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wyucandClaude Opus 4.8
7420d26ebb
Headless Chromium renders caller-supplied HTML on two paths, and neither applied the Content-Security-Policy the app packager injects for exports. Inline script in a preview scene or an uploaded render project could reach loopback and internal addresses, and on the render path the response is painted into the returned MP4. - Add a single untrusted-HTML CSP and an injector that places the policy as the first node the parser processes (ASCII whitespace only; a leading BOM is stripped; a byte-level injector preserves non-UTF-8 bodies). - Inject the policy into the interactive preview srcDoc and add a Puppeteer request guard that blocks non-data/blob/about requests from the untrusted frame and non-about main-frame navigations. - Harden every extracted project HTML, and sanitize framed same-origin .svg and .xhtml documents (scripts, on* handlers, javascript: URLs, foreignObject, nested frames removed via parse5), which cannot carry a meta CSP. - Document the residual top-level-navigation risk on the render path, which the egress lockdown must contain. - Add real-Chromium boundary tests (zero listener hits incl. WebSocket) and a packager-equivalence test for the policy. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>