. Also removes the never-read
ssh_handshake_skew_secs flag and config field.

BREAKING CHANGE: --ssh-handshake-secret / OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SECRET
and --ssh-handshake-skew-secs / OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SKEW_SECS are
removed from the gateway, sandbox, and all driver binaries. The
openshell-ssh-handshake K8s Secret is no longer managed by the chart;
operators may delete the orphan. Deployments using
--disable-gateway-auth must enforce caller authentication at the
fronting proxy, since the gateway no longer validates a per-request
secret on sandbox-class methods.

Refs OS-174.

* docs(auth): scrub residual SSH handshake secret references

Sweep across docs, e2e scripts, the Podman driver README/NETWORKING
notes, the RPM/Helm/setup guides, the gateway man page, and RFC 0003
to remove instructions and examples that still referenced
OPENSHELL_SSH_HANDSHAKE_SECRET / --ssh-handshake-secret /
ssh_handshake_skew_secs. The mechanism is gone; nothing should still
suggest setting it. Negative-assertion regression tests are kept so
the env var cannot silently be re-introduced.

* test(drivers): drop SSH handshake secret negative-assertion tests

The supporting code, env vars, CLI flags, and config plumbing are
gone — these tests asserted absence of strings that no longer have
any path to being set. Remove the guards from the Docker, Podman,
Kubernetes, and VM driver test modules.
2026-05-14 13:14:30 -07:00
Drew Newberry 8ab5ee875b fix(vm): harden compute driver socket (#1248) 2026-05-07 20:03:16 -07:00
Drew Newberry 2e0afeabe1 feat(vm): derive guest rootfs from sandbox images (#957) 2026-05-03 23:23:30 -07:00
Drew Newberry 24724742a8 ci(rust): enforce -D warnings on clippy (#1008) 2026-04-29 12:12:53 -07:00
vince-brisebois 2adddaa6b2 feat: Adding qemu vm driver support with GPU pass-through (#992)
* Adding qemu vm driver support with GPU pass-through

Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>

* Add GPU rootfs variant, harden VFIO binding, and fix networking and supervisor reliability issues discovered during GPU VM bring-up.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Vincent Caux-Brisebois <vcauxbrisebo@nvidia.com>
2026-04-29 09:18:27 -07:00
Drew Newberry 4483c860e0 feat(server,driver-vm,e2e): gateway-owned readiness + VM compute driver e2e (#901) 2026-04-22 16:42:35 -07:00
Drew Newberry e4d6f92d9b feat(vm): add standalone libkrun compute driver (#858) 2026-04-17 08:50:57 -07:00