OpenMAIC/render-service

@openmaic/render-service

Isolated MP4 render service for OpenMAIC's classroom video export (issue #866).

The main app compiles a classroom to a self-contained Hyperframes project ZIP (index.html + assets/ + vendored GSAP) entirely in the browser. This service takes that ZIP and renders it to an MP4 with @hyperframes/producer, which drives headless Chromium (frame capture) + FFmpeg (encode). It runs in its own Node 22 container because the producer needs Node ≥ 22, Chromium, and FFmpeg — none of which belong in the Next.js runtime.

It is an opt-in capability: when the app has no RENDER_SERVICE_URL configured, in-app export degrades to downloading the project ZIP for local CLI rendering. Nothing here is required for the app to run.

HTTP API

Rendering is asynchronous (a 10-minute video can take tens of minutes): submit, poll, then download. Job ids are opaque.

Method + path	Purpose
POST /render	multipart: project (the ZIP) + fps, quality, format fields → 202 { jobId }
POST /preview	JSON: persisted scene, stage context, and viewport → synchronous PNG
GET /render/:jobId	status/progress plus actual capture, worker, profile, and runtime metrics
GET /render/:jobId/download	stream the MP4 (or 302 to a presigned URL) once succeeded
DELETE /render/:jobId	cancel a queued/running job
GET /health	resource profile, observed runtime versions, and whether renders are being admitted

status is one of queued | running | succeeded | failed | cancelled; progress is 0..1.

Admission: 429s and /health

Admission rejections are machine-readable. POST /render answers 429 with a JSON body { error, reason } where reason is one of:

• queue_full — the deployment-wide cap RENDER_MAX_QUEUE (reserved + queued + running jobs) is exhausted; back off and retry.
• per_identity_limit — this client identity already holds RENDER_MAX_JOBS_PER_USER active renders.
• resource_unavailable — the opt-in resource owner is unavailable or admission is closed; operator investigation is required before resuming submissions.

POST /preview also answers 429 with { error, reason }, where reason is one of:

• preview_queue_full — RENDER_PREVIEW_MAX_IN_FLIGHT previews are already live (buffering or executing).
• preview_per_user_limit — this client identity already holds RENDER_PREVIEW_MAX_PER_USER previews.
• capacity_busy — the shared execution slot is occupied, including by a video render. Previews never queue for this slot; retry later.

The opt-in per-task resource mode does not expose /preview: it returns 503 with reason: resource_mode_unsupported before reading the request body. Preview Chromium runs in the HTTP process on the default path and is not part of the systemd task fence described below.

GET /health reports accepting: boolean — whether the queue cap currently has room for another video render — it reflects the render queue only, not preview admission or execution-slot availability. Callers and load balancers can shed traffic before probing with a real render. The flag is deliberately aggregate-only: no queue depths or occupancy counts, and never any per-identity data. Identity keys are client IPs when the service runs behind TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true, so exposing the per-identity map would publish the IP address of everyone currently rendering.

Previews share the service's single Chromium execution slot with video renders, but never wait in the video queue. Once a preview has passed its body and semantic checks, it renders immediately or fails with capacity_busy.

/preview requires fully self-contained scenes (inline code and data: URLs only); network, blob:, and relative references are rejected. Slide media must use data: URLs, and interactive scenes must contain embedded HTML whose resource references are inline or data: URLs. Non-self-contained inputs fail with 422 instead of returning a misleading PNG. Detection is best-effort: some exotic external constructs (for example, object data, track src, and CSS @import) may pass validation; self-contained scenes are the caller's responsibility, and end-to-end fidelity for persisted scenes arrives with caller-side preparation (tracked separately).

Environment

Var	Default	Meaning
PORT	9000	Listen port.
RENDER_RESOURCE_PROFILE	standard	standard prefers BeginFrame, permits producer compatibility fallback to screenshot, and requires 8 GiB; low-memory forces screenshot capture and requires 4 GiB. Both fix one producer worker, one render, and one extraction.
RENDER_MAX_CONCURRENCY	profile: 1	Must match the selected profile. Renders beyond the single execution slot queue FIFO.
RENDER_MAX_CONCURRENT_EXTRACTIONS	profile: 1	Must match the selected profile; bounds archive expansion to one 512 MiB expanded archive at a time.
RENDER_MAX_JOBS_PER_USER	1	Active jobs allowed per client identity (0 disables the guard — see note below).
RENDER_MAX_QUEUE	20	Max jobs in the system (reserved+queued+running) before new submits get 429.
RENDER_JOB_TTL_MS	1800000	How long finished jobs + artifacts live before cleanup.
RENDER_JOB_DEADLINE_MS	2700000	Hard per-job wall-clock deadline; overruns are aborted and marked failed.
RENDER_PREVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS	20000	Hard wall-clock deadline for a synchronous preview, including body parsing and Chromium cleanup.
RENDER_PREVIEW_MAX_IN_FLIGHT	8	Maximum admitted previews across buffering and execution.
RENDER_PREVIEW_MAX_PER_USER	2	Concurrent previews per owner identity; 0 disables the guard for deployments whose preview callers do not supply an owner identity (see note below).
RENDER_PREVIEW_MAX_JSON_BYTES	33554432	Maximum preview JSON body size (32 MiB), enforced on declared length and streamed bytes independently of the ZIP upload cap.
RENDER_CHUNK_EXECUTION	false	Opt in to the bounded local plan -> renderChunk -> assemble executor. The HTTP API stays unchanged.
RENDER_CHUNK_COUNT	1	Number of deterministic closed-GOP chunks planned for a render when chunk execution is enabled.
RENDER_CHUNK_WORKERS	profile: 1	Maximum producer capture workers inside one chunk. This remains explicit so chunk fan-out cannot multiply nested producer workers.
RENDER_MAX_PARALLEL_CHUNKS	1	Maximum chunks executed concurrently in the local process. Chunks beyond the bound wait locally.
RENDER_CHUNK_SIZE_FRAMES	unset	Optional fixed frame count per planned chunk.
RENDER_TARGET_CHUNK_FRAMES	unset	Optional target frame count used by the producer planner when deriving chunk boundaries.
RENDER_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES	314572800	Max compressed archive size accepted (300 MB); enforced on real bytes, before buffering.
RENDER_MAX_ENTRIES	5000	Max entries allowed in the archive.
RENDER_MAX_ENTRY_BYTES	209715200	Max expanded size of any single entry (200 MB).
RENDER_MAX_EXPANDED_BYTES	536870912	Max total expanded size across all entries (512 MB).
RENDER_MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO	200	Max expanded:compressed ratio per entry (ZIP-bomb guard).
RENDER_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN	true	Install the iptables egress lockdown at startup (needs root + CAP_NET_ADMIN); fails closed — the container exits if the rules can't be applied. Set false to run unisolated.
PRODUCER_TMP_PROJECT_DIR	/tmp/openmaic-renders	Scratch dir for unzipped projects + outputs.
PRODUCER_BROWSER_GPU_MODE	profile-controlled	Both profiles use the software/SwiftShader selector; standard keeps BeginFrame eligible with PRODUCER_FORCE_SCREENSHOT=false, while low-memory forces screenshot capture. This is not a host GPU requirement. Do not override it directly.
PRODUCER_LOW_MEMORY_MODE	profile-controlled	Explicitly false for standard and true for low-memory; cgroup heuristics cannot silently switch the selected profile.
PRODUCER_MAX_WORKERS	profile: 1	Explicit for both supported profiles so producer auto-sizing cannot raise the worker count.
PRODUCER_ENABLE_BROWSER_POOL	profile: false	Disabled because both supported profiles use one worker; no additional Chromium instances are admitted.
PRODUCER_HEADLESS_SHELL_PATH	/usr/bin/chromium-headless-shell (container)	Chromium headless shell executable used by producer's beginFrame resolver. Regular Chromium is not equivalent: it may resolve as beginFrame-capable and then reject HeadlessExperimental.beginFrame, causing a screenshot fallback.
RENDER_REQUIRE_BEGINFRAME	profile-controlled	false for both supported profiles. standard requests BeginFrame but accepts producer compatibility fallback; low-memory forces screenshot. This internal compatibility knob must not be overridden independently.
PRODUCER_PUPPETEER_PROTOCOL_TIMEOUT_MS	900000 (set in Compose)	CDP timeout headroom for long frame ranges. The producer default of 300 seconds caused long jobs to fall back from four workers to two.
HF_STATIC_DEDUP	false (set in Compose)	Temporary OpenMAIC-export workaround: these long slide compositions currently exhaust producer's 15-second verification budget and disable dedup anyway. Skipping the doomed verification removes the fixed startup cost without changing frames.
RENDER_HOME	/app	Writable home used after the entrypoint drops privileges. Producer font caches live under $RENDER_HOME/.cache, never /root/.cache.
PUPPETEER_EXECUTABLE_PATH	/usr/bin/chromium-headless-shell	System Chromium headless shell (set in the image).

Chunk settings are profile-bounded: the standard profile allows at most one producer worker per chunk and four concurrent chunks; low-memory allows one of each. Values above the selected profile limit fail startup rather than silently multiplying browser, FFmpeg, and temporary-disk usage.

Client identity for the per-user guard is taken from the x-openmaic-client header, which the app's proxy sets. A client-supplied userId form field is ignored. The app derives that header from x-forwarded-for/x-real-ip only when the operator sets TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true (and a real reverse proxy overwrites those headers); otherwise all callers share one direct identity, so the default directly-exposed Compose topology can't be gamed by spoofing forwarding headers.

Per-user guard vs. shared identity. Without TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true every caller collapses into one shared direct identity bucket, so any nonzero RENDER_MAX_JOBS_PER_USER throttles the whole deployment to that many concurrent renders — not just one user. This is why the default docker-compose.yml sets RENDER_MAX_JOBS_PER_USER=0 (guard off) and relies on RENDER_MAX_CONCURRENCY + RENDER_MAX_QUEUE (see the comment beside that variable in the Compose file). Enable the per-user guard only behind a trusted proxy that supplies a real per-user identity.

Preview callers are different: the app sends the durable session owner id in x-openmaic-client, so RENDER_PREVIEW_MAX_PER_USER stays enabled and defaults to 2. Set it to 0 only for deployments that call /preview without an owner identity.

Security / isolation

The uploaded archive is untrusted, so extraction is bounded before any bytes are decompressed (entry count, per-entry and total expanded size, and compression ratio — see the limits above), guarding against ZIP bombs. Extraction runs on fflate's worker (off the event loop) and is concurrency-capped so admitted jobs can't stack the per-archive RAM ceiling.

The composition HTML is then executed in headless Chromium. Two boundaries keep that untrusted page contained:

• No inbound-to-app bridge. The container's entrypoint installs an iptables egress lockdown (drop all outbound except loopback + replies on app-initiated connections), so Chromium can't open connections back to the app — even though they share the Compose network so the app can reach the service. This needs the container to run with CAP_NET_ADMIN (cap_add: [NET_ADMIN], already set in the Compose file). With RENDER_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true (the default) the entrypoint fails closed: if the rules can't be applied (missing capability, backend mismatch) the container exits non-zero rather than start an unisolated service the app would still advertise as healthy. An operator who knowingly accepts an unisolated standalone setup opts out with RENDER_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=false. scripts/egress-smoke.sh <image> asserts the boundary end-to-end (lockdown active, loopback works, a new outbound connection is blocked).
• No internet. In Compose the render network is internal: true (no host or internet gateway). The export ZIP bundles every asset (and GSAP) at build time, so the render needs no outbound at all.

When running standalone, place the service on an isolated network yourself (and keep the egress lockdown on, or accept the risk with the toggle) — it needs no outbound access.

Residual risk

The injected CSP plus request interception close script, fetch/XHR, WebSocket, image, frame and form egress from the untrusted documents. Two channels remain:

• Top-level navigation on /render. location, a <meta http-equiv=refresh>, window.open and target=_top can replace the top frame; CSP has no navigate-to directive, and the producer's browser exposes no request interception we can install. The service therefore relies on the container's egress lockdown: with RENDER_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=false, a rendered page can navigate to any reachable address and the result appears in the output video. Do not run standalone with the lockdown disabled.
• Declarative subresources inside a framed SVG/XHTML. Sanitizing removes script and event handlers, but a surviving <image href> (or CSS url()) can still load a subresource through a framed document that has no CSP of its own. The lockdown is what blocks that egress in supported deployments.

Run

Docker (recommended)

The root docker-compose.yml wires this service under the video-export profile and points the app at it:

docker compose --profile video-export up --build

Standalone (development)

Requires Node 22, Chromium's old headless shell, and FFmpeg on PATH. The standard profile checks for 8 GiB of available host/cgroup memory before listening:

cd render-service
npm install
PUPPETEER_EXECUTABLE_PATH=$(which chromium-headless-shell) \
PRODUCER_HEADLESS_SHELL_PATH=$(which chromium-headless-shell) \
RENDER_RESOURCE_PROFILE=standard \
PRODUCER_PUPPETEER_PROTOCOL_TIMEOUT_MS=900000 \
HF_STATIC_DEDUP=false \
npm start

Resource profiles

The default standard CPU profile is the intended 1080p / 30 fps / standard quality path: it prefers BeginFrame, while allowing producer to select screenshot for compatibility-sensitive compositions such as iframe GenUI. Producer workers are fixed at one, and the service admits one render plus one archive extraction at a time. It requires at least 8 GiB of host/cgroup memory and an existing headless shell so ordinary compositions remain BeginFrame-eligible. No host GPU is required or requested; Chromium uses its software/SwiftShader selector.

Use the safe low-memory profile only when BeginFrame latency is less important than a smaller memory ceiling. It fixes screenshot capture, one worker, one render, and one extraction, and requires at least 4 GiB:

RENDER_RESOURCE_PROFILE=low-memory \
RENDER_SERVICE_MEMORY_LIMIT=4g \
docker compose --profile video-export up --build

Both /health and GET /render/:jobId make the selection observable. Health reports the capture policy, requested mode, worker/concurrency bounds, minimum memory, and observed Node, producer, Chromium, and FFmpeg versions. A completed job reports requested versus actual capture mode and worker count with the same version record, so a standard-profile screenshot fallback remains explicit.

The previous fixed 720p short-sample comparison that motivated these profiles was:

Capture path	Workers	Result
screenshot	1	28.7 s baseline
BeginFrame	1	16.3 s, about 43% faster
BeginFrame	2	only a small improvement beyond one worker
BeginFrame	4	no improvement on four vCPU; higher resource pressure

These measurements justify the one-worker standard, not a general latency SLA. The full 1080p sample took 696.9 s with one worker, with capture about 75.5% and encode about 20.6% of runtime. Four-worker 1080p/4K and multi-job profiles remain unsupported until their combined correctness and memory bounds are validated.

Output parity must be verified separately for each validated profile before claiming parity acceptance.

Scalability

The service is built with three swap points so it can move from a single OSS host to a horizontally-scaled demo deployment without changing the HTTP contract or the app:

• RenderExecutor (src/render-executor.ts) — InProcessExecutor adapts the current HyperFrames producer to stable progress, cancellation, deadline, failure, and performance types. A bounded local or remote executor can replace it without changing RenderCoordinator or the routes.
• JobStore (src/job-store.ts) — Part A ships InMemoryJobStore. A RedisJobStore implementing the same interface lets any replica serve poll / download requests.
• ArtifactStore (src/artifact-store.ts) — Part A ships LocalDiskArtifactStore (streams through the app proxy). An S3ArtifactStore whose locate returns a presigned URL makes the download route 302 the browser straight to object storage, bypassing the proxy.

RenderCoordinator owns admission, queueing, job state, artifact registration, and cleanup while depending only on those three interfaces.

The opt-in local chunk executor uses @hyperframes/producer/distributed without adding a queue or changing the HTTP contract. It freezes the producer plan and runtime versions, bounds chunk fan-out and nested producer workers, verifies chunk bytes and sidecar hashes before ordered assembly, and reuses only a valid result for an idempotent retry. The default remains the in-process executor.

Experimental per-task resource budgets

The opt-in resource executor keeps RenderCoordinator as the service's only admission and queue owner. A dedicated root process starts each admitted render as a transient systemd service before that task imports the official, unmodified @hyperframes/producer 0.8.37 package. The unit applies the task CPU, memory, swap and PID limits to the worker and all Chrome/FFmpeg descendants.

Inside the unit's mount namespace, a private tmpfs supplies HOME, TMPDIR and the render candidate, while the extracted project is mounted read-only. After the business worker and descendants drain, the control process copies and fsyncs the candidate to a unique staging file on the output filesystem. Before that transfer it performs a bounded host-procfs scan for external FD, mmap, cwd, root or executable references to the private filesystem; a detected reference or unreadable evidence fails closed. The root owner publishes the staging file with an atomic rename only after ordinary unmount and systemd cgroup removal are both confirmed. Publication and cleanup settlement remain separate: an unconfirmed cleanup closes admission and cannot report the reservation returned. Before the task runner exits and systemd can remove its cgroup, it separately captures memory.current, memory.events, memory.events.local, cpu.stat, pids.current, and pids.events. Missing or unreadable counters are reported as an accounting collection failure; they do not fabricate measurements or change a confirmed cleanup into an unconfirmed one.

Start this mode with npm run start:resources -- /etc/openmaic/resource.json; resource-config.example.json documents the root-owned state directory, fixed tool paths and per-task budget. Provision the official alias from the lockfile with browser download disabled when a managed browser is already installed (for example, PUPPETEER_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=true npm ci). The config file, state directory, browser, FFmpeg and installed service code are trusted deployment inputs and must not be writable by the HTTP worker. Each project directory must be exclusively owned by that worker for the duration of its render. The task worker and HTTP service intentionally share the configured unprivileged UID; the resource boundary limits each task's descendants but does not treat those two same-UID processes as mutually hostile. Candidate transfer therefore drops to that UID before opening either source or destination, creates the stage exclusively as 0600, and never asks root to follow a worker-controlled path. Because the setuid worker receives absolute paths below the state root, that root must be mode 0711 (root-owned and non-writable): other-execute permits traversal only, while UUID task directories are also 0711 and their request/result files remain root-private 0600. The dedicated state directory must be empty at first startup. An owner crash intentionally leaves its lock and/or task directory behind, so a restart refuses admission until the platform cleanup is independently audited. The reference check assumes readable host procfs, a trusted privileged platform and exclusive ownership of the configured roots; it is not protection against a privileged process racing the bounded scan.

The standard service and Docker entrypoint keep their current startup and privilege model, but the install graph is not byte-for-byte unchanged: it adds the official Producer 0.8.37 alias, and shared transitive versions such as Puppeteer follow package-lock.json. The alias's own HyperFrames transitive packages are lockfile-resolved and are not all version 0.8.37. The shipped Docker image does not support start:resources; use a separately provisioned Linux host with systemd, cgroup v2, mount namespaces, mount/umount, and setpriv.

This profile is qualified for one render-service instance with one fixed per-task budget and one active execution slot. The state-root lock prevents a second owner from sharing that root, but instances using different roots do not coordinate capacity and can oversubscribe the same host. At startup the one instance rejects a budget larger than its effective CPU or memory capacity; the coordinator's queue and per-identity slots remain request admission controls, not a second resource ledger. The owner treats that fixed budget as reusable only after descendant drain, mount cleanup and task-cgroup removal are confirmed. Any unverifiable cleanup quarantines the project and state, keeps the settlement unreturned and closes admission. While running, the owner also samples the shared systemd slice and its memory ancestors: a local high, max or oom event, an active memory.high, or unreadable/reset evidence closes admission until an operator audits and restarts the owner. A unit launch failure also retains the task directory and closes admission, even when no worker is known to have started. This conservative path does not infer safe cleanup from a failed launch command. An operator must audit the unit, cgroup, mounts and task state before cleanup and owner restart; there is no automatic retry or admission reset.

Fixed-input Linux evidence on Ubuntu 22.04 x86_64 with Node 22.23.2, systemd 249 and cgroup v2 covers consecutive renders under one owner, cancellation and deadline cleanup with same-owner recovery, supervisor-death takeover, audio/video temporary paths, external FD/mmap rejection, task OOM enforcement, dynamic ancestor-memory pressure, descendant drain, cross-filesystem staging, ordinary unmount and publish ordering. The inputs and results are retained outside the product repository. These checks qualify the outer execution path on that tested platform and workload; they are not a claim that every deployment or media composition has been accepted. Resource-mode progress stays at preparing until the terminal result; intermediate frame counts and capture metrics are not reported. Do not interpret unchanged progress alone as a hung job; the configured deadline still applies. Deployment qualification remains specific to the installed platform and workload.