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codex/fix-proxy-unit-race
52
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Drew Newberry
|
9c7863907b |
fix(proxy): ignore exited socket owners and isolate middleware tests
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
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f152a96f93 |
fix(policy): report transparent denials to proposal aggregator
Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Seth Jennings
|
2493d415c2 |
feat(extensions)!: normalize protocol negotiation (#3352)
* feat(extensions)!: normalize protocol negotiation Closes #3057 Introduce a shared extension handshake, enforce protocol and capability compatibility across extension families, and expose immutable negotiated snapshots through gateway info and the Go SDK. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(credentials): fail fast on negotiation errors Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(extensions): validate gateway handshake metadata Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(go-sdk): re-export extension kind constants Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> * fix(extensions): fail fast on credential handshake rejection Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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krishicks
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cbf026366d |
fix(ocsf): require network activity endpoints (#3355)
Previously, Network Activity could be constructed without a source or destination endpoint, allowing connection, accept, relay, and configuration events to violate the OCSF 1.8 endpoint constraint. Now, NetworkActivityBuilder requires a source or destination endpoint at compile time. Connection failures identify the workload peer or genuine transparent destination, listener failures identify the listening endpoint, and mediation-lane failures use Application Lifecycle rather than fabricated network endpoints. Malformed forward requests use HTTP Activity with a method-only request, generated 400 response, and workload peer. Additionally, Unix relay-channel events use Base Event, policy-validation warnings use Config State Change, and the unused bypass monitor is removed because the current isolation architecture no longer uses it. Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com> |
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Shiju
|
9708ba9999 |
feat(providers): report applied sandbox provider changes (#3391)
* feat(providers): report applied sandbox provider changes Record exact provider mutation targets in shared configuration operations. Require authenticated evidence that credentials, effective policy, and the workload launch environment have been installed before reporting readiness. Add bounded CLI and Rust SDK status and wait support, preserving ordinary revision-scoped references for existing processes. Verify new-client rotation and acknowledged detach revocation without external-stable resolver changes. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(providers): align readiness times with protobuf contracts Represent readiness receipts, status, and operation times with Timestamp and report intervals with Duration. Reserve the scalar field tags, update all consumers and generated bindings, and preserve timestamp presence and nanosecond identity through storage and client validation. Qualify both empty-map constructors in the Linux boundary test so its module compiles while retaining the explicit default required by Clippy. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): preserve provider mutation storage uncertainty Recognize the gateway's exact structured storage-uncertainty reason for provider attach, detach, and update. Explain that the change may already be saved and must be reconciled before retrying, without exposing server messages or metadata. Preserve uncertainty ahead of generic retry hints. Exercise saved mutations through the CLI and verify single submission, redaction, missing receipt handling, and untrusted error-detail rejection. Document the recovery guidance for users and the public CLI skill. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(cli): explain denied provider profile lookups Report exact and alias profile lookup denials with fixed permission and workspace guidance. Keep backend details redacted and stop before provider mutations. Cover denied create and update calls through the CLI. Verify the complete provider list independently in the cross-workspace OIDC regression, extracting its JSON object from surrounding startup diagnostics. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
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Piotr Mlocek
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769273f096 |
feat(middleware): add a hook to inspect HTTP responses (#3074)
* feat(middleware): implement HTTP response processing Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): allow one-byte response stream units Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(examples): separate content guard from middleware protocol demos Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address HTTP response review findings Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(examples): defer protocol demo to a separate PR Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): keep response body timeout local Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): honor fail-open for unrepresentable responses Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): trim runtime docs and extract troubleshooting reference Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * chore(middleware): split build fix and simplify test and skill guidance Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): isolate HTTP response processing Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): hide response credential headers Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): end invalid preflight streams Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): remove hard-wrapped prose Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): use protobuf request timeouts Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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Derek Carr
|
d68b7069c3 |
refactor(proto)!: use well-known time types (#3113)
* refactor(proto)!: use well-known time types Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve time migration behavior Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve timestamp boundary semantics Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): convert sandbox token expiry to timestamp Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve time compatibility semantics Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proto): preserve exact endpoint and profile times Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(e2e): use duration for interactive exec timeout Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(sdk-go)!: remove legacy profile duration fields BREAKING CHANGE: Go provider profile callers must use RefreshBefore, MaxLifetime, and CacheTTL with ProfileDuration instead of the whole-second fields. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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Drew Newberry
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b3e4ad4579 |
fix(ci): repair RFC 0012 post-merge checks (#3360)
* fix(ci): lock nextest for Windows ARM64 Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve GPU access in sandbox runtime Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(windows): restore host proxy identity binding Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(windows): satisfy cross-platform network lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(windows): satisfy MXC lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(windows): exclude Unix supervisor runtime Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): satisfy Windows test lint Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(windows): escape proxy test policy paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): accept admitted GPU runtime groups Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): serialize proxy pipeline scenarios Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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Drew Newberry
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c1f2e7189f |
feat(isolation): implement the RFC 0012 sandbox architecture (#2942)
* feat(isolation): add RFC 0012 backend contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(isolation): name the interface crate explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): expose trusted host gateway Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(agents): inventory the MXC driver Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add mediated DNS transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): tighten interface error and digest contracts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): remove unrelated driver inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): define capability-free launch contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): seal confirmed boundary state Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate confirmation for external backend implementations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): clarify mediated DNS identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): unify typed network mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): bind launches to sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(mxc): initialize extended sandbox status Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add boundary protocol and Linux primitives Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden signals and separate process status from transport Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate remote confirmation through public contract Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): validate wire state and propagate snapshot failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(isolation): import owned agent specification explicitly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(isolation): describe mediated DNS channel Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): bound mediation attach without nested retries Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): generalize loopback protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add transport-neutral session authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): separate sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime boundary controls Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): add terminal boundary operation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): split supervisor and sandbox runtimes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): harden boundary isolation and lifecycle ownership Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): reject private root redirects and adopt typed errors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): preserve accept thread ownership on musl Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): isolate credential probes from filtered threads Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): return retained exec exit status to independent waiters Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound network mediation and preserve socket authorization Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bound control admission and retire stale mediation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * ci(e2e): select migrated drivers per stack layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): implement loopback connector Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(isolation): authenticate the Sandbox Protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): consume dedicated backend crate Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(sandbox): align topology session fixture Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): align projected bootstrap bundle Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): validate refreshed credentials before rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): fail closed across supervisor disconnects Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): repair rebased sandbox CI Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * build(runtime): publish separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(config): configure the sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate sandbox binary linkage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(isolation): use backend and runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(sandbox): use a scratch runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): refresh schema and dependency policy Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(sandbox): bind reconnects to supervisor process Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs: align runtime split operational guidance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(security): document Kubernetes runtime RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): enforce runtime lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(compute): identify sandbox start generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(server): restore sandbox launch sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): support authenticated runtime replacement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): bind sandbox session successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): retry pending sandbox successors Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(vm): run the supervisor outside the guest workload Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): use unified build toolchain Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): use sandbox runtime terminology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): own guest network bootstrap Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): expose guest init version Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): select native supervisor artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): guard guest init Linux symbols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): scope Linux test imports Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): avoid guest interface casts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): reconcile admitted sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): share resolved sandbox identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): surface host supervisor failures Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): include guest logs on supervisor exit Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate and clean runtime generations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): keep shared paths in the base layer Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): isolate workloads behind the host supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve host gateway alias resolution Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(docker): use separate sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): restore startup validation after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): narrow supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): close companion isolation gaps Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): align mediated network expectations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(docker): exercise mediated network paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): attach supervisor to managed network Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): defer supervisor recovery until gateway is ready Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): preserve workloads during session rotation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(docker): remove unrelated configuration RFC changes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): add proxy-pod isolation topology Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): use stable sandbox service authority Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(kubernetes): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): adapt proxy pods to current runtime APIs Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): describe the single runtime placement Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(kubernetes): simplify sandbox orchestration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): validate deployment prerequisites Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): update Trivy Helm profile inventory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * test(kubernetes): update Trivy scan inventory count Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): reuse preloaded runtime images in e2e Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): type and clean runtime resources Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): make sandbox restarts recoverable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve supervisor egress Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): adopt isolated sandbox and supervisor containers Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): stage bootstrap archives at named volume destinations Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): rotate launch-scoped authentication Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use sandbox backend protocol Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): use host networking for supervisor Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(podman): split sandbox and supervisor images Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): repair rebase integration Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(podman): name the sandbox runtime directly Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provision supervisor CA runtime storage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): address isolation review findings Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): inspect Debian supervisor provenance Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): use libpod-compatible tmpfs options Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind verified sandbox runtime binary Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): provide external driver data directory Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): start sandbox before joining user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): separate supervisor user namespace Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make sandbox starts generation-aware Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): rotate restored sandbox sessions Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): bind sandbox session lineage Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * perf(isolation): add TCP and DNS benchmark harnesses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): align benchmark timing and supported protocols Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): report TCP benchmark metrics accurately Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(perf): cancel failed worker startup Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(docker): build matching local supervisor image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(podman): make local sandbox smoke test runnable Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): wire local sandbox runtime image Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(kubernetes): narrow sandbox service RBAC Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(ci): validate split runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): harden runtime session handling Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * feat(supervisor): add standalone network proxy role Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): remove implementation companion notes Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * refactor(vm): standardize runtime release name Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(vm): pin renamed runtime artifacts Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): persist sandbox runtime identity Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(runtime): restore branch validation Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(isolation): reconcile main after rebase Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(network): close unframed HTTP 1.0 responses Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * chore(isolation): preserve upstream OCSF updates Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(security): close credential and TLS replay paths Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> * fix(auth): make sandbox refresh retries idempotent Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <385+drew@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Drew Newberry <anewberry@nvidia.com> |
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krishicks
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481ce566e1 |
fix(ocsf): correct HTTP activity context (#3316)
Previously, metadata events omitted both HTTP request and response objects, early proxy rejections used HTTP Activity without request context, and unsupported-scheme events did not expose enough safe HTTP context to satisfy the OCSF 1.8 schema. Now, metadata events include a method-only request and their actual HTTP response codes without recording the metadata URL. Unsupported-scheme events also include a method-only request plus the generated 400 response. Authority mismatches and credential-resolution denials use HTTP Activity with their generated 403 or 500 responses, and HTTP activity IDs are derived from the request method. Additionally, HttpActivityBuilder now enforces the OCSF request-or-response constraint at compile time. Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com> |
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Shiju
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fd3fd9cf74 |
feat(sandbox): explain failed calls to external tool servers (#3207)
Show configured tool server addresses and their last observed connection results together in sandbox status. Keep sandbox lifecycle readiness separate so an external connection failure does not mark the sandbox unready. Expose direct endpoint records through the CLI and SDKs, with plain-language failure explanations and gateway acceptance times. Keep observation tracking, runtime reporting, and gateway validation in dedicated endpoint status modules. Preserve bounded reporting, request attribution, retry ordering, and configuration and supervisor authority checks. Clear obsolete observations while retaining the configured addresses, and document the distinction between an observed HTTP response, current availability, and tool success. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
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26f2f96393 |
feat(mxc): add Windows host proxy for MXC sandbox network egress (#3163)
* Implement Windows host proxy integration and update dependencies for OpenShell
* Update README and gateway config to clarify egress proxy address handling and allocation
* Refactor ProxyIdentityMode to return Result for static_binary and add tests for binary path and SHA256 hash
* Enhance platform_hosts_path for Windows to use SystemRoot and improve error handling for hosts file reading
* Refactor FileFingerprint to use Option for mtime and ctime, simplifying metadata handling
* Add conditional compilation for Windows host module
* add unit tests for OPA policy evaluation and identity handling
* remove openshell-supervisor-network from unsupported driver package test exclusion list
* feat(mxc): enable host proxy TLS state generation
Generate per-sandbox TLS state for the MXC host proxy so HTTPS L7 enforcement can use the same MITM path as Linux. Grant generated CA material to the MXC process and inject standard trust env vars, while matching Linux behavior by disabling TLS termination on CA setup failure and relying on proxy fail-closed handling.
* fix(docs): remove outdated notes on governed egress from docs
* fix(tests): update TLS environment variable paths to use temporary directory
* fix(examples): make run-mxc-e2e harness correct and orphan-free
The MXC e2e harness never actually exercised the fs scenarios: it started
the gateway once and patched agent_command per scenario AFTERWARDS, so the
running gateway kept launching the default demo agent (not shipped in the
kit) and every fs scenario failed with CreateProcessW error:2. It also
scored on the `sandbox create` exit code (non-zero due to the harmless
interactive attach), wrote sandbox records to the persistent gateway DB
(leaving orphans that collided on later runs), and its deny scenarios never
proved denial.
Changes:
- Start a FRESH gateway per scenario so each scenario's agent_command is
actually loaded (root cause of CreateProcessW error:2).
- Score by on-disk artifact / expected outcome, not `sandbox create` exit.
- Real deny assertions: a control write to a granted path must succeed
(proves the agent ran) while the denied write must be absent. fs-empty
probes an ungranted out-of-share path (share_dir is mapped rw by design).
- Run the gateway on an ephemeral in-memory DB (sqlite::memory:) so the
harness never writes to the persistent store and cannot leave orphan
sandbox records; also use unique per-run sandbox names + pre-delete.
- Fix the process_container probe: use a real cwd + absolute cmd.exe
(canonical wxc-exec does not expand %TEMP% -> 0x8007010B).
- Fix summary counts (@() so a single FAIL is counted and exit is non-zero).
Verified PASS=4 FAIL=0 on 7F203-MXC-003 (no BaseContainer velocity keys)
using a canonical wxc-exec build (AppContainer fallback).
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(e2e): probe timeout is milliseconds (10ms->30000ms)
MXC process.timeout is wall-clock ms (wire.rs). The 10 value meant 10ms,
which the base-container tier (7F203-MXC-001/.181) enforced strictly and
timed the probe out. AppContainer path (.18/-003) happened to slip under
it. Bump to 30000ms so the process_container preflight probe is reliable
across both tiers.
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(mxc): use native paths in real runtime probes
Signed-off-by: Shailendra Singh <shailendras@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(mxc): make processcontainer work with mxc-latest-released wxc-exec
Three fixes to support the release wxc-exec binary (BaseContainer dispatcher)
in addition to mxc-fixes-env-vars:
1. Seed process env from host (driver.rs)
ProcessContainer starts with a completely blank environment -- no PATH,
SystemRoot, or anything. Seed the process env from the gateway host
environment so the agent binary can locate DLLs and run. Skip internal
Windows drive-letter variables (keys starting with '=') which cause
CreateProcessW to return ERROR_ENVVAR_NOT_FOUND. User agent_env entries
and TLS CA vars are applied as overrides on top of the host env.
2. Remove TLS readonly_paths grant (driver.rs)
The release wxc-exec (BaseContainer dispatcher) requires write-DAC
permission on every path in readonly_paths to set up AppContainer ACLs.
Adding the proxy's temp TLS directory caused a DACL error and exit -1.
The CA cert paths remain available to the agent via TLS env vars.
3. Remove allowedHosts from network JSON (mxc.rs)
The release wxc-exec rejects network.allowedHosts / network.blockedHosts
on Windows with "not yet supported". Removed the loopback exemption
attempt (127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost) from the network section.
Intra-container loopback works natively in the release binary without
it -- the spawner can connect to the server at 127.0.0.1:22000 directly.
Additional changes:
- mxc-ws-agent.rs: add relay-debug.txt error capture and relay-ready.txt
marker for reliable timing of host client connections.
- mxc-ws-gateway.toml: debug = true for JSON config dump during diagnosis.
- run-ws-agent-test.ps1: default port changed to 17670 (gateway default);
relay-ready.txt polling before ws-echo to avoid connecting before the
spawner has established the proxy bridge.
Signed-off-by: Prashant Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(e2e): address CodeRabbit review on run-mxc-e2e.ps1 (MR !46)
Four robustness/correctness fixes from CodeRabbit:
1. Start-Gw: kill the spawned gateway before the "did not start within 30s"
throw. If the process is alive but never binds the port, $gw is not yet
assigned in the caller, so the finally block cannot reap it -> orphan
gateway holding the port for the next run.
2. create-fail scoring: a non-zero `sandbox create` exit alone is not proof
of a policy rejection (gateway-registration/transport/fixture errors also
exit non-zero and would false-pass). PASS now requires a genuine
rejection signal (network / invalid_argument / network_policies) AND that
it is not an infrastructure failure; other non-zero exits go to FAIL with
output captured.
3. deny scenarios (ControlTarget path): snapshot the deny target AFTER
Wait-File lands the control artifact, so a late denied write (enforcement
regression racing the control write) can no longer be recorded as PASS.
4. -KeepRunning: break out of the scenario loop after the first scenario so
a later scenario does not start a second gateway on the same port
(previously a reliable port collision instead of a usable debug mode).
Re-verified PASS=4 FAIL=0 on both boxes (7F203-MXC-001 base-container and
7F203-MXC-003 AppContainer fallback); network-policy-rejected correctly
scores as "policy rejection".
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* feat(mxc-e2e): collect run-mxc-e2e output into a results bundle
Mirror the sibling run-*.ps1 scripts by collecting every run's logs into a
timestamped results-e2e-<stamp>\ folder and zipping it. The bundle contains the
console transcript, per-scenario gateway stdout/stderr, the exact TOML rendered
for each scenario, the policy fixture used, and a summary.txt with the verdict
table.
Per-scenario gateway logs now land in gateway.<scenario>.log/.err.log inside the
bundle instead of a single fixed gateway.e2e.log in the script directory.
Wrap pre-flight, mode setup, scenario definitions, and the scenario loop in a
single try/catch/finally so the finally always writes the summary, stops the
transcript, and zips the bundle -- even on a pre-flight failure. The existing
per-scenario gateway-cleanup try/finally stays nested inside. All scenario
logic, scoring rules, and comments are preserved.
Signed-off-by: Prashant S Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(mxc-e2e): address CodeRabbit review on run-mxc-e2e.ps1
- Require -Scenario when -KeepRunning: the loop breaks after the first
scenario, so a full-suite run would execute only one scenario yet still
report the suite as PASS. Fail fast so a partial run can't be mislabeled
complete.
- Start-Transcript now runs inside the guarded try block with a
$transcriptStarted flag; Stop-Transcript is only called when it actually
started, so a Start-Transcript failure still yields the results bundle.
- Wrap the -Scenario filter in @() so a single exact match stays an array
(reliable .Count and a proper array for the scenario loop on PS 5.1).
Signed-off-by: Prashant S Khodade <pkhodade@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(examples): pass gateway config via OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_CONFIG for spaced paths
Start-Process -ArgumentList does not quote array elements, so launching the
gateway with a bare --config <path> token split on any space in the install
path (e.g. C:\Users\First Last\...), and clap rejected the fragment with
'unrecognized subcommand'. Every MXC example launcher that started the gateway
hit this when the kit was unzipped under a path containing a space.
Pass the config path through the OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_CONFIG env var (which the
gateway already reads via clap) and drop the --config token. Env vars carry
spaces safely.
Affected: run-ocsf-audit, run-mxc-e2e, run-demo, run-inference-test,
run-ollama-test. run-mtls-test was not affected (its launch passes no config
path). Root-caused and fix-verified on 7F203-MXC-003 from a spaced path.
Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
* fix(run-mxc-e2e): improve scoring logic and enhance command execution handling
* fix(mxc): reconcile proxy support after rebase
Restore the proxy-enabled OCSF audit example removed by
|
||
|
Polite_realism
|
00f02127ad |
test(supervisor-network): show response body on ssrf_denied assertion failure (#3290)
forward_handler_preserves_ssrf_response_and_denial_stage's ssrf_denied check was the only assertion in the test without a failure message, unlike its sibling assertions. This test has failed intermittently in CI with no way to see what response was actually returned, since the message is where that gets surfaced. Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
226a83b323 |
fix(supervisor): classify credential placeholders in request bodies (#3246)
* fix(supervisor): classify credential placeholders in request bodies Closes #2904 Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(supervisor): preserve same-provider placeholders in request bodies Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Shiju
|
ea8eda6d5b |
feat(supervisor): enforce MCP request protocol versions (#3241)
* feat(supervisor): enforce MCP request protocol versions Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): enforce MCP versions across HTTP forwarding Apply shared request-version guards before authorization and after forward-request rewriting. Require version metadata to survive HTTP header cleanup, and cover valid initialization and selected-revision forwarding through middleware. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
||
|
John T. Myers
|
f4dc6be4b2 |
refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes (#3195)
* refactor(inference): remove managed inference routes Closes #3172 Remove the inference route control plane, inference.local data path, built-in router crate, and SDK surface. Move inference workloads to explicitly imported provider profiles and native endpoints, with migration cleanup and updated tests and documentation. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve alternate upstream isolation Restore the provider policy activation guard so legacy OpenAI and Anthropic providers configured for alternate base URLs do not grant egress to the built-in public vendor endpoints. Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Simon Scatton
|
48c449d8c8 |
chore(deps): replace ring with AWS-LC (#3243)
* chore(deps): replace ring with AWS-LC Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(lint): address warnings after dependency upgrades Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> * fix(tls): limit provider initialization to reqwest clients Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Simon Scatton <sscatton@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Shiju
|
e1084e19db |
fix(supervisor): preserve MCP versions in runtime config (#3199)
* fix(supervisor): preserve MCP versions in runtime config Carry canonical MCP version allowlists through both policy-loading paths into the supervisor's typed L7 endpoint configuration. Reject malformed, ambiguous, or cross-protocol version data during policy activation so invalid configuration cannot remove MCP inspection from a selected route. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor): accept mixed-case MCP version protocols Validate materialized MCP version metadata through the parsed L7 protocol so supported mixed-case spellings remain valid. Cover YAML and protobuf ingress with pinned-default regression tests. Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Piotr Mlocek
|
039b265096 |
feat(middleware): define HTTP response pre-return interface (#3073)
* feat(middleware): define HTTP response pre-return interface Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): clarify HTTP response interface Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): align response result actions Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): expose response reason codes Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): share session end reasons Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(middleware)!: finalize HTTP response pre-return contract Replace the separate body_end event with HttpResponseBodyUnit.end_of_stream. Every body-inspecting stage receives exactly one flagged unit, which may be empty; a zero-byte body is one empty flagged unit and OpenShell never reads ahead to set the flag. Defer response trailers from V1 and reserve their field numbers. HTTP/1.0 clients and Content-Length bodies cannot carry trailers and that behavior was undefined. Add HttpResponsePreflight.permitted_body_modes, computed once from the original upstream head so every stage sees the same list, and make an unlisted selection a failure rather than a downgrade. Add the block_delivery preflight action as a successful decision enforced regardless of on_error. Expose Content-Length, Content-Encoding, and Content-Range read-only in preflight. Cap STREAM_BYTES input units at half of max_payload_bytes and permit deferring bytes across replacements only for fail_closed bindings, surfaced as deferral_permitted. Split PEER_DISCONNECT into DOWNSTREAM_DISCONNECT and UPSTREAM_DISCONNECT and attribute WebSocket relay failures by direction instead of a generic peer error. Compile the content-guard example in lint and branch checks so proto renames cannot break it silently. BREAKING CHANGE: WebSocketSessionEndReason and WebSocketSessionEnd are replaced by the shared MiddlewareSessionEndReason and MiddlewareSessionEnd. NORMAL_CLOSE is now NORMAL, UPSTREAM_REJECTED is now UPSTREAM_FAILURE, and PEER_DISCONNECT is split into DOWNSTREAM_DISCONNECT and UPSTREAM_DISCONNECT. Enum numbers are unchanged so binary wire compatibility is preserved; generated symbols and JSON names change. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): describe skip as opting out of inspection Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(middleware): add body-phase block_delivery and skip_remaining actions Body results may now stop delivery or opt out of inspecting the rest of the response after a prefix. One HttpResponseBlockDelivery message is shared by preflight and body results and documents the difference between blocking before and after head commitment. Drop the field reservations, since nothing in this contract has shipped, and renumber session_end to close the gap. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): share HTTP body leaf messages across directions HttpBodyUnit, HttpBodyPassThrough, HttpBodyTransform, HttpBodySkipRemaining, and HttpBodyMode carry no response-specific semantics, so name them for reuse by the streaming request hook. Envelopes, results, preflight, and block_delivery stay response-specific because commitment semantics differ. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): keep HTTP body leaf messages response-specific Reverts the shared HttpBody* naming. A direction-specific payload such as a response-only semantic mode would otherwise add unreachable variants to the other direction or force a source-breaking fork after 0.1.0. The streaming request hook defines its own HttpRequestBody* messages and copies the shape; SDKs present a direction-neutral body handler over both. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): simplify response proto comments Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): reject undispatched response bindings Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): simplify phase field comment Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): rename HTTP response preflight result Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(middleware): add HTTP response trailer results Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): define response block delivery Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): define stage-local response body modes Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): define final response body units Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): define streaming response deferral Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): defer whole-body accumulation timeout Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): align response result diagnostics Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test(middleware): cover upstream WebSocket disconnect Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): keep response streams unit-local Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(middleware): trim disconnect compatibility note Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Polite_realism
|
74015b951a |
fix(sandbox): terminate sandbox when proxy accept loop exits unexpectedly (#2370)
* fix(sandbox): terminate sandbox when proxy accept loop exits unexpectedly Add a oneshot notification channel to ProxyHandle that fires when the proxy task exits for any reason (panic, abort, or loop break). The sandbox main loop now races this signal alongside the entrypoint process and shutdown signals, terminating with a clear OCSF error if the proxy dies. This prevents the sandbox from continuing to report Ready with a dead proxy. Follows the existing sidecar control channel pattern. All five wait paths (process+sidecar, process-only, network+sidecar, network-only on Linux, and non-Linux) now monitor proxy liveness. Refs #2337 Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * test(proxy): add unit tests for exit detection drop-guard and take_exit_receiver Verify the oneshot drop-guard pattern fires on normal task exit and abort, and document the take_exit_receiver contract including the double-call hazard. Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): classify terminal vs transient accept errors and exit on unrecoverable failures Extract accept-loop error handling into classify_accept_error() with AcceptAction enum so the decision logic is independently testable. Terminal errors (EBADF/EINVAL/ENOTSOCK) now exit the loop immediately, allowing the supervisor to detect proxy death. Unknown errors exit after 10 consecutive failures. FD exhaustion retries with exponential backoff capped at 5s (fix unreachable cap from min(6) to min(7)). Adds 9 unit tests covering classification, counter interactions, backoff progression, and bounded exit behavior. Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * refactor(proxy): use libc constants and Option-based exit receiver Replace raw errno numbers with libc:: constants behind #[cfg(unix)] gates in classify_accept_error and its tests. Refactor ProxyHandle::exited_rx to Option<Receiver<()>> so take_exit_receiver uses .take() instead of allocating a dummy sender. Add a ProxyHandle-level test that verifies the full drop → abort → receiver fires path. Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): restore full transient errno classification from main The refactored classifier only recognized EMFILE/ENFILE as retryable, routing all other documented transient accept errors (ENOBUFS, ENOMEM, ECONNABORTED, ECONNRESET, EINTR, ENETDOWN, etc.) through the unknown- error budget which terminates the proxy after 10 consecutive failures. Restore the complete transient errno table from main so these errors retry indefinitely with appropriate backoff. Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): resolve Clippy warnings in proxy-exit detection code Replace redundant closure |p| p.take_exit_receiver() with the method reference ProxyHandle::take_exit_receiver, and change all five select! arms from _ = &mut proxy_exited to () = &mut proxy_exited to satisfy clippy::ignored_unit_patterns. Also run cargo fmt on the new proxy test in proxy.rs. Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * ci: trigger required check re-run Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): remove unnecessary std::pin qualification Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> |
||
|
Artem Lytvyn
|
d7e137f12e |
fix(proxy): normalize trailing-dot CONNECT hosts before policy evaluation (#2248)
* fix(proxy): normalize trailing-dot CONNECT hosts before policy evaluation Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> * fix(supervisor-network): keep trailing dot on upstream proxy CONNECT host and add regression test Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> * fix(supervisor-network): drop redundant UpstreamProxyArgs import in tests Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> |
||
|
grs
|
40d1b48666 |
feat(provider): support for SPIFFE backed token exchange (#1970)
* feat(provider): add ability to request token exchange instead of client credentials as OAuth grant_type Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(proxy): add further tests for token exchange Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(provider): add runnable example for token exchange Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * test(e2e): cover Podman token exchange grants Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * refactor(oauth): extract duplicated functionality from server and supervisor Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(provider): evict nearest-to-expiry entry from intermediate token cache Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * doc(supervisor): add podman example for token exchange Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> * fix(provider): withhold token-exchange subject credentials Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Gordon Sim <gsim@redhat.com> |
||
|
Artem Lytvyn
|
7adc05af7a |
feat(supervisor): expose sandbox name to middleware request context (#2771)
* feat(supervisor): expose sandbox name to middleware request context Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> * feat(supervisor): add workspace to middleware request context Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Artem Lytvyn <alytvyn@redhat.com> |
||
|
John T. Myers
|
b2ea81822b |
feat(network): enable Docker and Podman policy DNS and transparent TCP (#2723)
* feat(network): enable Docker transparent TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover Docker transparent TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(network): correlate transparent TCP audit events Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(examples): add transparent TCP Redis demo Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(examples): demonstrate blocked TCP connections Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(examples): focus Redis demo audit output Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): close transparent TCP policy bypasses Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reject unsupported TCP policy reloads Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(ci): satisfy Linux transparent TCP lints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(podman): enable transparent TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): permit policy DNS port binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): use qualified transparent TCP hostname Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): preserve exact policy DNS names Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): route policy DNS over TCP Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(dns): serve multiple TCP queries per connection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(network): explain native DNS and TCP egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): reconcile runtime reload with upstream Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): harden transparent DNS capture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): preserve resolver behavior for native tcp Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(network): clarify native tcp runtime constraints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): remove unused transparent tcp pin Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): admit redirected transparent tcp Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): restore podman transparent networking Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): permit alpine busybox binaries Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): use portable alpine keepalive Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): build musl networking fixture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): isolate musl DNS probe Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): keep privileged port capability dropped Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve transparent TCP port 53 Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): report synthetic pool pressure by family Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): bind tcp fixtures before readiness Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(podman): grant fixture low-port bind Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
John T. Myers
|
0c6a3443ec |
feat(network): add policy DNS correlation store (#2713)
* feat(network): add policy DNS correlation foundation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(network): describe dormant policy DNS boundary Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): harden policy DNS publication Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): audit policy DNS failures Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve DNS answer order Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
John T. Myers
|
4d7f402ce2 |
feat(policy): establish direct TCP egress foundation (#2711)
* feat(policy): accept explicit tcp endpoint protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): snapshot authoritative egress decisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document explicit tcp protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): defer transparent TCP release guidance Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(go): regenerate sandbox protobuf bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): complete tcp egress foundation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document explicit tcp contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): fail closed on authorization errors Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(podman): fence delayed exit events before restart Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate network endpoint destinations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(providers): opt in tcp credential fixture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): require dns host for transparent tcp Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
alangou
|
0d708d6d51 |
fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints (#2493)
* fix(policy): gate uninspected credentialed endpoints Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * refactor(cli): extract allowed-ip option parsing Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * fix(policy): gate endpointless credential bindings Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Mrunal Patel
|
8d67250a5d |
fix(providers): keep refresh credential handles stable (#2780)
* fix(providers): keep refresh credential handles stable Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> * fix(providers): protect refresh-owned credentials Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com> |
||
|
Adel ZaaloukandClaude Opus 4.6
|
600bbae845 |
feat(ocsf): emit AI inference events via ai_operation profile on ApiActivity (#2664)
Apply the official OCSF ai_operation profile (introduced in v1.8.0) to ApiActivity [6003] events when the inference proxy routes a model call through inference.local. Attaches an ai_model object (name, ai_provider) and puts token counts and latency in unmapped fields. ApiActivity [6003] is the schema-correct class for the ai_operation profile in v1.8.0 (HttpActivity only gets it in v1.9.0). In Splunk CIM, ApiActivity maps to the "Change" data model, naturally separating inference events from regular HTTP proxy traffic. Changes: - Add AiModel object and ai_model field on BaseEventData - Add ApiActivityEvent struct and ApiActivityBuilder - Add emit_ai_inference in proxy.rs using ApiActivity with ai_operation - Vendor OCSF v1.8.0 schemas including api_activity class, ai_model object, and ai_operation profile definitions - Bump OCSF_VERSION to 1.8.0 - Update schema validation to skip profile-gated required fields Shorthand: API:INFERENCE [INFO] claude-3-haiku via anthropic 701ms [POST /v1/messages] Splunk/SIEM backward compatibility (v1.1/v1.3 CIM mapping) is tracked separately in #2662 as a configurable serialization concern. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
alangou
|
877ddbacb4 |
fix(supervisor-network): canonicalize dot-segments before policy evaluation (#2699)
* fix(supervisor-network): strip path parameters before dot-segment resolution Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor-network): scope allow_encoded_slash to the matched L7 endpoint Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> * fix(supervisor-network): check the canonical target for encoded slashes Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adrien Langou <alangou@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Piotr Mlocek
|
44bf0df485 |
feat(middleware): inspect WebSocket text messages (#2477)
* feat(middleware): inspect websocket text messages Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address websocket review feedback Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): bound websocket message assembly Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): harden websocket upgrade lifecycle Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): unify in-process and remote transports Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(middleware): support regex websocket redaction Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): bound persistent streaming sessions Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): accept websocket sequence gaps Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): refine websocket introspection contract Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify websocket preflight lifecycle Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify websocket coverage semantics Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): type websocket frame failures Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): return 503 when middleware admission is exhausted Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): align streaming API contract Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify WebSocket event result scope Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(rfc): simplify middleware revision history Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(examples): add WebSocket content guard support Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): unify binding payload limits Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(middleware): align payload limit terminology Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address websocket review feedback Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): address websocket review findings Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test(network): allow Linux handler setup in preflight regression Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): harden websocket relay finalization Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(network): inspect compressed websocket messages Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * test(network): stabilize compressed websocket regressions Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(go-sdk): regenerate middleware protobuf binding Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): clarify websocket skip lifecycle Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(middleware): address WebSocket review feedback Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Piotr Mlocek
|
bdabb54cb3 |
fix(security): authenticate extension services (#2638)
* fix(security): authenticate extension services Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * feat(extension-core): verify gateway JWTs Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(extension-core): keep inbound verification external This should become an extension SDK package. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(security): harden the extension authentication contract Follow-up hardening on the alpha extension authentication mechanism. Claim contract: - Extension tokens carry an explicit `typ` of `openshell-ext+jwt`. They share a signing key with sandbox-to-gateway admission tokens and were otherwise separated by audience alone, so a verifier that neglects to check `aud` could accept a gateway credential. The header is a second, independent discriminator. - Publish OIDC-shaped discovery at `/.well-known/openid-configuration` so a service configured with only the gateway URL can learn the exact expected issuer and the JWKS location. It is shaped, not compliant: `issuer` is the gateway identity, not the serving URL. Audience agreement: - `MiddlewareManifest` and `InterceptorManifest` gain `expected_audience`. The audience is otherwise configured independently on each side of the boundary, where a mismatch surfaces only as an opaque authentication failure on every call. OpenShell now compares the two and fails at startup. An empty field keeps the check off for existing services. Compatibility: - Add `allow_insecure_transport` per registration. Enabling gateway JWT signing previously made any plaintext endpoint a hard startup failure, including the endpoint form used in our own documentation. The opt-out attaches no credential, is refused by the gateway if a supervisor asks for one, and warns at every startup. - Make the transport requirement kind-aware. A middleware endpoint must be reachable from every sandbox supervisor, so only interceptors may use a gateway-local Unix socket. Credential lifecycle: - Replace the process-global slot map with a supervisor-owned `ExtensionCredentialStore` shared explicitly across the gateway connections the supervisor opens, removing test-order coupling. - Rotate only when a credential is missing or has passed four fifths of its lifetime. Configuration polling ran every ten seconds against fifteen-minute credentials, so each poll re-ran gateway effective-policy resolution and re-minted the gateway token. - Bound credential minting per sandbox, since each request resolves the caller's effective policy. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs: record alpha extension authentication in RFC appendices Restore the RFC 0009 and 0010 bodies to their accepted text and move every extension-authentication update into appendices instead. An RFC records a decision at a point in time; superseding detail belongs alongside it rather than rewritten into it. RFC 0009's appendix carries the shared contract: claims, authorization, key distribution, the `allow_insecure_transport` replacement for the body's `allow_insecure`, and residual risks. RFC 0010's records only what differs for interceptors and links to it. The existing protocol-extensions appendix, which parked the phase 2 transport question, now points forward to what was built. Also document the audience handshake, the discovery endpoint, the `typ` requirement, and `jti` replay guidance in the extensibility and gateway configuration pages, and correct the middleware transport guidance: middleware endpoints must be reachable from sandbox supervisors, so Unix sockets are not an option there. Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(extension-core): abstract extension server trust Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * docs(core): update middleware manifest example Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(extension-auth): preserve unsigned gateway compatibility Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * fix(extension-auth): reject cross-domain token replay Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
||
|
Shiju
|
c825b1f8ef |
perf(supervisor-middleware): remove body clones from local dispatch (#2679)
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
0120535efc |
feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints (#2510)
* feat(proxy): bind static credentials to provider endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): verify static credential endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(e2e): use valid endpoint isolation fixtures Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(provider): explain static credential endpoint binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve binding identity across rotations Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): enforce bindings across request lifecycle Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): close credential relay gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): hash selected provider profile scope Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): resolve credentials after request admission Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify binding failure diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): align single-route credential denials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): harden endpoint-bound rotation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce identity and authority binding Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): snapshot provider environment atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): include authority port in query proxy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): close credential revocation gaps Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(proxy): explain authority mismatch diagnostics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): enforce binding lifecycle invariants Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): reject credential config collisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): capture credential scope atomically Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): distinguish origin and absolute targets Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(provider): isolate endpointless profile credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): normalize IPv6 request authorities Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): clarify endpointless profile isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): bind endpointless provider credentials Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): use current GCP placeholder revision Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(providers): explain policy credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover endpointless fail-closed invariant Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(policy): expect ambiguity rejection at creation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): share credential mismatch finding builder Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): cover malformed binding metadata Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): verify multi-key endpoint isolation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): cover same-host credential path denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(credentials): document serialized refresh contract Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): consolidate L7 log formatting Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): precompile endpoint binding patterns Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * perf(credentials): share identity epoch revisions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): require explicit request default ports Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): validate SigV4 credential sources Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): preserve endpoint bindings for credential handles Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(go-sdk): expose network credential bindings Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Jim Meyer
|
8c7dd148a9 |
perf(net): set TCP_NODELAY on latency-sensitive TCP hops (#2220)
* perf(net): set TCP_NODELAY on all tunnel and proxy TCP hops The sandbox tunnel added ~44 ms of latency to every small request/response because no socket in the path disabled Nagle's algorithm, so sub-MSS writes waited on delayed ACKs at each hop. Set TCP_NODELAY on every latency-sensitive TCP socket: - gateway: accepted connections on the public listener (gRPC relay frames and WS tunnel writes) - CLI: edge tunnel local accept + underlying WebSocket TCP stream, insecure TLS connector (tonic's default connector already does this), and service-forward accepted sockets - supervisor: direct-tcpip connect into the sandbox netns, TCP relay target dials, egress proxy accepted connections, and all upstream CONNECT/HTTP dials (via a new connect_upstream helper) Setting TCP_NODELAY on connect is best-effort: a failure only costs latency, so we log and continue rather than fail the connection. The sandbox SSH transport rides a unix domain socket and gRPC client channels use tonic defaults (nodelay on), so no change is needed there. Fixes #2219 Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jim@meyer4hire.com> * refactor(net): house TCP_NODELAY helper in a shared net module Address review feedback on the TCP_NODELAY change: - Move the shared set-nodelay helper out of supervisor_session into a new crate-private `net` module in openshell-supervisor-process, so ssh and supervisor_session no longer reach across modules through a pub(crate) item. - Make the best-effort comments at each call site terse and consistent. No behavior change; the benchmark ladder reproduces the same numbers. Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jim@meyer4hire.com> * refactor(net): consolidate TCP_NODELAY helpers into openshell_core::net Move the best-effort TCP_NODELAY helpers into the shared openshell_core::net module so every crate dials and configures sockets the same way: - Add set_tcp_nodelay_best_effort (accepted/existing streams) and connect_tcp_nodelay_best_effort (dial + set) with unit tests. - Migrate all call sites in openshell-cli, openshell-server, and the supervisor crates to the shared helpers. - Remove the crate-private net module from openshell-supervisor-process. - Document socket guidance in AGENTS.md (Network Sockets). Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jim@meyer4hire.com> * perf(net): set TCP_NODELAY on exec bridge and metadata server The gateway-side single-use SSH-over-relay loopback bridge and the sandbox IMDS metadata server were missed latency-sensitive TCP hops. Set TCP_NODELAY on the accepted client connection and both russh client dials of the exec bridge — interactive keystrokes and line-buffered PTY output are the most tinygram-heavy traffic in the system — and on the metadata server's accepted connections. Also log unrecognized MaybeTlsStream variants in the edge tunnel so a future TLS-backend change surfaces a silent TCP_NODELAY miss instead of skipping it quietly. Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jim@meyer4hire.com> * perf(net): set TCP_NODELAY on openshell-sdk socket paths The openshell-sdk crate landed on main with its own copies of the CLI's hand-rolled sockets, which the CLI and TUI are meant to consume. Give them the same treatment as the CLI equivalents: - edge_tunnel: the accepted local tunnel connection and the WebSocket's underlying TCP socket (plain and rustls variants). - transport: the dial in InsecureTlsConnector, tonic's custom-connector path. Only these hand-rolled sockets need it. Tonic's own connector defaults tcp_nodelay to true and applies it itself, so plain Endpoint::connect callers were already covered. Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jim@meyer4hire.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jim Meyer <jim@meyer4hire.com> |
||
|
John T. MyersandJohn Myers
|
905b554c7c |
refactor(network): consolidate proxy egress pipeline (#2373)
* refactor(network): introduce shared egress pipeline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover shared proxy egress paths Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): make destination authorization explicit Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): pin proxy relay policy context Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): lock relay generation contracts Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): establish phase zero compatibility baseline Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(policy): detect ambiguous network endpoints Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(sandbox): fail closed on invalid policy updates Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(network): invalidate relays on policy changes Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): document validation failure posture Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): cover validation and middleware egress Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): move policy failure mode to gateway toml Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): name proxy contracts by behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): align overlap validation with endpoint selection Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): expect hard loopback denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): match declared endpoint denial Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): preserve path-specific endpoint overrides Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(network): respect hard-blocked host gateways Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): reconcile proxy refactor with main Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(network): preserve CONNECT policy generation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): cover runtime endpoint glob semantics Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): reject ambiguous policies before persistence Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(policy): explain ambiguity preflight behavior Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(policy): compare body limits within protocol Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): avoid global tracing capture race Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(server): format rebased provider tests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * test(server): authenticate rebased policy requests Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): retain runtime on middleware outage Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(server): preflight provider composition activation Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sandbox): distinguish runtime failure transitions Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: John Myers <9696606+johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: John Myers <johntmyers@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Polite_realism
|
79bcf296cd |
fix(proxy): retry with backoff on transient accept errors instead of exiting (#2369)
* fix(proxy): retry with backoff on transient accept errors instead of exiting The proxy accept loop unconditionally broke on any accept() error, permanently killing the proxy while the sandbox continued to report Ready. Replace the break with a sleep-and-continue pattern: EMFILE/ENFILE errors get exponential backoff (100ms to 3.2s) to let file descriptors drain, and all other accept errors get a fixed 100ms backoff matching the existing metadata_server and edge_tunnel patterns. Closes #2337 Signed-off-by: Sean Burdine <sburdine@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): address review feedback on accept retry backoff - Use libc::EMFILE / libc::ENFILE instead of raw errno values; promote libc from dev-dependency to regular dependency - Extract accept_backoff() and is_fd_exhaustion_error() into testable helpers - Fix unreachable 5s cap: bump exponent limit from min(6) to min(7) so the 5_000ms ceiling is reachable (100 * 2^6 = 6400, capped to 5000) - Add 6 unit tests covering exponential progression, counter reset, saturation at cap, EMFILE/ENFILE detection, and non-FD error rejection Signed-off-by: Sean Burdine <sburdine@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): classify accept errors and exit on terminal failures Three-way error classification for the accept loop: transient errors (EMFILE, ECONNABORTED) retry with backoff, terminal errors (EBADF, EINVAL, ENOTSOCK) exit immediately, and unknown errors exit after 5 consecutive failures. Adds unit tests for the classifier and error handler, plus a subprocess-isolated integration test that validates EMFILE recovery by lowering RLIMIT_NOFILE. Signed-off-by: Quinn Burdine <sburdine@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): use nested or-patterns to satisfy clippy lint Signed-off-by: Quinn Burdine <sburdine@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): expand transient error allowlist and fix clippy/test issues Widen the accept-error classification to cover all Linux accept(2) transient errnos (ENETDOWN, EPROTO, ENOPROTOOPT, EHOSTDOWN, EHOSTUNREACH, EOPNOTSUPP, ENETUNREACH, ENONET behind cfg gate). Rename fd-exhaustion helpers to resource-pressure to reflect ENOBUFS and ENOMEM coverage. Fix clippy lints in the integration test (borrow_as_ptr, collection_is_never_read, while_let_loop) and make post-EMFILE recovery verification cross-platform by handling Linux's stale backlog behavior. Signed-off-by: Quinn Burdine <sburdine@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): add remaining Linux accept(2) transient errnos and make test skip explicit Classify ENOSR, ESOCKTNOSUPPORT, EPROTONOSUPPORT, and ETIMEDOUT as transient accept errors per Linux accept(2) documentation. Treat ENOSR as resource pressure (exponential backoff). Make the EMFILE integration test skip path emit a diagnostic instead of silently returning success. Signed-off-by: Quinn Burdine <sburdine@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> * fix(proxy): panic instead of silent skip when EMFILE is not triggered The integration test child runs inside Command::output() which captures stderr. A silent return on the Ok path meant CI would report a passing test without any diagnostic. Panic instead so the parent test fails visibly if the platform cannot induce EMFILE. Signed-off-by: Quinn Burdine <sburdine@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Sean Burdine <sburdine@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: politerealism <burdcat17@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Quinn Burdine <sburdine@redhat.com> |
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Philippe Martin
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77e5c32217 |
feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy (#2245)
* feat(sandbox,gateway): route sandbox egress through corporate HTTP proxy - Chain sandbox egress through a corporate HTTP proxy so outbound traffic from within the sandbox respects the host proxy settings - Forward sandbox proxy environment variables to the generated Podman config so the proxy is applied consistently to Podman-managed workloads Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): make corporate proxy routing operator-owned The operator-configured corporate egress proxy was injected under the conventional HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY names as defaults beneath sandbox spec/template environment, so a sandbox creator could redirect egress at an arbitrary proxy or disable proxying with NO_PROXY=*. Route the boundary through reserved, supervisor-only variables (OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/NO_PROXY) written in the Podman driver's required-variable tier. Any sandbox-supplied value under a reserved name is stripped before the operator value is applied, so the supervisor never observes a reserved proxy variable the operator did not set. The supervisor now reads only the reserved names and ignores the conventional proxy variables the sandbox controls. Add the reserved proxy variables to the supervisor-only child-environment denylist so the corporate proxy URL and any embedded credentials are not inherited by the sandbox workload, which reaches egress through the local policy proxy and never needs them. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * feat(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy credentials via secret file Proxy credentials were embedded inline in the proxy URL, so they were stored in gateway.toml and exposed in container metadata via 'podman inspect'. Reject inline 'user:pass@' credentials in https_proxy/http_proxy at startup (parsed with the url crate rather than hand-splitting), and add a proxy_auth_file option pointing at a 'user:pass' file. The driver stages that file as a per-sandbox root-only Podman secret, mounts it at a fixed path, and exports only the path in the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_FILE variable, so the credential never appears in config, environment, or container metadata. Reading the file fails closed on a missing, empty, or control-character-bearing value. The supervisor reads the credential from the mounted file and builds the Proxy-Authorization: Basic header, rejecting control characters, and no longer derives credentials from URL userinfo. The auth-file path is added to the child-environment strip list, and the generated gateway.toml is written owner-only (mode 0600). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fail closed on invalid upstream proxy configuration The reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* variables are an operator-owned egress boundary, but the supervisor treated present-but-invalid values as unset: an unsupported or malformed proxy URL was ignored with a warning, an unreadable auth file proceeded without credentials, and a malformed credential silently became unauthenticated. Any of these could quietly downgrade the corporate proxy boundary to direct dialing or unauthenticated proxy access. Make every configured-but-invalid proxy or auth setting fatal to supervisor proxy startup, emit an OCSF ConfigStateChange failure event before refusing, and share URL validation semantics between the Podman driver and the supervisor through a single validator in openshell-core (parse_upstream_proxy_url), so a value accepted at sandbox-create time can never be rejected in-container or vice versa. Inline user:pass@ URL credentials are now fatal in the supervisor too (previously warn-and-strip), matching the driver. Unset or empty variables still mean no proxy; only present-but-invalid values fail. Error paths never include credential content. Addresses the fail-closed review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): finish the fail-closed upstream proxy credential contract The upstream proxy URL already had a single shared validator, but the credential did not: the Podman driver rejected only CR/LF/NUL while the supervisor rejected every control character, so a credential accepted at sandbox-create time (e.g. one containing a tab) could still be rejected in-container. Present-but-whitespace reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* values were also silently treated as unset, quietly downgrading the operator's egress boundary to direct dialing. Add parse_upstream_proxy_credential to openshell-core as the single source of truth for the documented user:pass credential form (non-empty user, no control characters, trimmed) and use it in both the Podman driver's secret staging and the supervisor's Proxy-Authorization header construction. Error variants carry no payload so credential content can never leak into messages. Make a present-but-empty reserved variable fatal to supervisor proxy startup instead of meaning "unset"; only fully unset variables disable the proxy. The driver correspondingly rejects an empty no_proxy at config time so it can never inject a value the supervisor refuses. Addresses the remaining fail-closed credential/config review item on Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> #2245. * fix(sandbox,podman): close remaining fail-open upstream proxy config paths Two configuration paths could still silently run without the proxy boundary the operator believed was in effect. A no_proxy bypass list configured without any https_proxy/http_proxy was accepted by both the driver and the supervisor and simply meant "dial everything directly". Reject it on both sides, exactly like the existing proxy_auth_file-without-proxy rule: an operator who wrote a bypass list assumed proxying was active, so accepting it hides a fail-open state. The gateway.sh dev script guarded proxy settings with [[ -n "${VAR:-}" ]], which conflates unset with explicitly-empty and dropped the latter before the gateway's validation could see it. Use ${VAR+x} instead so a set-but-empty variable is written into gateway.toml and rejected at startup by validate_proxy_config rather than silently discarded. Addresses the remaining fail-open configuration review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject upstream proxy URLs with path, query, or fragment parse_upstream_proxy_url accepted URLs like http://proxy.corp.com:8080/some/path and silently discarded everything after host:port, a lenience inherited from the original supervisor parser. A forward proxy is addressed by host:port only, so extra components indicate a misconfiguration (for example a pasted endpoint URL) and silently truncating them violates the present-but-invalid-is-fatal contract enforced everywhere else in this configuration surface. Reject a path, query, or fragment in the shared validator with a new UnexpectedComponent error. A bare trailing slash remains accepted because the url crate normalizes an absent http path to "/", making the two indistinguishable. Both the Podman driver (gateway startup) and the supervisor (sandbox startup) inherit the rule through the shared parser, keeping their semantics identical by construction. Addresses the proxy URL component review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): remove plain-HTTP upstream proxy support The http_proxy path tunneled plain-HTTP requests through the corporate proxy with CONNECT to port 80 and then sent origin-form requests down the tunnel. Conventional enterprise forward proxies expect plain HTTP as absolute-form requests sent directly over the proxy connection, and commonly refuse CONNECT to port 80, so the setting looked supported but failed against typical deployments. Tunneling also blinds the proxy to the one protocol it could inspect. Narrow the feature to TLS (CONNECT) egress only, which is the conventional and already-correct case: plain-HTTP requests now always dial the destination directly, and only client CONNECT tunnels chain through the corporate proxy. Remove the http_proxy config field, the --sandbox-http-proxy / OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_HTTP_PROXY driver surface, the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_HTTP_PROXY variable, and the UpstreamScheme plumbing. The feature never shipped, so this is a clean removal; a stray http_proxy key in gateway.toml still fails loudly through the config's deny_unknown_fields. Removing the plain-HTTP proxy branch also removes its host-gateway special case; the architecture doc now documents the real host-gateway behavior (add driver-injected host aliases to the reserved NO_PROXY list) instead of an invariant the HTTPS path never implemented. Plain-HTTP forwarding through a corporate proxy can return later as absolute-form forwarding behind its own design review. Addresses the plain-HTTP forwarding review item on #2245. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): escape generated TOML and require explicit proxy URL form Escape backslashes, quotes, and control characters when gateway.sh writes proxy values into gateway.toml, so a hostile or unusual environment value cannot corrupt the config or inject extra keys. Restrict the upstream proxy URL grammar to the documented http://host:port form: a scheme-less value is no longer normalized to http:// and a missing port is no longer silently defaulted to 80. Docs, README, and CLI help now state the explicit-form requirement consistently. Also fix a test-only call of handle_tcp_connection that was missing the upstream_proxy argument added in an earlier commit. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): preserve tunneled bytes read with the CONNECT response The CONNECT handshake reads the corporate proxy's response in chunks, so the read that completes the header block can also contain the first tunneled payload bytes. Those bytes were discarded, silently corrupting the start of the tunnel for server-speaks-first destinations or proxies that coalesce writes. connect_via now returns a PrefixedStream that replays any bytes received past the response terminator before reading from the socket again; writes pass through unchanged. Direct dials wrap the stream with an empty prefix so downstream relay and TLS paths keep a single stream type, and tls_connect_upstream is generalized to any AsyncRead + AsyncWrite stream. Adds regression coverage for a combined response/payload read and for prefix replay ordering. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): gate cleartext proxy Basic auth behind an explicit opt-in Proxy-Authorization: Basic is base64 over the plain-TCP connection to the http:// corporate proxy, so anyone on the network path between the sandbox host and the proxy can recover the credential. Sending it is now an explicit operator decision instead of an implicit side effect of configuring proxy_auth_file. Add a proxy_auth_allow_insecure driver setting (CLI --sandbox-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE), delivered to the supervisor as the reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE variable. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: an auth file without the acknowledgement is rejected at gateway startup and at supervisor startup, as is the acknowledgement without an auth file or any value other than 'true'. gateway.sh writes the key only as a TOML boolean; a non-boolean value is emitted as a quoted string so the gateway rejects it at startup instead of risking injection. Documents the exposure prominently in the gateway config reference, the driver README, and the sandbox architecture doc. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): honor port qualifiers and resolved addresses in NO_PROXY Two divergences from the documented NO_PROXY contract: - A port-qualified entry (internal.corp:8443) was silently stripped to its hostname and bypassed the proxy for every port, excluding traffic the operator never listed. Entries now keep the optional :port qualifier (also on IP and CIDR entries) and only apply to that destination port; a trailing qualifier that is not a valid port stays part of the pattern instead of widening the entry. - IP and CIDR entries only matched IP-literal hosts, so a bypass like 10.0.0.0/8 never applied to hostnames resolving into that range. NO_PROXY evaluation now sees the validated resolved addresses: an IP/CIDR entry matching through resolution authorizes a direct dial of only the addresses it contains, so a bypass scoped to an internal range cannot widen into a direct dial of addresses outside it. Hostname-level matches (loopback, wildcard, domain entries, IP-literal hosts) keep authorizing all validated addresses. proxy_for is replaced by decision(host, port, resolved) returning either the proxy endpoint or the permitted direct-dial subset, and dial_upstream restricts the direct connect to that subset. Adds regression coverage for port-scoped bypasses on domain, IP, and CIDR entries, invalid port qualifiers, resolved-address matching, and split-resolution subset dialing. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bind proxied CONNECT tunnels to validated addresses The CONNECT request sent to the corporate proxy carried the destination hostname, so the proxy resolved the name itself and the addresses that had passed SSRF and allowed_ips validation were discarded. Split-horizon DNS or rebinding at the proxy could then reach internal or otherwise unapproved destinations through a tunnel the supervisor logged as validated, and IP-range policy could not be enforced at all on proxied dials. CONNECT now targets a validated resolved address by default: the proxy performs no DNS resolution and the tunnel stays bound to the answer the supervisor checked. The hostname still travels inside the tunnel (TLS SNI, application Host), so destination servers behave normally. In split-horizon networks, operators point the gateway host at the corporate resolver so internal names validate to their internal addresses. For proxies whose ACLs filter on hostnames and reject IP CONNECT targets, a new proxy_connect_by_hostname opt-in (CLI --sandbox-proxy-connect-by-hostname, env OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME, reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME) restores hostname CONNECT, documented as re-opening proxy-side resolution and making the proxy's ACLs the effective egress control. Fail-closed pairing on both sides: the opt-in without a proxy, or any value other than 'true', is fatal. Adds regression coverage for the IP CONNECT request line (including IPv6 bracketing and hostname non-leakage), the hostname opt-in, and the config pairing rules in driver and supervisor. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): reject empty port after bracketed IPv6 proxy host http://[fd00::1]: passed the explicit-port check because the bracketed branch only tested for a colon after the bracket, then fell back to port 80 — violating the fail-closed http://host:port contract and potentially sending configured Basic credentials to an unintended service. Require a non-empty suffix after ]:, matching the unbracketed branch, and cover the case in the shared parser tests. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): fall back across validated addresses in proxied CONNECT The direct path hands TcpStream::connect the whole validated address list and it falls back across them, but the validated-IP CONNECT path attempted only the first address, so a dual-stack destination could fail through the corporate proxy even when a later validated address was reachable. connect_via_validated tries each validated address in order under one aggregate CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT budget, returning the first success; when every attempt fails the error names the attempt count and carries the last failure. An empty address list is rejected up front. Adds regressions for first-fails/second-succeeds fallback (asserting both CONNECT request lines), the aggregate all-addresses failure message, and the empty-list rejection. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): strip new reserved proxy vars and complete docs/tests Follow-ups from review: - Add OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_AUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE and OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_PROXY_CONNECT_BY_HOSTNAME to the supervisor-only strip list so workload child processes never inherit them, matching the documented contract for the other reserved proxy variables, and cover both in the supervisor-only variable test. - Document all five OPENSHELL_SANDBOX_* proxy variables in the mise run gateway help text, marked Podman-only and stating the auth-file/acknowledgement pairing, and complete the gateway-key list in the Podman README. - Add NO_PROXY composition coverage for bracketed IPv6 entries with port qualifiers, bare IPv6 entries, and IPv6 CIDR matching against an IPv6-literal host and against a hostname's resolved addresses, including the port-qualified CIDR form. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): cap each proxied CONNECT attempt within the shared budget A proxy that accepted the first CONNECT request but never responded consumed the entire aggregate handshake timeout, so later validated addresses were never tried and the hang defeated the multi-address fallback. Each attempt is now time-boxed to its fair share of the time remaining before the shared deadline (remaining / attempts_left): a hanging attempt is cut off with enough budget left for every remaining address, while time a fast failure does not use rolls over to later attempts and the total never exceeds CONNECT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT. A timed-out attempt is recorded like any other failure, and the aggregate error distinguishes all-attempted from budget-exhausted runs. Adds a first-hangs/second-succeeds regression driven through a test-visible budget parameter so it runs in about a second instead of a real 30s window. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): deliver corporate proxy config on the supervisor argv The proxy settings were injected as reserved OPENSHELL_UPSTREAM_* container environment variables. The driver only wrote names the operator configured, but container runtimes layer the spec environment over ENV values baked into the sandbox image, so an image could supply NO_PROXY=*, enable hostname CONNECT, or point an unconfigured deployment at an attacker-controlled proxy whenever the operator left a field unset. The settings now travel as supervisor command-line arguments (--upstream-proxy, --upstream-no-proxy, --upstream-proxy-auth-file, --upstream-proxy-auth-allow-insecure, --upstream-proxy-connect-by-hostname) built by the driver from operator config. The driver sets the container entrypoint and command explicitly, so neither sandbox spec/template environment nor image ENV can influence argv, and an omitted flag genuinely means unconfigured — in every supervisor topology, since the supervisor no longer consults its environment for these settings at all. Credentials stay on the root-only secret mount; only the mount path appears on argv. The reserved environment names, their strip-list entries, and the env-based validation surface are removed. UpstreamProxyConfig::from_args replaces from_env, reusing the same shared fail-closed validation and pairing rules keyed by the CLI flag names. Driver tests now assert the argv contract, including that sandbox-supplied environment cannot add, remove, or redirect proxy flags; supervisor tests cover from_args mapping and its pairing rules. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs(sandbox): align proxy comments with the argv transport The argv migration left comments describing the configuration as reserved environment variables ("reserved value", "present-but-empty variable", "reserved upstream proxy variables"). Rephrase them as driver-supplied arguments and operator settings so the documented trust boundary matches the implementation. Comment-only change. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): parse bracketed IPv6 authorities in client CONNECT targets parse_target split the CONNECT authority at the first colon, so an IPv6-literal target like [2001:db8::1]:443 always failed port parsing and IPv6-literal clients could never reach policy evaluation; a regression test even locked in that failure. Parse the RFC 3986 bracketed form and return the host bracket-free, matching what DNS resolution, SSRF validation, NO_PROXY matching, and the upstream CONNECT builder expect. Unclosed brackets, a missing or empty port after the bracket, and non-numeric ports are rejected; unbracketed behavior is unchanged. Replaces the failure-locking test with success coverage for bracketed targets and adds malformed-bracket rejection cases. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover proxy-auth secret cleanup across lifecycle failures The per-sandbox proxy-auth credential secret is staged before the container is created and removed on cleanup, but no test proved the cleanup paths actually issue the secret removal. Add Podman-stub tests that drive create_sandbox to a container-create failure and to a start failure, and delete_sandbox for an out-of-band deletion, asserting each path issues the DELETE for the per-sandbox proxy-auth secret so a credential can never outlive the sandbox that owned it. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * docs: list corporate proxy keys in the Podman compute-driver overview The Fern Podman driver section enumerated its gateway.toml keys but omitted the corporate egress proxy settings. Add https_proxy, no_proxy, proxy_auth_file, proxy_auth_allow_insecure, and proxy_connect_by_hostname with a pointer to the gateway configuration reference for the full contract. No navigation change: the reference folder already includes the gateway configuration page. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(sandbox): cover the SSRF-to-TLS composition across the proxy tunnel Existing tests exercised validated-IP CONNECT and the upstream-TLS helper independently, but not the full boundary. Add an end-to-end regression that stands up a fake corporate proxy tunneling to a fake TLS server and drives the real path: connect_via_validated CONNECTs to the validated address, the proxy splices the tunnel, and tls_connect_upstream verifies the upstream certificate against the original hostname carried in SNI. It asserts the CONNECT authority is the validated IP and never the hostname, that verification succeeds for the matching hostname, and that a mismatched hostname is rejected — proving a rebinding or split-horizon substitution behind the proxy cannot pass certificate verification. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox,podman): bound proxy-auth reads, reject port 0, fix stale comment Three review findings: - CWE-400: the proxy-auth credential file was read with an unbounded read_to_string on both the driver (sandbox-create) and supervisor (startup) paths, so a huge file or a special file such as /dev/zero could exhaust memory. Add a shared bounded reader in openshell-core that rejects non-regular files, caps the size at 4 KiB, and reads at most that many bytes; the driver runs it via spawn_blocking. Covers oversized, special-file, and missing-path cases on both sides. - Reject an upstream proxy URL with port 0: it passed the explicit-port check and startup validation but is not a connectable TCP port, so every proxied dial would fail later. Add a typed ZeroPort error with shared-validator and Podman-config tests. - Reword a driver-config comment that still described a 'reserved variable' to match the argv transport. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(sandbox): open proxy-auth file non-blocking to reject FIFOs promptly read_upstream_proxy_credential_file opened the path with a blocking File::open before the regular-file check, so a configured FIFO with no writer would block open() indefinitely — hanging sandbox creation on the driver and supervisor startup. Open with O_NONBLOCK on Unix so the open returns immediately, then reject the non-regular file as before; O_NONBLOCK has no effect on the later read of a regular file. Adds a mkfifo regression asserting the reader returns promptly with a non-regular-file error instead of hanging. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): cover corporate proxy egress across driver and supervisor The existing corporate-proxy tests construct config structs or call CONNECT helpers directly, so none of them detect a break in the wiring between layers: gateway TOML deserialization, the Podman argv and secret-mount semantics, supervisor CLI parsing, or policy denial before proxy contact. Add a Podman e2e that drives the whole chain against a fake authenticated forward proxy and asserts that an approved TLS request traverses it with a validated-IP CONNECT, a policy-denied destination is refused with 403 without ever reaching the proxy, credentials arrive through the mounted per-sandbox secret, and deleting the sandbox removes that secret. SupportContainer is a new harness fixture. Unlike ContainerHttpServer it probes readiness with a TCP connect rather than an HTTP GET, so it can host a forward proxy and TLS servers, and it exposes container logs and network IP for assertions. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * test(podman): restart the gateway on the proxy-config panic path The panic cleanup for the temporary corporate proxy configuration restored the gateway TOML but left the gateway process running with the temporary configuration still loaded, which could poison later test binaries in the same run. Nothing restarted it: the only ManagedGateway is the short-lived one inside restart_gateway, and its Drop only calls start, which does not reload config for an already-running gateway. Restore and synchronously stop/start the gateway in Drop, and set restored only after the normal restore and restart both succeed so a failed restart no longer suppresses the fallback. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(supervisor-network): derive the loopback proxy bypass from resolved IPs The automatic bypass treated the host string "localhost" as proof that the destination was loopback and returned every resolved address. A sandbox controls its own /etc/hosts and resolve_socket_addrs consults it before DNS, so a workload could map localhost to any policy-allowed address and dial it directly, escaping the operator proxy and the inspection and audit boundary it exists to provide. Check the resolved addresses instead: the name bypasses only when the resolution is non-empty and every address is loopback. A mixed answer is not partially honored, and an IP literal is still authoritative for itself. A spoofed localhost falls through to the entries below, so an explicit operator NO_PROXY entry is still honored. This matches the trust model detect_trusted_host_gateway already applies to the same hosts file, which validates the mapped address rather than the alias. Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> * fix(podman): clean up proxy-auth secret when container already deleted The delete_sandbox early-return path cleaned up the token secret but skipped the proxy-auth secret, leaking it on disk. Also update tests for recent API changes (Optional socket_path, workspace field, list-based container lookup). Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <phmartin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Martin <philippe@openshell.dev> |
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Piotr MlocekandEvan Lezar
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f7cd910829 |
fix: eliminate parallel Rust test flakes (#2434)
* fix: eliminate parallel Rust test flakes Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> * refactor(supervisor-network): name workload proxy TCP connection Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(supervisor-network): name procfs address family Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Evan Lezar
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21da343c9f |
refactor(supervisor): pass agent proposal state explicitly (#2421)
* test(supervisor-network): default L7 eval context in tests Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> * refactor(supervisor): pass agent proposal state explicitly Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Evan Lezar <elezar@nvidia.com> |
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Adel Zaalouk
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472e23f96a |
fix(proxy): include OPA deny reason in CONNECT 403 response (#2363)
* fix(proxy): include OPA deny reason in CONNECT 403 response When a CONNECT request was denied by OPA policy, the 403 response used a generic "not permitted by policy" message for both "endpoint not in policy" and "endpoint matched but binary didn't match." Users had no way to distinguish the two without reading supervisor logs. The OPA policy already computes a detailed deny_reason (e.g., "binary '/usr/bin/node' not allowed in policy 'X'") but the proxy was not including it in the HTTP response. Now the CONNECT deny response includes a "reason" field with the OPA deny reason when available. When the reason is empty, the field is omitted for backward compatibility. Fixes #2355 Signed-off-by: Adel Zaalouk <azaalouk@redhat.com> * docs(observability): document optional reason field in CONNECT 403 response The proxy now includes a reason field in the JSON body of denied CONNECT responses when the policy engine provides a specific denial cause. Update the Proxy Error Responses section to show the field and describe when it is present vs omitted. Signed-off-by: Adel Zaalouk <azaalouk@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adel Zaalouk <azaalouk@redhat.com> |
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Derek Carr
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5952a5a23f |
feat(workspace): add workspace resource model with scoping, membershi… (#2243)
* feat(workspace): implement workspace model (Phase 1 of RFC 0011) Implements workspace and membership model providing hard isolation boundaries for multi-player OpenShell deployments. Workspace CRUD with Kubernetes-style Terminating phase for graceful deletion. All resources scoped by workspace via ObjectMeta. Membership RPCs for workspace access control. Persistence migration shifts name uniqueness to (object_type, workspace, name). Provider profiles support platform and workspace scoping. Service routing uses workspace-prefixed DNS labels. Inference routes renamed and workspace-scoped with DeleteInferenceRoute RPC. Python SDK with WorkspaceClient, two-method list pattern (workspace-scoped and for_all_workspaces), and workspace parameter on all methods. CLI workspace flags, TUI workspace cycling. K8s driver filters unmanaged CRs and uses delete preconditions. Podman driver uses immutable container IDs. Label serialization fixed across all put_if call sites. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(cli): delegate sandbox upload command to existing upload function The standalone `sandbox upload` command reimplemented upload logic inline with two bugs: it used `Path::exists()` which follows symlinks (rejecting dangling symlinks), and it ran git-aware filtering on symlink sources. The `run::sandbox_upload()` function already handles both cases correctly via `sandbox_upload_plan()`. Replace the inline logic with a call to the existing function. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): shorten sandbox names and fix test compatibility Shorten the sandbox name in initial_sparse_policy_is_acknowledged_as_loaded from 'e2e-2159-sparse-enrich' (22 chars) to 'e2e-sparse-enrich' (17 chars) to comply with MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN (19 chars). Also capture stderr in create_keep_with_args so future sandbox creation failures include the actual CLI error instead of reporting empty output. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * test(workspace): add test coverage for workspace CRUD and persistence isolation Add unit tests for workspace create happy path, get round-trip, get not-found, get empty-name rejection, already-exists error, and resolve_workspace not-found. Add persistence test proving cross-workspace name uniqueness (same name in different workspaces produces separate records). Add workspace name max-length boundary tests. Fix e2e harness to include stderr in name-parse-failure error path. Align Python e2e test_workspace_crud with try/finally pattern. Document provider profile catalog workspace scoping gap in RFC 0011. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(examples): update examples for workspace model compatibility Shorten sandbox names in demo scripts to fit the 19-character MAX_ROUTABLE_NAME_LEN limit: policy-demo prefix to pd-, multi-agent notepad derives a short SANDBOX_TAG from the run ID, governance interceptor uses gs-PID-RANDOM. Update vscode-remote-sandbox.md SSH host aliases from openshell-{name} to openshell-{name}.{workspace} format. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * feat(sdk): add workspace-scoped client and workspace CRUD Add WorkspaceScopedClient modeled after kube::Api::namespaced — captures workspace once and injects it into every sandbox request. Add workspace CRUD methods (create, get, list, delete) and list_sandboxes_all_workspaces on OpenShellClient. Extend SandboxRef with workspace field and add WorkspaceRef type. Include mock tests for all new operations. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings in workspace test assertions Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(docs): convert indented code blocks to fenced in RFC 0011 Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(lint): resolve clippy warnings and apply cargo fmt across workspace Auto-format with cargo fmt and fix clippy warnings exposed by the reformat: unnecessary qualifications, map_unwrap_or, identical match arms, unused variable prefix, dead code annotations, and let-unit-value in e2e harness. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): address workspace scoping issues from review - Add workspace field to settings JSON output (CLI) - Skip Podman containers missing workspace label instead of defaulting to empty string, matching K8s driver behavior - Add resource_version to list_by_scope SELECT in both SQLite and Postgres backends, with regression test - Gate PolicyLocalContext proposal/lookup routes on workspace readiness, returning 503 when workspace is not yet discovered - Block sandbox and provider creation in TUI all-workspaces mode - Clear workspace vectors in TUI reset_sandbox_state Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog workspace-aware Thread workspace through snapshot_catalog so the EffectiveProviderProfileCatalog enforces workspace boundaries on both read and write paths. UserProviderProfileSource now loads platform-scoped profiles (workspace "") plus the target workspace's profiles, preventing cross-workspace duplicate profile ID collisions that previously caused global catalog failures. Update RFC 0011 to reflect catalog scoping is implemented in Phase 1 rather than deferred to future work. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(persistence): include workspace column in atomic policy revision INSERT put_policy_revision_atomic omitted the workspace column from the INSERT into the objects table in both SQLite and Postgres backends, causing atomically-written policy revisions to lose their workspace association. Add workspace field to AtomicPolicyRevisionWrite and thread it through both backend INSERT statements, matching the non-atomic put_policy_revision path which already included it. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(proxy): skip ancestor walk when socket owner is the entrypoint collect_ancestor_identities walked the entire process tree above the entrypoint when the connecting process was the entrypoint itself, SHA256-hashing every ancestor binary (IDE, shell, container runtime). On dev machines with large binaries in the ancestor chain this exceeded the 30-second test timeout. When start_pid == stop_pid there are no intermediate ancestors to verify, so return an empty list immediately. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): make provider profile catalog scope-aware Allow the same profile ID at platform and workspace scopes by introducing layered catalog entries where workspace profiles shadow platform profiles. Add source and scope fields to the ProviderProfile proto and CLI output. Migrate List/Get handlers to the catalog, fixing divergence with runtime profile resolution. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align podman e2e labels with centralized driver constants The podman driver moved its container labels to the centralized openshell.ai/ prefix, but the e2e test harness and cleanup script still referenced the old openshell.sandbox-* keys, causing the local_driver_token_restart test to fail on container lookup. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(e2e): align python profile isolation test with scope-aware catalog Platform profiles are now visible in workspace listings as fallbacks per the layered catalog design. Update the assertion to match. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> * fix(workspace): honor profile_workspace in runtime profile resolution Runtime profile lookups now consult provider.profile_workspace via get_type_profile_for_scope. Providers created with --global-profile (profile_workspace="") resolve to the platform profile even when a workspace profile shadows the same ID. All 6 runtime call sites updated; type-only call sites remain scope-agnostic. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com> |
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Piotr Mlocek
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d556748771 |
feat(supervisor-middleware): add network egress middleware (#2027)
Signed-off-by: Piotr Mlocek <pmlocek@nvidia.com> |
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|
Shiju
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fcc9db3074 |
refactor(jsonrpc): carry typed inspection errors (#2244)
Signed-off-by: Shiju <shiju@nvidia.com> |
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Tony Luo
|
40194f935e |
fix(network): fail closed when credential placeholders cannot be rewritten (#2162)
* fix(network): fail closed when credential placeholders cannot be rewritten When the credential rewriter degrades internally, the proxy forwarded the literal `openshell:resolve:env:<NAME>` placeholder (or its provider alias marker) to the upstream instead of the resolved secret, leaking the reserved token on the wire and causing upstream auth failures (#2161). Two fail-open paths are closed: - secrets: `rewrite_http_header_block` returned the header block verbatim when no `SecretResolver` was available, so the fail-closed marker scan (which ran only on the resolved path) never saw the placeholder. It now scans the header region for reserved markers even with no resolver and returns `UnresolvedPlaceholderError` when one is present. Marker-free traffic still passes through unchanged. - proxy: when TLS was detected on a CONNECT but `tls_state` was `None` (ephemeral CA generation or CA file write failed at startup), the handler fell back to a raw `copy_bidirectional` tunnel, bypassing credential rewrite. Inside the proxy handler `tls_state` is `None` only on CA-init failure (`mode != Proxy` never starts the handler, and `tls: skip` is handled earlier), so it now refuses the connection with a 503 and a High-severity denial event instead of tunneling. The two startup CA-failure logs are raised from Medium to High. Tests: resolver=None with a placeholder in the request line, a header value, and the provider-alias form now fail closed; marker-free passthrough is unchanged; the relay integration test asserts the request is rejected before any byte reaches upstream; and the 503 fail-closed response contract is locked. Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> * fix(network): refuse CONNECT before 200 when TLS termination is unavailable The fail-closed refusal for a terminating CONNECT with no TLS termination state (ephemeral CA init failed) was written after the 200 Connection Established response. Because a CONNECT client only sends its TLS ClientHello after reading the 200, the peek-based TLS detection is inherently post-200, so the 503 landed inside the established tunnel and surfaced to the client as a TLS protocol error rather than a readable status. An 'allowed CONNECT' event was also logged first. Move the decision to a pre-200 gate: query_tls_mode resolves purely from the policy decision + host/port (no peeked bytes), so the route's TLS treatment is known before the tunnel is acknowledged. When TLS state is absent and the route is not tls: skip, write the 503 as the first bytes on the socket, emit the High-severity Denied event, and close. tls: skip routes tunnel raw exactly as before, and no allowed-CONNECT event is emitted on the refusal path. The now-unreachable post-200 branch is kept as defense in depth but no longer writes an in-tunnel 503; it fails closed by dropping the connection instead. Add connection-level regression tests over a real loopback socket: the gate refuses with HTTP/1.1 503 as the first bytes for a terminating route, and writes nothing when TLS termination is present or the route is tls: skip. Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> * fix(network): order the CONNECT TLS-unavailable refusal after SSRF Addresses the gator re-check on #2162. Ordering: the pre-200 fail-closed refusal ran before SSRF/allowed_ips validation, so during CA-init failure an internal-address CONNECT got a 503 tls_termination_unavailable instead of the normal 403 ssrf_denied, weakening operator visibility in degraded state. The SSRF branches now return validated addresses; the refusal runs after that validation (an internal address has already been denied with 403) but still before the upstream connect and before 200 Connection Established. effective_tls_skip is still resolved up front since the refusal consumes it. Tests: add connection-level regressions through the real handle_tcp_connection, driving a CONNECT from a child /bin/bash copy so the /proc process-identity binding resolves it against a permissive policy (the hot-swap test's identity pattern). They assert the first bytes are HTTP/1.1 503 for a terminating route with no TLS state, a 403 (not 503) for an internal address, and no refusal for a tls: skip route. These are gated to Linux at runtime (evaluate_opa_tcp needs /proc); a companion test verifies the OPA policy shape (glob allow, tls mode) on every platform so the precondition is locked where /proc is unavailable. rest.rs: tighten the fail-closed relay test to assert the forwarded buffer is_empty() rather than merely lacking the placeholder/secret. Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> * test(network): keep the CONNECT handler test client fork-free The handler regression tests forked cat to read the proxy reply, so the client socket fd was inherited by a second process with a different binary. The identity resolver correctly denies that as ambiguous shared-socket ownership (the same invariant resolve_process_identity_denies_fork_exec_shared_socket_ambiguity pins), so the tests exercised the deny path instead of the allow path — and on busy CI runners the deny-path /proc fallback scan exceeded the test budget and looked like a hang. The client script now uses only bash builtins (exec, printf, read -d '') so exactly one process owns the socket, and the child is left to exit on EOF instead of being killed mid-read. Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> * test(network): drive the CONNECT handler tests with an in-process client The child-process client (even fork-free) made the handler tests environment-sensitive: on CI runners with a busy or restricted /proc, resolving the child's socket ownership degraded into the whole-/proc fallback scan and a deny, which surfaced as a hang. The client is now an in-process TcpStream and the test policy allows current_exe(), so identity resolution binds the socket to the test process itself in the descendant scan — the same in-process pattern the passing resolve_process_identity tests rely on. The tls: skip test additionally asserts that the handler emitted no DenialEvent at any stage, so it can no longer pass vacuously on a policy or identity deny. Refusal budgets widened to 30s as a belt for slow runners; the refusals themselves return in milliseconds. Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> * test(core): pin the percent-encoded marker no-resolver fail-closed path The no-resolver scan already catches the percent-encoded canonical marker through its decoded pass; this regression pins it: a request line carrying openshell%3Aresolve%3Aenv%3AKEY with no resolver must fail closed with UnresolvedPlaceholderError { location: header }. Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Tony Luo <xialuo@nvidia.com> |
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|
Taylor MutchandSeth Jennings
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8eacb4779f |
feat(kubernetes): add sidecar supervisor topology (#2076)
* feat(kubernetes): add sidecar supervisor topology Add the Kubernetes sidecar supervisor topology, its Helm/Skaffold configuration, topology documentation, and sidecar e2e matrix coverage. Skip root-only sandbox identity rewriting when process enforcement is network-only so the low-permission sidecar process container can start successfully. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar process id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar process id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): avoid similar proxy id names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * docs(kubernetes): clarify sidecar topology limits Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): keep sidecar process leaf capless Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): refresh sidecar provider env snapshots Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * test(supervisor): align hot-swap identity regression Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): stage sidecar mtls files before proxy chown Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): simplify sidecar supervisor topology Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * chore(helm): reuse sidecar skaffold values Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid similar iptables helper names Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(e2e): harden kube gateway wrapper setup Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(supervisor): avoid nft batch rollback on OCP Run nftables setup as individual commands so optional conntrack and log expressions can fail without rolling back required table, chain, and reject rules. Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): preserve process identity in sidecar topology Render sidecar pods with a shared process namespace, keep binary-aware network policy enabled, and move Kubernetes sidecar settings under the nested sidecar config table. Also apply unprivileged Landlock/seccomp setup in NetworkOnly supervisor mode so sidecar topology keeps sandbox child hardening without privileged process setup. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): replace sidecar snapshots with control socket Coordinate sidecar policy and provider bootstrap over a local Unix socket so the process leaf no longer reads policy/provider snapshot files. Report entrypoint startup through the control channel and keep gateway credentials confined to the network sidecar. Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * feat(kubernetes): support relaxed sidecar network identity Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy sidecar clippy lint Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * refactor(kubernetes): standardize topology naming Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(sandbox): satisfy linux clippy timeout import Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): support kata sidecar on ipv4 pods Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): satisfy linux clippy for sidecar fallback Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * chore(kubernetes): remove stale supervisor topology references Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): enable sidecar binary policy inspection Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): harden sidecar control boundary Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> * fix(kubernetes): couple sidecar supervisor lifecycles Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Mutch <taylormutch@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com> |
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Shane Utt
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420a855ddc |
test(supervisor-network): add proxy hostname parser regression tests (#2197)
Add regression coverage for parser differentials in the egress proxy's CONNECT hostname handling and OPA wildcard policy matching. Signed-off-by: Shane Utt <shaneutt@linux.com> |
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krishicksandddurst
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7bce1223dc |
feat(policy): add JSON-RPC and MCP L7 policies (#1865)
Add policy schema, proto, provider profile, OPA, and L7 proxy support for `protocol: json-rpc` and `protocol: mcp`. Generic JSON-RPC endpoints match exact method names only, with `method: "*"` as the all-method sentinel; wildcard/glob methods and params matchers are rejected. Parse JSON-RPC request bodies and batches in the forward proxy, deny response-shaped client frames, limit receive-stream GET allowance to MCP endpoints, and redact params in decision logs. Preserve L7 rule params on the proto load path so MCP `tools/call` tool filters behave like YAML-loaded policies. Add MCP conformance coverage, JSON-RPC L7 e2e coverage, and docs for the new protocols and current matcher limitations. Signed-off-by: Kris Hicks <khicks@nvidia.com> Co-authored-by: ddurst <267424412+ddurst-nvidia@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Jesse JaggarsandRussell Bryant
|
f569a0ade6 |
feat(sandbox): proxy-side AWS SigV4 credential signing for CONNECT tunnels (#1638)
Signed-off-by: Jesse Jaggars <jjaggars@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Russell Bryant <russell.bryant@gmail.com> |
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Calum Murray
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4b78b442e6 |
fix(openshell-network-supervisor): gate proxy accept on symlink resolution readiness (#1968)
* fix(openshell-network-supervisor): gate proxy accept on symlink resolution readiness Signed-off-by: Calum Murray <cmurray@redhat.com> * fix(openshell-network-supervisor): skip symlink resolution gate when process supervisor is disabled Signed-off-by: Calum Murray <cmurray@redhat.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Calum Murray <cmurray@redhat.com> |